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The purpose of the study of the article is to reveal the features of the formation of a virtual person in the postmodern era. The relevance of the article is due to the need to study the processes in society, determined by technical and information systems and virtual reality, which lead to the formation of a new posthuman. The authors made an attempt to trace the influence of the information age and virtual reality technologies on the formation of a person of the postmodern era – Homo Virtualis. The article emphasizes that virtual reality technologies can significantly affect not only the evolution of man, but also his consciousness. The scientific novelty of the article lies in an attempt to present the possible consequences of the virtualization of consciousness. As a result of the study, the authors came to the conclusion that the process of virtualization transforms not only the work of consciousness, but also the valuable and practical attitudes of a person., Originally published in https://ruservices.rgutspubl.org/index.php/1/article/view/266

En este trabajo se analiza la cuestión de si el volcado de la mente en una máquina (mind uploading), en caso de ser alguna vez tecnológicamente posible, mantendría o destruiría la identidad personal de quien experimentara el volcado. Se verá cómo podría contestarse a la cuestión en función de los criterios para el mantenimiento de la identidad personal que se asuman. No hay una respuesta única, puesto que la identidad personal se mantendría o no en función de los supuestos aceptados. No obstante, para la mayor parte de las concepciones filosóficas sobre la identidad personal, ésta no se mantendría en un proceso de volcado de la mente en una máquina. Si esto es así, habría que concluir que, desde diversos enfoques, dicho volcado sería equivalente a la desaparición del sujeto, es decir, a su muerte, y solo desde posiciones muy limitadas podría defenderse lo contrario., This paper explores the question of whether mind uploading, if ever technologically possible, would maintain or destroy the personal identity of whoever experienced the uploading. It will be explained how the question could be answered in different ways depending on the criteria for the maintenance of personal identity that are assumed. There is no single answer, since personal identity would be considered as maintained or not depending on the accepted assumptions. However, for most of the philosophical conceptions about personal identity, this would not be maintained in a process of uploading. This means, therefore, that this process would be equivalent to the disappearance of the subject, that is, to his death, and only from very limited positions could the opposite be defended., Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales

We present the consequences of the assumption of the classical and quantum nature of information storing and processing in the brain. These assumptions result in different behaviours of consciousness under a hypothetical brain copy experiment. The subject is important in the context of ‘mind uploading’ considerations.

The embryo space colonization (ESC) concept is an interesting, very rational and quite effective way to guarantee the survival of the human species, as long as the technology is achieved and no unforeseen complications arise during even many millions of years journey to an exoplanet. Despite these formal advantages of the concept, this paper points to a number of arguments against its validity. These arguments revolve around two issues. One is to point out that while the concept of saving the Homo sapiens species is noble and should be supported, the way of saving humanity envisioned by the ESC departs from what should be understood by the concept of saving humanity through space colonization. The second issue is to draw attention to the ethical controversies that make this concept perhaps unsuitable for implementation at all. At least some of these objections do not address the concept of saving humanity by sending adult living persons on space missions.

From the U.S. president fist-bumping a brain-controlled robotic arm to monkeys playing brain-controlled Pong, the past few years have had a surge of neural interfaces in the news. Neural interfaces, which are used in brain–machine interface (BMI) and neurostimulation technologies, often conjure images of mind-controlled cyborgs and mind uploading. In reality, they offer incredible hope for patients with intractable neurological conditions. For example, just nine years ago came the first demonstration of a woman with tetraplegia (paralysis from the chest down) controlling a robotic prosthetic arm through electrical signals recorded directly from her brain, specifically, the motor cortex, which controls movement [1] . For 15 years, she had been unable to perform basic daily tasks, such as eating and drinking on her own, but with a BMI, she demonstrated the ability to pick up a cup of coffee and take a sip.

