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This article explores the positives and negatives of philosophy in management research with a response from the original authors, Ramoglou and McMullen, to commentaries on their 2024 article “What is an opportunity?: From theoretical mystification to everyday understanding.” Their response includes a defense of their anti-metaphysical perspective in entrepreneurship theory.

AbstractDespite the fact that humans experience the reality of consciousness first hand, a remarkable paradigm shift within the Western worldview has entrenched the notion of an inverted cognitive order: first we have objects, and only then minds, if we have them at all. How the community of minds developed such a counterintuitive theory, and how this mental product was elevated to the status of an undisputable ‘scientific’ principle is a long story, one that involves more cultural history than sound philosophical arguments, and nearly no science. Oddly, mainstream materialism helped qualifying another model for which very little rational support is available: dogmatic dualism. Psychiatrists in general lack the basic knowledge to deal with this metaphysical aspect of their ‘objects’, which greatly impoverishes the efficiency and decelerates the advancement of our understanding of the mind. This article will present the major inconsistencies of dualism, and why they ultimately promote materialism. Finally, I will stress how this diversion has been harmful for medicine, and how philosophical education could mitigate it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of this paper is a critique of the pronatalist metaphysics that underlies bioethics and shapes the thinking and discourse on reproductive rights. The point of reference is the philosophy of antinatalism presented by Marcus T. L. Teo. Seemingly arguing in favor of antinatalism, Teo mixes antinatalist concepts with pronatalist intuitions. The consequence of combining the impossible is the restoration of negative eugenics on the one hand, and a series of contradictions on the other. The article shows that philosophical antinatalism is a universal position that indicates that procreation always, everywhere and for everyone is wrong. The paper simultaneously exposes and criticizes the metaphysics of pronatalism underlying bioethical discourse. Weakening pronatalism in bioethics and turning more attention to antinatalism could bring good results for women, the environment, and bioethics itself in terms of its thematic preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reinterprets Kant’s Copernican revolution as a transcendental-psychological transformation in the approach to metaphysics. It tackles the prevalent scholarly view that Kant’s theory of the faculty of cognition appears incompatible with his broader metaphysical framework of transcendental idealism, primarily due to difficulties in integrating cognitive faculties such as sensibility and understanding within the dichotomy of appearances and things in themselves. The paper proposes that Kant’s transcendental psychology is neither a metaphysical-rational doctrine of the noumenal mind, nor an empirical-naturalized study of the phenomenal mind. Instead, it presents a theory centered on the transcendental subject as an abstract entity, positing it as the hypothetical bearer of the cognitive functions necessary for all potential finite cognizers, with humans exemplifying a particular empirical realization. While empirical realizations of cognitive functions manifest through temporal-causal mechanisms, their transcendental grounds consist of abstract functional structures defined by unschematized categories. These transcendental functions, which determine the necessary conditions for objective cognition, also inherently define the fundamental structure of all possible objects of cognition. Kant’s metaphysical inquiry into the structure of reality is thus conducted through an examination of the faculty of cognition, showcasing a revolutionary transcendental-psychological approach to metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in objective reality (i.e., in itself, independently of another entity's consciousness), then it seems that it cannot be part of the material basis and determinants of other entities that do exist on their own. We argue that the core origin of these problems lies in IIT's equation between true existence and phenomenal existence (consciousness), and the corresponding ontological exclusion of non-conscious physical entities (i.e., extrinsic entities) from objective reality. In short, these two problems seem to show that IIT should reconsider the ontological status of these extrinsic entities, because they need to exist objectively to account for the ontological implications of the scenarios we present here, which are permitted by the operational framework of the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the way the world appears to be plays an important role in standard scientific practice, and that therefore the way the world appears to be ought to play a similar role in metaphysics as well. I then show how the argument bears on a specific first-order debate in metaphysics – the debate over whether there are composite objects. This debate is often thought to be a paradigm case of a metaphysical debate that is largely insulated from scientific considerations, and is often disparaged or avoided by naturalistically inclined