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Climate change requires significant adaptation of economies, and the largest part of most economies is composed of private sector actors. In this Viewpoint, we argue that it should not be the role of the public sector to cover the full costs of adaptation - which would also typically exceed government's fiscal space. Rather, we suggest that the public sector should set the right conditions to catalyse private investments in adaptation. While the suggestion is not new, we argue that the current focus on generic ‘barriers’ hindering more private investments in adaptation is not expedient. These barriers are descriptive rather than explanatory, sometimes mix cause and effect, and tend to focus on eliminating obstacles, rather than adapting efficiently. Alternatively, we suggest to focus on addressing three market imperfections that give rise to those barriers. In doing so, the overall welfare of society, including the vulnerability of the most marginalized, should be centre-stage. The development of markets should aim to contribute to such welfare - it is not an end in itself. In that sense, our call for a focus on market imperfections is a call for a larger role of public actors, both in developed and developing countries.

Unlike climate change mitigation, adaptation to climate change does not as much suffer from the fundamental global public good problem – at least at the country-level – since it is in the self-interest of each individual country to adapt. However, the observed level of adaptation is insufficient from an economic perspective. We address this puzzle by adding a psychological perspective to explain actors’ behaviour. Based on existing meta-analytic evidence we discuss micro- (i.e. individual-), meso- (i.e. group-) and macro- (i.e. society-) level factors that may contribute to more engagement in adaptation and provide recommendations on how to address them. The results show that the strongest predictors of individual adaptation behaviour are people's beliefs whether adaptive actions will be effective in protecting them from climate-related hazards (outcome expectancy), the degree to which people believe that they are able to engage in adaptive actions (self-efficacy) and their emotional reaction to climate change. Equally strong on a meso-level are behavioural norms and cultural aspects on a macro-level. We recommend that decision-makers create more transparency about the cause–effect chain between adaptation activity and desired adaptation effects to strengthen individuals’ sense of efficacy. Furthermore, inducing reflection on social norms through communicative interventions may contribute to motivate adaptive actions by individuals and organisations. Key policy insights -Psychological factors play an important but underestimated role in explaining adaptation behaviour. -If people believe that they can address the risks of climate-related hazards they will show stronger adaptation behaviour. This insight can be used to incentivise more investments in adaptation. -Social norms and cultural values are linked to adaptation behaviour. Public communication campaigns and other policy interventions can help to change social norms, and they should be tailored to the cultural values of societies. -The influence of social norms and cultural values can be stronger than individual-level variables such as beliefs and preferences. -People underestimate the extent to which others are willing to contribute to society, in particular in societies scoring high on individualism and masculinity. This can prevent people from investing in adaptation.

Effective capacity building is vital for developing countries to enable them to contribute to global efforts to mitigate climate change and adapt to its consequences. This letter provides first empirical evidence on the impact of climate finance on institutional capacity in recipient countries. Using data from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and a World Bank index, we find a robust positive relation for sub-Saharan Africa from dynamic panel data estimation whereas no such effect is detected across remaining sample countries. While focusing on identification, however, our analysis should be seen as an initial piece of the puzzle. In light of the abundance of different capacity building concepts and definitions in the field of climate change future research is needed to understand the underlying mechanics.

This chapter argues that Germany’s national development bank, KfW, derives its legitimacy as an important policy actor through three characteristics: (i) it acts on the financial market with the government’s backing to pursue economic—rather than purely commercial—objectives; (ii) as a government agency, it has privileged access to officials and regulators; and (iii) it has extensive in-house technical and engineering expertise. As such, KfW can profoundly impact how these policies are implemented at five stages of the policy process: agenda setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. This conceptualization is applied to two illustrative case studies: facilitating Germany’s shift towards a green economy (the Energiewende) and coping with challenges of the 2008 global financial crisis.

This chapter argues that Germany’s national development bank, KfW, derives its legitimacy as an important policy actor through three characteristics: (i) it acts on the financial market with the government’s backing to pursue economic—rather than purely commercial—objectives; (ii) as a government agency, it has privileged access to officials and regulators; and (iii) it has extensive in-house technical and engineering expertise. As such, KfW can profoundly impact how these policies are implemented at five stages of the policy process: agenda setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. This conceptualization is applied to two illustrative case studies: facilitating Germany’s shift towards a green economy (the Energiewende) and coping with challenges of the 2008 global financial crisis.

