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Introduction 1065 I. The (Grass)Roots of the Ban the Box and Fair Chance Hiring Movement 1068 II. Collaborative Policymaking & Community Engagement in Austin, Texas 1078 III. Radical Resilience in [...]

I. INTRODUCTION When Alaska joined the Union in 1959, its constitutional framers believed that they had developed a revolutionary local government framework. (1) They realized that American counties, cities, and [...], Alaska's unorganized borough is the only unincorporated county-equivalent area in the entire United States, but the Alaska Constitution never envisioned that would be the case. The framers of the Alaska Constitution drafted a revolutionary article on local government that prioritized localism--participation in local government--to further democratic engagement in the state. Recognizing that much of rural Alaska lacked the population and infrastructure to support incorporated and localized self-governance in the 1950s, the framers opted not to automatically incorporate the entire state under various borough governments. Even so, the framers made clear that the state was to play an active role in encouraging (and even compelling) the incorporation of rural sections of the state as time progressed. Today, many sections of the Alaska's unorganized borough eligible for incorporation remain unincorporated, resulting in a number of adverse governance outcomes for rural and urban communities alike. This Note argues that Alaska maintains a positive obligation to incorporate eligible sections of the unorganized borough and that its failure to do so is unconstitutional under the state Constitution. Acknowledging the potential dangers of imposing local government on non-consenting citizens, this Note also articulates why borough governance may further the Alaska Constitution's localism mandate by developing the regional political communities envisioned by the framers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 213 II. BACKGROUND 214 A. The Origins and Limits of a City's Power and Autonomy to Preserve Venues 214 1. Historical Context 214 2. Dillon's [...], While cities can use their power to enact zoning ordinances and create historic preservation districts, these preservation ordinances vary widely across the United States, from allowing almost any type of development to strictly limiting any new development that does not match existing height, density, and use patterns. Within this framework, state legislatures have often limited the types of regulatory actions cities may take, as cities are merely political subdivisions of the state. Some states--known as "Dillon's Rule" states--restrict cities from taking novel legislative approaches to existing policy issues, such as affordable housing, unless those powers are expressly provided to the municipalities by the state legislature. "Home rule" states, on the other hand, grant broad legislative authority to cities to act on any local issues not preempted or foreclosed by the state legislature. The current affordable housing and homelessness crises in cities across the United States cause some scholars to argue against traditional historic preservation broadly, as it often results in overinclusive or unnecessary preservation that hinders efforts to develop more densely. In fast-growing places like Nashville, Tennessee, with strong music and entertainment scenes, there is a tension between preserving notable music landmarks and the pressure to develop housing in higher densities. These cities need the power and means to generate innovative methods of determining which sites to preserve while upzoning surrounding areas. Cities tend to over-prioritize either preservation or new development without creating a logical method for preserving only those sites with continued relevance and use while facilitating new development on other sites. Where applicable, states should legislate to make it easier for Dillon's Rule and partial or limited home rule cities to create innovative preservation schemes prioritizing sites of importance without preserving entire swaths of neighborhoods or districts unnecessarily and for aesthetic reasons alone. Cities should use existing means to develop zoning schemes with a more individual site analysis approach, allowing for the preservation of individual buildings while increasing density around them with incentives for housing development.

INTRODUCTION Fiscal year 2020 promised another year of record economic growth, which would generate natural revenue growth for local governments. (1) Instead, local governments spent much of 2020 addressing record [...], As scholars of local government have long noted, without adequate local revenue, home rule provides hollow legal authority. Recognizing the importance of local revenue, the National League of Cities' Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century ("'Principles",) explicitly includes taxation as a power granted by home rule and articulates a constitutional commitment to adequate intergovernmental aid. To further strengthen local budgetary control, the model bans unfunded mandates and incorporates an anti-coercion principle that requires conditions on state aid relate to the purposes of such aid. Together, the anti-coercion and unfunded mandate provisions limit state lawmakers' ability to indirectly limit home-rule authority through state purse strings. This Article applies these provisions to three recent examples of state efforts to tie local fiscal support and taxing authority to substantive state policy goals. In doing so, the Article highlights the ways the Principles might strengthen local democracy and also explores the challenge local governments face when confronting state legislatures with oppositional policy preferences. Introduction 1506 I. Purse Strings and Taxing Authority 1509 II. Arizona's 2020 Audit and S.B. 1487: Hyper Preemption as a Tool of Democratic De-Legitimacy 1512 A. S.B. 1487 1512 B. S.B. 1487 Under the Anti-Coercion Provision 1515 III. H.B. 1900 AND POLICE REFORM: HYPER PREEMPTION OF Local Budgeting 1517 A. H.B. 1900 1518 B. H.B. 1900 Under the Anti-Coercion and Unfunded Mandate Provision 1520 IV. Arizona's Education Grants 1522 V. Breaking the Chains of Fiscal Preemption 1525

Introduction 617 I. The Rise of Intrastate Pre-Emption 619 II. The Delegation of Marijuana Police Powers to Municipalities 623 III. Recreational Marijuana 'Opt-Out' Provisions in California 626 IV. Recreational Marijuana [...]

Introduction 1175 I. Family Law Localism: The Legal Framework 1176 A. Local Initiative 1176 B. Preemption 1181 II. The Place of Local Legislatures in Resolving Family Law Disputes 1183 INTRODUCTION [...]

"The police power of the state is one of the most difficult phases of our law to understand, and it is even more difficult to define it and to place [...]

Decentralization stands at a crossroad of scholarly debate and discussion on governance issues, no less so in transition countries. This article examines the role of decentralization for the promotion of good local governance in Kazakhstan. Available evidence substantiates that decentralization has a limited capacity to contribute to good local governance in Kazakhstan. This raises a fundamental question as to whether the Kazakh government is politically ready to build an efficient and responsive local government in order to achieve its 'Kazakhstan 2030' policy aspirations.