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The article focuses on working methodology and ethics of lobbying groups and also discusses the importance of lobbying in the expansion of globalization and translationalism. It informs that domestic interest groups are expanding their activities to several foreign countries which need them to bend the policy according to their demand and requirement so the lobbyist groups play their role in creating suitable working environment for their respective organizations.

Interest groups wish to expand their organization to achieve maximum results. Therefore, it is theorized that an interest group will attempt to persuade the policies of their home government, as well as the policies of other states internationally. In theory, an interest group will both directly and indirectly lobby their home government as well as directly and indirectly lobby the governments of other states internationally. As a result, interest groups will at time become transnational organizations, becoming involved in a three-level game. The domestic level of the game involves the direct and indirect lobbying of the group’s home government. The international level is two-part. The first level involves the groups contact with similar groups in an attempt to indirectly sway the policy outcomes of that state. At the same time, the second level involves the interest group’s attempts to directly lobby the policy makers of the international state. In order to test this theory, an environmental case study will be developed in which the environmental policies of the United States and Canada will be reviewed. Through review, it will be determined which groups supported the legislation, and how the policies developed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author 1:Anthony FlemingPhD CandidateWest Virginia University1057 Takoma Street Morgantown WV, 26505Home Phone: 304-599-1642Cell Phone: 304-549-2517Sjtfadd0@aol.comAdvisor: Donley Studlardstudlar@wvu.eduAuthor 2:Sara MoatsPhD CandidateWest Virginia University971 Valley View Ave. Home Phone: 304-677-2357Fax: 304-265-6036sara.moats@mail.wvu.eduAdvisor: Donley Studlardstudlar@wvu.eduAuthor 3:Paul RutledgePhD CandidateWest Virginia UniversityPer126@psu.eduAdvisor: Robert DiclericoInternational policy is dependent on a number of factors. Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental organizations have a tremendous effect on policy. The domestic agenda also highly effects policy. We theorize that states that have a large number of arms manufacturers will have more association with NGOs and IGOs, and as a result will have a more liberal arms trade policy. A state with NGO and IGO involvement that doesn't have many or any gun manufacturers will be likely to favor a more restrictive arms control policy. Another aspect of our theory suggests that third world states with high poverty will likely join certain NGOs and IGOs to obtain arms easily, if they join one of these organizations at all.Preliminary conclusions suggest that NGO and IGO activity is driven by domestic interests. This would suggest states operate within the constraints of a two-level game. Using theories drawn from comparative agenda setting we theorize that the ways in which governments set the agenda greatly effects the state's membership in IGOs and NGOs dealing with small arms trade. We feel this is a contribution to the field of political science because it helps one understand a states relationship with NGOs and IGOs, it also aids in the understanding of how domestic interests drive international policy choices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The member states of the European Union each have different security needs. Their national security policies each member reflects not only the needs of the states, but also the goals of the public and the domestic institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]