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We study the internationalization of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 21st century and its underlying firm-level and country-level drivers. Using a global database of more than 110,000 M&A (10% having a state-owned acquirer), we empirically investigate differences between private enterprises, traditional SOEs and contemporary reformed SOEs. We show that the intensity of government control is associated with diverging targeting strategies and internationalization patterns. Compared to traditional SOEs, reformed SOEs are more outward-oriented, tend to purchase better performing targets, concentrate their investments towards less risky countries that are geographically and culturally closer, with better institutional quality and a more central position in the trade network. Our findings are consistent with the view that reformed SOEs are increasingly adopting market-oriented strategies thus diverging from traditional SOEs (and converging towards the private model) in their objective functions. • Different internationalization patterns between traditional and reformed SOEs. • Reformed SOEs more likely to internationalize and acquire better performing targets. • Reformed SOEs tend to adopt market-oriented strategies in key trade network markets. • Traditional SOEs pursue political goals seeking strategic resources in riskier markets. • Cultural and geographical proximity matter more for reformed than for traditional SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigate how GVC participation and centrality in the intermediate trade network are associated with firms' productivity in the MENA countries. • Using several measures of GVCs, we show that firms in GVCs are more productive. • Multi-level estimations show that country-sector intermediate trade network centrality is also positively associated with firms' productivity. • Results are confirmed using propensity score matching and shift-share instrumental variable approach. Global Value Chain (GVC) participation is typically associated with a productivity premium, yet similar firms can benefit differently depending on the possibility for creating production linkages offered by their countries' involvement in trade. We show that country-sector intermediate trade network centrality is also positively associated with firms' productivity, suggesting that the connectivity of the business environment may enhance productivity on top of direct firm-level involvement in GVCs. For a large cross-section of MENA countries included in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), we find evidence of productivity premia using several firm-level GVC participation measures and network centrality indicators constructed from the EORA input-output tables. Centrality is also positively associated with firms' productivity, adding to the direct effect of GVC participation. Our results are confirmed using OLS, multi-level models, Propensity Score Matching techniques, and a Shift-Share instrumental variable approach which help addressing endogeneity issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a firm level perspective of global value chain participation in the food industry. We single out some stylized facts on food global value chains and the Italian food industry. Exploiting a very rich and original dataset, based on a 2011 survey of 25,090 Italian firms operating in manufacturing and related services, we characterize the food industry, describing its main strengths and weaknesses, and analyze the links between the probability to export and the value chain participation. Our results show that participating in a value chain significantly increases the probability to export. This is particularly true for small firms in the industrial food value chain and for firms positioned downstream. Participating in distribution chains, for instance being able to sell products through large supermarkets, also significantly contributes to internationalization. These results can have important implications in terms of trade policy: tariffs and other protection measures are cumulative when intermediate inputs are traded across borders multiple times. Hence, protection can end up in a significantly higher cost of finished goods. When discussing trade policy therefore, it is crucial to “think value chain”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We analyse the relationship between trade patterns and the allocation of investment projects carried out under the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). • Investments tend to concentrate in countries located in central nodes of the international production networks as well as towards suppliers of intermediate goods whose revealed comparative advantage overlaps with China. • High income countries closer to destination markets tend to attract fewer but larger investments. • The BRI represents an opportunity for China to upgrade its exports and for the countries receiving investments to enhance their participation in Global Value Chains with possible positive impacts on development. We analyze the relationship between trade patterns and the allocation of investment projects carried out under the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rooted on a novel database, we construct the intermediate trade network and assess its role in the allocation of the projects. Investments tend to concentrate in countries located in central nodes of the international production networks as well as towards suppliers of intermediate goods whose revealed comparative advantage overlaps with China. High income countries closer to destination markets tend to attract fewer but larger investments. Controlling for gravity variables as well as for political proximity to China adds explanatory power without affecting the results on the importance of trade. The BRI represents an opportunity for China to upgrade its exports and for the countries receiving investments to enhance their participation in Global Value Chains (GVC) with possible positive impacts on development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]