The paper analyses selected philosophical aspects of Stanisław Lem’s Solaris. I argue that there is an interesting similarity between the history of “Solarist studies” –the fictional scientific discipline depicted by Lem and cognitive science. I show that both disciplines go through similar stages as they try to describe their main subject (the planet Solaris and human consciousness respectively). In the further part of the paper, I focus on two problems identified in cognitive science that can be directly related to the themes found in Solaris: the problem of the detection of intelligence and the problem of the notion of mental representations.I finish the paper by looking at the mysterious guests that stalk the main protagonists and show that they can be understood as heuristic models that are taken into account in the theories of mind uploading. Artykuł bada wybrane filozoficzne aspekty powieści Solaris Stanisława Lema. Twierdzę, że zachodzi interesujące podobieństwo pomiędzy historią „solarystyki” – fikcyjnej dyscypliny naukowej opisywanej przez Lema a historią kognitywistyki. Pokazuję, że obie dyscypliny przechodziły przez podobne etapy, starając się opisać swój przedmiot (odpowiednio, planetę Solaris oraz świadomość ludzką). W dalszej części artykułu skupiam się na dwóch problemach zidentyfikowanych w kognitywistyce, które można bezpośrednio odnieść do wątków obecnych w Solaris: problemie wykrywania istot myślących oraz problemie reprezentacji umysłowych.Kończę artykuł przyglądając się tajemniczym gościom, którzy prześladują bohaterów powieści i pokazuję, że mogą oni być zinterpretowani jako modele heurystyczne rozważane w teoriach uploadu.

Agradezco los comentarios de Belén Liedo y Pablo García-Barranquero a una versión previa del manuscrito, así como a los revisores anónimos de la revista Isegoría y al público de Valencia, Santiago de Compostela y Málaga por sus aportaciones. Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’. Transhumanism and philosophical posthumanism have paid special attention to human corporeality in relation to technological breakthroughs. This article begins by pointing out how the two movements differ significantly about the inheritance of humanism. Subsequently, the transhumanist notion of ‘morphological freedom’ is addressed from the proposals of More, Sandberg, and Bostrom. Then, paradigmatic cases of body modifications through cybernetic implants are considered. Finally, the issues of identity, corporeality, and the disagreement between the two currents regarding ‘mind uploading’ are problematized. Proyecto Inteligencia artificial y biotecnología de la mejora moral. Aspectos éticos (FFI2016-79000-P), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad del Gobierno de España

Background:While modern humans seek ways to extend life expectancy, the necessity of advanced bioengineering tools for the production of effective human enhancement applications appears as compelling as ever.Objective:The technological future of Homo sapiens has been scheduled within a quantum environment and advanced physical interventions are imperative to occur in the anatomy of modern humans, including genetic improvement and human cloning. New terminologies and latest projects such as genome editing, mind uploading and tissue engineering applications for the growth of new organs are issues of discussion in this paper.Methods:Several advanced biotechnological methods are presented in this paper, including the 14-days rule, the 2045 Initiative project and the CRISPR technique and their social and ethical implications are discussed.Results:The exponential aging of the population results in rapidly increasing demands for next-generation drugs and innovative pharmaceutical products that target individualized genetic treatment, resulting in the emergence of controversial ethical and social implications in the forthcoming post-Homo sapiens Era.Conclusion:The next-generation ethics must be clarified, an interdisciplinary debate should be initiated, and all the different perspectives must be recorded and evaluated to adopt the most efficient practices for controversial topics like the potential digital immortality.

Technology in the last century has flourished exponentially. Previous fantasies are becoming cutting-edge discoveries like global communications, encyclopedic knowledge at the average person’s fingertips, and even medical advances used to improve and extend one’s quality of life and life expectancy. As technology pushes the boundaries of what is possible, ambitious visionaries look to solve the arguably greatest problem known to humanity: death. Transhumanists aiming to use technology to overcome this great human limitation, mortality, present the newest proposed solutions to life’s oldest challenge. One of these solutions, mind uploading, is perhaps the most ambitious, but it is not without its own philosophical hindrances. In contrast, Christian resurrection claims to not only solve the problem of death, it claims to already have a historical model in the person of Jesus Christ.