metaphysicians as a result. My argument below shows that this attitude is a mistake. The way in which metaphysical debates can be informed by our best science is more complex and far-reaching than is often acknowledged in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relation between politics and biology in Catherine Malabou's work, traces the origin of her recent anarchist turn, and seeks to explain how the latter influences the concept of plasticity. Whereas the relation between plasticity, neuroscience and epigenetics reflected a certain affinity with Marxism in her earlier work, Malabou's recent claim that biology and ontology are anarchist remains opaque as to its grounding in her own thought and scientific developments alike. The article argues that the origin of the metamorphosis of plasticity from a Marxist to an anarchist notion gives rise to a new metaphysics of biology that is based on the assumption that society needs to be brain-like, reflecting the networked structure of synaptic plasticity. The article also proposes a new reading of Malabou's three plasticities (negative, positive and the plasticity of the concept) in temporal terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ordinary objects are experienced to endure over space and time, to not be collocated with each other, to be composed of proper parts, and to survive the loss of some of their parts. These qualities are on the one hand difficult to reconcile for theorists of perception and on the other hand pose a variety of problems when considered in isolation. Relying on the theoretical framework of predictive processing, this paper argues that we can use the category of a robust predictive process to conceptualize qualities such as persistence and compositionality in a unified manner. Traditional problems concerning the structural properties of ordinary objects, such as the question of when two objects compose, can then be reformulated using this new category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been numerous studies on Kant's concept of the 'Fact of Reason', drawing on various intellectual resources, ranging from metaphysics to psychology, from Aristotle to Mencius, from analytic philosophy to phenomenology, and beyond. How should we evaluate these studies? Is it possible that these studies can contribute both to an understanding of Kantian philosophy and to an understanding of Western philosophy as a whole, as well as shed light on the development of philosophy after Kant and on the philosophical questions of our own era? In order to at least partially clarify the above questions, this article will draw on the work of philosohers such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, C.I. Lewis, Jin Yuelin and Feng Qi, and discuss how certain presuppositions of communicative action can be both regulative and constitutive, how the same propositions can be both empirical and a priori, how the same concepts can both describe reality and regulate it, and how the 'Fact of Reason' can be understood as the 'Fact of Learning', in order to offer a new interpretation of Kant's concept of the 'Fact of Reason'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article enriches discussions about the metaphysics of normative facts with conceptual resources from social ontology that metaethics has neglected so far: the resources of Haslanger's critical realism as social constructionism. By pointing out the viability of understanding reasons as socially constructed facts, the article shows how normative facts can be understood as features of mind-independent reality that are, however, not features of the universe independently of social practices. The move into social ontology allows us to understand normative facts as mind-independent in a more substantial sense than deflationists do, by stressing individual mind-independence, while denying collective mind-independence – the subsistence independently of established human cultures. The new position can fruitfully mediate between realism, error theory and constructivism. Finally, the metaphysical nuances provided by social ontology pave the way for novel approaches to normative change and progress – thereby indicating pathways to normative theorising that many traditional metaethical positions lack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Covid-19 pandemic in the USA, churches were faced with a question of medical and metaphysical importance: can Christianity's rite of Holy Communion spread Covid-19? This article examines Christian responses to Covid-19 through a case study of five of Christianity's multifaceted Covid eucharistic policies, arguing that the responses of churches in times of crisis reflect a nuanced understanding of the metaphysical theories surrounding the Eucharist. The goal of this article is to serve as a primer on the relationships between beliefs of the Eucharist and Covid-19 in American churches, seeking to provide an overview and facilitate further inquiry into modern concerns of Christianity's holiest rite and the spread of disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay critically examines a widely held assumption in interpreting Leibniz's modal metaphysics: that whatever is necessarily actual is necessary. I argue that Leibniz rejected this axiom for principled reasons having to do with his views on the grounding of metaphysical modalities in divine power and intellect (but not divine will). I also argue that if we read him