This paper develops a better understanding of what may be understood as a barrier to climate friendly investment and suggests to tool that could be used in appropriate policy design. In addition to an overview of the broader conceptual definitions of a barrier, the paper develops a definition of a barrier to adaptation and mitigation investment according to economic mechanisms that lead to the decreased attractiveness of the investment (relative to the hypothetical case of functioning markets) leading to the market imperfections as well as the impact on the risk and return profile. This illustrates that in general barriers may be addressed to correct the market imperfection or compensating the investor. The decomposition of the barriers along the market imperfection and investor’s perception enable to suggests a tool to suggest the design for the require policy change.

Across the globe climate policy is shifting away from a carbon price towards investment subsidies, such as grants, interest-subsidised loans or guarantees. This increases the risk of inefficient public spending. This paper shows how the main market imperfections related to the emission externality, knowledge spillovers and capital market imperfections negatively affect the risk-return-profile of a climate investment. To some extent these negative impacts can be compensated through different forms of investment subsidies. Minimising the risk of inefficient public spending is, however, challenging and requires detailed understanding of technologies and markets at the project level. The analysis provides guidance for the design of appropriate investment subsidy schemes. Carbon prices and investment subsidies are not perfect substitutes, and - at least for developed economies - a carbon price remains the single most efficient instrument. This price should, however, coexist with other instruments, e.g. investment support schemes, which can be tailored to address the non-emission market imperfections related to climate change.

This paper analyzes barriers for energy efficiency investments for small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Based on a survey of 480 SMEs in Zhejiang Province, this study assesses financial, informational, and organizational barriers for energy efficiency investments in the SME sector. The conventional view has been that the lack of appropriate financing mechanisms particularly hinders SMEs to adopt cost-effective energy efficiency measures. As such, closing the financing gap for SMEs is seen as a prerequisite in order to promote energy efficiency in the sector. The econometric estimates of this study, however, suggest that access to information is an important determinant of investment outcomes, while this is less clear with respect to financial and organizational factors. More than 40 percent of enterprises in the sample declared that that they are not aware of energy saving equipments or practices in their respective business area, indicating that there are high transaction costs for SMEs to gather, assess, and apply information about energy saving potentials and relevant technologies. One implication is that the Chinese government may assume an active role in fostering the dissemination of energy-efficiency related information in the SME sector.

Without participation of the United States, the world?s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, mitigation of global climate change seems hardly conceivable. Despite the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the reluctance of the Bush administration to engage in Post-Kyoto negotiations, recent developments suggest that the U.S. position towards climate policy might change in the medium run. This study provides an overview on current trends in U.S. climate policy. Besides the main elements of national climate policy proposals and state-level initiatives the climate contents in the U.S. presidential candidates? agendas are outlined. Based on this overview recent trends in U.S. climate policy are related to the European approach to combat climate change. Furthermore, we elaborate on the aspects which may be important for Europe to design its own domestic and international climate policy in order to achieve the long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations.

We analyze the productivity effects of environmental (green) investment as well as of environmental expenditures and energy expenditures. For this purpose, we follow a production function approach where we account for these investment and expenditure categories as inputs. Based on a panel dataset for the German manufacturing industry between 1996 and 2002 we find that both environmental and energy expenditures do not contribute to production growth. In contrast, environmental investment positively impinges upon production growth as a productivity driver. We thus conclude that environmental regulation should stimulate investment in order to be compatible with economic goals such as productivity.

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international trade and energy use. Employing project-based CDM supply data we assess the relative importance of transaction costs and investment risks as well as CDM regulations through supplementarity and additionality criteria. Our numerical results show that the macroeconomic impacts of transaction costs and investment risks are negligible: Given the large supply of cheap project-based emissions credits in developing countries, compliance to the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved at a very low cost. However, regulatory restrictions such as a supplementarity criterion can substantially curtail the potential efficiency gains from where-flexibility in climate policy.

