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We examine the difference between attending to our mental states by looking 'within' and attending to the process of perceiving the object through a higher-order type of reflection. The distinction bears particular significance for the field of phenomenology as it corresponds to a crucial difference phenomenologists make between “introspection” (looking inward to examine our own mental states) and “phenomenological reflection” (a unique kind of higher-order act that looks at our perception of the world). In this paper, we attempt to show how they are two distinct ways of knowing ourselves in the world by comparing the models of their information processes. Taking the phenomenon whereby an agent perceives an object in the surrounding reality, we differentiate processes that obtain information from mental states resulting from a perceptive act, from ones which extract information from the perceptive act itself. Whilst in the former case, the perceived information remains within a single computation layer, the latter introduces a second, 'meta' order of computation. The structure of this distinction is reminiscent of informational processes in physical systems, in particular living ones. Similar meta layers are knowingly extremely common in those physical organizations as systems grow increasingly complex, thus allowing different computation types to combine. The benefit of this separation between computations is the capacity of variables from one layer to be coupled to ongoing dynamics in another, making for mutually constructive feedbacks. We use these formalisms to argue that resulting layering effects may enrich and clarify the distinction at issue.

Mindfulness has received increasing interest in the scientific community due to its proved benefits within clinical settings and in increasing well-being. One challenge for mindfulness researchers is how to measure the construct without relying on self-report instruments, which are prone to biases. Here we tested two different computer-based tasks that aimed to get an objective measure of non-attachment (the Behavioral Attachment Task, BAT) and non-reactivity (the Non-Reactivity Assessment Task, NORAT). The BAT leverages the endowment effect, a concept from behavioral economics describing the attachment developed over time towards something we own, to measure increased reactions times to decisions to sell an object gifted to participants. We correlated changes in these reaction times after participants had owned these objects over a delay period with a Non-Attachment Scale commonly used in mindfulness studies using several versions of the test. However, the BAT failed to replicate the original endowment effect, and no significant correlations with mindfulness scores were found. The NORAT investigated the effect of non-task related emotional stimuli (Negative and Positive pictures) on response times to a two-alternative forced choice task, and correlated the degree of emotional interference with the non-reactivity subscale from the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. While negative pictures significantly increased reaction times, we did not find a correlation between this change and non-reactivity. In conclusion, the BAT and NORAT were not successful as objective measures of trait mindfulness, and further research is needed to explore novel ways of measuring these constructs.

Meditation practice is believed to foster states of mindful awareness and mental quiescence in everyday life. If so, then the cultivation of these qualities with training ought to leave its imprint on the activity of intrinsic functional brain networks. In an intensive longitudinal study, we investigated associations between meditation practitioners' experiences of felt mindful awareness and changes in the spontaneous electrophysiological dynamics of functional brain networks. Experienced meditators were randomly assigned to complete 3 months of full‐time training in focused‐attention meditation (during an initial intervention) or to serve as waiting‐list controls and receive training second (during a later intervention). We collected broadband electroencephalogram (EEG) during rest at the beginning, middle, and end of the two training periods. Using a data‐driven approach, we segmented the EEG into a time series of transient microstate intervals based on clustering of topographic voltage patterns. Participants also provided daily reports of felt mindful awareness and mental quiescence, and reported daily on four experiential qualities of their meditation practice during training. We found that meditation training led to increases in mindful qualities of awareness, which corroborate contemplative accounts of deepening mental calm and attentional focus. We also observed reductions in the strength and duration of EEG microstates across both interventions. Importantly, changes in the dynamic sequencing of microstates were associated with daily increases in felt attentiveness and serenity during training. Our results connect shifts in subjective qualities of meditative experience with the large‐scale dynamics of whole brain functional EEG networks at rest., We identified sequences of brain electric microstates across 3 months of residential training in meditation. Training‐related changes in the dynamic sequencing of microstates were associated with daily changes in self‐reported states of mindful awareness. These results connect subjective qualities of meditative experience with the dynamics of functional brain networks at rest.

Consciousness and the human mind have been pondered for centuries [1,2]. Today the most fundamental, likely outlines of the explanation of consciousness are known, and from this landscape we are well-positioned to fill in the basket of specific theories that will include the correct one. However, many errors in thinking and assumptions have accumulated, and even gained fashion, that obscure our progress. It is time to eliminate these, which we do herein by enumerating the complementary true assertions. Following that we mention four principles for choosing direction for further work. We conclude with a framework for further progress.

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a 2-D map that has global levels or states on one axis, and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, phenomenal content is conflated with awareness itself, which contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously (Josipovic 2014, 2019; Josipovic and Miskovic, 2020) I have proposed that consciousness as such, or nondual awareness - a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation, is phenomenally, functionally and neurobiologically, a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by a 2-D map of levels/modes and contents. Here, I propose an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the third dimension on z-axis. an axis to the 2D map of consciousness. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties.I explore how including the implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind altering substances, or spontaneously. I discuss the relevance of this for current theories of consciousness.

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed.

Brahma Kumaris Rajayoga’s open eyed ‘seed stage meditation’ was studied in 52 meditators. Meditation stages: concentration on peace, realization of being a soul and communion with the Supreme Soul. Frequency domain brain electric source localization was used on multichannel EEG recordings to establish activation differences between meditation and open eyed, task-free resting. Additional exploratory analyses probed for effects of passing time from initial rest through meditation to final rest. Meditation showed reduced activity in delta and increased activity in low alpha frequencies. Affected brain areas comprised the following networks: central executive network, mirroring network, task-positive and task-negative network. These altered activations reflect the main cognitive-affective and behavioral specifics of seed stage meditation: attention modulation, self-related processing, experiencing the soul as a point of light between the eyes, endowing the soul with the properties (peacefulness) of the Supreme Soul. Future studies need to differentiate between the stages of the meditation.

Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs) have recently gained attention in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. They can be thought of as episodes of greatly reduced or even absent phenomenal content together with a reduced level of arousal. It has also been proposed that MPEs are cases of consciousness-as-such. Here, we present a different perspective, that consciousness-as-such is first and foremost a type of awareness, that is, non-conceptual, non-propositional, and nondual, in other words, non-representational. This awareness is a unique kind and cannot be adequately specified by the two-dimensional model of consciousness as the arousal level plus the phenomenal content or by their mental representations. Thus, we suggest that to understand consciousness-as-such, and by extension consciousness in general, more accurately, we need to research it as a unique kind.

The study of the human mind has evolved over the course of many centuries. While modern neuroscience relies on objective, quantitative methods for measuring how mental events manifest as brain activity, ancient contemplative traditions have used first-person introspective practices to gain a greater understanding of the mind. It is now possible to combine these different approaches, hopefully in a mutually enriching, synergistic way. As proposed by the late Francisco J. Varela, studying the conscious mind could greatly benefit from bringing together the “first-person” perspective of a well-trained experimental subject with the “third-person” perspective of an outside observer (i.e., a scientist measuring brain activity). Varela called this approach neurophenomenology, referring to the combination of neural measurements with the style of inquiry of classic phenomenology (Varela, 1996). In neurophenomenology experiments, the subject is actively involved in describing his moment-by-moment conscious experience and is sometimes asked to generate specific mind states, while the experimenter is guided by these first-person data in the analysis and interpretation of physiological data (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). This methodology can be used to better account for seemingly random fluctuations in brain activity, which are usually discarded as “noise” but may reveal key insights into ongoing variations in the subject's inner experience (Lutz et al., 2002; Lachaux, 2011).

Mindfulness and compassion meditation are thought to cultivate prosocial behavior. However, the lack of diverse representation within both scientific and participant populations in contemplative neuroscience may limit generalizability and translation of prior findings. To address these issues, we propose a research framework calledIntersectional Neurosciencewhich adapts research procedures to be more inclusive of under-represented groups. Intersectional Neuroscience builds inclusive processes into research design using two main approaches: 1) community engagement with diverse participants, and 2) individualized multivariate neuroscience methods to accommodate neural diversity. We tested the feasibility of this framework in partnership with a diverse U.S. meditation center (East Bay Meditation Center, Oakland, CA). Using focus group and community feedback, we adapted functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) screening and recruitment procedures to be inclusive of participants from various under-represented groups, including racial and ethnic minorities, gender and sexual minorities, people with disabilities, neuropsychiatric disorders, and/or lower income. Using person-centered screening and study materials, we recruited and scanned 15 diverse meditators (80% racial/ethnic minorities, 53% gender and sexual minorities). The participants completed the EMBODY task – which applies individualized machine learning algorithms to fMRI data – to identify mental states during breath-focused meditation, a basic skill that stabilizes attention to support interoception and compassion. All 15 meditators’ unique brain patterns were recognized by machine learning algorithms significantly above chance levels. These individualized brain patterns were used to decode the internal focus of attention throughout a 10-min breath-focused meditation period, specific to each meditator. These data were used to compile individual-level attention profiles during meditation, such as the percentage time attending to the breath, mind wandering, or engaging in self-referential processing. This study provides feasibility of employing an intersectional neuroscience approach to include diverse participants and develop individualized neural metrics of meditation practice. Through inclusion of more under-represented groups while developing reciprocal partnerships, intersectional neuroscience turns the research process into an embodied form of social action.

Contemplative practices are thought to modify one's experience of self and fundamentally change self-referential processing. However, few studies have examined the brain correlates of self-referential processing in long-term meditators. Here, we used the self-referential encoding task (SRET) to examine event-related potentials (ERP) during assessment of pleasant and unpleasant self-views in long-term meditators versus age-matched meditation-naive control participants. Compared with controls, meditators endorsed significantly more pleasant and fewer unpleasant words as self-referential. We also found a between-group difference in the early component of the late-positive-potential (LPP) of the ERP characterized by a larger response to unpleasant versus pleasant words in controls and no difference in meditators. A cross-sectional design, such as the one used in the present study, has certain caveats like self-selectivity bias. If such caveats did not affect our results, these findings suggest that a long-term contemplative lifestyle, of which meditation training is an integral part, alters self-referential processing towards a more adaptive view of self and neural equivalence towards pleasant and unpleasant self-views. These findings suggest that long-term meditation training may affect brain and behavioural mechanism that support a more flexible and healthy relationship to one's self.

