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According to a traditional view, inferences are personal-level entities pertaining to the domain of reasons, and therefore they cannot be accounted for in causal terms – specifically, as mere associations. I intend to argue that this is at the very least a drastic simplification, for two reasons. First, the word “association” is polysemous, so we should specify in which of its possible senses an inference is not a mere association. Second, personal-level inferences based on formal rules are only the extreme end of a complex developmental trajectory. As the last decades of research in the field have shown, we should refrain from identifying the entire domain of reasoning with that final stage, which is in fact mostly contingent upon extensive logical training. In this paper, I try to disentangle some major stages in the development of full-fledged (prototypical) inferences, and then to show that all of them – till the final one – can be considered associative in appropriate senses of the word.

Reproductive competence in mammals depends on the projection of gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons to the hypothalamic median eminence (ME) and the timely release of GnRH into the hypothalamic–pituitary–gonadal axis. In adult rodents, GnRH neurons and the specialized glial cells named tanycytes periodically undergo cytoskeletal plasticity. However, the mechanisms that regulate this plasticity are still largely unknown. We demonstrate that Semaphorin7A, expressed by tanycytes, plays a dual role, inducing the retraction of GnRH terminals and promoting their ensheathment by tanycytic end feet via the receptors PlexinC1 and Itgb1, respectively. Moreover, Semaphorin7A expression is regulated during the oestrous cycle by the fluctuating levels of gonadal steroids. Genetic invalidation of Semaphorin7A receptors in mice induces neuronal and glial rearrangements in the ME and abolishes normal oestrous cyclicity and fertility. These results show a role for Semaphorin7A signalling in mediating periodic neuroglial remodelling in the adult ME during the ovarian cycle., Reproduction in mammals is dependent on the function of specific neurons that secrete gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) and project their axons to the median eminence (ME) of the hypothalamus. Here the authors show that Semaphorin7A signaling plays a role in mediating the plasticity of GnRH axon terminals and tanycytes in the ME.

How does the machine classify styles in art? And how does it relate to art historians' methods for analyzing style? Several studies showed the ability of the machine to learn and predict styles, such as Renaissance, Baroque, Impressionism, etc., from images of paintings. This implies that the machine can learn an internal representation encoding discriminative features through its visual analysis. However, such a representation is not necessarily interpretable. We conducted a comprehensive study of several of the state-of-the-art convolutional neural networks applied to the task of style classification on 67K images of paintings, and analyzed the learned representation through correlation analysis with concepts derived from art history. Surprisingly, the networks could place the works of art in a smooth temporal arrangement mainly based on learning style labels, without any a priori knowledge of time of creation, the historical time and context of styles, or relations between styles. The learned representations showed that there are a few underlying factors that explain the visual variations of style in art. Some of these factors were found to correlate with style patterns suggested by Heinrich Wölfflin (1846-1945). The learned representations also consistently highlighted certain artists as the extreme distinctive representative of their styles, which quantitatively confirms art historian observations.

We propose a new system for generating art. The system generates art by looking at art and learning about style; and becomes creative by increasing the arousal potential of the generated art by deviating from the learned styles. We build over Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), which have shown the ability to learn to generate novel images simulating a given distribution. We argue that such networks are limited in their ability to generate creative products in their original design. We propose modifications to its objective to make it capable of generating creative art by maximizing deviation from established styles and minimizing deviation from art distribution. We conducted experiments to compare the response of human subjects to the generated art with their response to art created by artists. The results show that human subjects could not distinguish art generated by the proposed system from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs. Human subjects even rated the generated images higher on various scales., Comment: This paper is an extended version of a paper published on the eighth International Conference on Computational Creativity (ICCC), held in Atlanta, GA, June 20th-June 22nd, 2017

Glycosynthases are mutant glycosidases, which in the presence of activated glycosides and suitable reaction conditions, synthesize oligosaccharides without hydrolysing them. This feature makes these catalysts promising tools for the large scale synthesis of carbohydrates. However, despite the popularity of the glycosynthetic approach, the number of enzymes effecting glycosynthetic reactions is still limited. We report here on the design of novel reaction conditions for a thermophilic α-l-fucosidase mutant, which might provide a route for the production of novel glycosynthases.

Grice in pragmatics and Levelt in psycholinguistics have proposed models of human communication where the starting point of communicative action is an individual intention. This assumption, though, has to face serious objections with regard to the alleged existence of explicit representations of the communicative goals to be pursued. Here evidence is surveyed which shows that in fact speaking may ordinarily be a quite automatic activity prompted by contextual cues and driven by behavioural schemata abstracted away from social regularities. On the one hand, this means that there could exist no intentions in the sense of explicit representations of communicative goals, following from deliberate reasoning and triggering the communicative action. On the other hand, however, there are reasons to allow for a weaker notion of intention than this, according to which communication is an intentional affair, after all. Communicative action is said to be intentional in this weaker sense to the extent that it is subject to a double mechanism of control, with respect both to present-directed and future-directed intentions.