Search

Despite growing interest in both party and citizens’ support for the EU, the relationship between sources of public attitudes toward the EU and the values deriving from structural cleavages remains poorly observed. Particularly, the emergence of a new Transnational Cleavage appears theoretically and empirically disconnected from the state of knowledge on the sources of support and opposition for the Union. How do past explanations of support for the EU relate to individual positioning along Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) values? Our research aims to bridge public opinion studies on support for the EU with cleavage theory, going beyond the analysis of party positions, but focusing, instead, on citizens’ beliefs at the individual level. Our results show that transnational cleavage defines a dimension on which explanatory factors of support for the EU align consistently. Differently from the U-curve of the left-right cleavage, it shows a linear trend profiling pros versus opponents of the EU integration process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last decade, democratic backsliding (DB) has become a worrying phenomenon worldwide. This article addresses this topic by focusing on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). An overview of the literature on DB in this region has identified a relevant lacuna: the lack of attention to the role political support indicators (democratic satisfaction, government trust) may play in DB processes. Testing several hypotheses through different random regression models applied to CEE countries for the period 2005–2021, an unexpected puzzle emerges: contrary to the expectations, we find that a greater government trust contributes to DB. Building on several consolidated findings of the system support theory and the classic democratisation literature, we address this puzzle, identifying temporal phases, mechanisms and causal relations and stressing the relevance of interaction processes among a complex set of causal factors to explain DB processes in CEE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crises bring both human consequences and political repercussions. COV-ID-19, like any other crisis, strained both European governments and public support for them. During the first wave of the pandemic, political trust was correlated with public adherence to infection containment measures in the major democracies. At the end of the first wave, how did public perceptions of COVID-19 measures and of measures introduced by institutions to protect health and the economy affect the bond of political trust between the governed and the governors? Using Eurobarometer data, we estimate the effects on political trust of the public's assessment of institutional performance, political output and policy. Applying various multilevel regression models, we show that, at the end of the first wave of the pandemic, political trust was positively affected by institutional performance and only partially affected public perceptions and the policy measures taken by governments to contain the spread of the virus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines changes in levels of social confidence in unions in Canada and the United States between 1982 and 2006 based on an analysis of the World Value Survey (WVS) data set. It considers why confidence rates are similar in the two countries, applying a logistic regression model to the two most recent WVS waves (i.e., 2000 and 2006) so as to bring out the effects of political and social differences on the propensity of individuals to trust unions in each national context. The results show similarities between the two countries (e.g., more progressive and younger citizens generally have greater confidence in unions), but also important distinctions (e.g., only in Canada do individuals with a working class profile appear to have greater confidence in unions). Cet article examine revolution des niveaux de confiance sociale envers les organisations syndicales au Canada et aux Etats-Unis entre 1982 et 2006 en s'appuyant sur les donnees de la World Value Survey (WVS). Partant du constat que ces taux de confiance sont relativement similaires au sein de ces deux pays, nous appliquons un modele de regression logistique sur les deux vagues de donnees les plus recentes du WVS (soit celle de 2000 et 2006) afin de mieux comprendre la propension des individus a faire confiance aux syndicats dans chaque contexte national en fonction de certaines de leurs caracteristiques sociales et politiques. Les resultats montrent des similitudes entre les deux pays (par exemple, les citoyens les plus progressistes et les plus jeunes ont generalement une plus grande confiance envers les syndicats), mais egalement des distinctions importantes (a titre d'exemple, seul au Canada les individus repondant a un profil de 'classe ouvriere' manifestent une plus grande confiance envers les syndicats)., UP TO THE 1990s, public opinion analyses helped enhance understanding of the nature of the relationship between unions and society. However, this type of analysis has since been all but [...]

In many respects, Italy – a founding member of the EU and once one of its most pro-European countries – may well represent today a privileged observation point for the study of the electoral behaviour of Eurosceptic voters. In the article, we look for evidence about a Eurosceptical match between the demand and the supply sides of the Italian electoral process. For this purpose, through use of data collected by the Itanes 2018 national election survey, we analyse whether it is possible to find a relationship between Eurosceptical attitudes among voters and their vote choice for Eurosceptic parties. We hypothesise that those citizens who have turned their back on the EU rejecting its intervention and who prioritise instead defence of national sovereignty have a greater propensity to vote for Eurosceptic parties. Results confirm our hypothesis showing that, in a context of growing disenchantment of Italian public opinion toward the EU, Eurosceptic voters increasingly mobilised in support of those parties that have made great efforts in the past to politicise EU issues and to establish their ownership on Euroscepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent history of European politics has been characterised by the mounting phenomena of populism and Euroscepticism. Some recent analyses discuss the possible convergence between the two, exemplified, above all, by the increased success of Eurosceptic and populist parties. Conceptually and historically, Euroscepticism and populism are two distinct ideological realms. To what extent do they develop in parallel or converge, both at the elite and mass levels? We address this question by looking at the Italian case, where populism and Euroscepticism have apparently progressed simultaneously. Through an analysis of the attitudes of political elites and the public, we argue that the two phenomena actually move in parallel and in general do not converge, with the main exception of the Five Star Movement where a convergence is instead visible. Finally, by observing the effects of Euroscepticism and populism on the voting choices of citizens, we find a high level of congruence in the political system between demand and supply, hence between voters and their representatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]