in light of this rejection, his per se possibility theory becomes (contrary to its reception in the literature) quite successful in addressing the problem of necessitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the role of disagreement in relation to the goals of metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I will discuss two reactions to Kant’s initial observation that metaphysics does not make any lasting progress: Kant’s own demand for a critical revision of metaphysics and Schelling’s ideas as presented in his 1821 lecture On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science. Kant’s account allows for an appreciation of metaphysical conflict as a necessary precondition for a critically revised system of pure reason. However, he thinks that such a system will ultimately replace all previous ones and thereby make further development of metaphysics obsolete. Although Schelling appropriates Kant’s notion of systematicity, he arrives at a positive evaluation of metaphysical disagreement as an expression of freedom which articulates itself within the history of metaphysics. I argue that Schelling’s view also entails that the history of metaphysics is an ongoing process rather than terminating in an ultimate system or a withdrawal from metaphysical inquiry. Thus, we get to see a) that Kant himself (not just his post-Kantian successors) entertains an account of the essential historicity of reason and b) how Schelling both preserves and transforms the Kantian legacy of a philosophical history of metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical naturalism is sometimes accused of problematic metaphysics or epistemology. Some argue that naturalists rely on concepts of ‘nature’ indefensible in the light of modern evolutionary biology. There is also an epistemological worry that has been raised recently that strong normative evaluation, such as meaning in human life, is empirically inaccessible or even in conflict with what we know in scientific contexts. While the critics have targeted Aristotelian and Neo-Aristotelian views, I will appeal to an argument from the Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi as one potential way that we can respond to skeptics. If we can know that human beings are capable of moral goodness, and it is comprehensible for us to take moral goodness as a final or unifying goal of our lives, then we can respond to the skeptical objections which allege that we cannot sustain rich normative judgments about meaning in life in the face of scientific evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a summary of the recent research related to the issue of future contingents. It focuses on the aspects that were largely neglected in the traditional debate, such as relativism, pragmatics of assertion, probability, epistemology, and metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article consistently elaborates the extra‐contextual nature of metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysicsis seen as a semantic construction of culture that produces a certain type of thinking, memory, and identification: that is, subjectivity, and sociality as an ethical and axiological model of interaction with the world and the Other. The paper argues that metaphysics is a kind of orientation in space and that culture is a semiotic way of world orientation, or collection of spaces into an intelligible structure, a specific characteristic of human existence in the universe. Indeed, metaphysics through the space of culture allows one to experience the universe empirically as unity, to assume the presence of meaning. Based on the analysis, the paper summarizes the definition of the phenomenon of culture as a specifically human way of mastering space and controlling time, consciousness as a topology of reflective practices, and virtual reality technology as a space of pure metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

" Metaphysics" is a philosophical perspective different from mechanical materialism, and the Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine's view of the human body as " body-qi-spirit" embodies a " metaphysical" cognitive pattern. This paper takes the content of General Treaiise ore Causes and Marei/esiaiions of All Diseases · Wired Diseases as an example to analyze and compare the cognitive evolution process of wind diseases in General Treaiise ore Causes and Marei/esiaiiores of All Diseases. It is argued that the General Treaiise ore Causes and Marei/esiaiions of All Diseases constructs a body model characterized by " metaphysics" where the meridian system connects the entire body to facilitate the flow of qi and blood, with the organs serving as the storage places for essence-qi. Through the analysis of the symptoms of stroke, it reveals the specific application of this body model in the theory of disease mechanisms. The meridian tendons, as the subordinate parts of the meridian system, become the physical basis for the explanation of stroke with their substantive existence. It is thus determined that General Treatise ore Causes and Marei/esiaiiores of All Diseases has perfected the two-layer space of " metaphysical-physical" body structure of the theory of disease pathogenesis, laid the foundation for the theory of disease mechanism with the state of qi and blood as the focus of discussion, and constructed a model of disease diagnosis and treatment, which is "disease-symptom-etiology and pathogenesis-treatment". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff's explanations for the flourishing of philosophical theology in analytic philosophy by taking Arthur Norman Prior's (1914–1969) development of tense-logic into account. Prior's work challenged the prevailing anti-metaphysical norms in analytic philosophy and introduced an alternative understanding of the relationship between logic and metaphysics. Prior's application of tense-logic to an analysis of the concept of existence in quantified tense-logic and his exploration of future contingency in branching time semantics provide a strong reason for why analytic philosophy naturally incorporates philosophical theology. These considerations lead us to modify Wolterstorff's emphasis on the importance of meta-epistemology for the resurgence of philosophical theology. A development in logic was necessary. Furthermore, Prior's importance questions the assumption that philosophical theology was a consequence of theistic philosophers seeking ways to defend theistic beliefs in analytic philosophy. This is not true for Prior. His invention of tense-logic and discussion of omniscience was driven by an existential interest in finding answers to philosophical problems concerning divine foreknowledge and human freedom which ultimately led him to reject his Christian beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 150 years, Thomists have been divided over whether or not St. Thomas Aquinas himself held to the transcendentality of beauty. Francis J. Kovach divides the Thomists into three groups: (1) the transcendentalists, (2) the anti-transcendentalists, and (3) the undecided. Some contemporary Thomist philosophers in the transcendentalist camp, such as Étienne Gilson, see beauty as the forgotten transcendental. We will briefly trace the historical context of the debate by mentioning how philosophers viewed the transcendentality of beauty in ancient and medieval times. Then, we will summarize a contemporary Thomistic transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status, followed by a contemporary Thomistic anti-transcendentalist view of the nature of beauty and its transcendental status. After that, we will evaluate the nature of beauty according to St. Thomas, as well as the criteria which determines transcendentality. Finally, both the transcendentalist and anti-transcendentalist positions on beauty's transcendental status will be evaluated to determine whether it is metaphysically consistent to regard beauty as a transcendental according to Thomistic thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, modal epistemology has turned its attention to ordinary modal knowledge. This paper brings to the fore a neglected but central form of ordinary modal knowledge: knowledge of agentive modality, and in particular of our own abilities, which I call 'ability knowledge'. I argue that modal epistemology as it is does not account for ability knowledge, by looking at the most promising candidate theories: perception-based, counterfactual-based, and similarity-based modal epistemologies. I then outline a more promising epistemology for our ability knowledge, which relies on the experience of our own agency, and draw out some lessons for modal epistemology in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

José Benardete developed a famous paradox involving a beginningless set of items each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. The Grim Reaper version of this paradox has recently been employed in favour of various finitist metaphysical theses, ranging from temporal finitism to causal finitism to the discrete nature of time. Here, I examine a new challenge to these finitist arguments—namely, the challenge of implying that the future cannot be endless. In particular, I develop future-oriented Benardete paradoxes and examine their epistemic symmetry with past-oriented paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When does a model explain? When does it promote understanding? A dominant approach to scientific explanation is the interventionist view. According to this view, when X explains Y, intervening on X can produce, prevent or alter Y in some predictable way. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I reject a position that many interventionist theorists endorse. This position is that to explain some phenomenon by providing a model is also to understand that phenomenon. While endorsing the interventionist view, I argue that explaining and understanding are distinct scientific achievements. Second, I defend a novel theory of scientific understanding. According to this view, when some model M promotes understanding, M makes available a distinctive mental state. This state is of the same psychological kind as when we grasp events in a narrative as bearing on some ultimate conclusion. To conclude, I show that, given this view, mechanistic explanations often provide a powerful source of understanding that many causal-historical models lack. This paper will be of interest to both philosophers of science and epistemologists engaged in the topics of explanation and understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate's reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back a 'forgotten' distinction between two ways in which value can depend on other properties. We should distinguish those properties in virtue of which a value is had—the grounds of the value—from those on condition of which it is