Search

The article presents a study that deals with the causal mechanism of the influence of national public opinion in the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court. The authors highlight the potential influence of localized and personal micro-publics as well as the possibility of partisan based elite influence. Based on their findings, they discuss its implications and suggest useful avenues for research.

The article shows the relationship between the rise of factional politics and admission to the American Union. It explores the claim that the development of organized political factions solved the coordination problem which prevented new states from entering into the Union. Particular focus is given to the collective action problems associated with the Articles of Confederation and the entry of Vermont to the Union. A brief history of the Vermont Republic is also provided.

Recent studies of legislative gridlock espouse the importance of institutions in separation-of-powers games (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 2006). However, no study has focused on the greatest institutional change in American political history, the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. This paper makes two contributions. First, it determines whether the Constitution significantly increased or decreased the volume of legislation, while other factors are controlled. Second, it determines whether the marginal effect of the gridlock interval on the volume of legislation differed with the enactment of the Constitution. In other words, it helps to determine whether the Constitution changed legislative gridlock in degree or in kind. The results should help resolve the debate between those who view the Constitution as a series of constraints and those who view it as an enabling document. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that presidential appointments to the Supreme Courtinfluence policy outcomes (Baum 1995). However, when a president has appointedmore than one justice, appointees must vote cohesively and in manner that reflectspresidential preferences before we can truly say a president has influence through hisappointment power. Yet the president is not a singular actor in the appointmentprocess, the Senate must also confirm judicial nominees. Presidents who face theirown party in the Senate should theoretically face less opposition to their nominees,allowing them to appoint justices whose ideology is more similar to their own andmore likely to vote cohesively. During periods of divided government, a hostile Senatemay require a president to nominate individuals who are less similar ideologically andless likely to operate in a cohesive manner. The opposing party's ability to blockappointments should diminish the ability of the appointing president to shape the court.We hypothesize that voting cohesion within presidential blocs should be reflective ofthe circumstances under which appointments were made.Using data from 1948 to 2000 this research looks at the cohesive voting behaviorof presidential blocs appointed under various nomination conditions. Blocs of justicesappointed under favorable conditions should be more ideologically similar and exhibita higher degree of voting cohesion while blocs of justices appointed under less favorableconditions should be less cohesive and less likely to vote consistently with the ideologicaland policy preferences of the appointing president. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The removal of the property qualification for voting during the mid-19th Century was a critical episode in the development of American democracy, essential to the transformation of the franchise from a possession by stakeholders into a right inherent to citizenship. Nevertheless, the topic has received virtually no rigorous and systematic study. There was 47 years difference in property qualification removal between South Carolina (1810) and North Carolina (1857); there was 24 years difference between Connecticut (1818) and Rhode Island (1842). This variation across roughly similar states provides a natural experiment for social science purposes. Empirically, the paper consists of a pair of structured, matched comparisons using evidence from these four states. Conceptually, it explores the importance of economic development, class conflict, and party consolidation upon the trajectory of property qualification removal. Importantly, there appears to be a contrast between states where the pressure for the expanded popular franchise was a consequence of party consolidation, where it was a mechanism of party consolidation, and where it developed independently in the absence of a consolidated party system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test several claims about the relationship between unanimity rule and Pareto optimality. Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Mueller (2003), and other scholars argue that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than other voting rules, such as majority rule, because unanimity rule passes an alternative only if it makes everyone better off. Majority rule can pass alternatives that make some individuals worse off. Dougherty and Edward (2008), in contrast, claim that majority rule is at least as likely to select Pareto optimal outcomes as unanimity rule in finite games if proposals are random, sincere, or strategic. We test the two sets of conjectures in a two dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our results suggest: 1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, 2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and 3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule in the final round of play. Our results also suggest that proposers do not behave observationally-rational in the final round and complete information does not affect the primary result. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]