ML would like to thank Kaj Sotala for his support for Moralities of Intelligent Machines team and for providing the first version of the Mind Upload vignette. ML would like to thank all of his team members, who make this research possible. Special thanks to Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation (grant number: 170112) and Academy of Finland (grant number: 323207) for funding this research. This article is dedicated to ML’s mother: thank you for everything. May all the beings in all the worlds be happy., Mind upload, making a digital copy of one's brain, is a part of the transhumanistic dream of eternal life and the end of suffering. It is also perceived as a viable route toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). However, AI safety research has alerted to one major risk in creating AGI by mind upload: namely, that mind upload technology could appeal primarily to callous and selfish individuals who then abuse this technology for their personal gain—and, potentially, at a considerable cost to the welfare of humankind. Therefore, it is important to understand whether people's acceptance of mind upload is associated with pathological and/or antisocial traits. To this end, the present research examined whether individual differences in Dark Triad traits predict attitudes toward mind upload in a sample of 1007 English-speaking adults. A pre-registered structural equation model revealed that Machiavellianism (but not psychopathy) was associated with favorable views about mind upload, both directly and indirectly through utilitarian moral attitudes. These results therefore substantiate the concerns voiced by AI safety researchers—namely, that mind upload technology could be adopted disproportionately by individuals with an antisocial personality., Jane & Aatos Erkko Foundation [grant number 170112], Academy of Finland [grant number 323207]

The aim of the article was to present the influence of changes to the body-machine system, resulting from the application of innovative technologies and the strategy of cyborgization on the perception of and assignment of value to the human body in contemporary society. I apply two research approaches. On the one hand, the non-invasive functioning of the body-machine system as an expression of transgression; on the other one: the functioning of a machine connected with a body (exo-extension), the functioning of a machine in a body (endo-extension) and the functioning of a body in a machine (mind uploading), as an expression of transhumanism. Addressing the problem formulated in the title of this article, I postulated the hypothesis that undermining the natural status of the human body in postbiological society, favoured by cyborgization and the application of innovative technologies, resulting from a controlled social discourse and knowledge, changing the body-machine relations, changes the perception of and assignment of value to the human body. The hypothesis was confirmed. The article is analytical and descriptive. The research problem is analysed from the sociological perspective.

This paper addresses the greatest aspiration of the transhumanist movement: achieving immortal life through a procedure known as mind uploading. This procedure consists in keeping our minds fully a...

The technology and possibility of achieving mind uploading, technically called whole brain emulation, are explored. Experimental work is ongoing with small animal brains. Religious issues addressed include the role of the body, what kind of body the uploaded mind gets, and how cognition is embodied. The philosophical and religious concept of personal identity is examined with regard to whether the mind upload preserves the identity of the person choosing this procedure. The chapter discusses the various ways the religions might respond, should mind uploading technology be successful. Three ways of defining the ethics of mind uploading are discussed: the therapy—enhancement continuum and ways to make us better, choice, and justice. Discussion questions are included at the end of the chapter.

Elon Musk regularly advertises for the simulation argument, stressing that he regards it as highly likely that we live in a computer simulation. However, it must be noted that the argument can be reconstructed such that its line of thought can be rationally grasped. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is a plausible argument. The argument presupposes the anthropology that human beings can be uploaded onto a hard drive, which is based upon the view that humans are nothing like a software running on our body which serves as our hardware. It is this understanding of the human species which has been employed by many transhumanists who stress that immortality is near. The author will explain the line of thought underlining the simulation argument while they will, at the same time, explain that it is neither highly likely that we live in a computer simulation, nor that we can upload our personalities onto a computer, and even if this was possible, it would not enable us to become immortal.

