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Background: The Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) network, funded by the US National Institutes of Health, has been operational since 2007 and is tasked with conducting research to improve understanding of influenza viruses. Recently, CEIRS developed an Influenza Response Plan (IRP) to improve science preparedness for the network. Methods: Development of the IRP involved a collaborative process between project staff, CEIRS center directors or their designees, and NIAID CEIRS leadership (referred to as the Pandemic Planning Advisory Committee [PPAC]). Project staff identified and summarized the response capabilities of each center and then worked with the PPAC to identify and rank research priorities for an emergency response using a modified Delphi method. Results: Key elements of the response plan include tables of response capabilities for each CEIRS center, a framework that outlines and ranks research priorities for CEIRS during an emergency situation, and an operational strategy for executing the research priorities. Conclusions: The CEIRS IRP highlights the importance of enhancing science preparedness in advance of an influenza pandemic or other influenza‐related zoonotic incident to ensure that research can be carried out expeditiously and effectively in emergency situations and to improve global health security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nipah virus causes highly lethal disease, with case-fatality rates ranging from 40% to 100% in recognised outbreaks. No treatments or licensed vaccines are currently available for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection. In 2019, WHO published an advanced draft of a research and development roadmap for accelerating development of medical countermeasures, including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines, to enable effective and timely emergency response to Nipah virus outbreaks. This Personal View provides an update to the WHO roadmap by defining current research priorities for development of Nipah virus medical countermeasures, based primarily on literature published in the last 5 years and consensus opinion of 15 subject matter experts with broad experience in development of medical countermeasures for Nipah virus or experience in the epidemiology, ecology, or public health control of outbreaks of Nipah virus. The research priorities are organised into four main sections: cross-cutting issues (for those that apply to more than one category of medical countermeasures), diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. The strategic goals and milestones identified in each section focus on key achievements that are needed over the next 6 years to ensure that the necessary tools are available for rapid response to future outbreaks of Nipah virus or related henipaviruses., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests CCB declares grant U19AI142764 from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CCB received royalties from the licensing of Hendra sG to Zoetis (Equivac HeV), Auro Vaccines (subsidiary of Aurobindo Pharma USA), and monoclonal antibodies to Henipaviruses, Absolute Antibody, UK, created and operating under the laws of the UK. CCB declares patents planned, issued, or pending for “Soluble forms of Hendra and Nipah virus G glycoprotein” (Australian patent number 2005327194; US patent numbers 8865171, 9045532, 9056902, 9533038, and 10053495); “Soluble forms of Hendra and Nipah virus F glycoprotein and uses thereof” (Australian patent numbers 2013276968; US patent numbers 10040825 and 10590172); “Human monoclonal antibodies against Hendra and Nipah viruses” (US patent numbers 7988971, 8313746, and 8858938); “Antibodies against F glycoprotein of Hendra and Nipah viruses” (US patent numbers 9982038 and 10738104); and “Cedar virus and methods of use” (US patent number 10227664). EdW received financial support from the Intramural Research Program, NIAID, NIH; and royalties related to the vesicular stomatitis virus Nipah vaccine mentioned in this manuscript. ESG received funding (through a grant to ESG's institution) from Stanford University (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations [CEPI] was the primary donor) to work on two studies related to development of Nipah vaccines, including development of consent documents for future trials in Bangladesh. ESG is also the principal investigator of a U01 (cooperative agreement) from NIAID, NIH for the study of Nipah virus spillovers in Bangladesh. ESG also received funding (grant to institution) from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study the dynamics of Nipah virus transmission in bats in Bangladesh. ESG received a consultancy contract from Montana State University to provide technical guidance to a study collecting biological samples from bats in Bangladesh; and served as an unpaid elected board member for the American Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. LTM received financial support as a science consultant at FIND; and received consulting fees as a science consultant at FIND. SPL received research funding from CEPI to support the development of two vaccine candidates against Nipah virus. SP received research funding from Public Health Vaccines through a subaward from Stanford University. CFS declares patents planned, issued, or pending for “Nipah Henipavirus virus replicon particles and their use” (US patent number WO2023/133077 A1). KAM, AJM, NMM, JTO, MTO, and AKU received financial support for the completion of this Personal View from the Wellcome Trust (grant number 226538/Z/22/Z; payments were made to the University of Minnesota). Wellcome supported travel to attend the workshop identified in this Personal View for CCB, EdW, ANF, ESG, KH, SPL, LTM, KAM, JTO, M-PP, MTO, SP, and MR. PCF, PJH, and JPG worked at the Wellcome Trust during the time that this Personal View was completed. No authors were paid by a pharmaceutical company or any other agency to write this Personal View. All other authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.)

