Search

Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate 'taking back control' and generally do so in the name of the 'people', pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People's Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People's Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right-wing populism voting, such as perceived immigration threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National-populist parties display a discourse based on the defense of the national integrity. However, in the current European context, these parties have to deal with an increasing cultural heterogeneity, new forms of citizenship, and multi-scaling arenas. How does national-populism develop its narratives in these settings? The paper elaborates a framework for understanding the way in which ambiguity is included in the discursive strategies of national-populists. Through the Critical Discourse Analysis approach, the contribution will focus on the analysis of the discourses produced by three parties located at the Swiss-Italian border at the time of the referendum campaign for the 2014 Swiss initiative "Against Mass Immigration." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While economic issues are increasingly salient in political mobilization by European radical right-wing populist parties, we are still in need of a definition of these parties' economic positions. This paper argues that the economic supply of radical right populist parties is best characterized by a mix of economic populism and sovereigntism, which forms the basis of a common mobilization frame. Economic populism refers to defence of the economic prosperity of the 'heartland' against the elite and immigrants. Economic sovereigntism is seen, on the other hand, as a means of restoring the people's well-being and the nation's prosperity. To illustrate this argument, we conduct a qualitative analysis of five established European populist radical right parties. We demonstrate that, despite different socioeconomic stances, all parties under scrutiny share a common economic populist sovereigntist frame which claims to defend the self-identified economic interests and well-being of the people. We discuss the implications of our research for the broader understanding of populist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sovereignist claims are on the rise – in Europe, the USA, and beyond. In dealing with processes such as globalization and supranational integration, which have progressively shifted powers and competencies away from nation states, these transformations have created a fertile terrain for reactions against the sources of such insecurity, which find full expression in the sovereignist claims to 'take back control', that is to say to return to the traditional understanding of sovereignty being based upon mutually exclusive territories. These sources of insecurity and social unrest have also provided structures of political opportunity for the electoral success of populist parties. Despite its relevance for the understanding of the populist discourse, however, sovereignty has been largely under-theorised by scholars dealing with populism. Accordingly, we propose a new research agenda to study populist mobilization that focuses on the linkage between populism and sovereignism, while also encouraging further theoretical and empirical studies, focusing on both the demand side and the supply side. In particular, we suggest some crucial aspects with which the Special Issue seeks to engage, before pointing to some substantial implications that are likely to emerge from the findings of this research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely assumed that political parties need to have members in order to fulfil their functions in a representative democracy (drawing up platforms, candidate nomination and electoral mobilization) and in terms of their legitimacy. However, the theoretical literature on party models - the evolution from the mass party to the catch-all party, the electoral-professional party and/or the cartel party - suggests an increasing marginalization of members within the party organization. In the business-firm party model, members no longer have any role whatsoever. The next phase in this development seems to be a party without members. This article analyses the contextual (societal, communicational and institutional) factors favouring the rise and endurance of the memberless party as well as the strategic conditions for doing without formal membership (such as maximizing the centralization of internal decision-making, promoting party unity and enhancing electoral effectiveness). The functioning of two no-member parties - the Freedom Party in the Netherlands and the Lega dei Ticinesi in Switzerland - will be discussed in the empirical part of this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect parties. This article addresses these questions using a qualitative case study of the relationship between mayors and the three faces of their parties (in local public office, local central office and on the ground) in Genoa and Lausanne. Based on interviews with the mayors, elected representatives and party members, it finds in the two cases that, as long as these mayors can count on high levels of popularity and are not nearing the end of their term, they are ‘party detached’. When these factors do not apply and/or party institutionalization increases, the relationship with the party in local central office (although not with the party in local public office or on the ground) becomes more significant. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The aim of this paper is to highlight the public's appraisal of politicians' behaviour. We know from previous studies that citizens' judgements of politicians are related to social and political characteristics. Nevertheless, the impact of partisan ties, especially in European countries, has rarely been investigated. Using data drawn from surveys carried out in two neighbouring regions, in Switzerland and Italy, we focus on the supporters of two right-wing populist parties, the Lega Nord and the Lega dei ticinesi. Empirical evidence shows that, in contrast with the anti-establishment and anti-corruption discourse of these parties, their supporters are more indulgent vis-à-vis politicians' transgressions than the supporters of more moderate and left-wing parties. In order to interpret these findings, we consider the position of these populist parties in their respective party systems (both were involved in government coalitions at the time the survey was carried out), the behaviour and character of their leaders and their supporters' attitudes regarding public and private conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]