The accelerating pace of development in artificial intelligence invokes fundamental questions regarding what constitutes a mind. Considering that AI has sprung from the cognitive enterprise of humanity and that there is the likely prospect of constructing some form of 'global brain', examining such questions may help to refine the conversation around AI and understand what might constitute a global brain. We draw on recent work in philosophy of mind and cognition—viewing mind as being representational and/or enactive in nature and function—, and hone in on insights that practices and accounts of non-ordinary consciousness (NOC) lend to this discussion. We discuss the concept of a "mindplex", which is comprised of individual constituents (humans and/or AI's) and an encompassing collective global brain that both concurrently possess cohesive 'theatres of consciousness'. We posit that these theatres of an AGI global brain have correspondences with key aspects of the inherent nature of consciousness and reality (as understood outside the AI context) as gleaned through NOC. We propose that these considerations are poised to strongly contribute to the construction of mindplexes by reflecting in their functional architecture the nature of mind and engineering mindplexes in tandem with ethical and value-alignment considerations. Furthermore, we propose the adoption and implementation of AI on distributed ledger technology (DLT), such as blockchain, which would provide support for the evolution of a global brain mindplex.

The ability to discriminate among goal-relevant stimuli tends to diminish when detections must be made continuously over time. Previously, we reported that intensive training in shamatha (focused-attention) meditation can improve perceptual discrimination of difficult-to-detect visual stimuli (MacLean et al., 2010). Here we extend these findings to examine how discrimination difficulty and meditation training interact to modulate event-related potentials of attention and perceptual processing during vigilance. Training and wait-list participants completed a continuous performance task (CPT) at the beginning, middle, and end of two 3-month meditation interventions. In the first intervention (Retreat 1), the CPT target was adjusted across assessments to match training-related changes in participants’ perceptual capacity. In the second intervention (Retreat 2), the target was held constant across training, irrespective of changes in discrimination capacity. No training effects were observed in Retreat 1, whereas Retreat 2 was associated with changes in the onset of early sensory signals and an attenuation of within-task decrements at early latencies. In addition, changes at later stimulus processing stages were directly correlated with improvements in perceptual threshold across the second intervention. Overall, these findings demonstrate that improvements in perceptual discrimination can modulate electrophysiological markers of perceptual processing and attentional control during sustained attention, but likely only under conditions where an individuals’ discrimination capacity is allowed to exceed the demand imposed by the difficulty of a visual target. These results contribute to basic understanding of the dependence of perceptual processing and attentional control to contextual demands, and their susceptibility to directed mental training.

No individual exists without exhibiting prosociality in one or another situation during their lifetime. The argument however, is to what extent? Does it arise spontaneously, out of true empathy and compassion for others, or it is goal-oriented with some hidden motive? Here, our primary intention is to convey that, though various meditation-based interventions can be utilized for different purposes like cultivating prosocial behaviors such as compassion, empathy etc., one’s underlying motive and intent seems to play a crucial role in an individual’s development. Most of the studies exploring prosociality, in the context of meditation, usually do not consider the role of hidden or underlying motivation in one’s prosocial expression. By considering an example of how mindfulness may sometimes lead to the wrong consequences, we try to analyze why it is important to include the aspect of inner motivation in future studies exploring the effects of meditation on prosociality. We also propose that while practicing meditation one may need traditional assistance and ethical/moral teachings in addition to those merely isolated techniques.

International audience; The surge of interest about mindfulness meditation is associated with a growing empirical evidence about its impact on the mind and body. Yet, despite promising phenomenological or psychological models of mindfulness, a general mechanistic understanding of meditation steeped in neuroscience is still lacking. In parallel, predictive processing approaches to the mind are rapidly developing in the cognitive sciences with an impressive explanatory power: processes apparently as diverse as perception, action, attention, and learning, can be seen as unfolding and being coherently orchestrated according to the single general mandate of free-energy minimization. Here, we briefly explore the possibility to supplement previous phenomenological models of focused attention meditation by formulating them in terms of active inference. We first argue that this perspective can account for how paying voluntary attention to the body in meditation helps settling the mind by downweighting habitual and automatic trajectories of (pre)motor and autonomic reactions, as well as the pull of distracting spontaneous thought at the same time. Secondly, we discuss a possible relationship between phenomenological notions such as opacity and de-reification, and the deployment of precision-weighting via the voluntary allocation of attention. We propose the adoption of this theoretical framework as a promising strategy for contemplative research. Explicit computational simulations and comparisons with experimental and phenomenological data will be critical to fully develop this approach.

Background: Family dementia caregivers often suffer from an immense toll of grief while caring for their loved ones. We sought to identify the clinical relationship between grief, depression and mindfulness and identify neural predictors of symptomatology and improvement. Methods: 23 family dementia caregivers were assessed at baseline for grief, mindfulness and depression, of which 17 underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). During fMRI, caregivers were shown faces of either their dementia-stricken relative or that of a stranger, paired with grief-related or neutral words. In 9 subjects, post fMRI scans were also obtained after four weeks of either guided imagery or relaxation. Robust regression was used to predict changes in symptoms with longitudinal brain activation changes as the dependent variable. Results: Grief and depression symptoms were correlated (r = 0.50, p = .01), and both were negatively correlated with mindfulness (r = -.70, p = .0002; r = -.52, p = .01). Relative to viewing strangers, caregivers shown pictures of their loved ones (picture factor) exhibited increased activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus and precuneus. Improvement in grief but not mindfulness or depression was predicted by increased relative brain activation in the precuneus and anterior cingulate (different subregions from baseline). Viewing grief-related vs. neutral words elicited activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus. Conclusions: Caregiver grief, depression and mindfulness are interrelated but have at least partially nonoverlapping neural mechanisms. Picture and word stimuli related to grief evoked brain activity in regions previously identified with bereavement grief. These activation foci might be useful as biomarkers of treatment response.

