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imágenes, tablas ; 28 cm. En primer lugar, se identifica para el presente trabajo la problemática de la que se desglosa todo su desarrollo, en Doble as In House aunque mantiene una comunidad en sus redes sociales, se identifica que no hay una actividad constante sobre el contenido que se publica, por esta razón se pretende llegar a la construcción de un manual enfocado en producción audiovisual unido a las redes sociales y a las diferentes formas de proceder a publicar contenido en formato de video, se busca que el manual sea de guía para dar las bases y se logre captar de manera eficaz al público objetivo alrededor de la agencia en las redes sociales, para este trabajo se realizó técnicas de análisis documental y entrevistas semi-estructuradas, las cuales arrojaron que en la estructura de un manual audiovisual siempre se compone por las etapas de preproducción, producción y postproducción; sin embargo, se sugirió dentro del manual diferentes datos relevantes que se deben tener en cuenta sobre cada red social para la realización de contenido audiovisual. Consideraciones generales.-- Pregunta de investigación.-- Objetivo de investigación.-- Justificación.-- Marco referencial.-- Metodología.-- Resultados.-- Conclusiones.-- Recomendaciones.-- Bibliografía. Pregrado Publicista Mercadeo y Publicidad

De las mejores características con las cuales cuenta nuestro país es la cultura, todos estos hermosos conocimientos y tradiciones que se han transferido durante muchas generaciones y que nos brindan la esencia con la que contamos hoy en día. Lastimosamente debido a el fenómeno de la globalización muchas de estas culturas se han ido deteriorando ya que el ser humano opta por adoptar otras costumbres que no son propias de nuestra región, a esto además se le suma el mal manejo de fondos de nuestros gobernantes que no invierten en este factor, es por esto que nace el proyecto Centro Cultural “un viaje por el Atlántico”, ubicado en la ciudad de barranquilla, capital del departamento del Atlántico. Estará localizado cerca de la muy conocida hoy en día, aleta de tiburón, monumento simbólico al equipo de la ciudad. El principal objetivo del proyecto es impulsar la cultura de la región, y así dar ese primer pasó a incentivar nuevamente todas esas costumbres, este a su vez busca incrementar el turismo de la zona. Además, se generará empleo puesto que el edificio principal, tendrá espacios de venta de artesanías y muestra cultural propias de cada municipio, esto liderado por sus nativos. También, los visitantes podrán encontrar planes turísticos y la opción de tener el reconocimiento de embajador atlanticense. Este proyecto promoverá el cuidado del entorno desarrollando planes de manejo ambiental contando con sus propios paneles solares, plan de manejo ambiental para RCDs y residuos sólidos, programa de reforestación en zonas aledañas, medidas de ahorro de agua y energía, junto con zonas verdes, libres para compartir. Por último, aunque este proyecto es totalmente innovador para la ciudad de Barranquilla, presenta limitaciones como el interés del público debido a que hoy en día la cultura se ha dejado en un tercer plano, afectando de esta forma la búsqueda de la generación de empleo en el departamento del Atlántico. One of the best characteristics of our country is its culture, all this beautiful knowledge and traditions that have been transferred for many generations and that give us the essence that we have today. Unfortunately due to the phenomenon of globalization many of these cultures have been deteriorating as human beings choose to adopt other customs that are not typical of our region, to this is also added the mismanagement of funds of our rulers who do not invest in this factor, which is why the project was born Cultural Center "a journey through the Atlantic", located in the city of Barranquilla, capital of the department of Atlántico. It will be located near the well-known shark's fin, a symbolic monument to the city's team. The main objective of the project is to promote the culture of the region, and thus give that first step to encourage again all those customs, this in turn seeks to increase tourism in the area. In addition, employment will be generated since the main building will have spaces for the sale of handicrafts and cultural displays of each municipality, led by its natives. Also, visitors will be able to find tourist plans and the option of being recognized as an ambassador of the Atlantic. This project will promote care for the environment by developing environmental management plans with its own solar panels, an environmental management plan for CDW and solid waste, a reforestation program in surrounding areas, water and energy saving measures, and green areas free for sharing. Finally, although this project is totally innovative for the city of Barranquilla, it has limitations such as the interest of the public due to the fact that nowadays culture has been left in the third plane, thus affecting the search for employment generation in the department of Atlántico.

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross-cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.

Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pair of cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving home on Friday and considering whether to stop at the bank to deposit a check. The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming back on Saturday. In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check is deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be deposited. Bob’s wife asks whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was open. However, his wife points out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank will be open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does indeed know that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers maintain that Bob is ignorant – his statement that he knows the bank will be open tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain that this pattern of judgments is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this and similar cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Nagel, 2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005).Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic contextualism, holds that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across conversational contexts (e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes contexts. Another view, interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the Bank cases show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alternative, which we’ll call classical invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, play a direct role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g., belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007; Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge ascriptions fails to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists deny this, claiming that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge are held fixed, stakes continue to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; Lawlor, 2013). So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, forthcoming; though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and Stanley, 2012). If stakes really do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic contextualism and interest relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born out of nothing more than a myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2009). If so, classical invariantism about knowledge might be best supported—not because it provides the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors, epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. These radical alternatives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of one of their important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would stand. In the remainder of this article, we’ll disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We’ll accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.

Fuente TESIUNAM

In 2017, migrants were 4.35% of the Chilean population, mainly from Peru and Colombia. From 2015, the amount of migrants from Central America, particularly from Haiti increased notably. This process changed the phenotype of the male population, increasing the proportion of black men, mainly between 20 and 50 years. Afro-descendant men have a higher risk for prostate cancer, and the tumor can appear as early as 40 years of age among them. This increase will have future repercussions on the public health system, since part of these men have low income and poor living conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss early detection strategies focused on this population, including education for both patients and health professionals. This review includes data on the reality of migration in Chile and its impact on the health system. The higher incidence and mortality of prostate cancer in the migrant population is reviewed and risk-adjusted screening strategies are proposed.

Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject’s assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data fromover 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.

En este documento se proporciona evidencia de que existen municipios indígenas en México que están reestructurando sus economías y han logrado mejorar sus condiciones de marginación y pobreza a partir de dinámicas económicas propias que les han permitido mejorar sus niveles de ingreso. Se realiza un estudio de 84 municipios indígenas en México, con una aproximación teórica desde la nueva ruralidad y la nueva sociología rural que permite entender cómo estos municipios indígenas con sus formas de organización social pueden promover su propio desarrollo socioeconómico. La metodología es documental y estadística, se realizó una búsqueda exhaustiva de información económica de estos municipios a través de diversas fuentes y bases de datos para los años de 1990 al 2010. Los resultados arrojan evidencia de que no sólo existe una correlación positiva entre la producción agrícola con el incremento de unidades económicas, la remuneración del personal ocupado y el PIB per cápita de los 84 municipios de nuestro estudio, sino que los promedios de éstos son superiores a los de los 468 municipios indígenas del país.