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State control over competition plays a pivotal role in ensuring the efficiency and fairness of market economies. While competition drives innovation, lowers prices, and boosts economic growth, the absence of proper regulation can result in monopolistic practices, market distortions, and diminished consumer welfare. This article examines the dynamics of state-controlled competition, focusing on the mechanisms governments employ to prevent anti-competitive practices and regulate market structures. These mechanisms not only aim to enhance economic efficiency but also ensure consumer protection, public transparency, and equitable access to resources. The article delves into the challenges regulators face in modern economies, including the complexities of globalization, digital markets, and growing market concentration. These challenges highlight the need for regulators to adapt traditional approaches to suit contemporary economic conditions. Furthermore, the article emphasizes the critical need for a balanced approach to regulation, where state intervention preserves competitive markets without stifling innovation. Article asserts that effective state control is essential to fostering sustainable competition that benefits both consumers and businesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper characterizes the power dynamics of firms in product and labour markets in Lithuania between 2004 and 2018. We first show that both markets are not perfectly competitive, as both price markups and wage markdowns are far from unitary and homogeneous. We show that the dynamics of these margins followed different patterns. On the one hand, dispersion and the economy‐wide markup have increased, suggesting an increase in product market power. On the other hand, we document a decline in monopsony power, as heterogeneity and the aggregate markdown have declined. Altogether, our results underscore the importance of jointly analyzing product and labour markets when assessing firms' market power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low learning outcomes of students in interpreting the rules in the school and home environment need attention. This is caused by the teacher's teaching methods, which are less varied and interesting. This study aims to develop Pancasila monopoly media to improve PPKn learning outcomes. The study applies the 4D development model, which stands for Define, Design, Development, and Dissemination. This model was chosen because the stages of implementation are divided in detail and systematically. The analysis is descriptive of quantitative and qualitative data obtained through observation, interviews, and direct measurements in the field. The results of the media expert assessment obtained a score of 93.7% with very good criteria, and the material expert obtained a score of 96.2% with very decent criteria. Student learning outcomes increased to 82.32 from the previous score of 42.50. The increase was 39.8%. While the control class that did not use media increased its score from 49.05 to 75.48. The results of the N-Gain test obtained an average difference in the experimental class of 39.8 with an n-gain of 0.76 and a moderate criterion, and the effectiveness interpretation obtained a score of 76.50 with a fairly effective criterion. While the control class with an average difference of 26 obtained an N-Gain score of 0.52 on the moderate criterion and an effectiveness level of 52.35, a less effective.

This study delves into a market characterized by vertical product differentiation. Product qualities are represented on a one-dimensional interval scale. The research investigates the equilibrium within a monopoly scenario, considering a production cost that is strictly convex. The monopoly offers a strategy comprising various quality–price combinations, with consumer choices determining profits. The analysis involves a comparison between two analogous models: one with a continuous range of consumers and the other with a finite number of consumers. The study explores disparities in the potential for market failure between these two settings. Notably, numerical illustrations underscore these divergences in both market contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a simple and old question: should innovators receive a patent or a prize? The answer I provide is equally simple: they should receive both. The literature on patents versus prizes has proceeded mostly under the assumption that there should be a choice between a regime of patents and a regime of prizes in which patents fall into the public domain upon award of the prize. There are significant "public choice costs" under the prize plans. By this I mean there are risks of inappropriate transfers to patentees – that is, looting – and of confiscation of patentees, through the conduct of or through the omissions of government agents. The innovation regime I propose is a patent-plus-prize scheme. The patentee would receive the patent and a prize that approximates consumer surplus. Public choice costs are considerably lower than under prize schemes: there would be no looting and no risk of confiscation under patent-plus-prize. In addition, private and social incentives to innovate are aligned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Exclusive breastfeeding is one of the rights that children should have, as breastfeeding for the first six months is the best way to fulfill a child's nutritional needs to continue the growth of their brain, liver, and immune system. Exclusive breastfeeding can also reduce infectious mortality by 88 percent in infants less than 3 months old. Currently, the achievement of exclusive breastfeeding is 69.7% and has met the 2021 target of 45%. One of the causes is influenced by the learning process. Interesting and fun learning media can affect learning outcomes. Therefore, it is important for midwives to grow the interest and attractiveness of pregnant women in the learning process