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Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction with material, identity related and international variables.

Religion has become increasingly contentious in recent years. Faith-based discrimination, hostility and violence seem to have increased worldwide. But how can faith lead to conflict? In this article, we test the impact of two important dimensions of religion that have been neglected in previous research: the belief in ‘one true religion’ and perceptions of threats by other religious groups. Putting these two potential drivers to the test, we conducted a representative survey experiment with 972 respondents in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Results show that one of the tested dimensions, perceptions of threats by others, increases the support to use violence to defend one’s own group. This is particularly the case for religiously intolerant respondents with characteristics such as pre-existing threat perceptions, unfavorable views on intermarriage, or belief in the superiority of their own faith. In contrast, we find relatively weak evidence that the prime of ‘one true religion’ increases the readiness to use violence. Our findings have important implications for policy: We conclude that appeals by leaders to threats by others and intolerance toward other faiths can contribute to more conflict. Political and religious leaders should refrain from capitalizing on such notions and should promote tolerance towards other faiths instead.

Contrary to the expectations of secularization theory, religion remains socially important and affects politics in multiple ways - especially regarding conflict between religious communities. Theoretically, religion can increase altruism, but belief in the superiority of one's faith may facilitate intergroup discrimination and related conflict. Previous findings remain inconclusive, however, as specific religious ideas have hardly been tested. In this article, we argue that the content of religious ideas has causal effects on intergroup discrimination. We hence test the impact of two opposing, prominent religious ideas on altruism and discrimination: universal love and the notion of one true religion. Conducting dictator games with Christians and Muslims in Ghana and Tanzania, we find causal effects: Whereas the idea of one true religion increases intergroup discrimination, that of universal love fosters equal treatment. The policy implications hereof are obvious - promoting tolerant religious ideas seems crucial to avoiding conflict.

Religion plays a fundamental role in most people's lives with profound implications for socioeconomic development. This survey provides a comprehensive and systematic overview of the causal mechanisms between religion and development discussed and tested in the economics literature, and reviews quantitative empirical evidence on the actual effects of religion on economic and social dimensions of development. We start by disaggregating the concept of religion into four religious dimensions and propose a framework to conceptualize causal mechanisms. Numerous mechanisms are possible but only a few uncontested findings exist. Religion is ambivalent vis‐a‐vis development: although religious ideas can foster certain forms of human capital acquisition and labor market participation, scholars have found a negative relationship between religious dimensions and both income and gender equality as well as innovation activities. Religious identity is also a source of labor market discrimination and has ambivalent effects on economic growth and social cohesion. Methodological challenges refer to the availability of fine‐grained data, especially for developing countries, the use of concepts and definitions, and the lack of causal inference.

Religion has been taking an increasingly contentious character worldwide. Deprivation, grievances and protest by religious groups seems to be on the rise. Previous research has shown that the marginalization of ethnic groups can contribute significantly to violent conflict. However, we know little about religious groups as existing research has lacked the necessary fine-grained data. This paper introduces the “Religious Minorities at Risk” dataset comprising data on 771 religious minorities worldwide for the period between 2000 and 2014. The dataset contains pertinent worldwide information on relevant characteristics of these minorities, especially those that may explain their motivation and capability to mobilize. Such characteristics include objective deprivation in religious, economic and political terms as well as corresponding subjective grievances and intensities. The dataset also includes group-related features and structural variables that arguably influence minorities’ capability to mobilize. Moreover, while previous studies have focussed exclusively on violence, we now have more information available on the exact character of mobilization enabling scholars to distinguish between peaceful and violent forms of mobilization.

