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In this article we present a review of research on the IAM Task, whereby memories are cued by self-images in the form of "I am ... " statements, such as I am a grandfather, I am a Bob Dylan fan, I am from Darlington, I am a Psychologist. Such cues are particularly successful at accessing memories associated with the formation of specific aspects of the self. We describe the conceptual and historical context for the development of our task and review findings from other researchers who have used the same basic design. We present aggregate data and examples from across several experiments, examining how these patterns change in psychological distress and dysfunction. We also discuss research on "I will be" statements and how these have been adopted to examine self-related future cognitions. We conclude that the working self operates to organise memory retrieval and make accessible episodic and semantic material for self-relevant periods across the lifespan. Moreover, accessibility of self-images can be modulated by retrieval of autobiographical memories, highlighting Conway's bidirectional relationship between memory and the self. We provide suggestions for future research and for the first time provide a standardised version of our IAM Task for use by researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Conway's view, Autobiographical memory (AM) construction is accompanied by control processes. These processes range from filtering out relevant memories according to the current context, to generating or elaborating appropriate retrieval cues. These processes can be conceptualised as metacognition, the ability to control and monitor cognitive processes. Experimentally, little has been carried out to support the idea that metacognition is involved in AM. To assess this, we designed a task, the Feeling of Retrieval. Participants had to predict whether cue words would facilitate AM access (i.e., fluent access cues) or not (i.e., limited access cues) in a limited time (either 1 (Exp. 2) or 2 (Exp. 1) s). Later, they retrieved memories in response to both types of cues. Results show that cues judged as fluent access led to better AM generation, as illustrated by AM retrieval latency and a subjective measure of the ease with which the AMs were retrieved. These rapid predictions may rely on epistemic feelings and / or other mnemonic cues such as a partial retrieval of information. This metacognitive access to the earliest stages of AM retrieval illustrates the ability to monitor AM processes as proposed by Conway (2005). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated metacognitive monitoring abilities in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder in two experiments using the judgment-of-learning paradigm. Participants were asked to predict their future recall of unrelated word pairs during the learning phase. Experiment 1 compared judgments-of-learning made immediately after learning and judgments-of-learning made after a delay. We found that both groups overestimated their memory performance but that overall there were no group differences in judgment-of-learning accuracy. Additionally, both groups displayed the standard delayed judgment-of-learning effect (yielding greater judgment accuracy in delayed compared to immediate judgments), suggesting that both groups were able to use appropriate information in making their judgments-of-learning. Experiment 2 assessed whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder could regulate their study time according to their judgments-of-learning using a self-paced learning procedure. Results showed that both groups spent more time learning items given lower judgments-of-learning. Finally, Experiment 2 showed that judgments-of-learning and study time varied according to item difficulty in both groups. As a whole, these findings demonstrate that adolescents with autism spectrum disorder can accurately gauge their memory performance while learning new word associations and use these skills to control their study time at learning.

In this article we review the literature on the phenomenology of retrieval from the personal past, and propose a framework for understanding how epistemic feelings and metacognitive reflections guide the retrieval of representations of past events in the Self Memory System. Our focus is on an overlooked aspect of autobiographical memory, the phenomenology of the retrieval process, as opposed to the products of retrieval themselves. As we argue in the present paper, this is not some magical collection of phenomena, but centers on the feeling of familiarity derived from retrieval fluency during the process of retrieval. The relationship between retrieval fluency and retrieved content, interpreted metacognitively is what gives autobiographical retrieval its particular phenomenological "flavor." To illustrate our point, we focus on two phenomena that only recently were considered alongside each other: the déjà vu experience and involuntary autobiographical memories. Our proposal is that the feeling of familiarity (i.e., this reminds me of something) for the personal past acts to guide deliberate, conscious memory search. We argue that the critical concept in the phenomenology of retrieval is fluency—how readily information comes to mind. This article is categorized under:Psychology > MemoryPhilosophy > ConsciousnessPhilosophy > Knowledge and Belief [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jamais vu is a phenomenon operationalised as the opposite of déjà vu, i.e. finding subjectively unfamiliar something that we know to be familiar. We sought to document that the subjective experience of jamais vu can be produced in word alienation tasks, hypothesising that déjà vu and jamais vu are similar experiential memory phenomena. Participants repeatedly copied words until they felt "peculiar", had completed the task, or had another reason to stop. About two-thirds of all participants (in about one-third of all trials) reported strange subjective experiences during the task. Participants reported feeling peculiar after