This paper analyses the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European energy markets on the basis of existing macroeconomic simulation studies. The analysis comprises the European emssion trading scheme, energy taxes, measures in the transport sector, and the promotion of renewable energy sources. We find that these instruments affect the European economy, in particular the energy intensive industries and the industries that produce internationally tradeable goods. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, the costs of environmental regulation appear to be modest. The underlying environmental targets and the efficient design of regulation are key determinants for the cost burden.

Energy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are subject to a diverse set of policies related to climate change. We analyse the potential efficiency losses from simultaneous application of emission taxes and emissions trading in qualitative and quantitative terms within a partial equilibrium framework for the EU. It turns out that those firms within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which at the same time are subject to domestic energy or carbon taxes will abate inefficiently much while other firms within the EU ETS will benefit from lower international emission permit prices. The same logic disproves the argument that additional national emission taxes will reduce inefficiencies in abatement supposed to be resulting from allowance (over-) allocation. In essence, unilateral emission taxes within the EU ETS are ecologically ineffective and subsidise net permit buyers. Thus, all firms that are subject to emissions trading and any CO2 emission taxes at the same time should be exempt from the latter. The foregone tax revenue could be generated by auctioning a small fraction of the permits instead. This would be cheaper for the emissions trading sectors as a whole and could be compatible even with the tight auctioning restrictions of the EU directive.

We investigate a class of optimal control problems that exhibit constant exogenously given delays in the control in the equation of motion of the differential states. Therefore, we formulate an exemplary optimal control problem with one stock and one control variable and review some analytic properties of an optimal solution. However, analytical considerations are quite limited in case of delayed optimal control problems. In order to overcome these limits, we reformulate the problem and apply direct numerical methods to calculate approximate solutions that give a better understanding of this class of optimization problems. In particular, we present two possibilities to reformulate the delayed optimal control problem into an instantaneous optimal control problem and show how these can be solved numerically with a state-of-the-art direct method by applying Bock’s direct multiple shooting algorithm. We further demonstrate the strength of our approach by two economic examples.

Since January 1st the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS may be linked at some time to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.

We analyze a dynamic multi-pollutant problem where abatement costs of several pollutants are not separable. The pollutants can be either technological substitutes or complements. Environmental damage is induced by the stock of accumulated pollution. We find that optimal emission paths are qualitatively different for substitutes and complements. We derive general properties governing optimal emission paths and present numerical examples to illustrate our main results. In particular we find that optimal emission paths need not be monotonic, even for highly symmetric pollutants. Finally, we describe a comparatively simple method to implement the optimal path without explicitly knowing its shape.

We formulate an optimal control capital accumulation model with a Leontief-type production function and an exogenously given time-lag between investment and the accumulation of the capital stock, to analyze the qualitative and quantitative influence of time-lags on the system dynamics. As known from the time-to-build literature, optimal investment paths for positive and finite time-lags are in general cyclical, in contrast to the monotonic optimal paths for instantaneous capital accumulation. We show that the transition between instantaneous and time-lagged capital accumulation is continuous, in the sense that the greater is the time-lag between investment and capital accumulation, the more likely and more pronounced becomes cyclical behavior of the optimal paths.

Implementation of an EU-wide emissions trading system by means of National Allocation Plans is at the core of European environmental policy agenda. Member States are faced with the problem of allocating their national emission budgets under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement between energy-intensive sectors that are eligible for international emissions trading and the remaining segments of their economies that will be subject to complementary domestic emission regulation. The country-specific segmentation of national emission budgets between trading sectors and non-trading sectors will determine the cost efficiency of the EU emissions trading system and the gains for each Member State vis-?-vis domestic abatement policies. We present an interactive simulation model where users can specify the design of National Allocation Plans for each EU Member State and then evaluate the induced economic effects. Our numerical framework is based on marginal abatement cost curves for (emissions) trading and non-trading sectors of the EU-15 economies. Illustrative simulations highlight the importance of a coordinated design of National Allocation Plans in order to avoid substantial excess costs of regulation and drastic burden shifting between nontrading and trading sectors.