with the help of appropriate learning media and involve pregnant women in lactation education classes through Monopoly games. Objectives: This study aims to develop Monopoly game media in lactation education classes and describe the feasibility of Monopoly game media as learning media in lactation education classes for pregnant women. Methods: This study uses research and development methods, namely expert sampling. The data collection instrument was a Likert scale questionnaire and descriptive statistical analysis techniques. The design of research activities only reached the feasibility test of monopoly learning media. Results: The learning media developed regarding the feasibility of learning aspects by material experts and users obtained an average score of 4.32, entered the good category. Meanwhile, according to media experts, an average score of 4.9 was obtained based on media engineering aspects, and based on visual communication aspects, an average score of 4.62 was obtained. Conclusions: This study shows that the development media for lactation education classes in the form of monopoly is in a good category and suitable for use

In this article, authors critically analyze the concept of derisking. Derisking is actively promoted by the Western expert community as a new strategic basis for US-China trade relations. Derisking refers to the transition from the policy of radical breakdown from the trade partnership with China to the rhetoric of risk reduction, which implies limiting dependencies and risks arising from them. It does not imply a complete rupture with a partner. Based on the extensive historical material study, as well as applying modern conflictological methods of risk analysis, authors come to the conclusion that derisking management strategy does not have the conceptual optics necessary for analyzing political dimension of international economic relations and is unable to explain what is the source of risks in reality.Conceptual non-viability of derisking is due to disregard for the uneven capital development regularity, which determines the interstate relations. Global economy is a space of unfading conflict within the economic competition, and therefore eternal risk activity. The constant presence of risks in international relations makes conflict either a source that generates risks, or their result. On the example of the US-China trade relations, authors demonstrate how an attempt to elevate a partner who was designated for the outsiders’ fate generates a response from the risk-beneficiary to return the outsider to his native bosom by minimizing the consequences of risk for himself at the expense of others.In fact, behind the derisking strategy, lies desire to increase the intellectual rents’ price paid for Western patents and technologies. The reaction to the possibility of losing one’s monopoly position creates an impulse to shake up relations and change their dynamics in the right direction for oneself. These impulses expose inherent systematical contradictions and determine the outbreak of a new round of a hot trade war. While staying in the negative unity relations, participants have no other choice but to achieve the goals of enrichment, which are the same for all participants, through denying each other, and aspire every time to establish unequal economic exchange in their favor.

While previous resource conflicts have often been linked to fuel minerals such as oil, future resource conflict may revolve around nonfuel minerals that enable strategic emerging technologies. During a 2010 diplomatic dispute, China reportedly blocked exports of rare earth elements to Japan, thereby leveraging China's near-monopoly to threaten Japanese manufacturers of advanced technologies including batteries and permanent magnets. Although this caused significant concern for manufacturers outside China, China's control over other critical minerals has yet to be studied comprehensively. Besides rare earth elements, perhaps no mineral has received more attention for its supply risks than cobalt. Here Chinese control is estimated for each cobalt material at each stage of the cobalt supply chain from 2000 through 2022. The results show that from mining, to refining, consumption, recycling, stocks, and trade, China dominates the cobalt materials that feed lithium-ion battery cathode production. Specifically, the results show that in 2022 Chinese firms had control over 62% of cobalt mine materials primarily used for cobalt chemical refining, 95% control of refined commercial-grade cobalt chemicals, 92% control of battery-grade tricobalt tetroxide, 85% control of battery-grade cobalt sulfate, and 91% control of nickel–cobalt-manganese cathode precursor materials. China's monopoly over cobalt battery materials may imply a serious supply risk to non-Chinese battery producing and consuming industries—especially given rising geopolitical tensions and the reemergence of critical mineral export restrictions including gallium for semiconductors, germanium for solar panels, graphite for lithium-ion batteries, and (again) rare earth elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses and explains how the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) acquired and retains monopoly and monopsony power over Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) in a complex political, legal, regulatory, and financial context. A qualitative and interpretive approach to research underpins a thematic analysis of social media and journalistic content alongside a review of a limited academic literature. It is found that the UFC has acquired and retained monopoly and monopsony power in a context of weak regulation, limited competition, ineffective legal and political intervention, and an absence of unionisation. The three key strategies employed by the UFC to sustain power over MMA were found to be 1. control of athlete labour via restrictive contracts; 2. acquisition of competitor promotions, expertise, and commercial contracts; and 3. building