Political party systems are an important element of political systems in Africa and elsewhere. They form the central intermediate institution between the general population and the government. Party systems represent and aggregate diverse political views and group interests, and they form coalitions that then form governments with potentially important consequences of democracy and political stability. Unlike the case in the period directly after independence, African party systems have been overwhelmingly multiparty since the 1990s. As a result, the literature has grown significantly, although most works focus on political parties rather than party systems. Many efforts have been devoted to classification, referring to the legal context as well as, more specifically, the number of relevant parties, the levels of institutionalization, and, less often, the degree of ideological or other polarization. While levels of institutionalization and ideological differences are generally not pronounced, more than half of African party systems have been one-party dominant, of which most are authoritarian. In contrast, two-party and pluralist-party systems, which make up approximately one half of all multiparty systems, are generally more democratic. Besides determining classifications, most analytical work focuses on the determinants of African party systems using quantitative and qualitative as well as macro- and micro-level methodologies. Three determinants are debated: first, ethnicity, which has been cited as the main social cleavage behind African party systems; however, while ethnicity matters, its effects vary and are limited; second, political institutions, especially electoral systems for legislative elections, which only partly explain fragmentation or other features; third, the performance of political parties and rationalist approaches. Scholars largely agree that all of these elements need to be taken into account. While certain functions of party systems may facilitate democratization and political stability or other outcomes, little empirical work exists on the consequences of party systems. Some evidence suggests that highly institutionalized, moderately fragmented, and polarized systems promote democracy. Future research faces many challenges, in particular the development of integrated theory and more fine-grained data, as well as an increased focus on the consequences of party systems.

In recent years, many oil finds were made along the shores of Africa, often triggering high hopes. But do expectations of the consequences of oil discoveries affect subsequent conflict? A number of arguments back this idea. Relative deprivation theory suggests that oil discoveries raise hopes of windfalls, which if not fulfilled, result in frustration and thus increase conflict risk. In contrast, cognitive psychology assumes that the effect of expectations largely works through a confirmation bias and thus depends on whether individuals attach positive or negative expectations to oil discoveries. Given the lack of appropriate data, these relationships have never been tested empirically. Using unique georeferenced data from a representative survey in Mali in 2006, this paper addresses this gap. Our results suggest that expectations indeed significantly contribute to subsequent conflict. The negative or positive character of expectations is critical, working as "self-fulfilling prophecy" rather than frustrated "great expectations": when people hold negative views on the future effects of oil, the risk of civil unrest increases.

Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict.

Religion has increasingly become important in conflicts worldwide. Religious leaders may play a key role in mobilizing believers as they can call for peace or instigate violence. But what makes religious leaders support peace or promote violence? Drawing on a survey poll of 102 religious leaders in Juba, South Sudan, this paper represents virtually the first attempt to study the correlates of pro-violence opinions of religious elites in a more quantitative manner in a developing country. The paper analyzes when and why some religious leaders support faith-based violence while others do not. Employing a unique combination of innovative measures, our results have many implications for mobilization processes. We find that leaders’ support for faith-based violence is largely independent of individual demographic or personal determinants but is closely related to religious attitudes. Tolerance toward other faiths and secularism reduce pro-violence attitudes. Muslims seem to be more ready to support faith-based violence, probably given their minority status and other peculiarities of Islam in (South) Sudan. Surprisingly, interreligious activities do not reduce support for violence but increase appreciation for peaceful protest. Generally, determinants of peaceful protest substantially differ, suggesting that any support for violence follows its own distinct logic.

Since Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel it has become conventional wisdom that (relative) deprivation creates grievances and that these grievances in turn lead to intergroup violence. Recently, studies have yielded evidence that the exclusion of ethnic groups is a substantial conflict risk. From a theoretical angle, the relationship is straightforward and is likely to unfold as a causal chain that runs from objective discrimination to (subjective) grievances and then to violence. We test this proposition with unique group-format data on 433 religious minorities in the developing world from 1990 to 2008. While religious discrimination indeed increases the likelihood of grievances, neither grievances nor discrimination are connected to violence. This finding is supported by a large number of robustness checks. Conceptually, discrimination and grievances can take very different shapes and opportunity plays a much bigger role than any grievance-based approach expects.

Until recently, academia has largely neglected the impact of religion on sustainable development. However, empirical studies have shown that religion remains important in many societies and that its importance has been increasing since the beginning of the new millennium. This paper reviews the empirical quantitative literature on the effect of religion on development from the last decade. We start by disaggregating the concepts of religion and sustainable development into four religious and three developmental dimensions and proposing a framework to identify causal mechanisms. Numerous mechanisms are possible, and this complexity explains why only a few uncontested findings exist. Religion is ambivalent vis-a-vis development: although religious dimensions exert a positive influence on physical and mental health as well as on general well-being, scholars have found a negative relationship between religious dimensions and both income and gender equality. Studies agree that the dominance of one religious group together with parallel ethnic and religious cleavages increases the risk of conflict, while studies on the pro-peace effects of religious factors are largely missing. Methodological challenges relate to the availability of fine-grained data, especially for non-Western countries, and the use of concepts and definitions. Most importantly, the study of religion and development requires methods that allow for causal inference.

