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This article studies linear-quadratic Stackelberg games between two dominating players (or equivalently, leaders) and a large group of followers, each of whom interacts under a mean field game (MFG) framework. Unlike the conventional major-minor player game, the mean field term herein is endogenously affected by the two leaders simultaneously. These homogeneous followers are non-cooperative, whereas the two leaders can either compete or cooperate with each other, which are respectively formulated as a Nash and a Pareto game. The complete solutions of the leader-follower game can be expressed in terms of the solutions of some non-symmetric Riccati equations. Notably, our analysis suggests that both modes of interactions between leaders has their own merits and neither of them is always more favourable to the community of followers. In our knowledge, a comparative study of the effect of different modes of governance on the society is relatively rare in the existing literature, we here provide its first preliminary quantitative analysis; under a broad class of practically relevant models, we provide sufficient conditions to decide whether cooperation or competition between leaders is more favourable to the followers. Being in common with modern folklore, the relative merits of the two Stackelberg games depend on whether the interests between the two leaders and the followers align among themselves. Representative numerical examples are also supplemented.

Optimal investment strategies of an individual worker during the accumulation phase in the defined contribution pension scheme have been well studied in the literature. Most of them adopted the classical backward model and approach, but any pre-specifications of retirement time, preferences, and market environment models do not often hold in such a prolonged horizon of the pension scheme. Pre-commitment to ensure the time-consistency of an optimal investment strategy derived from the backward model and approach leads the supposedly optimal strategy to be sub-optimal in the actual realizations. This paper revisits the optimal investment problem for the worker during the accumulation phase in the defined contribution pension scheme, via the forward preferences, in which an environment-adapting strategy is able to hold optimality and time-consistency together. Stochastic partial differential equation representation for the worker's forward preferences is illustrated. This paper constructs two of the forward utility preferences and solves the corresponding optimal investment strategies, in the cases of initial power and exponential utility functions.