reputation and legitimacy via public relations and lobbying activities. The UFC has employed a combination of legitimate, referent, reward, expert, informational, and coercive power to become the dominant organisation in MMA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the applicability and implications of the political tournament model in Chinese cities by arguing that there is urban bias in political tournaments, especially in prefecture-level cities. Urban district leaders have to cooperate more and compete less than their counterparts in counties. The implication is that the percentage of urban districts is positively associated with monopolistic behavior of local government. Based on land leasing data of 290 prefecture-level cities from 2004 to 2014 (except 2012), it is found that the percentage of districts is positively associated with the speed of land price decline in leases through tender, auction and listing (TAL). This result supports the urban bias hypothesis in the context of the Coase Conjecture. It is also found that the total number of districts or population size is negatively associated with the speed of land price decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the introduction to a Special Issue on the 2023 Merger Guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note delineates the conflict of hotel rate parity and key clauses of competition laws in both Europe and the U.S. We trace the origin of hotel rate parity to the principle of most favored nation (MFN) in international trade agreements. We show that rate parity challenges two pillars of competition law. Under rate parity agreements, it is travel intermediaries—not hotels—that demand rate parity, which comes down to the dominance of travel intermediaries over small and independent hotels. The courts view MFN status as a hindrance to competition and therefore in violation of competition law. The trend and message in Europe are clear: the clause is most likely to be judged as not complying with EU competition law and its national equivalents. In the U.S. though, a lack of case decisions precludes us from reaching any conclusion about the fate of the MFN clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Economy / Wspolczesna Gospodarka is the property of University of Gdansk, Seaborne Trade & Maritime Transport Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the prohibitions enshrined under the Malaysian Competition Act 2010 is abuse of dominant positions. The Act also provides a limited exception of monopoly under limb (c) of the Second Schedule. However, the Court of Appeal in a ruling in 2018 declared monopoly outside the Act's ambits. This note argues that this ruling by the Court of Appeal contradicts with the existing provisions of the Act that allow a limited exception on monopoly and the ruling by Malaysia Competition Commission in its 2015 Dagang Net case. This note further argues that the Court of Appeal's ruling conflicts with the principles of Islamic muamalat (transactions and mutual dealings) pertaining to monopoly. The analysis of these rulings, monopoly related provision of the Act, and Islamic law in this note provides insights on possible reconciliation of the current statutory provisions and the judicial approaches on monopoly with the Islamic principles and the theory of competitive harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista do Curso de Direito do UNIFOR is the property of UNIFOR Law Course Magazine / Revista do Curso de Direito do UNIFOR and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Small businesses within the digital sector are spread across the USA. However, a significant number of promising small businesses concentrate in major technology hubs, either initially or through relocation. This phenomenon can be attributed to the influential role played by localized markets for financing and acquisition, which is, in turn, driven by the dominant market positions held by major digital platforms. Our research demonstrates a clear pattern of localized acquisition markets, particularly in sectors frequently targeted by the seven largest American digital giants—Amazon, Alphabet (Google), Apple, Microsoft, Meta (Facebook), Oracle, and Adobe, collectively known as 'Big Tech'. This localization trend has become more pronounced between 2000 and 2020. Our analysis indicates that the gravitational pull of these acquisition markets poses challenges to local initiatives aimed at fostering digital businesses. These efforts would be more successful if measures were taken to limit the market influence of digital platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an industry with homogeneous goods, this note compares the standard incumbent's strategic capacity choice versus the incumbent's pre‐emptive payment (profit) transfer (PPT) strategy (i.e., pre‐entry acquisition). It is shown that via the transfer option, the incumbent holds its monopoly position "dissuading" the potential competitor entry for a range of fixed costs larger than under strategic capacity. Moreover, in that range, at least one firm is better off under PPT, while the other is indifferent between PPT and capacity choice. That is, in contestable markets, the incumbent can keep its dominant position in an easier way than standard models predict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the old days, taxing a commodity meant setting its price (i.e., its "rate") through negotiation, to keep it within the reach of as many people as possible. Taxation was an exceptional measure granted by royal authority to the public, who cherished it. In the name of a freedom that would be enjoyed only by merchants, the Enlightenment movement argued that taxation was theft, and the Revolution rigorously prohibited it from the outset. Prices soared. Whereas yesterday we taxed a product to prevent it from going up in price, today the tax is what increases the price to the benefit of the State or a community. History has changed the meaning of words.