Anecdotal evidence from many armed conflicts suggests that religion incites violence. Theoretically speaking, several facets of religion can create motives and opportunities to overcome the collective action problems associated with organized violence. However, empirical research has hitherto found no conclusive answer on the extent to which religion is connected to armed conflict onset. Contributing to the filling of this gap, we use a new database that incorporates important religious factors that previous studies left largely untested. The data set covers 130 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2010. Results from logistic regressions confirm our expectation that certain religious factors fuel armed conflict—in particular, the overlap of religious and other identities, religious groups’ grievances, and religious leaders’ calls for violence. We also find that religious determinants vary in their impact according to whether conflicts are religious or not in origin.

In this article we investigate whether natural resource endowments, specifically oil and gas, and the political status of ethnic groups interact to increase or decrease armed conflict risk. We argue that political exclusion of ethnic groups should amplify, while monopoly power of ethnic groups should reverse the effects of oil and gas on conflict, as these groups can use revenues for patronage or repression. We use highly spatially disaggregated grid data from Africa (1990–2010) and match conflict events, oil and gas deposit locations and the political status of local ethnic groups to test our hypotheses. We find that differences in group status matter. While there is no strong amplification effect of ethnic group exclusion on oil and gas, above and beyond their conflict-increasing constituent effects, we find very clear and strong evidence for a conditioning effect for groups with a monopoly over national-level political institutions: Oil and gas in grid cells with powerful, nationally represented groups reduce conflict risk, while otherwise increasing the probability of violent conflict onset.

This article employs an innovative methodology to study causal mechanisms in the oil–conflict link by combining a systematic approach with taking into account country details. Engaging in a deductive test of causal mechanisms in a controlled comparison of four major oil exporters, results show that no oil-related causal mechanism can fully explain the differences in violence. A more inductive analysis complemented by process tracing suggests a more comprehensive mechanism: oil contributes to the formation of opposition through grievances. Levels of violence, however, vary largely according to non-oil conditions – particularly the cohesiveness of opposition and the reaction of government to challengers.

Given its religious demography, sub-Saharan Africa seems particularly prone to the outbreak of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims. This article compares three sub-Saharan countries—Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Tanzania—that display different levels of inter-religious violence despite each having in common similar population ratios of Christians and Muslims, as well as all sharing a number of the classical risk factors for conflict onset. The analysis of these three case studies shows that higher levels of inter-religious violence result from horizontal inequalities and overlapping religious and ethnic group boundaries that, in the context of tense political transformation, consequently breed inter-religious grievances and violence. When theological ideas become politicized, inter-religious violence reaches its most intense level of expression.

We investigate whether uranium, similar to other resources, is associated with armed conflicts. The analysis uses grid cells in Africa to test this hypothesis. Results from logistic regressions reveal that uranium operations are not an independent conflict risk; however, it is significantly linked to local conflict events when interacting with ethnic exclusion. The analysis is supplemented by process tracing in four countries, where armed conflict broke out after uranium operations started (DR Congo, Central African Republic, Niger and South Africa). We find substantial evidence for a link only in the case of Niger. Our results suggest that uranium promotes intrastate conflict only under specific circumstances.

Though African party systems are said to be ethnic, there is little evidence for this claim. The few empirical studies rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favour of Anglophone Africa. This paper looks at four Francophone countries, drawing on representative survey polls. Results reveal that ethnicity matters, but that its impact is generally rather weak and differs with regard to party systems and individual parties. ‘Ethnic parties’ in the strict sense are virtually absent. In particular, the voters’ location seems more important than ethnic affiliation. Other determinants such as regional ties, elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and rational preferences deserve more attention in the future study of voting behaviour in Africa.