In recent years, the idea of mind uploading has left the genre of science fiction. Uploading our minds as a form of immortality, or so it has been argued, is now within our reach. Of course, this depends on the assumption that our mind is nothing more than some sort of computer software running on the brain as hardware paving the way for a standard procedure of mind uploading, namely instantaneous destructive uploading – where the brain is simulated on a computer - or gradual destructive uploading – where brain regions are gradually replaced by micro-chips. Lately, however, there has been sustained doubts that things are so simple. In this volume alone Susan Schneider & Joe Corabi and Gualtiero Piccinini argue that a person cannot survive standard procedures of mind uploading. The main reasons are that the uploading process violates identity criteria for the person and that it is unclear that conscious mental states can be uploaded. In this article, we argue that while the sceptics about the standard methods of uploading are probably right, there are more options to be evaluated. We introduce what we call slow continuous mind uploading as an alternative procedure. Slow continuous uploading (SCU) is based on the extended mind thesis which claims that artefacts can under specific circumstances come to count as part of the realization basis for an individual’s mind. In this context, we explore a form of mind uploading which may already be being innovated today through our deep reliance upon cognitive incorporation of “smart” internet technologies. We will argue that this process may give us the right kind of tools to survive mind uploading, or more minimally, to create an agent that can be considered a psychological continuity of an individual. We think that, at least, the objections so far developed in the literature do not rule this out.

Agradezco los comentarios de Belén Liedo y Pablo García-Barranquero a una versión previa del manuscrito, así como a los revisores anónimos de la revista Isegoría y al público de Valencia, Santiago de Compostela y Málaga por sus aportaciones., Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’., Transhumanism and philosophical posthumanism have paid special attention to human corporeality in relation to technological breakthroughs. This article begins by pointing out how the two movements differ significantly about the inheritance of humanism. Subsequently, the transhumanist notion of ‘morphological freedom’ is addressed from the proposals of More, Sandberg, and Bostrom. Then, paradigmatic cases of body modifications through cybernetic implants are considered. Finally, the issues of identity, corporeality, and the disagreement between the two currents regarding ‘mind uploading’ are problematized., Proyecto Inteligencia artificial y biotecnología de la mejora moral. Aspectos éticos (FFI2016-79000-P), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad del Gobierno de España

According to the intellectual and cultural movement of transhumanism, human beings are in the early stages of development, and it encourages the use of modern science to radically enhance physical, intellectual, psychological, and moral capacities. This paper offers an overview of transhumanism by outlining its historical roots and some current debates within this movement. This paper will further describe several theological responses to transhumanist ambitions and predictions about the future. As will be seen in this paper, how one understands “salvation” affects whether the relationship between Christianity and transhumanism can be framed in terms of a conflict or cautious friendship. The paper will end by showing the ways in which transhumanism itself gives rise to both soteriological and eschatological beliefs about human nature and the wider cosmos. Publisher PDF

El mind uploading es el acto de transferir una mente de su sustrato original (el cuerpo biológico de la persona) a otro sustrato, que puede ser también biológico, o bien robótico o incluso digital. Esta propuesta se enmarca en el movimiento transhumanista y tiene como objetivo último la inmortalidad personal más allá de la duración temporal del cuerpo biológico. La tesis de este artículo es que el mind uploading es una propuesta que se presenta principalmente como tecnológica, pero que, en realidad, tiene implicaciones a muchos otros niveles: antropológico, cultural, político, etc., por lo que requiere una reflexión más profunda. Por ello, se analizan en este artículo dos dimensiones del mind-uploading: su posibilidad real de realización y su deseabilidad, sin pretender tanto dar respuestas finales como suscitar preguntas que se dan muchas veces por descontadas.

This chapter focuses on AI-based cognitive and perceptual enhancements. AI-based brain enhancements are already under development, and they may become commonplace over the next 30–50 years. We raise doubts concerning whether radical AI-based enhancements transhumanists advocate will accomplish the transhumanists goals of longevity, human flourishing, and intelligence enhancement. We urge that even if the technologies are medically safe and are not used as tools by surveillance capitalism or an authoritarian dictatorship, these enhancements may still fail to do their job for philosophical reasons. In what follows, we explore one such concern, a problem that involves the nature of the self. We illustrate that the so called transhumanist efforts to “merge oneself with AI” could lead to perverse realizations of AI technology, such as the demise of the person who sought enhancement. And, in a positive vein, we offer ways to avoid this, at least within the context of one theory of the nature of personhood.