had—which following Dancy I call the enablers of the value. With this distinction in hand, I offer a clear re-statement of the two main conditionalist accounts of final value: non-instrumentalism and non-derivatism. When understood not as making claims about the properties on which final value depends but rather as making more specific ones about the properties that ground final value, these accounts are perfectly coherent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on questions about basic action, the logical structure of intentional action, and the notion of "options" in decision theory. On the way to these central ideas, we argue that a person can try to do something even if they believe it is impossible that they will succeed, that a person can try to do something even if they do not want to succeed, and that a person can try to do something even if they do not intend to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities than into the nature of primary qualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard Russellian variety of the content view can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary and secondary qualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, while secondary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, every fact has an explanation. An important challenge to this principle is that it risks being a counterexample to itself. What explains why everything needs to be explained? My first goal is to distinguish two broad kinds of answers to this question, which I call "Humean Rationalism" and "Non-Humean Rationalism". My second goal will be to defend the prospects of Humean Rationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers a critical perspective on some modern studies of Plotinus’ doctrine of Love, which interpret his Eros as more than a guide, leading the soul to the intelligible world and above, to the first Principle, or directing its gaze to the sensible world. They consider Love to be the driving force behind generation from the One and even identify it with the One itself, basing most of their arguments on rare instances of Eros’ appearance at levels above the soul and using an emphatically erotic terminology that is alien to Plotinus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spatial misrepresentation objection (SMO) against the wave theory of sound argues that if sounds are compression waves, then our auditory experiences are massively illusory for not representing sounds as propagating in the medium. Thus, it claims that the wave theory should be rejected because it is unreasonable to accept such an error theory of hearing. This paper presents a metaphysics of compression waves to show that the wave theory correctly implies that we cannot hear sounds as propagating. Moreover, I argue that the SMO is based on a mischaracterisation of the phenomenology of auditory experiences. A new conception of auditory perception is then proposed to explain how a sound source and its compression wave are both represented in the same auditory experience. Finally, I compare my view with some alternative theories of sound. Overall, it is found that the SMO is more of an objection against the traditional conception of hearing than a challenge to the wave theory of sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The running thread of the present article is the perceived union and harmony between faith and reason in the worldview of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī (d. 1542), arguably the most significant – but little-known to modern scholarship – Shiʿi intellectual and polymath of the late medieval era. The study sets to do three things: first, to introduce to introduce new data and material for the study of early Safavid intellectual history, focusing on the figure of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī (d. 1542), his life, writings, and legacy; second, to set out the contours of Dashtakī's major accomplishments in philosophy, namely in metaphysics; and third, to call for a revised reading of the Safavid intellectual and cultural renaissance, showing that there was precedent in the example of the Shiraz Circle and particularly in Dashtakī, who, along with his contemporaries, led an important scholarly revival in religion and philosophy well over a century before the rise of the Isfahan school in the early decades of the eleventh/seventeenth century. The article will be concerned primarily with Dashtakī the son who lived under the dispensation of the Safavid rulers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our 'best state' and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the 'human' kind (ho anthrōpinos nous , 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a 'by-product' (en parergōi , 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs , I contend, equally applies to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the 'divine life' of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents a critical response to S. Pearl Brilmyer's essay "Queer Rigidity: Habit and the Limits of the Performativity Thesis" published in the Summer 2024 issue. Topics include comments on Brilmyer's account of underlying metaphysics of queer theory, the author's view on dual-aspect metaphysics offered by Judith Butler in her works "Gender Trouble" and "Bodies That Matter" and other works that explore what metaphysics might offer queer theory such as that of Jasbir Puar and Mel Chen.

