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Understanding the role of "representations" in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as "standing in," and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.

Attentional bias to sleep-related information is thought to be a core feature for developing and/or maintaining insomnia. This study used a hallmark measure of attentional bias, the dot-probe task, to determine whether this bias toward sleep-related stimuli was a function of the severity of insomnia symptoms. A sample of 231 volunteers (175 females; mean age of 26.91 ± 8.05 years) participated in this online study, filling out the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) and performing a visual dot-probe task. After categorizing individuals based on the ISI score into normal, subclinical, and moderate/severe sleep groups, we only found a marginally significant interaction between sleep groups and the type of stimuli on RTs, suggesting that subclinical and moderate/severe sleep groups reported slower RTs for sleep-related words than for neutral words. When we calculated the attentional bias score (ABS), we found that ABS significantly differed from zero in the moderate/severe sleep group only, suggesting a disengagement for sleep-related information as a function of the severity of insomnia symptoms. This finding seems to suggest that insomnia is related to greater difficulties in shifting away from sleep-related stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

1 Introduction 1.1 The Phylogenetic Problem of Communication The Nobel Prize winner Nikolas Tinbergen, one of the founders of modern ethology, classified ethological questions into four main categories (Tinbergen, 1963). […], Like any other biological trait, communication can be studied from at least four perspectives: mechanistic, ontogenetic, functional, and phylogenetic. In this article, we focus on the following phylogenetic question: how can communication emerge, given that both signal-producing and signal-responding abilities seem to be adaptively neutral until the complementary ability is present in the population? We explore the problem of co-evolution of speakers and hearers with artificial life simulations: a population of artificial neural networks evolving a food call system. The core of the article is devoted to a careful analysis of the complex evolutionary dynamics demonstrated by our simple simulation. Our analyses reveal an important factor, which might solve the phylogenetic problem: the spontaneous production of good (meaningful) signals by speakers because of the need for organisms to categorize their experience in adaptively relevant ways. We discuss our results with respect both to previous simulative work and to the biological literature on the evolution of communication. Keywords evolution of communication * producer bias * receiver bias * evolutionary dynamics