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The Sudanese thinker Mahmud Muhammad Taha (d. 1985) was a bold advocate of Arab enlightenment, which he based on a synthesis of Sufism, democracy and socialism that in his view represented the idea...

Many studies have been devoted to the features of global jihad (also known as Salafi jihadism), its historical development, its difference from other Salafi groups, or its struggles with ideological rivals. Little emphasis, however, has been given to global jihadists’ ideological genealogy, and hence to locating them in a comparative perspective. How did they commemorate their formative heroes, such as the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyya and mid-twentieth century ideologues, such as Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Aʿla al-Mawdudi, ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj, Shukri Mustafaʾ, Marwan Hadid or Saʿid Hawwa? Were these figures still perceived as cultural heroes, or were they shunned? Did their writings continue to provide sources of inspiration, or were they replaced by new manifestos? An in-depth discussion of these questions, based on a textual analysis of jihadi sources, may shed further light on global jihadists’ ideological evolution and self-perceptions. It will provide an additional prism for analyzing modern Sunni militancy, and scrutinize the extent its protagonists’ treatises match past traditions or, alternatively, deviate from them in favor of cultivated traditions, thus advancing a dissident agenda.

This article focuses on a comparative discussion of Arab secular and Islamic perceptions of power in the interwar period (1919-39), analyzing the writings of two key figures, namely Sāmī Šawkat, who was a vocal protagonist of Arab unity in Iraq, and Ḥasan al-Bannā, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. A comparative perspective reveals marked similarities between the two authors. Both advocated commitment to the nation and opposition to imperialism, and both positioned education as the focal point of their approach, fostering a glorious legacy and the exaltation of sacrifice.

When the Arab Spring of 2011 sparked a second revolution in Egypt (the first having occurred in 1952), it caught the longstanding Muslim Brotherhood almost by surprise. Arguably the oldest Sunni political mass movement in Egypt (having been established in 1928), it had proven remarkably resilient during more than eight decades of alternating repression and toleration by subsequent governments. Though its social composition changed over the years, its principles, as laid down by its founder Hasan al-Banna, continued to inspire large segments of the population in a quest for a state based on Shariʿa, and provided an alternative vision for a more just and moral society. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood built a wide network of social, educational, and welfare institutions. From the early 1980s onwards, with Mubarak in power, the Brotherhood was condoned, if not officially recognized, and members were allowed to participate in several parliamentary and other elections. As an organization with formal traditional leadership bodies, but also a younger generation versed in the modern social media, the Brotherhood was seen to be slowly nearing a point where it would be able to make the transition to a party. It began to formulate a political platform and an economic blueprint for the country. A modicum of democracy was adopted, and more openness towards the integration of women was seen. After winning a relatively large (minority) representation in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the regime was scared enough to allow the Brotherhood to win only one token seat in 2010. The revolution of 2011 ousted Mubarak and then led to relatively free elections with a solid victory for the Freedom and Justice Party, which had been formed by the Brotherhood, as well as a new Islamist-inspired constitution and the election of Muhammad Mursi as president. However, within a year the Muslim Brotherhood government had missed this historical window of opportunity. It proved inadequately prepared for efficient and orderly governance, did not bring order and stability, nor did it advance the aspirational goals of demonstrators. This is how the army, not for the first time in Egypt’s history, came to intervene and depose Morsi in July 2013, replacing him with Defense Minister ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Sisi. It was not long before the Brotherhood was once more suppressed and outlawed. With many leaders in jail, but latent support continuing, observers tend to believe it is not the end of the Brotherhood’s existence.

The emergence of al-Qāʿida in the mid-1990s was followed by a redefinition of moral standards and the legitimation of jihād that does not differentiate between enemy soldiers, prisoners of war, or civilians. Several Islamist ideologues affiliated with global jihād, troubled by the absence of traditional ethical norms of Islamic warfare, attempted to redefine the legitimacy of jihād in terms of what is strictly permissible or prohibited. The main proponents of this redefinition were Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī of Jordan and Sayyid Imām al-Sharīf of Egypt. Al-Sharīf, a prolific writer, is the focus of this study. Using both pragmatic and ethical arguments, al-Sharīf asserted that the conduct of contemporary jihād deviates from traditional legal boundaries, brings no benefit to the Muslim world, and constitutes pure violence. The correct direction of Islamic activity, he argued, lies in adjusting to the prevailing reality and in advocating daʿwa (communal activity). By analyzing al-Sharīf’s discourse, I seek to shed light on crucial debates within the ranks of radical Islam over the legal and ethical constraints of jihād and violence, while also highlighting the connections between jihād, ethics, and religious authority.

There is a plethora of books dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian-Arab conflict. Most, however, focus on the contentious formative periods, particularly from the 1930s and thereafter, in the wake o...

This article examines aspects of cultural exchange between the Middle East and the West in which Sufism, Christianity, the traditions of the Circassians and New Age concepts played a central role. It focuses on the teaching of Murat Yagan, of Abkhaz-Circassian origin who grew up in Turkey and immigrated to Canada in the 1960s, where he developed his philosophy, Ahmsta Kebzeh (“the knowledge of the art of living”). The Kebzeh way of life emphasizes modesty, mutual responsibility and compassion. Yagan linked these values to the ancient ethos of the Caucasus Mountains which he sought to revive as the basis of a universal vision. The nature of Kebzeh was influenced by the cosmopolitan environment in which Yagan was educated in Turkey; by his enrollment with Sufi circles in North America; and by the multicultural Canadian atmosphere. These diverse influences enabled him to devise an ecumenical model of dialogue between cultures. The article provides a first-time survey and analysis of Kebzeh ideological and communal features. It sheds new light on the role of ethnicity and cultural heritage in immigrant societies in the context of the evolution of spirituality in Canada, a relatively unexplored milieu in comparison to the United States and Europe.

