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Cultural comparisons suggest that an understanding of other minds may develop sooner in independent versus interdependent settings, and vice versa for inhibitory control. From a western lens, this pattern might be considered paradoxical, since there is a robust positive relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control in western samples. In independent cultures, an emphasis on one's own mind offers a clear route to ‘simulate’ other minds, and inhibitory control may be required to set aside one's own perspective to represent the perspective of others. However, in interdependent cultures, social norms are considered the key catalyst for behaviour, and metacognitive reflection and/or suppression of one's own perspective may not be necessary. The cross-cultural generalizability of the western developmental route to ToM is therefore questionable. The current study used an age-matched cross-sectional sample to contrast 56 Japanese and 56 Scottish 3–6-year-old's metacognition, ToM and inhibitory control skills. We replicated the expected cultural patterns for ToM (Scotland > Japan) and inhibitory control (Japan > Scotland). Supporting western developmental enrichment theories, we find that inhibitory control and metacognition predict theory of mind competence in Scotland. However, these variables cannot be used to predict Japanese ToM. This confirms that individualistic mechanisms do not capture the developmental mechanism underlying ToM in Japan, highlighting a bias in our understanding of ToM development. Research Highlights: We replicate an independent cultural advantage for theory of mind (Scotland > Japan) and interdependent advantage for inhibitory control (Japan > Scotland). From a western lens, this pattern might be considered paradoxical, since there is a robust positive relationship between theory of mind and inhibitory control. Supporting western developmental enrichment theories, we find that the development of inhibitory control mediates the link between metacognition and theory of mind in Scotland. However, this model does not predict Japanese theory of mind, highlighting an individualistic bias in our mechanistic understanding of theory of mind development.

Over the past 30 years, researchers have demonstrated that children's understanding of mind and emotion develops throughout their childhood. One such ability, the understanding of how to regulate emotional expression, emerges from ages 4 to 6 and has been seen as an important element of social competence. To understand how to control emotional expression in a social context, children need to realize that inner emotional states need not necessarily correspond to outer expressions, and, by extension, that these expressions can lead to an onlooker's false belief about the expresser's inner emotions. This article reviews empirical researches, and shows some social and cognitive factors that may affect understanding of the regulation of emotional expression and its development. Relevant issues are discussed, and promising directions for future research are suggested.

This study investigated how young children understand apparent angry expression. Twenty-six younger children (43-59 months, M = 51 months) and 32 older children (61-75 months, M = 68 months) were read stories in which a protagonist was really or apparently angry in a pretend play context and asked about these events. The result showed that only older children could distinguish protagonists' appearance and reality. However, some younger children who could distinguish the appearance and reality judged that the protagonist did not feel angry and that another character inferred that the protagonist did not actually angry, as older children did. These findings suggested young children's limited understanding of apparent angry expression.

Proceedings of the 2nd International Colloquium between the Graduate School of Education, Kyoto University (Japan) and the Institute of Education, University of London (UK) : 28 February- 1 March 2009 Kyodai Kaikan Kyoto University

The present study examined the development of young children's recognition of fake crying. Sixty-two children aged from 3 to 6 were studied individually. They were questioned about their knowledge of fake crying, whether their friends engaged in real and fake crying, the situations in which they did so, and their own reactions to these cries. They were also questioned about whether they themselves engaged in real and fake crying, the situations in which they cried, and their friends' reactions to these cries. The children were assigned "crying tasks, " which were developed by Mizokawa and Koyasu (2007). Their answers were classified into three groups based on their crying task performances (low. middle. and high). The results revealed that children in the low group did not distinguish fake crying from real crying and they recognized that both expressions would attract attention and elicit helping behavior by others to help them. In turn, children in the middle group were able to distinguish fake crying from real crying. Lastly, children in the high group not only distinguished between these types of crying, but also they clearly recognized that fake crying would deceive others.

Over the past 30 years, researchers have demonstrated that children's understanding of mind and emotion develops throughout their childhood. One such ability, the understanding of how to regulate emotional expression, emerges from ages 4 to 6 and has been seen as an important element of social competence. To understand how to control emotional expression in a social context, children need to realize that inner emotional states need not necessarily correspond to outer expressions, and, by extension, that these expressions can lead to an onlooker's false belief about the expresser's inner emotions. This article reviews empirical researches, and shows some social and cognitive factors that may affect understanding of the regulation of emotional expression and its development. Relevant issues are discussed, and promising directions for future research are suggested.

This study investigated how young children understand apparent angry expression. Twenty-six younger children (43-59 months, M = 51 months) and 32 older children (61-75 months, M = 68 months) were read stories in which a protagonist was really or apparently angry in a pretend play context and asked about these events. The result showed that only older children could distinguish protagonists' appearance and reality. However, some younger children who could distinguish the appearance and reality judged that the protagonist did not feel angry and that another character inferred that the protagonist did not actually angry, as older children did. These findings suggested young children's limited understanding of apparent angry expression.

The present study examined the development of young children's recognition of fake crying. Sixty-two children aged from 3 to 6 were studied individually. They were questioned about their knowledge of fake crying, whether their friends engaged in real and fake crying, the situations in which they did so, and their own reactions to these cries. They were also questioned about whether they themselves engaged in real and fake crying, the situations in which they cried, and their friends' reactions to these cries. The children were assigned "crying tasks, " which were developed by Mizokawa and Koyasu (2007). Their answers were classified into three groups based on their crying task performances (low. middle. and high). The results revealed that children in the low group did not distinguish fake crying from real crying and they recognized that both expressions would attract attention and elicit helping behavior by others to help them. In turn, children in the middle group were able to distinguish fake crying from real crying. Lastly, children in the high group not only distinguished between these types of crying, but also they clearly recognized that fake crying would deceive others.