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This paper proposes a complex dynamic system subpopulation model for the construction and validation of a novel form of local complementary currency, namely the Grassroots Economics Foundation’s Community Inclusion Currency (CIC) implemented recently in Kenya. First, we highlight that CICs can act as a local liquidity-provision institutional device in poor or isolated economic regions, thereby serving as a market-based mechanism to alleviate poverty. Second, we elicit 50 heterogeneous utility types according to observed transactions behavior in our rich data set, i.e., via revealed – and recorded – preferences, and build a corresponding model and simulation at a meso-economic level., Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Research

This paper uses a survey among students at European universities to explore whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected attitudes toward European integration. Some respondents completed the survey just before Russia's assault on February 24, 2022, and some did so just afterwards, thus delivering a quasi-experimental design situation, which we exploit. Our results suggest that the ominous news about the Russian attack increased the participants' interest in EU politics, consolidated their attachment to the EU, and made them more mindful and appreciative of the benefits of deeper European integration. In effect, the war so close to the EU Eastern border provoked a rally around the supranational EU flag, with convergence of public opinion toward shared European values.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-o¤ between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which each of the systems can remain stable., Current version uploaded April 2013.

In this paper we evaluate the relative influence of external versus domestic inflation drivers in the 12 new European Union (EU) member countries. Our empirical analysis is based on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005) for small open economies (SOE). Employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), we find that the SOE NKPC is well supported in the new EU member states. We also find that the inflation process is dominated by domestic variables in the larger countries of our sample, whereas external variables are mostly relevant in the smaller countries.

This paper studies the transmission of preferences in an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous mature agents characterized by different degrees of inflation aversion. We show how the dynamics of a society's degree of inflation aversion and the implied degree of central bank independence depend on the direction and speed of changes in the structure of the population's preferences, themselves a function of parent socialization efforts in response to observed inflation. We then construct a survey-based measure of inflation aversion and provide empirical support for our analytical and simulation results. Available cross-section evidence confirms that a nation's demographic structure, in particular variation in the share of retirees as a proxy for the more inflation-averse type, is a key determinant of inflation aversion, together with experience with past inflation and the resulting collective memory embodied in monetary institutions.

This paper applies GMMestimation to assess empirically the small open-economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005). We obtain a testable specification where fluctuations in the terms of trade enter explicitly, thus allowing a comparison of the relevance of domestic versus external determinants of CPI inflation dynamics. For most countries in our sample the expected relative change in the terms of trade emerges as a more relevant inflation driver than the contemporaneous domestic output gap. Overall, our results indicate some, albeit moderate, support for the tested relationship based on data from ten OECD countries typically classified as open economies.

The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.