Recent research has questioned the notion that ethnicity is the main determinant of party preference in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on data from representative survey polls in eight anglophone and francophone sub-Saharan countries, multinomial and binary logit regressions confirm that ethnicity counts but does not explain party preference as a whole. More importantly we find that the relevance of ethnicity varies substantially from country to country. Looking at possible effects, there is little evidence that ‘ethnicized’ party systems harm democracy; discussing possible structural, institutional and historical determinants of the role of ethnicity in party politics, tentative results suggest that specific integrative cultural features, low ethnic polarization, one-party dominance and a historical non-mobilization of ethnicity might thwart the politicization of ethnicity. Future research should focus on the interaction of several factors and how processes of ethnic mobilization evolve historically.

During the 1990s the number of African states allowing multiparty elections increased dramatically. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied in the majority of countries by legal bans on ethnic and other particularistic parties. The main official reason has been the aim of preventing the politicization of ethnicity as this is feared to lead to ethnic conflict and political instability. Despite the resurgent interest in institutional engineering, this phenomenon has received little scholarly attention. This contribution outlines the main research questions and preliminary answers of a collaborative research project which combines large and small N comparisons and case studies. Bans are relatively rarely enforced and the decision actually to ban parties is best explained by the interaction of an experience of ethnic violence in the past and hybrid regimes using these measures to restrict political party competition. Positive effects on democracy and conflict management seem generally limited and are context...

Following the introduction of multiparty systems, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced wide-ranging measures of party regulation, particularly bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties, in order, it is claimed, to prevent intercommunal conflict and to promote democracy. While this restrictive type of party regulation has become a dominant political feature in Africa, little is known about the efficacy of such measures. This article engages in an analysis of the possible effects on democracy and peace of different types of party regulation and implemented party bans and shows that party bans are apparently less suited to alleviating conflict than has been claimed. It also finds that implemented bans seem to be negatively related to democracy as ethnic bans are frequently abused to suppress the political opposition or to silence ethnic or religious minorities.

The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis claims that abundance in natural resources, particularly oil, encourages especially civil war. Natural resources provide both motive and opportunity for conflict and create indirect institutional and economic causes of instability. Contrarily, the theory of the rentier state — largely neglected in the study of peace and war in this respect — suggests that regimes use revenue from abundant resources to buy off peace through patronage, large-scale distributive policies and effective repression. Consequently, such rentier states would tend to be more stable politically and less prone to conflict. These two theories thus imply ambivalent effects of resource abundance on conflict proneness. This article presents part of a solution to this apparent puzzle for the case of oil-producing countries. The key argument is that both resource wealth per capita and resource dependence need to be taken into account, since only the availability of very high per capita revenues from oil allows governments to achieve internal stability. The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. The findings of multivariate cross-country regressions indicate a U-shaped relationship between oil dependence and civil war onset, while high resource wealth per capita tends to be associated with less violence. The results of a macro-qualitative comparison for a reduced sample of highly dependent oil exporters are even more clearcut. Using the same reduced sample, we find that oil-wealthy countries apparently manage to maintain political stability by a combination of large-scale distribution, high spending on the security apparatus and protection by outsiders. Compared to oil-poor countries and in contradiction to the rentier state theory, the institutions of oil-wealthy countries do not seem to be particularly characterized by patronage and clientelism.

Recent research has increasingly questioned the link between natural resources and violent conflict while stressing the importance of resource-specific context conditions under which internal conflicts become more likely. This paper engages in a systematic analysis of six of these resource-specific conditions comparing 15 African oil and diamond producing countries. Employing a Boolean logic, the results of our analysis indicate that, typically, a conflict-ridden diamond or oil producer is highly dependent on resources, its revenues are hardly spent on distributional policies and the security apparatus and, moreover, it suffers from intercommunal problems in the producing regions. Little income from resources per capita and substantial production of lootable resources in peripheral regions seem to constitute necessary conditions for civil war. Thus, our findings imply that future theoretical models and empirical strategies should integrate the full set of (resource specific) context conditions. Efforts to raise a more integrative approach combining quantitative and qualitative research designs seem particularly promising.