In 2016, WHO designated Lassa fever a priority disease for epidemic preparedness as part of the WHO Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics. One aspect of preparedness is to promote development of effective medical countermeasures (ie, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines) against Lassa fever. Diagnostic testing for Lassa fever has important limitations and key advancements are needed to ensure rapid and accurate diagnosis. Additionally, the only treatment available for Lassa fever is ribavirin, but controversy exists regarding its effectiveness. Finally, no licensed vaccines are available for the prevention and control of Lassa fever. Ongoing epidemiological and behavioural studies are also crucial in providing actionable information for medical countermeasure development, use, and effectiveness in preventing and treating Lassa fever. This Personal View provides current research priorities for development of Lassa fever medical countermeasures based on literature published primarily in the last 5 years and consensus opinion of 20 subject matter experts with broad experience in public health or the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for Lassa fever. These priorities provide an important framework to ensure that Lassa fever medical countermeasures are developed and readily available for use in endemic and at-risk areas by the end of the decade., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests KAM, AJM, NMM, JTO, MTO, and AKU declare receiving financial support for the completion of this Personal View from Wellcome (grant number 226538/Z/22/Z), payments were made to the University of Minnesota. ADTB is a member of the Vaccine Research, Development and Manufacturing Committee of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). DME is employed by FIND. RFG declares grants U01AI151812, U19AI135995, R01AI132223, R01AI132244, and U19AI142790, all awarded from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, LEAP4WA awarded by the European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership, and ESEP1904 and INTU1901, both awarded by CEPI; stocks in and royalties or licenses from Zalgen Labs; ownership of a monoclonal antibody patent (WO2018106712A1); and travel support from Wellcome to attend the workshop identified in this Personal View. SG declares financial support for this Personal View from WHO and Wellcome; the receipt of drugs for clinical trials from Toyama–Fujifilm; grants (all payments were made to SG's institutions) from the German Research Foundation (grants GU 883/4-2, GU 883/5-1, and GU 883/7-1), the European Commission (project 101103204—INTEGRATE), the German Government, Ministry of Health (projects ZMI1-2521WHO002 and ZMII2-2523GHP006), CEPI (framework agreement for implementing partner services); the Kirmser Foundation (donation of equipment); speaker honoraria for continuing medical education on viral haemorrhagic fevers; and support for attending meetings from WHO, Wellcome, and CEPI, including travel support from Wellcome to attend the workshop identified in this Personal View. LTM declares being a science consultant at FIND, for which she receives grants, contracts, and consulting fees; and travel support from Wellcome to attend the workshop identified in this Personal View. SAO declares a consulting contract with CEPI (payments made to SAO); is a member of the INTEGRATE consortium with grants from the European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (payments made to SAO's institution); and support from CEPI and EDCTP funds (payments made to travel agencies and through SAO's institution). CR declares participation on a Data Safety Monitoring Board or Advisory Board (this advisory board was designated after CR's participation in the work leading to this Personal View). WKA is Executive Director of the African Vaccine Manufacturing Initiative, and Cheif Executive of National Vaccine Institute, Ghana. DAA, IMA, WKA, ADTB, DGB, EF-C, IdC, DSG, SBG, MJ, KAM, JTO, MTO, AKU, and CSS declare Wellcome supported for travel to attend the workshop identified in this Personal View. PCF, PJH, and JPG worked at Wellcome during the time that this Personal View was completed. All other authors declare no competing interests. No authors were paid by a pharmaceutical company or any other agency to write this Personal View. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed in this Personal View and they do not necessarily represent the views, decisions, or policies of the institutions with which they are affiliated. Editorial note: The Lancet Group takes a neutral position with respect to territorial claims in published maps and institutional affiliations., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.)