The appearance of al-Qa‘ida at the beginning of the 1990s challenged the modern Islamic discourse by bringing the struggle against the ‘new Crusaders’—the United States and Europe—to centre stage. Impelled by frustration with the meagre record of Sunni radicalism in achieving substantive political change, and by its own aspiration for leadership, the organisation singled out the non-violent, influential Muslim Brethren as a main rival and a prime target for polemics. The formative basis for this polemic was provided by an essay written by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Hisad al-murr [The Bitter Harvest], around 1989. The essay, which has not been dealt with in the research literature until now, constitutes a biting attack against the Brethren. It undermines their historical legacy and goes so far as to shatter the image of their charismatic founder, Hasan al-Banna. More broadly, al-Zawahiri's essay reveals the close affinity between historical memory and politics, and illuminates the clash within modern Islam.

The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology Barbara H. E. Zollner Abingdon & New York, Routledge, 2009, Pp.ix + 184, bibliography, index, £70.00/$140.00 (hardback), ISBN 0-415-43557-4, 0-...

With the entry of Muslim society into the modern era in the nineteenth century, Sufi beliefs and rituals became the focus of systematic debate and denunciation by local and foreign observers alike. An illuminating example is the dawsa ritual—a ceremony involving the shaykh of the Sa'diyya order riding his horse over the backs of his prostrate disciple s, which was particularly widespread in the Cairene milieu. This practice, intended to prove that true believers are protected from all harm, was officially abolished in 1881 in the name of enlightenment and human dignity. The present article traces the history of the dawsa and, more broadly, sheds light on the Sufi encounter with the challenges of modernity. It reveals a diverse picture of the anti-Sufi campaign carried out by various elements in Egypt—foreign consul s, government official s, modernists and nationalists—which resulted in a loss of influence by Sufi order s, yet fostered a capacity for survival and ideological rejuvenation.

An analysis of Arab liberal thought, with its core values of rationalism, freedom, civic rights, constitutionalism, and cultural ecumenism, involves several methodological and historical difficulties. Arab liberals in the twentieth century, especially since 1967, have constituted a heterogeneous and poorly organized group. They have lacked a coherent school of thought, divided as they were by religious creed, professional training, and attitudes toward Islam, the West, and Israel. Their language was too rational and remote for the general public, and they offered no attractive solutions to socioeconomic ills beyond calling for gradual educational and political reform. Moreover, they lacked an effective network of civil associations, not to mention political parties, that could back their cause. Many liberals were identified with centers of Western civilization, whose colonial history in the region was such that anyone who empathized with a Western political or cultural agenda was accused of seeking to destroy their society’s indigenous identity, and in fact of constituting a fifth column.

Education occupied a central position in modern Islamic thought. It aimed at purifying faith, but also at nurturing activism in the service of Islam and the community. Education was required to be holistic, strengthening both soul and body. It embraced all aspects of life and was conveyed by diverse means, ranging from communal involvement to political revolution. The broad scope of this education was impelled by the comprehensiveness of the Islamic religion, but also by the multifaceted nature of Westernization itself. The corrupting presence of hedonistic culture backed by indigenous regimes heightened the functional aspect of the pedagogic realm in Islamic discourse more than ever before. Re-education was perceived as the main lever for achieving cultural authenticity and as a core component of identity politics. The paper offers a contextualized reading of education in Islamic thought, an issue largely overlooked in the scholarly literature, which has focused more on socio-political aspects of the mod...

Suicide attacks, which were traditionally rare in the Middle East and limited to the Shi‘ite arena – in Iran and Lebanon – became widespread during the Israel–Palestinian conflict of the 1990s. They increasingly turned into a religious ritual, positing their perpetrators as symbols of a revolutionary theology and have engendered a debate in the Arab Muslim world as to their religious legitimacy, involving both the self-inflicted death of the perpetrator and the killing of civilian targets. Most of the ‘ulama’ provided theological justification for Palestinian suicide acts against Israel, crowning them the epitome of faith in Allah, while still other ‘ulama’ renounced them as non-sacred acts of violence unfit for reward in paradise. Both groups of scholars delved into historical and judicial sources to reinforce their arguments, but have also adopted creative interpretations inspired by contemporary political considerations.

The standing of the Christian Copts in modern Egypt has always been problematic, at times fragile. The perennial debate over the status of Islam, aggravated by the Islamic insurgence in the 1970s a...

Jihad (holy war) and self-sacrifice constituted a formative ethos for Palestinian Islam in its struggle against Israel from the early 1990s onward. They became important components of politics of identity, aimed at infusing metaphysical values into Palestinian life, while also positing a political alternative to the PLO. This paper focuses on a formative manifesto titled ‘Readings in the Laws of Martyrdom’ (Qira'a fi Fiqh al-Shahada). Disseminated by the Islamic Jihad in 1988, the manifesto laid down the ideological foundations of martyrdom in Palestine. With the passage of time, Palestinian ‘suicide attacks’ became unprecedented in scale, distinctive thereby from similar phenomena in other conflicted areas such as Lebanon, Kashmir, Chechnya, Turkey and Sri Lanka. The discussion evaluates the role of the Palestinian manifesto in the radical Islamic orbit. For this purpose, two other formative texts are also examined. The first is ‘The Absent Duty’, issued in 1981 by the Egyptian Jihad movement, which was ...

The centralized pattern of government in the Middle East engendered rifts within the ranks of the Islamic movements in the 1990s due to mounting pressure by their followers, especially from the urb...