Starting from controversial findings about the relationship between party systems and the prospects of democratic consolidation, this article argues that problems can only be properly addressed on the basis of a differentiated typology of party systems. Contradictory research results do not pose an ‘African puzzle’ but can be explained by different and inadequate approaches. We argue that a modified version of Sartori's typology of party systems provides an appropriate method for classifying African party systems. Based on Sartori's framework, a preponderance of predominant and dominant party systems is identified. This can be explained partly by the prevailing authoritarian nature of many multiparty regimes in Africa but not by electoral systems or the ethnic plurality of African societies. All kinds of electoral systems are connected to dominant party systems. High ethnic fragmentation does not automatically produce highly fragmented party systems. This phenomenon can be attributed to the ‘ethn...

This article provides an introduction to recent debates on area studies and its less well-known ‘cousin’ comparative area studies. Though written from a political science angle, many of the aspects covered in the article equally apply to other disciplines. We begin by noting the developments and debates that have accompanied area studies since the end of the Cold War. We then highlight some contemporary understandings of area studies and present our own definition of comparative area studies. The importance of both area studies and comparative area studies is spelled out in a further section. Two of the methodological challenges comparative area studies are faced with-the use of concepts and the choice of research strategies-are subsequently addressed in some detail. The paper closes by summing up the main points raised.

(2007). Public Perceptions of Security in Post-Conflict Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone Part I – Liberia: Caught between International, State and Non-State Actors. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 84-96.

Building on theoretical insights from research on the rentier state and the “resource curse,” several studies have supported the argument that oil hinders democracy. However, previous research on the rentier state has neglected the global surge of multiparty autocracies or “electoral authoritarian” regimes since the end of the Cold War. No systematic study has been carried out on the question of whether or not and how oil affects electoral contests in nondemocratic regimes. In this paper we contribute to filling this gap by combing the literature on multiparty autocracy and the political economy of the rentier state. As oil production creates substantial, nontransparent revenue streams to national and subnational governments, we hypothesize that oil production has a negative effect on electoral competitiveness, both cross- and subnationally, in multiparty autocracies. Consequently, the democratic “resource curse” emphasized in earlier work on the rentier state is likely to persist even after the introduction of multipartyism in cases where oil production predates democratic institutions. The paper tests the hypothesis cross-nationally, using data on all multiparty elections held in the world in the period 1975–2010, and subnationally, using a new data set on subnational election results and oil production in Nigeria. Our results confirm that oil impedes electoral competitiveness, both cross- and subnationally, in multiparty autocracies.

According to quantitative studies, oil seems the only natural resource that is robustly linked to civil war onset. However, recent debates on the nexus of oil and internal conflict have neglected the fact that there are a number of peaceful rentier oil states in existence. Few efforts have been made to explain why some oil-exporting countries have experienced civil war while others have not. We thus address this puzzle, by arguing that civil war risks depend on the specific conditions of oil production and how they come to structure state–society relations. Specifically, we expect that states that are either highly dependent on oil or who have problematic relations with oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these risks will be mitigated either when democratic institutions can manage conflicts peacefully or when abundant oil revenues can be spent in such a way as to buy peace. We test this conditional argument by comparing 39 net oil exporters, using a (crisp-set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis – a methodology particularly suited to test conditional relationships in medium-Nsamples. Our results largely confirm our conditional hypotheses. Conditions of oil production are ambiguous, and particular combinations thus explain the onset of civil war. Specifically, we find that high abundance is sufficient to ensure peace, while two distinct pathways lead to civil war: the combination of high dependence and low abundance, as well as the overlap of ethnic exclusion and oil reserves in non-abundant and non-democratic oil states.

1. Ethnic party bans in Africa: an introduction 2. Party bans in Africa - an empirical overview 3. Understanding variations in party bans in Africa 4. An effective measure of institutional engineering? Ethnic party bans in Africa 5. Why there is no party ban in the South African constitution 6. Political party bans in Rwanda 1994-2003: three narratives of justification 7. Ethnic party bans and institutional engineering in Nigeria 8. Comparing ethnic party regulation in East Africa 9. Senegal's party system: the limits of formal regulation

Thus far, researchers working on ethnicity and resources as determinants of civil conflict have operated largely independently of each other. While there is plenty of evidence that natural resources may spur armed conflict, empirical evidence for the nexus between ethnic fractionalization and conflict remains inconclusive. Some authors conclude that ethnically fractionalized societies are actually spared from intrastate violence. Others find either a positive relationship or none at all between ethnic fragmentation and internal conflict. In this context, this paper serves two purposes: first, it shows that salience-based fractionalization indices are associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict onset; second, it finds evidence that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries. The combination of oil and a shared identity seems to help overcome the collective action problems associated with rebellion, by providing recruitment pools, strong motives and the necessary financial means for insurgency. Employing logit models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data, our quantitative analysis shows that various ethnic fractionalization indicators are robustly linked to a substantially increased risk of ethnic armed conflict onset in a subset of oil-abundant countries.

