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Different researchers from psychology and neuroscience state that navigation involves the manipulation of cognitive maps and graphs. In this paper, I will argue that navigating – specifically, journey planning – can be conceived as a process of practical reasoning. First, I will argue that journey planning constitutes a case of means-end reasoning involving inferences with cartographic representations. Then, I will argue that the output of journey planning functions as an instrumental belief in means-end reasoning. More specifically, journey planning can deliver an instrumental rule that plays a normative role in spatial cognition. This approach motivates a pluralist conception of practical reasoning, stating that inferences might run through different representational formats and processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the reasoning in the design process is essential to comprehend design practice and promote students' learning. Followingly, to effectively support students through the design process, it is crucial to pay attention to their reasoning. Therefore, in this study, we have built a model for students' reasoning in the design process in technology education to be used as a utility in further research. Here, reasoning is viewed as the process of using premises to reach a conclusion. Drawing from philosophy of technology and philosophy of technology education, the model introduces relevant concepts that are particularly useful in technology education. The model incorporates two types of reasoning: means-end reasoning and cause-effect reasoning. Means-end reasoning involves identifying actions to achieve a desired end. While cause-effect reasoning leads to conclusions in the form of beliefs about causes, effects, consequences, and side-effects, which is important when predicting and evaluating in the design process. The model highlights the interplay between these two types of reasoning, where students would constantly move between them in the design process. The model involves a holistic view of the reasoning and the design process, rather than taking a purely instrumental approach. That the model fuse two types of reasoning, makes it applicable at any point in the design process and across different contexts in technology education. Overall, the model provides a comprehensive view of reasoning in the design process in technology education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning to reason in the design process is enclosed in the process of learning to design. Hence, in this study, we explore teacher-student interactions with the aim of describing teachers' support strategies in relation to enacted reasoning in the design process in secondary school technology education in Sweden. The study deploys social cultural theory as a lens, with a focus on scaffolding means and intentions of the teacher. Relevant reasoning in the design process is theoretically framed as means-end reasoning and cause-effect reasoning. Empirical data was collected through three classroom observations with three different Swedish secondary school technology teachers, with subsequent interviews with the teachers using stimulated recall. During the observations the students were engage in different design processes. The data was analysed using thematic analysis, where themes as strategies were constructed for each reasoning type from patterns of meaning in teachers' scaffolding means and intentions. For each reasoning type, teachers employed strategies of decreasing control and increasing control. However, the enactment of these strategies differed in scaffolding intentions and means in relation to what reasoning was verbally enacted. Our findings indicate that teacher-student interactions within the design process in technology education classrooms hold significant meaning and value. This has implications for both teaching and learning in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning—and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program.

We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning—and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nihilism about practical reasoning is the thesis that there is no such thing as practical rationality—as rationally figuring out what to do. While other philosophers have defended a theoretically oriented version of the thesis, usually called "error theory", a case is made for a fully practical version of it: that we are so bad at figuring out what to do that we do not really know what doing it right would so much as look like. In particular, much of our control of instrumental (or means-end) rationality is illusory, and we are almost entirely incompetent at managing the defeating conditions of our practical inferences—that is, of knowing when not to draw an apparently acceptable conclusion. If that is right, then instead of trying to reason more successfully, we should be trying to make failure pay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a logic-based approach for designing simulation-based training scenarios. Our methodology embodies a concise definition of the scenario concept and integrates the notions of training goals, acceptable versus unacceptable actions and performance scoring. The approach applies classical artificial intelligence (AI) planning to extract coherent plays from a causal description of the training domain. The domain- and task-specific parts are defined in a high-level action description language A L. Generic causal and temporal logic is added when the causal theory is compiled into the underlying Answer Set Programming (ASP) language. The ASP representation is used to derive a scoring function that reflects the quality of a play or training session, based on a distinction of states and actions into green (acceptable) and red (unacceptable) ones. To that end, we add to the casual theory a set of norms that specify an initial assignment of colors. The ASP engine uses these norms as axioms and propagates colors by consulting the causal theory. We prove that any set of such norms constitutes a conservative extension of the underlying causal theory. With this work, we hope to lay the foundation for the development of design and analysis tools for exercise managers. We envision a software system that lets an exercise manager view all plays of a tentative scenario design, with expediency information and scores for each possible play. Our approach is applicable to any domain in which means-ends reasoning is pertinent. We illustrate the approach in the domain of crisis response and management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to do so. In this paper, I undermine these widely held asymmetries by elucidating the unnoticed nature of skill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reasons transmit. If one has a reason to attain an end, then one has a reason to effect means for that end: reasons are transmitted from end to means. I argue that the likelihood ratio (LR) is a compelling measure of reason transmission from ends to means. The LR measure is superior to other measures, can be used to construct a condition specifying precisely when reasons transmit, and satisfies intuitions regarding end-means reason transmission in a broad array of cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]