Distinct types of meditation practice addressed in this review can help cultivate skills people may bring to later social interactions. We examine self-transcendence, or the drive to benefit others beyond the self, as a key mechanism through which meditation may promote positive social outcomes. Self-transcendence cultivated through various styles of meditation can impact social outcomes through two main pathways: First, self-transcendence can turn rigid, defensive self-focus into flexible and receptive self-construals. Second, it can increase positive other-focus by integrating reward and social signals in the brain. These accounts offer one practical solution of positively transforming social relations and highlight potential usefulness of considering self-transcendence in researching social effects of meditation.

Distress is commonly characterized by prolonged internal suffering that can range from self-focused processing of negative emotions and stressors, to highly intensely aversive and prolonged emotional states thereby worsening or complicating emotional and physical conditions. Decentering represents a metacognitive capacity thought to reflect three interrelated processes: meta-awareness, disidentification from internal experience, and reduced reactivity to thought content—which is reliably increased with mindfulness-based interventions. In this essay, we seek to link the clinical presentation of distress disorders to known or hypothesized disruptions in neural networks that underlie emotion, cognition, and goal directed behavior, and offer a neurobehavioral account for how and why treatments imbued with mindfulness meditation might ameliorate these conditions, in part through increases in decentering.

I introduce arguments toward a non-representational reflexivity theory of consciousness-as-such to address one of the key issues in the science of consciousness today: lack of understanding of the nature of consciousness itself. An expanded map of consciousness is outlined, which includes, in addition to the well-known contents of awareness and levels of arousal, the indeterminate substrate and consciousness-as-such or nondual awareness. The central idea presented is that consciousness-as-such is a non-conceptual nondual awareness, whose essential property is non-representational reflexivity. This property makes consciousness-as-such phenomenologically, cognitively and neurobiologically a unique kind, different from and irreducible to any contents, functions and states, including the indeterminate substrate. Our previous hypothesis on the precuneus network for nondual awareness is further discussed in relation to non-representational reflexivity, and in the light of other hypotheses on the neural correlates of consciousness-as-such.

Mindfulness meditation has been primarily studied within the context of individual’s psychological well being and/or in relation to it’s potential to enhance cognitive skills such as attention and working memory. However, in Buddhism, mindfulness is used as a tool to cultivate wholesome actions, and as a means to promote virtuous, prosocial qualities. In this article, we postulate that heightened awareness of physiological and mental phenomena following mindfulness training may contribute to altered processing of morally relevant information and promote moral action. We will first briefly summarize neuroscientific investigations into moral cognition, and provide a theoretical and an experimental framework for the investigation of the relationship between mindfulness and ethical behavior.

Meditation practices are often used to cultivate interoception or internally-oriented attention to bodily sensations, which may improve health via cognitive and emotional regulation of bodily signals. However, it remains unclear how meditation impacts internal attention (IA) states due to lack of measurement tools that can objectively assess mental states during meditation practice itself, and produce time estimates of internal focus at individual or group levels. To address these measurement gaps, we tested the feasibility of applying multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to single-subject fMRI data to: (1) learn and recognize internal attentional states relevant for meditation during a directed IA task; and (2) decode or estimate the presence of those IA states during an independent meditation session. Within a mixed sample of experienced meditators and novice controls (N = 16), we first used MVPA to develop single-subject brain classifiers for five modes of attention during an IA task in which subjects were specifically instructed to engage in one of five states [i.e., meditation-related states: breath attention, mind wandering (MW), and self-referential processing, and control states: attention to feet and sounds]. Using standard cross-validation procedures, MVPA classifiers were trained in five of six IA blocks for each subject, and predictive accuracy was tested on the independent sixth block (iterated until all volumes were tested, N = 2,160). Across participants, all five IA states were significantly recognized well above chance (>41% vs. 20% chance). At the individual level, IA states were recognized in most participants (87.5%), suggesting that recognition of IA neural patterns may be generalizable for most participants, particularly experienced meditators. Next, for those who showed accurate IA neural patterns, the originally trained classifiers were applied to a separate meditation run (10-min) to make an inference about the percentage time engaged in each IA state (breath attention, MW, or self-referential processing). Preliminary group-level analyses demonstrated that during meditation practice, participants spent more time attending to breath compared to MW or self-referential processing. This paradigm established the feasibility of using MVPA classifiers to objectively assess mental states during meditation at the participant level, which holds promise for improved measurement of internal attention states cultivated by meditation.

Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) and mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) have made important contributions to resolving the global burden of mental illness. However, response rates are comparatively more modest for the distress disorders. Newer CBTs enriched with MBI components have emerged with promising findings for distress disorders but with a high degree of heterogeneity and, subsequently, an unclear path for determining the unique and synergistic contributions from CBTs and MBIs. We propose that one way to elucidate and improve upon this union is to identify common overarching principles (i.e., attention change; metacognitive change) that guide both approaches and to refine therapeutic processes to optimally reflect these common targets and their interplay (e.g., sequencing and dosing).

Exploration of human consciousness remains a final frontier within basic neuroscience; that is, how the finite biological structure and function of the brain gives rise to the seemingly infinite expanse that encompasses the terrain of the mind. Contemporary mindfulness and other contemplative practices across historical and post-modern traditions involve systematic forms of mental training that allow the practitioner to develop the mind in very specific and quantifiable ways. Some fundamental questions pertain to this scientific enquiry; (1) how to concisely classify discrete and developmentally-specific “mind states” of consciousness that are in line with the subtle complex phenomenology of experience so to yield ontological quantifications? (2) what measures best represent such classification/quantification systems? (3) can the present electrophysiological purview map developmentally-specified mind states and stages to neurobiological substrates, based on extant contention (i.e. discrete EEG band functionality, phenomenological significance, and underlying mechanisms) regarding the interpretation of EEG physiology?

