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People are multi-faceted, typically good at some things but bad at others, and a critical aspect of social judgement is the ability to focus on those traits relevant for the task at hand. However, it remains unknown how the brain supports such context-dependent social judgement. Here, we examine how people represent multidimensional individuals, and how the brain extracts relevant information and filters out irrelevant information when comparing individuals within a specific dimension. Using human fMRI, we identify distinct neural representations in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) supporting separation and selection of information for context-dependent social judgement. Causal evaluation using non-invasive brain stimulation shows that AI disruption alters the impact of relevant information on social comparison, whereas dmPFC disruption only affects the impact of irrelevant information. This neural circuit is distinct from the one supporting integration across, as opposed to separation of, different features of a multidimensional cognitive space.

Humans learn about the environment either directly by interacting with it or indirectly by seeking information about it from social sources such as conspecifics. The degree of confidence in the information obtained through either route should determine the impact that it has on adapting and changing behaviour. We examined whether and how behavioural and neural computations differ during non-social learning as opposed to learning from social sources. Trial-wise confidence judgments about non-social and social information sources offered a window into this learning process. Despite matching exactly the statistical features of social and non-social conditions, confidence judgments were more accurate and less changeable when they were made about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition to subjective reports of confidence, differences were also apparent in the Bayesian estimates of participants’ subjective beliefs. Univariate activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and posterior temporo-parietal junction (pTPJ) more closely tracked confidence about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition, the multivariate patterns of activity in the same areas encoded identities of social information sources compared to non-social information sources.

Contains fulltext : 235985.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) To navigate social environments, people must simultaneously hold representations about their own and others' abilities. During self-other mergence, people estimate others' abilities not only on the basis of the others' past performance, but the estimates are also influenced by their own performance. For example, if we perform well, we overestimate the abilities of those with whom we are co-operating and underestimate competitors. Self-other mergence is associated with specific activity patterns in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Using a combination of non-invasive brain stimulation, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and computational modeling, we show that dmPFC neurostimulation silences these neural signatures of self-other mergence in relation to estimation of others' abilities. In consequence, self-other mergence behavior increases, and our assessments of our own performance are projected increasingly onto other people. This suggests an inherent tendency to form interdependent social representations and a causal role of the dmPFC in separating self and other representations. 9 p.

Environments furnish multiple information sources for making predictions about future events. Here we use behavioural modelling and functional magnetic resonance imaging to describe how humans select predictors that might be most relevant. First, during early encounters with potential predictors, participants’ selections were explorative and directed towards subjectively uncertain predictors (positive uncertainty effect). This was particularly the case when many future opportunities remained to exploit knowledge gained. Then, preferences for accurate predictors increased over time, while uncertain predictors were avoided (negative uncertainty effect). The behavioural transition from positive to negative uncertainty-driven selections was accompanied by changes in the representations of belief uncertainty in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The polarity of uncertainty representations (positive or negative encoding of uncertainty) changed between exploration and exploitation periods. Moreover, the two periods were separated by a third transitional period in which beliefs about predictors’ accuracy predominated. The vmPFC signals a multiplicity of decision variables, the strength and polarity of which vary with behavioural context. Trudel et al. find that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex carries multiple decision variables, the strength and polarity of which vary according to their relevance to the context of exploration, exploitation and the transition between these states.

Summary More than one type of probability must be considered when making decisions. It is as necessary to know one’s chance of performing choices correctly as it is to know the chances that desired outcomes will follow choices. We refer to these two choice contingencies as internal and external probability. Neural activity across many frontal and parietal areas reflected internal and external probabilities in a similar manner during decision-making. However, neural recording and manipulation approaches suggest that one area, the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC), is highly specialized for making prospective, metacognitive judgments on the basis of internal probability; it is essential for knowing which decisions to tackle, given its assessment of how well they will be performed. Its activity predicted prospective metacognitive judgments, and individual variation in activity predicted individual variation in metacognitive judgments. Its disruption altered metacognitive judgments, leading participants to tackle perceptual decisions they were likely to fail., Highlights • People prospectively estimate their “internal probability” of deciding correctly • Prefrontal area, alPFC, accumulates internal probability information • alPFC disruption impairs prospective metacognition but not perceptual decisions • alPFC is crucial for estimating performance prior to tackling a perceptual decision, Miyamoto et al. found that activity in the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC; area 47) reflects accumulation of information for prospective metacognitive decisions and predicts prospective metacognitive performance. Disruption of the alPFC by transcranial magnetic stimulation impairs accurate estimation of the probability of success prior to tackling difficult decisions with perceptual ambiguity.