Search

The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in April 2010 resulted in the largest oil spill in U.S. waters. In the aftermath of the explosion, many sought answers to what appeared to be a lack of effective oversight of the well's owner, British Petroleum (BP). Using multi-actor principal-agent theory as our framework, we examine the relationships between citizens, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), BP, and BPs partners in the drilling operation. We find that principal-agent theory provides important insights into the case, and that a lack of monitoring, coupled with the willingness of MMS to align its goals with the oil industry rather than the public interest, resulted in a lax regulatory environment that allowed BP to operate largely without public oversight. Keywords: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Principal-Agent Theory, Environmental Regulation, BP, British Petroleum, Public Interest, Regulatory Oversight, Oil Industry, Minerals Management Service, Transparency, Corruption. La explosion de la plataforma petrolifera Deepwater Horizon en Abril del 2010 resulto en el derrame petrolero mas grande en aguas estadounidenses. Luego de la explosion, muchos buscaron respuestas a lo que parecio ser una falta de planeacion efectiva por parte del dueno del yacimiento, British Petroleum (BP). Usando una la teoria del agente-principal con multiples actores como marco teorico, examinamos la relacion entre ciudadanos, el Servicio de Manejo de Minerales (SMM), BP, y los socios de BP en la perforacion de los pozos petroliferos. Encontramos que la teoria del agente-principal provee importantes perspectivas sobre el caso; y que la falta de monitoreo, junto con la intencion de el MMS de alinear sus intereses con los de la industria petrolera en lugar del interes publico, resulto en un ambiente regulatorio laxo que permitio a BP continuar con sus operaciones en gran parte sin una vigilancia regulatoria., On April 20, 2010, an explosion in the Gulf of Mexico on the oil rig Deepwater Horizon, leased by the oil company British Petroleum (BP), killed eleven people and produced [...]

There has been little policy effort to address sea level rise in coastal states in the US. It is important to examine, at the state level, how the multitude of different (and changing) actors with different preferences and perspectives contribute to such inertia. This study examines state-level legislative inaction with regards to sea level rise. Using Kingdon's multiple streams framework, we draw a picture of the policy landscape in Virginia as one where the problem of sea level rise is perceived as a low priority, with little consensus on achievable policy solutions, and is politically controversial. We find that policy inertia in Virginia is a result of (1) fractious viewpoints regarding sea level rise as a problem, (2) a lack of clear consensus on policy solutions, and (3) conflicting perspectives of the role of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States currently imprisons more citizens than any other Western nation. Over the last few decades, the trend across the United States has been to increase penalties for many offenses. This increase in state punitiveness has likely contributed to the existing state of mass incarceration. If there are certain factors that enhance a state’s penchant for punitiveness, identifying these factors can offer a better understanding of mass incarceration and why certain policy choices are made. Drawing from theories of social control and racial threat, we test social and economic explanations for variations in state punitiveness across several dimensions. We find the effect of the independent variables is not uniform across the dimensions, suggesting there is a difference in how criminal justice policy decisions are made depending on the policy area in question. This finding begs for further investigation into the issue of state punitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]