Owing to its benefits on various cognitive aspects, emotions and one’s wellbeing meditation have drawn much interest from several researchers and common public alike. We have different meditation practices associated with numerous cultures and traditions across the globe. In addition, current literature also suggests distinct differences in neural oscillatory activity among different practices of meditation. Since these diverse practices influence in a different way, they contribute to distinct physiological and psychological effects. Though this is the case, we want to find out if there is an underlying commonality among all these seemingly distinct practices. Through this paper, we want to emphasize that though these techniques and practices may appear different on the periphery, they are all supposed to eventually lead in the same state of experience; a natural meditative state (which is discussed in various spiritual traditions as a goal of meditation). This is where the outer diversity in practices and techniques collapses to an inner unitary state of conscious experience. In this context, we would also like to make a few comments on the way contemporaries regard different practices of meditation

Previous work found that single-session focused attention meditation (FAM) enhanced motor sequence learning through increased cognitive control as a mechanistic action, although electrophysiological correlates of sequence learning performance following FAM were not investigated. We measured the persistent frontal N2 event-related potential (ERP) that is closely related to cognitive control processes and its ability to predict behavioural measures. Twenty-nine participants were randomised to one of three conditions reflecting the level of FAM experienced prior to a serial reaction time task (SRTT): 21 sessions of FAM (FAM21, N = 12), a single FAM session (FAM1, N = 9) or no preceding FAM control (Control, N = 8). Continuous 64-channel EEG were recorded during SRTT and N2 amplitudes for correct trials were extracted. Component amplitude, regions of interests, and behavioural outcomes were compared using mixed effects regression models between groups. FAM21 exhibited faster reaction time performances in majority of the learning blocks compared to FAM1 and Control. FAM21 also demonstrated a significantly more pronounced N2 over majority of anterior and central regions of interests during SRTT compared to the other groups. When N2 amplitudes were modelled against general learning performance, FAM21 showed the greatest rate of amplitude decline over anterior and central regions. The combined results suggest that FAM training provided greater cognitive control enhancement for improved general performance, and less pronounced effects for sequence-specific learning performance compared to the other groups. Importantly, FAM training facilitates dynamic modulation of cognitive control: lower levels of general learning performance was supported by greater levels of activation, whilst higher levels of general learning exhibited less activation Refereed/Peer-reviewed

Objective: Studies have consistently shown that long-term meditation practice is associated with reduced pain, but the neural mechanisms by which long-term meditation practice reduces pain remain unclear. This study tested endogenous opioid involvement in meditation analgesia associated with long-term meditation practice.Methods: Electrical pain was induced with randomized, double-blind, cross-over administration of the opioid antagonist Naloxone (0.15mg/kg bolus dose, then 0.2mg/kg/hr infusion dose) with 32 healthy, experienced meditation practitioners and a standardized open monitoring meditation.Results: Under saline, pain ratings were significantly lower during meditation (pain intensity: 6.41 ± 1.32; pain unpleasantness: 3.98 ± 2.17) than at baseline (pain intensity: 6.86 ±1.04, t(31) = 2.476, p = 0.019, Cohen’s d = 0.46; pain unpleasantness: 4.96 ±1.75, t(31) = 3.746, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.68), confirming the presence of meditation analgesia. Comparing saline and Naloxone revealed significantly lower pain intensity (t(31) = 3.12, p = 0.004, d = 0.56), and pain unpleasantness (t(31) = 3.47, p = 0.002, d = 0.62), during meditation under Naloxone (pain intensity: 5.53 ± 1.54; pain unpleasantness: 2.95 ± 1.88) than under saline (pain intensity: 6.41 ± 1.32; pain unpleasantness: 3.98 ± 2.17). Naloxone not only failed to eliminate meditation analgesia, it made meditation analgesia stronger.Conclusions: Long-term meditation practice does not rely on endogenous opioids to reduce pain. Naloxone’s blockade of opioid receptors enhanced meditation analgesia; pain ratings during meditation were significantly lower under Naloxone than under saline. Possible biological mechanisms by which Naloxone-induced opioid receptor blockade enhances meditation analgesia are discussed.

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated with the early inception of a thought has proved challenging. Here we addressed this issue by taking advantage of the heightened introspective ability of experienced mindfulness practitioners to observe the onset of their spontaneously arising thoughts. We found subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited by spontaneous thought. In some of these regions, fMRI signal peaked prior to the spontaneous arising of a thought — most notably in the medial temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobule. In contrast, activation in the medial prefrontal, temporopolar, mid-insular, lateral prefrontal, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices peaked together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clarification of key concepts. The authors propose that such clarification is best advanced by neurophenomenological investigations that integrate neuroscience methods with phenomenological models based on first-person reports of hypnotic versus meditative experiences. Focusing on absorption, the authors argue that previous treatments of hypnosis and meditation as equivalent are incorrect, but that they can be fruitfully compared when characteristic features of the states described by these concepts are examined. To this end, the authors use the “phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness” (PNM), a multidimensional modelrecently proposed by Lutz and colleagues. The authors compare focused attention meditation and open monitoring meditation with hypnosis across the dimensions of the PNM, using it to interpret empirical research on hypnosis, and to shed light on debates about the role of meta-awareness in hypnosis and the role of suggestion in meditation.

