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Arguments have been made both for and against military use of autonomous weapon systems (AWSs) on the basis of how they will help or hinder a state in meeting its international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations. Often, these arguments are made in isolation, or they fail to address all of the potential compliance concerns related to autonomous weapons. This is not ideal. It means the bearers of legal obligations must locate, assess and piece together the disparate arguments into a coherent structure if they are to know whether they can legitimately utilise a particular autonomous capability and, if so, in what circumstances. This article offers a high-level description of a conceptual framework which can be used to organise and assess legal arguments about autonomous weapons. It proposes that the task of integrating autonomous capabilities into an armed force may be viewed as a constrained optimisation problem wherein the task is to find the optimal balance between the fundamental principles of IHL while also satisfying all normative, technological and strategic/operational constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet governance involves actors from all sectors of society: international, State-based, private sector and civil society bodies working with and against each other to balance and rebalance the interests of States, governments, commercial organisations and private citizens through the exercise of formal governmental authority, commercial control, technical know-how and social influence. Far from the popular image of the internet as a borderless, world-spanning communications free-for-all, this mass of competing interests has resulted in an internet criss-crossed by boundaries both hard and soft, defined by law or politics or technology, creating and dividing communities, opening and closing communications channels between people across the world. At the same time, the internet has also become part of the landscape of modem conflict, with States and non-State actors using it to conduct and defend against cyberattacks, coordinate military operations, gather intelligence, deliver humanitarian aid, disseminate IHL, broadcast press reports and propaganda, and so on. It is no surprise, then, that actions which create or remove borders on the internet frequently lead to consequences which may enliven domestic or international legal obligations of the party concerned. This paper surveys the legal aspects of decisions by State and non-State actors to interfere, or refrain from interfering, with internet communications in relation to conflict in ways which bear consequences for the rule of law. Its two purposes are to show that domestic considerations appear to be a central consideration for entities which seek to shape internet communications, and to identify areas which deserve further, more detailed research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]