about thirty repetitions, or one minute. We describe these experiences as jamais vu. This experimentally induced phenomenon was related to real-world experiences of unfamiliarity. Although we replicated known patterns of correlations with déjà vu (age and dissociative experiences), the same pattern was not found for our experimental analogue of jamais vu, suggesting some differences between the two phenomena. However, in daily life, those people who had déjà vu more frequently also had jamais vu more frequently. Findings are discussed with reference to the progress that has been made in déjà vu research in recent years, with a view to fast-tracking our understanding of jamais vu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors tested MR against controls using the Inventory for déjà vu Experiences Assessment (Sno et al., [41]) and experimental procedures, showing both elevated reports of déjà vu, and déjà vecu (which has been described as a form of déjà vu in which the experience is of recollection of a prior event rather than familiarity). Again, this work continues the historically fruitful investigation of déjà vu based on the experiences of people with epilepsy, offering insight into the distinctions between déjà vecu and déjà vu. Beyond being mere curiosities, déjà vu and jamais vu as described here should be harnessed to investigate memory function since they underline the complexity of memory decision making, subjective experience and metacognitive processes. On the one hand, it is excellent that researchers are now bringing déjà vu into mainstream accounts of memory retrieval processes, such as classifying déjà vu as "implicit scene memory" (Rubin, [35]), but without data to support such claims, the mention of déjà vu amounts to little more than academic clickbait. [Extracted from the article]

Déjà vu occurs when a novel event is experienced with an erroneous sense of familiarity. Memory researchers theorise that this arises due to an error in the processes underlying the recognition memory system. Research has indicated that there may be a link between high levels of anxiety and increased frequency and intensity of déjà vu, however, there has been a comparatively little characterisation of déjà vu as experienced by individuals with clinical anxiety. We used an online questionnaire to collect data from individuals self-reporting a clinical diagnosis of anxiety, as well as from age-matched controls. The Anxiety Group reported a significantly higher frequency of déjà vu episodes over the previous month than controls. They also reported experiencing déjà vu more frequently and with higher intensity during periods of high anxiety. In addition, the Anxiety Group reported finding déjà vu episodes significantly more distressing than the Control Group. The findings indicate that there are differences in déjà vu experienced by people reporting high levels of anxiety compared to healthy controls without an anxiety diagnosis. We discuss structural and neural mechanisms thought to underpin déjà vu in relation to these results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is metacognition a general resource shared across domains? Previous research has documented consistent biases in judgments across tasks. In contrast, there is debate regarding the domain generality or the domain specificity of the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers (metacognitive sensitivity) because most previous work has documented nonsignificant correlations across domains. However, such null findings may be due to low statistical power and differences in task structure or performance, thereby masking a latent domain generality in metacognition. We examined across-domain correlations in confidence level and sensitivity in a large sample (N = 181). Participants performed 4 2-alternative forced-choice tasks (episodic memory, semantic memory, executive function, and visual perception) with trial-by-trial confidence judgments. We found significant correlations in average confidence level across tasks. By applying a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate cross-task covariance, we found five out 6 cross-task correlations in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d') were significant, even for pairs of tasks in which first-order performance was not correlated. This suggests that at least some components of metacognitive efficiency in retrospective confidence are domain general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Control of skilled actions requires rapid information sampling and processing, which may largely be carried out subconsciously. However, individuals often need to make conscious strategic decisions that ideally would be based upon accurate knowledge of performance. Here, we determined the extent to which individuals have explicit awareness of their steering performance (conceptualised as “metacognition”). Participants steered in a virtual environment along a bending road while attempting to keep within a central demarcated target zone. Task demands were altered by manipulating locomotor speed (fast/slow) and the target zone (narrow/wide). All participants received continuous visual feedback about position in zone, and one sub-group was given additional auditory warnings when exiting/entering the zone. At the end of each trial, participants made a metacognitive evaluation: the proportion of the trial they believed was spent in the zone. Overall, although evaluations broadly shifted in line with task demands, participants showed limited calibration to performance. Regression analysis showed that evaluations were influenced by two components: (a) direct monitoring of performance and (b) indirect task heuristics estimating performance based on salient cues (e.g., speed). Evaluations often weighted indirect task heuristics inappropriately, but the additional auditory feedback improved evaluations seemingly by reducing this weighting. These results have important implications for all motor tasks where conscious cognitive control can be used to influence action selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]