In this article, I will focus on an aspect that can be inferred from reading Moby Dick: the voyage of the Pequod as an attempt to exceed the human limit with the intention to punish the culprit of his expulsion from Eden, at the same time, Moby Dick is the monster at the gates of the limit, and whose purpose is to prevent this transgression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the recent publication of Donner le tempts II, we question the status of the gift, its singularity, its relationship, beyond the intentional structure of decision and consciousness, with the general problematic of democracy and the archive, of Khora as an enigma that haunts the same Onto-Theo-Cosmological conjugation of metaphysics and logocentrism, to show that the question about the gift is also the question about history and about the very possibility of democracy, beyond the capitalist logic of accumulation and valuation. We end up referring to the strange case of the 'six pesos' thematized in Miguel Angel Asturias's novel, Hombres de maiz, as a case of the incalculable. Far from an instrumental account, but also from a providential version of the gift, we try to show it as an event always already inscribed in the abyss of our exchange relations, a possibility contained in its own impossibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derrida's reading of Heidegger's 1962 lecture On Time and Being concludes the last session of the 1978–79 seminar published in Donner le temp II. There, Heidegger suggests that the task of thinking consists of thinking Being without regard to metaphysics, while ceasing all overcoming of metaphysics as such. What is given as the task for thought is that which onto-theology makes impossible to think, that is, the constitutive aporetic remainder of metaphysical thinking. This essay contends that for both Heidegger and Derrida the task of thought consists in this same matter of thinking, with which the question of the gift primarily deals. It maintains that in order to think the giving of the gift without regard to metaphysics, the gift could be thought in terms of anxiety. In this perspective, anxiety emerges as a thoughtful affect that gives an access to thinking the impossible, cutting through the onto-theological order of metaphysics. Finally, bringing together Heidegger and Lacan's accounts of anxiety allows us to creep deeper into this liminal dimension of what is to be thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the reader to contemporary philosophical research on God and time, without presupposing any familiarity with either philosophy of religion or philosophy of time. To start with, aspects of the topic are compared to some structurally similar ideas in secular philosophical thought about time and ethics. The article then introduces timeless versus temporal conceptions of eternity and discusses positions intending to combine elements of both. There is a brief interlude on relevant background in temporal metaphysics regarding A‐ and B‐theories. The final two sections then examine recent developments in the timeless and temporal camps, with a particular emphasis on the role that temporal metaphysics is playing in discussions of the timeless approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In debates about the metaphysics of properties, many have claimed that properties are powers. According to the powers view, a property's nature disposes objects to behave in certain ways in response to certain stimuli. For example, the property of fragility disposes objects to smash when a force is applied to them. But how should we understand powers? There has recently been a surge of interest in the powerful qualities view of properties. Other views in the field either claim that properties are pure powers, or that they are qualities. The powerful qualities view rejects this dichotomy, saying that properties are both powers and qualities. In this paper, I distinguish some versions of the powerful qualities view, and some of the reasons to hold it. I also outline one of the most exciting elements of the view, which is its relation to the philosophy of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a reply to critics who contributed to a roundtable on my book, Hegel's World Revolutions. It offers a series of clarifications with a restatement of some core positions, defending historically informed interpretation, and then covering the reception of his work, his views on contemporary politics, the nature of his metaphysics, and the grounds for criticising his claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the philosophical basis for neuropsychoanalysis, dual-aspect monism is fundamental to the entire neuropsychoanalytic project. However, dual-aspect monism has been criticized not only from without but also from within neuropsychoanalysis. This paper considers criticisms of dual-aspect monism from within neuropsychoanalysis. These might be summed up as a concern that the difference at the level of epistemology (neuroscience, psychoanalysis) and phenomena (objectivity, subjectivity) must not be washed away by an appeal to a common ontology. In response, I propose to supplement dual-aspect monism with the philosophical framework of Transcendental Materialism. In this view, epistemological difference between the dual aspects is secondary to antagonism at the level of monistic ontology. Transcendental Materialism begins with the question: what sort of nature must nature be to give rise to two irreducible perspectives such as neuroscience and psychoanalysis? I argue for supplementing dual-aspect monism with Transcendental Materialism through a review of Mark Solms’s work on the hard problem of consciousness via Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle. Within the Solms-Friston framework, the informatic mechanisms that give rise to dual-aspect epistemologies rely upon ontological