This chapter provides an overview of neurophenomenology, its importance for investigating contemplative experience, and its relevance to considerations about science and religion.

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that ‘affect-biased attention’ – the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others – provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one’s filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.

Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an experimental study from our group explicitly concerned with relating the temporal dynamics of rivalrous experience to the temporal dynamics of cortical activity. Drawing attention to the importance of dealing with ongoing activity and its inherent changing nature at both phenomenological and neurodynamical levels, we argue that the notions of recurrence and variability are pertinent to understanding rivalry in particular and the flow of experience in general.

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.

This chapter argues that the body beyond the brain is required for consciousness.

Training to understand the feelings and thoughts of others induces structural changes in two divergent social brain networks., Although neuroscientific research has revealed experience-dependent brain changes across the life span in sensory, motor, and cognitive domains, plasticity relating to social capacities remains largely unknown. To investigate whether the targeted mental training of different cognitive and social skills can induce specific changes in brain morphology, we collected longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data throughout a 9-month mental training intervention from a large sample of adults between 20 and 55 years of age. By means of various daily mental exercises and weekly instructed group sessions, training protocols specifically addressed three functional domains: (i) mindfulness-based attention and interoception, (ii) socio-affective skills (compassion, dealing with difficult emotions, and prosocial motivation), and (iii) socio-cognitive skills (cognitive perspective-taking on self and others and metacognition). MRI-based cortical thickness analyses, contrasting the different training modules against each other, indicated spatially diverging changes in cortical morphology. Training of present-moment focused attention mostly led to increases in cortical thickness in prefrontal regions, socio-affective training induced plasticity in frontoinsular regions, and socio-cognitive training included change in inferior frontal and lateral temporal cortices. Module-specific structural brain changes correlated with training-induced behavioral improvements in the same individuals in domain-specific measures of attention, compassion, and cognitive perspective-taking, respectively, and overlapped with task-relevant functional networks. Our longitudinal findings indicate structural plasticity in well-known socio-affective and socio-cognitive brain networks in healthy adults based on targeted short daily mental practices. These findings could promote the development of evidence-based mental training interventions in clinical, educational, and corporate settings aimed at cultivating social intelligence, prosocial motivation, and cooperation.

Social but not attention-based mental training reduces cortisol reactivity to psychosocial stress., Psychosocial stress is a public health burden in modern societies. Chronic stress–induced disease processes are, in large part, mediated via the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary system. We asked whether the contemplative mental training of different practice types targeting attentional, socio-affective (for example, compassion), or socio-cognitive abilities (for example, perspective-taking) in the context of a 9-month longitudinal training study offers an effective means for psychosocial stress reduction. Using a multimethod approach including subjective, endocrine, autonomic, and immune markers and testing 313 participants in a standardized psychosocial laboratory stressor, we show that all three practice types markedly reduced self-reported stress reactivity in healthy participants. However, only the training of intersubjective skills via socio-affective and socio-cognitive routes attenuated the physiological stress response, specifically the secretion of the HPA axis end-product cortisol, by up to 51%. The assessed autonomic and innate immune markers were not influenced by any practice type. Mental training focused on present-moment attention and interoceptive awareness as implemented in many mindfulness-based intervention programs was thus limited to stress reduction on the level of self-report. However, its effectiveness was equal to that of intersubjective practice types in boosting the association between subjective and endocrine stress markers. Our results reveal a broadly accessible low-cost approach to acquiring psychosocial stress resilience. Short daily intersubjective practice may be a promising method for minimizing the incidence of chronic social stress–related disease, thereby reducing individual suffering and relieving a substantial financial burden on society.

Interoceptive body awareness (IA) is crucial for psychological well-being and plays an important role in many contemplative traditions. However, until recently, standardized self-report measures of IA were scarce, not comprehensive, and the effects of interoceptive training on such measures were largely unknown. The Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire measures IA with eight different scales. In the current study, we investigated whether and how these different aspects of IA are influenced by a 3-months contemplative intervention in the context of the ReSource project, in which 148 subjects engaged in daily practices of “Body Scan” and “Breath Meditation.” We developed a German version of the MAIA and tested it in a large and diverse sample (n = 1,076). Internal consistencies were similar to the English version (0.56– 0.89), retest reliability was high (r s: 0.66–0.79), and the MAIA showed good convergent and discriminant validity. Importantly, interoceptive training improved five out of eight aspects of IA, compared to a retest control group. Participants with low IA scores at baseline showed the biggest changes. Whereas practice duration only weakly predicted individual differences in change, self-reported liking of the practices and degree of integration into daily life predicted changes on most scales. Interestingly, the magnitude of observed changes varied across scales. The strongest changes were observed for the regulatory aspects of IA, that is, how the body is used for self-regulation in daily life. No significant changes were observed for the Noticing aspect (becoming aware of bodily changes), which is the aspect that is predominantly assessed in other IA measures. This differential pattern underscores the importance to assess IA multi-dimensionally, particularly when interested in enhancement of IA through contemplative practice or other mind–body interventions.