A phenomenon in the growth aspect of the child age group is obesity. Obesity is influenced by behavior in choosing food and drinks consumed daily. The preventive efforts that have been carried out so far have focused on lecture methods and media distribution. However, an educational approach in the form of games has not been implemented. The aim of this program is to implement a monopoly game with the theme "Healthy Snacks Monopoly" to increase knowledge and behavior in choosing healthy foods and drinks. This game is played in groups, for 30 minutes, and students can buy the food and drinks provided. Monitoring is also carried out for one month through the homeroom teacher. The results obtained were that students showed an increase in aspects of knowledge and behavior in choosing healthy food and drinks. This game can be applied to teachers, parents and health workers who are responsible for the health of school children to improve healthy lifestyles, especially in choosing food and drinks.

The article contributes to the emerging literature on neoliberalism that explicitly rejects the long-held assumption that it is fundamentally about the valorisation of free markets. This scholarship has taken a more ‘applied’ approach hitherto, leaving open the question of whether neoliberalism might be about free markets in principle. Via a wide-ranging survey of texts authored by intellectuals from the Austrian, Chicago and Ordoliberal schools, the article explores the neoliberal endorsement of monopolistic corporations. While beginning with distinctive conceptions of markets, neoliberal intellectuals occupy remarkably similar ground once they elaborate on their vision for markets. Monopolistic corporations are most enthusiastically discussed by Austrian authors and in the most qualified manner by Ordoliberals, but the effect is analogous: they represent the ideal form taken by markets. Only when neoliberalism is detached from free markets can a fully appropriate critique be mounted, enhancing the possibilities for it to be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of online gambling has drawn attention towards offshore gambling. Currently there is lack of evidence on reasons and motivations to gamble on offshore gambling sites. This study investigated the general gambling motives of onshore and offshore gamblers, and the reasons to gamble on offshore gambling sites. The study used binary logistic regression model to analyze the data from Finnish Gambling 2019 population survey including adult past-year online gamblers (n = 1,422). The validated measure for problem gambling severity (PGSI, Problem Gambling Severity Index) was used. Furthermore, data-driven qualitative analysis was used to form categories for the reasons to gamble on offshore gambling sites. Offshore gambling was more common among men and younger age groups than among women or older age groups. Offshore gamblers gambled less often for money or worthy causes than onshore gamblers. Furthermore, offshore gamblers had more different types of motives to gamble, they gambled more frequently and had higher problem gambling severity scores (PGSI) than onshore gamblers. Finally, the most common reasons to gamble offshore were: (1) larger game supply and game features, (2) benefits, bonuses, and the usability of the website, and (3) inner motivation. Offshore gambling is characterized with intensity and diversity of gambling behavior and motives, and it poses a risk especially for young men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain commitment power to set price paths. The type of monopolist is private information of the firm and not observable to consumers. If commitment to future prices is not possible, the initial price is high in equilibrium, but the firm falls prey to the Coase conjecture later to capture the residual demand. The relative price cut is increasing in the probability of commitment as buyers anticipate that a steady price is likely and purchase early. Pooling in prices may occur for perpetuity if commitment is sufficiently weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economy is the backbone of the success of any country. A failure in its domain is equivalent to failure in other aspects. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, which has been considered a land of vast economic potential, is still struggling to actualize this prospect due to some imperfections. Monopoly hugely contributes to market imperfection, and its effects can be constraints on economic growth. The issue had arisen since the advent of Islam, whereby it was used as a strategy to maximize profit. The Islamic system believes in the co-existence of an economic public sector along with the private sector. Though Islam frowns at any market imperfection that can lead to paroxysms of increasing prices for both suppliers and consumers, it also pinpoints regulatory measures. The study, therefore, adopted a qualitative method, which was used to review related and relevant literature on the concept of monopoly, and interviews were also conducted to gather information on the practice and effect of monopoly. The paper revealed that among the regulatory measures used to control this market imperfection was Ḥisbah. The study exposed that killing the sense of competitiveness in the market is the most atrocious effect of monopoly on the Nigerian economy. The paper also found that the Nigerian economy can regain its breath and fame if these measures can be applied to control the juggernauts' engineering in the market either by halting the competitive market, hoarding, or proportioning scarcity. The study recommended that the government should play its role as an overall investigating force over the prices dictated by the public and private sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara University Journal of Turkology / Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We investigate a finite‐horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that under the class of posted‐price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue‐dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority‐based deterministic tie‐breaking rule instead of using a random tie‐breaking rule. The effect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper surveys the monopoly regulation literature with the Bayesian approach. The literature builds on Baron and Myerson's seminal 1982 paper, entitled "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs." After presenting their contributions to the regulation literature, the paper discusses the main criticisms of their model, relating to either informational or commitment assumptions about the Bayesian regulator. The paper also briefly reviews some non-Bayesian incentive schemes, price-cap regulation, and several extensions and applications of Baron and Myerson's regulatory model to highlight the evolution and scope of the new economics of regulation after 40 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoclassical economic theories form the basis of modern economics, along with the principles of Keynesian economics. As part of economic theory, the main direction that reveals the functioning mechanism of a market economy is the neoclassical direction. In this regard, identifying the peculiarities of the relationship between the subject and method of the neoclassical direction is an urgent task, since it will make it possible to more clearly define the place of the neoclassical direction in modern economic thought, identify the theoretical basis and applicability of practical recommendations of neoclassics, in particular, more clearly define its capabilities as a theoretical basis for the formation market economy in different countries. In this article, the authors analyze the difference between neoclassical macroeconomics and microeconomics. It is shown that the microeconomic aspects of neoclassical theory have much greater theoretical and applied significance than neoclassical macroeconomics. They largely reflect real economic processes and determine the economic behavior of economic entities. The work examines, in a microeconomic aspect, the theoretical approaches of the main representatives of neoclassical theory, such as A. Marshall, L. von Mises and other representatives, to the analysis of economic processes. The authors note the importance of limit analysis, which has not only theoretical but also practical significance. The work also examines the approaches of representatives of neoclassical theory to assessing the value and price of goods and economic resources. In the real economy, markets of imperfect competition predominate, which are characterized by their own characteristics that influence the economic behavior of firms in commodity and resource markets, as evidenced by the use of marginal analysis to substantiate the position of the authors. The article assesses the views of representatives of the neoclassical school on the differences between market and planned economies. Their approach to the process of economic monopolization is characterized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the developed economies, recent political economy scholarship has highlighted the growing role of intangible assets (brand equity, software, business processes, patents etc.) in corporate portfolios. Much of this literature has emphasized how intangible assets erect barriers to entry, produce artificial scarcity of key inputs, enhance the pricing power of firms and thus lead to greater and greater levels of concentration. Being as they are monopoly rights and privileges, intangible assets represent the relational power of their owner vis-à-vis those excluded from their ownership. While much of this literature has focused on the developed world, this paper turns its gaze to the case of a developing country and analyzes the patterns and trends of intangible assets for a sample of Indian firms for the period 2000–2022. The analysis reveals a substantial acceleration in the weight of net intangible assets relative to net physical assets, especially after 2008. It also suggests that the largest and most powerful corporations are the ones that have contributed to this spike. Ranked by assets, sales and ownership category, the results show that intangible asset accumulation has been the strongest in the highest echelons of the corporate hierarchy. Moreover, the patterns of intangible asset accumulation have been such that they have not been restricted to the traditional "rentier" sectors in the sense that their presence in the "productive" sectors has been as important if not more so. By focusing on firm-level patterns of intangible asset accumulation, the results show the internal and necessary connections between accumulation and value capture that undergirds modern day capitalism in the Southern peripheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of IPR's ability in the progress of society is undisputable. Such protections are be instrumental in making sure that adequate investment in terms of money and time are made for food security and sustainable agriculture ecosystem. Revolutionary technologies of genetic transformation leading to the products like genetically modified crops (GM) have glamorized an otherwise rustic industry. There is a general consensus in relation to the complexity of the issue and granting gene patents which in themselves (isolation) are worthless. Only in conjugation with complex biological system of a plant can they show their effect. Super crops are now possible through various plant biotechnological interventions to obtain the desired traits by changing the genome of plants. Such techniques are research intensive and demand high investment, hence legal protection