antagonism. Principles of a transcendental materialist dual-aspect monism for neuropsychoanalysis are put forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyse Émilie Du Châtelet’s (1706–49) account of causation which, in turn, is crucial for understanding her philosophical main work, the Institutions de physique (1740/1742). So far, the topic of causation in Du Châtelet’s thought has received but little attention despite its importance. I will show that Du Châtelet’s account of physical causation is that of physical influx much in line with the position taken by some of the most prominent eighteenth-century German metaphysicians at the time of the publication of her Institutions: Martin Knutzen (1713–49), Johann Peter Reusch (1691–1758) and the pre-Critical Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). I will argue that physical influx takes place at the level of simple substances or physical monads, and I will defend my interpretation against the main objection to physical influx: that it conflicts with Leibniz’s non-transfer argument. The ultimate metaphysical details regarding how physical influx has to be understood remain an issue, that of understanding the causality of the cause. This, however, is an issue that other causal theories face, too (in their own way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche is a an important philosopher whose works and ideas are have been debated and revisited not only in the Western tradition but also and in the Eastern traditions. For example, almost all of Nietzsche's works have been translated into Turkish, and he is one the most translated European philosophers. There are also numerous scholarly works on Nietzsche, not only by philosophers, but also by literary scholars, theologians, cultural scholars, sociologists and even political scientists. The main reason for Nietzsche' popularity is that his philosophy can be read and interpreted from a variety of perspectives. Nietzsche's ideas can be used to support and argue for any ideological tendency, or to criticize any ideological approach. As a result, Nietzsche has been variously described as a fascist, anarchist, atheist, religious, or even conservative. His most widely held and understood opinions are his interpretation of the phrase "God is Dead" and his portrayal of Nietzsche as an anti-religious character. Nietzsche, on the otherhand, is unafraid to challenge the dominant views of science, reason, and morality. This is because, according to Nietzsche, all previous values, beliefs, and acceptances have created a prejudice against the human capacity for understanding, which can be eradicated by re-evaluating values and reconstructing oneself. Nietzsche takes a genealogical approach, aiming to trace the errors of human history from its beginnings to the present. It is a historically grounded critique of metaphysics and superstition. It is critical to release people from the shackles of the past and help them get back on their feet. According to Nietzsche, the most crucial event that will disturb him/her is God's death. Only then can a person begin to examine his own thinking and question his fundamental identity. What does the short, revolutionary phrase "God dying" actually mean? Did Nietzsche declare war against all religions? How should Nietzsche be understood fundamentally? The present study is intended to answer these questions and to prevent unfounded and damaging discussions about Nietzsche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Lauren Groff's 2015 novel Fates and Furies engages with distinct conceptions of pessimism – cosmic pessimism as defined by Eugene Thacker and metaphysical pessimism as defined by Joshua Foa Dienstag – via the depiction of a deteriorating American marriage. The essay considers how the text's representations of pessimism allows Groff to consider multiple philosophical issues such as the meaning and function of excess and the subjective limits of interpersonal relations. The piece concludes with an analysis of what the novel's narrator dubs "the paradox of marriage," – encapsulated in the phrase "you can never know someone entirely; you do know someone entirely" – examining, finally, how a state-sanctioned humanism haunts the concept of marriage at its core, one predicated on the pessimistic nature of subjectivity (202). The essay ultimately attempts to start a long overdue conversation on a considerably underappreciated author with little to no scholarship published on her significant writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hargrove's ontological argument for Aesthetic Foundation of Wilderness Preservation was the extension of the thinking paradigm from human beings to moral consideration and aesthetic appreciation of wilderness. The thinking paradigm was based on the framework of traditional Western philosophy, which includes metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In this article, I will examine Hargrove's ontological argument by making a little comparison with the perspective of a Chinese philosophical framework. This paper will be divided into three parts. In the part I, I will summarize Hargrove's ontological argument for natural beauty and environmental preservation. In part II, I will examine the metaphysical framework in Hargrove's ontological argument. I argue it is the extension of Plato's metaphysics of the ultimate reality to wilderness. In Part III, I will examine the ethical and aesthetic framework in his ontological argument. I point out Hargrove's ethical framework comes from ethical rationalism and his aesthetic framework is the legacy of Plato's aesthetics. By comparison, Chinese metaphysics stresses the process and Chinese ethics stresses care. The two different directions promote the aesthetic appreciation of agricultural land rather than wilderness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for a version of sacred naturalism within