According to constructivist theories of emotion, members of different populations experience emotion differently as a result of assembling different neural resources to produce it. To test this prediction, we sampled individuals from three populations (experienced meditators, cancer survivors, matched controls) and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess their neural responses to four kinds of affective phrases (positive cancer, negative cancer, positive non-cancer, negative non- cancer). As predicted, the three populations responded differently to these affective phrases. When assessing neural activity for positive vs. negative phrases, controls showed the standard negativity bias reported in the emotion literature, cancer survivors showed a positivity bias (perhaps related to personal growth following cancer), and experienced meditators showed no bias (perhaps reflecting the mental quality of equanimity established through regular meditation practice). When assessing neural activity for positively-valenced cancer vs. non-cancer phrases, controls exhibited difficulty engaging with the cancer phrases, engaging much more with the non-cancer phrases instead. In contrast, experienced meditators and cancer survivors engaged more with the cancer phrases, while exhibiting different affective styles. Together these results indicate that experienced meditators, cancer survivors, and matched controls assemble different neural resources to process emotion.

Pre-adolescence is a key developmental period in which complex intrinsic volitional methods of self-regulation are acquired as a result of rapid maturation within the brain networks underlying theself-regulatory processes of attention control and emotion regulation. Fostering adaptive self-regulationskills during this stage of development has strong implications for physical health, emotional and socio-economic outcomes during adulthood. There is a growing interest in mindfulness-based programmesfor pre-adolescents with initial findings suggesting self-regulation improvements, however, neurode-velopmental studies on mindfulness with pre-adolescents are scarce. This analytical review outlinesan integrative neuro-developmental approach, which combines self-report and behavioural assess-ments with event related brain potentials (ERPs) to provide a systemic multilevel understanding ofthe neurocognitive mechanisms of mindfulness in pre-adolescence. We specifically focus on the N2,error related negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe), P3a, P3b and late positive potential (LPP) ERP com-ponents as indexes of mindfulness related modulations in non-volitional bottom-up self-regulatoryprocesses (salience detection, stimulus driven orienting and mind wandering) and volitional top-downself-regulatory processes (endogenous orienting and executive attention).

Standard economic theory postulates that decisions are driven by stable context-insensitive preferences, while motivation psychology suggests they are driven by distinct context-sensitive motives with distinct evolutionary goals and characteristic psycho-physiological and behavioral patterns. To link these fields and test how distinct motives could differentially predict different types of economic decisions, we experimentally induced participants with either a Care or a Power motive, before having them take part in a suite of classic game theoretical paradigms involving monetary exchange. We show that the Care induction alone raised scores on a latent factor of cooperation-related behaviors, relative to a control condition, while, relative to Care, Power raised scores on a punishment-related factor. These findings argue against context-insensitive stable preferences and theories of strong reciprocity and in favor of a motive-based approach to economic decision making: Care and Power motivation have a dissociable fingerprint in shaping either cooperative or punishment behaviors.

We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that the brain and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are explanatorily inseparable. Such entanglement implies that we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body, and hence we have good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system forconsciousness includes the body and not just the brain. In this way, we put the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to a new use, one that supports the “enactive” view that consciousness is a life-regulation process of the wholeorganism interacting with its environment.

Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experiencehave mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental ,yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent.We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction inperception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases – sensorimotor integration andhomeostatic regulation – and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive–affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based onour framework.

Studies have suggested that the default mode network is active during mind wandering, which is often experienced intermittently during sustained attention tasks. Conversely, an anticorrelated task-positive network is thought to subserve various forms of attentional processing. Understanding how these two systems work together is central for understanding many forms of optimal and sub-optimal task performance. Here we present a basic model of naturalistic cognitive fluctuations between mind wandering and attentional states derived from the practice of focused attention meditation. This model proposes four intervals in a cognitive cycle: mind wandering, awareness of mind wandering, shifting of attention, and sustained attention. People who train in this style of meditation cultivate their abilities to monitor cognitive processes related to attention and distraction, making them well suited to report on these mental events. Fourteen meditation practitioners performed breath-focused meditation while undergoing fMRI scanning. When participants realized their mind had wandered, they pressed a button and returned their focus to the breath. The four intervals above were then constructed around these button presses. We hypothesized that periods of mind wandering would be associated with default mode activity, whereas cognitive processes engaged during awareness of mind wandering, shifting of attention and sustained attention would engage attentional subnetworks. Analyses revealed activity in brain regions associated with the default mode during mind wandering, and in salience network regions during awareness of mind wandering. Elements of the executive network were active during shifting and sustained attention. Furthermore, activations during these cognitive phases were modulated by lifetime meditation experience. These findings support and extend theories about cognitive correlates of distributed brain networks.

This chapter provides an overview of the enactive approach in cognitive science.

This chapter considers a form of attention-based meditation as a novel means to gain insight into the mechanisms and phenomenology of spontaneous thought. Focused attention (FA) meditation involves keeping one’s attention on a chosen object, and repeatedly catching the mind when it strays from the object into spontaneous thought. This practice can thus be viewed as a kind of self-caught mind wandering paradigm, which suggests it may have great utility for research on spontaneous thought. Current findings about the effects of meditation on mind wandering and meta-awareness are reviewed, and implications for new research paradigms that leverage first-person reporting during FA meditation are discussed. Specifically, research recommendations are made that may enable customized analysis of individual episodes of mind wandering and their neural correlates. It is hoped that by combining detailed subjective reports from experienced meditators with rigorous objective physiological measures, we can advance our understanding of human consciousness.