through intellectual property rights is imperative. But it is complicated to grant a patent or similar monopoly on plant genetic resources as it has direct implications on food affordability and security especially in developing countries. Additionally, giant seed companies of developed countries have gained many patents on genes of plants, misappropriating the plant genetic resources of poor or undeveloped countries which are rich in biodiversity giving rise to biopiracy. The purpose of the article is to examine the legal framework for gene patenting in reference to plant variety protection (PVP) in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research analyzes the U.S. cheese industry dynamics (changes in wholesale cheese prices, milk price, margins, and the nature of wholesale cheese pricing) in light of a herd retirement program implemented by the Cooperatives Working Together (CWT) in the period of 2003–2010, which led to an antitrust lawsuit filed by cheese buyers against a group of dairy cooperatives and a large settlement. Presuming that they had a Capper-Volstead Act immunity, the CWT cooperatives acted in a cartel-like manner to decrease milk supply to increase and stabilize milk prices received by dairy farmers. While the program may have modestly increased seller market power of dairy farmers, seller market power of dairy cooperatives involved in cheese manufacturing decreased. This is because the cost of milk used in cheese manufacturing increased at a higher rate than wholesale cheese prices, which caused wholesale cheese margins to decrease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern District of California held that Apple did not operate a monopoly in its App Store marketplace, offered through its famously known mobile device, the "iPhone." Both parties appealed aspects of the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision in full, except for the award of attorney fees. While this App Store dilemma continues to unfold, several companies, U.S. states, and even the U.S. Congress have sided in favor of Epic, trying to provide support in its fight for a fairer App Store. This Note examines where the district court erred, and where it correctly applied the law. It also analyzes Epic's future chances, as there is a lot of work to be done before victory can be claimed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms’ rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a ‘Polanyian’ double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process.

Abstract This study investigated the extent of currency competition within the cryptocurrency market through the Hayek’s concept of the denationalization of money. Hayek’s original analysis primarily centered on competition revolving around the medium of the exchange function. This study posited that cryptocurrencies compete across diverse monetary functions, particularly concerning their roles as speculative stores of value and exchange media. This assertion provided insight into the distinction between Hayek’s envisaged private currencies and the cryptocurrency paradigm. Utilizing an extensive dataset encompassing 101 cryptocurrencies spanning from 2016 to 2022, an empirical exploration was conducted to scrutinize the progression and intensity of competition within the broader cryptocurrency market and its submarkets. These findings reveal a robust competition among unpegged cryptocurrencies, predominantly contending for speculative investment purposes. Similarly, there is pronounced competition among stablecoins as stable stores of value. In contrast, competition is much less pronounced concerning the medium of the exchange function, potentially entailing network effects and the emergence of monopolistic tendencies within this specific submarket.

Technology transfer agreements are considered the most common and essential legal tool for conducting technological exchanges between developed countries and their developing counterparts. These agreements are not limited to their role in international trade, but also extend their impact to various stages of production, services, information technology, scientific and technical detection, as well as other sectors that are considered pillars of state sovereignty. These agreements contribute to the transfer of knowledge and technology between countries, thus helping to develop industries and services in developing countries, and contributing to improving the standard of living and the economy in those countries. Therefore, countries must pay great attention to technology transfer agreements and work to determine the objectives and necessary controls to ensure their full benefit from this type of international cooperation while preserving their economic and technological interests.

Power and dependence in economic exchange shape industry structure. When a focal industry faces powerful suppliers or buyers, this can reduce industry rents. The authors argue that these dynamics also affect job quality by reducing the economic surplus available to be shared with workers. Drawing on ideas from power-dependency theory, this article explains industry earnings and job quality differences by examining inter-industry exchange patterns. The authors build on Ronald Burt's seminal analysis of structural constraint in economic exchange using industry input-output tables. They calculate market constraint measures for recent years in the United States and link these with CPS data on wages and benefits. Analyses reveal that workers in more buyer-constrained industries (dependence on powerful buyers) experience lower wages and benefits. Findings also show that market constraint reduces the economic surplus available for union bargaining. Theory and results suggest that market concentration reduces suppliers' economic rents, harming job quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]