We employ a two -tier spatiotemporal analysis to investigate whether uranium operations cause armed conflict in Africa. The macrolevel analysis suggests that . compared to the baseline conflict risk . uranium ventures increase the risk of intrastate conflict by 10 percent. However, we find ethnic exclusion to be a much better predictor of armed conflict than uranium. The microlevel analysis reveals that uranium ]spurred conflicts are spatiotemporally feasible in four countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia, Niger and South Africa. We find strong evidence in the case of Niger, and partial evidence in the case of the DRC. Namibia and South Africa do not yield substantial evidence of uranium -induced conflicts. We conclude that uranium may theoretically be a conflictinducing resource, but to the present day empirical evidence has been sparse as most countries are still in the exploration phase. Considering that the coming years will see 25 African countries transition from uranium explorers into producers, we strongly suggest that our analysis be revisited in the coming years.

Causal mechanisms and related contextual variables are crucial to the study of the resource-conflict link, but little systematic research has been done on their exact functioning. This paper contributes to the filling of this gap by comparing four major oil exporters (Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) with differing levels of internal violence. To capture the causal complexity of the resource-conflict link we created a questionnaire with some 150 variables that distinguish between resource-specific (RS) and non-resource specific (NRS) conditions. The causal mechanisms are measured by assigning pertinent RS and NRS indicators to them. Our results suggest that the role of resources may be less prominent than is widely assumed. Only three resource-related causal mechanisms provide limited explanatory value (motive at subnational level, indirect economic, and institutional mechanism) by distinguishing Venezuela-the most peaceful case-from all the others. Only a mixed mechanism that combines 13 RS and NRS (economic and geographic characteristics, identity, intergroup relations, as well as political and institutional variables, including elite behavior) conditions can explain the differences between the countries with regard to the dependent variable comprehensively.

Despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, social science research has inadequately addressed the question of how and to what extent religion matters for conflict in Africa. This paper presents an innovative data inventory on religion and violent conflict in all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008 that seeks to contribute to filling the gap. The data underscore that religion has to be accounted for in conflict in Africa. Moreover, results show the multidimensionality (e.g. armed conflicts with religious incompatibilities, several forms of non-state religious violence) and ambivalence (inter-religious networks, religious peace initiatives) of religion vis-à-vis violence. In 22 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries, religion plays a substantial role in violence, and six countries in particular—Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda— are heavily affected by different religious aspects of violence.

The debate on institutional engineering offers options to manage ethnic and other conflicts. This contribution systematically assesses the logic of these institutional designs and the empirical evidence on their functioning. Generally, institutions can work on ethnic conflict by either accommodating (“consociationalists”) or denying (“integrationists”) ethnicity in politics. Looking at individual and combined institutions (e.g. state structure, electoral system, forms of government), the literature review finds that most designs are theoretically ambivalent and that empirical evidence on their effectiveness is mostly inconclusive. The following questions remain open: a) Is politicized ethnicity really a conflict risk? b) What impact does the whole “menu” (not just single institutions) have? and c) How are effects conditioned by the exact nature of conflict risks?

According to the functionalist argument, party systems that show moderate fragmentation, high institutionalization and rather low polarization are more conducive to democracy than others. This hypothesis is systematically tested in four country cases in Francophone West Africa that share many historical, social and economic characteristics but differ in their level of democratization, thus providing an at least approximate most-similar-systems design that is best suited to isolating the impact of party-system characteristics. The employment of pertinent and innovative indicators for the three dimensions of party systems reveals that the central hypothesis must be rejected. At best, four indicators confirm the assumptions, while 13 show no relationship and five show inverse findings. The case with the most favourable fragmentation and institutionalization values, Niger, has in between experienced a substantial decline in democracy. The paper concludes that the link between party systems and democracy is, at least in Africa, less simple and straightforward than the literature suggests.