the framework of a processual metaphysics that characterizes the cosmos as an interplay between Chaos (disunity) and Logos (unity). I argue that although creativity is highly valuable from the perspective of life and humanity, at a cosmic scale it is overshadowed by the universal tendencies toward conservation and destruction. Within this metaphysical picture I develop a naturalist notion of the sacred as a phenomenological object inspiring particularly intense feelings of inner harmony but functioning eudaemonically to strengthen mind, body, and soul against forms of Chaos, whether anomie, stress, or personal conflict. After developing some criteria for a sacred but immanent meta-unity in contrast to the transcendental unities of traditional religion, I describe how the unity of the cosmos might be experienced as a sacred object by emphasizing its heterarchical, aesthetic and life-affirming dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can a bridge be constructed between Whiteheadian process metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic substance metaphysics? I ask this question in the context of physical change, using the chemical transformation of molecules as the quintessential exemplar. While both metaphysical systems describe nature as dynamical and relational, each sees change differently: for process metaphysics, change is constitutive of all actualities, while for substance metaphysics, change is secondary and something that happens to actualities. My analysis concludes that these two systems of thought have fundamental metaphysical differences that do not permit a reconciliation. Rather than reconciliation, what might be possible is the development of a new way to speak about the actualities of world, not as substances or processes but a way that subsumes both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advocates a realist position with respect to science and common sense. It considers the question of whether science provides knowledge of reality. It presents a positive response to that question. It rejects the antirealist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But it remains to be specified just what world that is. Some argue that science leads to the rejection of our commonsense view of the world. If so, the world about which science informs us is not the world of common sense. Common sense is "stone-age metaphysics". It is false theory inherited from our primitive ancestors that is to be eliminated in favour of science. Against such an elimination of common sense, it is argued that science both preserves and explains our commonsense experience of the world. Science may well lead to the overthrow of some of our most deeply held beliefs. But common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs that are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to base a realist philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ibn Sīnā famously opens The Metaphysics (Al-ilāhiyyāt) of The Healing (Al-šifāʾ) with a discussion of what constitutes the subject matter of that science. Several candidates are introduced and subsequently dismissed, before "the existent qua existent" is identified as its subject matter. Among the candidates dismissed, he mentions "the ultimate causes for all existents, the four of them" (which are, however, things investigated [ maṭālib ] in this science). Here, Ibn Sīnā comes to problematise the notion of causality itself. He is adamant that "the existence of causes for things which are effects" is not self-evident, but needs to be proven by the metaphysician by means of a "demonstrative clarification" (bayān burhānī). He explains why sensation (ḥiss) and experience (taǧriba) cannot prove causality, before turning to its metaphysical proof. In this article, I investigate what Ibn Sīnā thought this "demonstrative clarification" of causality is. I present an analysis of his train of thought and a commentary on the various points he makes, leading up to his proof of causality. These points touch on problems of psychology, scientific method, and scientific proof, and can be unpacked by taking into account explanations he offers elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his first work, Kant discusses the possibility that more than one universe exists. Starting from the principle that substances have an essential force to act outside of themselves and that they are linked only in the exercise of this force, Kant concludes that the total set of substances linked to each other forms a universe. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible that a substance exists with-out being linked to the substances of a certain universe, not being part of it, and that it is linked to other, alien substances, forming a separate universe with these. But the possibility of multiple universes requires that there be spaces of different natures or dimensionalities, so that such universes remain disconnected and are actually different universes and not distant parts of the same universe. This is because the nature of space depends on the kind of force with which the substances interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In what follows, I present my replies to Nicholas Walker, Taylor Carman, and Peter Gordon's reflections on my What Would Be Different? Figures of Possibility in Adorno. I begin by summarizing what is at stake in the book. My reply to Nicholas Walker and Taylor Carman focusses on Adorno's criticisms of Heidegger, who claims that the history of metaphysics has blocked our access to an "other beginning" for thinking. This prepares the ground for a comparison of Adorno's and Heidegger's notions of what I call "blocked possibility." My reply to Peter Gordon clarifies the relation of "blocked possibility" to actuality and, more specifically, to the actuality of happiness in Adorno's writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]