Recent advances in brain imaging have improved the measure of neural processes related to perceptual, cognitive and affective functions, yet the relation between brain activity and subjective experience remains poorly characterized. In part, it is a challenge to obtain reliable accounts of participant’s experience in such studies. Here we addressed this limitation by utilizing experienced meditators who are expert in introspection. We tested a novel method to link objective and subjective data, using real-time fMRI (rt-fMRI) to provide participants with feedback of their own brain activity during an ongoing task. We provided real-time feedback during a focused attention task from the posterior cingulate cortex, a hub of the default mode network shown to be activated during mind-wandering and deactivated during meditation. In a first experiment, both meditatorsand non-meditators reported significant correspondence between the feedback graph and their subjective experience of focused attention and mind-wandering. When instructed to volitionally decrease the feedback graph, meditators, but not non-meditators, showed significant deactivation of the posterior cingulate cortex. We were able to replicate these results in a separate group of meditators using a novel step-wise rt-fMRI discovery protocol in which participants were not provided with prior knowledge of the expected relationship between their experience and the feedback graph (i.e., focused attention versus mind-wandering). These findings support the feasibility of using rt-fMRI to link objective measures of brain activity with reports of ongoingsubjective experience in cognitive neuroscience research, and demonstrate the generalization of expertise in introspective awareness to novel contexts.

Fairness violations elicit powerful behavioral and affective responses. Indeed, people are willing to incur costs to sanction unfair behavior. Here we study the possible impact of long-term mental training in socio-affective capacities such as compassion on altruistic punishment and compensatory behavior in economic games. To this end we recruited a group of long-term meditation practitioners (LTPs) who had engaged in an average of 40 K h of mental training exercises including compassion-related meditation, along with a group of meditation-naïve controls. Participants played several adaptations of the dictator game in which they had the opportunity to punish the dictator both when they were the recipients of the dictator’s offer and when they were third-party witnesses to the dictator’s treatment of an anonymous second player. Compared to controls, LTPs were less likely to punish when they were the victims of fairness violations. However, both groups punished equivalently when they witnessed others receiving unfair treatment. In post-task questionnaires, controls reported significantly more anger in response to unfair offers than LTPs, although fairness judgments did not differ between groups. These data suggest that because the LTPs were less angered by unfair treatment of themselves, they punished that behavior less. However, when they witnessed the unfair treatment of others, they engaged in norm-reinforcing punishment. Finally, when participants played an additional game which included the opportunity to recompense victims, LTPs were more likely to do so. Together these data point to differential approaches to justice whereby LTPs engaged less in vengeful, retributive justice and focused more on norm reinforcement and the restoration of equity. These differences suggest that social preferences are plastic and that altruistic responses to unfairness may be shaped by the prolonged cultivation of prosocial motivation, altruism, and compassion.

The amygdala has been repeatedly implicated in emotional processing of both positive and negative-valence stimuli. Previous studies suggest that the amygdala response to emotional stimuli is lower when the subject is in a meditative state of mindful-attention, both in beginner meditators after an 8-week meditation intervention and in expert meditators. However, the longitudinal effects of meditation training on amygdala responses have not been reported when participants are in an ordinary, non-meditative state. In this study, we investigated how 8 weeks of training in meditation affects amygdala responses to emotional stimuli in subjects when in a non-meditative state. Healthy adults with no prior meditation experience took part in 8 weeks of either Mindful Attention Training (MAT), Cognitively-Based Compassion Training (CBCT; a program based on Tibetan Buddhist compassion meditation practices), or an active control intervention. Before and after the intervention, participants underwent an fMRI experiment during which they were presented images with positive, negative, and neutral emotional valences from the IAPS database while remaining in an ordinary, non-meditative state. Using a region-of-interest analysis, we found a longitudinal decrease in right amygdala activation in the Mindful Attention group in response to positive images, and in response to images of all valences overall. In the CBCT group, we found a trend increase in right amygdala response to negative images, which was significantly correlated with a decrease in depression score. No effects or trends were observed in the control group. This finding suggests that the effects of meditation training on emotional processing might transfer to non-meditative states. This is consistent with the hypothesis that meditation training may induce learning that is not stimulus- or task-specific, but process-specific, and thereby may result in enduring changes in mental function.

This study sought to examine the effect of meditation experience on brain networks underlying cognitive actions employed during contemplative practice. In a previous study, we proposed a basic model of naturalistic cognitive fluctuations that occur during the practice of focused attention meditation. This model specifies four intervals in a cognitive cycle: mind wandering, awareness of mind wandering, shifting of attention, and sustained attention. Using subjective input from experienced practitioners during meditation, we identified activity in salience network regions during awareness of mind wandering and executive network regions during shifting and sustained attention. Brain regions associated with the default mode were active during mind wandering. In the present study, we reasoned that repeated activation of attentional brain networks over years of practice may induce lasting functional connectivity changes within relevant circuits. To investigate this possibility, we created seeds representing the networks that were active during the four phases of the earlier study, and examined functional connectivity during the resting state in the same participants. Connectivity maps were then contrasted between participants with high vs. low meditation experience. Participants with more meditation experience exhibited increased connectivity within attentional networks, as well as between attentional regions and medial frontal regions. These neural relationships may be involved in the development of cognitive skills, such as maintaining attention and disengaging from distraction, that are often reported with meditation practice. Furthermore, because altered connectivity of brain regions in experienced meditators was observed in a non-meditative (resting) state, this may represent a transference of cognitive abilities off the cushion into daily life.