According to quantitative studies, oil is the only resource that is robustly linked to civil war onset. However, recent debates on the nexus of oil and civil war have neglected that there are a number of peaceful oil‐rentier states, and few efforts have been spent to explain why some oilexporting countries have experienced civil war and others have not. Methodologically, the debate has been dominated by research using either quantitative methods or case studies, with little genuine medium‐N comparison. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying the conditions of civil war onset among net oil exporters using (crisp‐set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). Considering a sample of 44 net oil exporters between 1970 and 2008, we test conditions such as oil abundance (per capita) and dependence, the interaction of ethnic exclusion and oil reserve locations (overlap) as well as the type of political regime (polity). Our results point to a combination of necessary and sufficient conditions that has been largely ignored until now: low abundance is a necessary condition of civil war onset. Two pathways lead to civil war: first, a combination of low abundance and high dependence and, second, a combination of low abundance and the geographical overlap of ethnic exclusion with oil reserve areas within autocracies. Quantitativen Studien zufolge ist Erdol die einzige Ressource, die robust mit dem Ausbruch von Burgerkriegen verbunden ist. Die bisherige Forschung hat bisher weitgehend auser Acht gelassen, dass es auch eine Anzahl friedlicher Rentierstaaten gibt. Es ist kaum untersucht worden, weshalb einige Erdol exportierende Lander von Burgerkriegen betroffen sind, andere dagegen nicht. In methodischer Hinsicht wird die Debatte zum Zusammenhang von Erdol und Burgerkrieg entweder von quantitativen Ansatzen oder aber Einzelfallstudien dominiert. Untersuchungen mit mittleren Fallzahlen fehlen fast ganzlich. Der vorliegende Beitrag mochte zur Schliesung dieser Forschungslucken beitragen, in dem die Einflussbedingungen fur Burgerkrieg durch (crisp‐set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) untersucht werden. Anhand eines Samples von 44 Erdol exportierenden Landern wird der Einfluss von Olreichtum (pro Kopf), Olabhangigkeit, der geographischen Uberlappung von Erdollagerstatten und exkludierten ethnischen Gruppen und der politische Regimetyp fur die Periode 1970 bis 2008 untersucht. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine Kombination aus notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen, die bislang keine oder nur wenig Beachtung fand. Zwei Kausalpfade fuhren zu Burgerkrieg: ‒ Eine Kombination von geringem Reichtum an und hoher Abhangigkeit von Erdol sowie ‒ eine Kombination geringen Reichtums und der Interaktion von Erdolvorkommen und ethnischer Exklusion in autoritaren Regimen.

Bislang haben - trotz der religiosen Vielfalt und religios motivierter Auseinandersetzungen in Afrika - nur wenige Studien den Zusammenhang von Religion und Konflikt in Subsahara-Afrika systematisch untersucht. Insbesondere mangelt es an Untersuchungen, die den Einfluss von Religion in den Mittelpunkt stellen und die Starke und Art der Beeinflussung von Konflikten durch Religion in Afrika analysieren. Der vorliegende Artikel soll diese Forschungslucke mit Hilfe der systematischen Auswertung einer neuen Datenbank zu Religion in Subsahara-Afrika (RSSA) fur den Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2008 schliesen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass religios motivierte Konflikte in Afrika zahlreicher sind als oftmals angenommen. Ferner unterstreichen die Ergebnisse die Multidimensionalitat (z.B. Gewaltkonflikte mit theologischen Gegensatzen, weitere Typen nicht-staatlicher religioser Gewalt) und die Ambivalenz (z.B. interreligiose Netzwerke, religiose Friedensinitiativen) von Religion. Insgesamt spielt Religion in 22 der 48 Lander Subsahara-Afrikas eine bedeutsame Rolle bei gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen. Sechs Lander - (Athiopien, Kongo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Sudan, Tschad und Uganda) - sind besonders stark von unterschiedlichen religiosen Gewaltfaktoren betroffen.