Search

The aim of the study is to analyze the effect of crisis severance on individual time discounting and charitable giving. We will be investigating this by means of an online experiment at three different waves during the Corona Pandemic. We expect that efficiency consideration become less important for the intertemporal decisions on private and charitable giving when the crisis matures.

Does the experience of civil war promote in-group bias among survivors? We try to answer this question by analyzing cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game among Syrian refugees in two host countries, Germany and Jordan. We use a between-subjects analysis to test our in-group cooperation hypothesis. We find that Syrians are more likely to cooperate when they are interacting with another Syrian participant than when they are interacting with a German or a Jordanian participant. While Syrian refugees self-report a feeling of relative welcome in the host country, punishment of cooperation norm violations by ingroup or out-group members does not differ significantly. We conclude that our results are more likely to be driven by in-group favoritism rather than out-group hostility.

We report the results of an experiment on norm violation, specifically lying, in a repeatedly played mind game with Syrian refugees in Jordan and in Germany. We compare their behavior with Jordanians, Germans, and Syrians who still live in Syria. The average number of lies is amazingly similar - and low - across all five samples. However, the lying patterns of Syrian refugees are very different from non-refugee participants in Germany, Jordan, and Syria itself. After having lied once, refugee participants resort to a "never return"- pattern significantly more often than the nonrefugee participants. A closer look at the socio-demographic characteristics of our Syrian refugee participants reveals that lying is associated with higher age and gender, while a longer stay in the host country is positively correlated with a lower likelihood of reporting extreme numbers of matches.

We analyze possible links between both trust and trustworthiness among Syrian refugees in Germany in relation to the refugees' involvement in two different forms of social networking (forming bonding ties with other refugees vs. forming bridging ties between refugees and Germans). We implement treatment conditions in which Syrian refugees play a trust game either with another Syrian refugee or with a German participant. Our results show that Syrians who engage in bonding networks show higher levels of trust and (un)conditional trustworthiness when they interact with a Syrian compared to when interacting with a German participant. In turn, the negative discrimination refugees display towards Germans decreases regarding trust and conditional trustworthiness, and vanishes regarding unconditional trustworthiness, for refugees engaged in bridging networks. The type of social ties created by the refugees correlates with their living conditions: newly arrived Syrian refugees tend to engage in bonding networks, whereas both staying longer in Germany and having a private home in Germany coincide with increased engagement in bridging networks. Thus, residence in a refugee camp appears to be an important barrier to the proliferation of social networks between hosts and refugees.

An unprecedented number of refugees from Syria has sought refuge in both the Middle East and Europe since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011. We analyze the level of altruism and risk-seeking among Syrian civil war victims in Jordan. We find systematic variations in their revealed levels of altruism and their willingness to accept risk: feeling as if having no future coincides with both more egoistic and more risk-seeking behavior. Refugees' behavioral responses and their sense of no future correlate with their current personal living experiences. Our findings suggest that both the sense of no future and the accompanying behavioral responses are primarily associated with miserable current living conditions rather than with experiences directly related to the civil war in Syria. Policy implications of these findings seem straightforward: Policy makers need to provide additional assistance for facilitating family reunion.

Experimental dataset (subjects table).

The civil war in Syria has been raging since 2011. We ask whether civil war experience affects voluntary cooperation and its coordination by means of peer punishment. To answer that question, we ran experiments with Syrians and Jordanians, and use a victimization index to measure the individual war exposure among Syrians. Despite being more trusting, severely victimized Syrians tend to be less cooperative when subsequent peer punishment is possible. Severely victimized participants punish whenever possible, not distinguishing between their opponent s decisions. Our findings show that experiencing extreme violence deteriorates the adequate use of sanctioning mechanisms.

Recent experimental studies question whether societies can selfgovern social dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has been shown that imperfect information increases misdirected punishment and thereby hampers the efficacy of the punishment mechanism. We study an environment with monitoring opportunities, in which subjects can improve the quality of their information at a cost. We find experimentally that the majority of subjects are willing to pay a modest cost to improve their information. The demand for monitoring is price sensitive, but does not systematically depend on whether other subjects are informed about the monitoring decision. Almost no subjects take up the chance to monitor partially at a lower price. Rather subjects choose to monitor either perfectly or not at all. Little punishment takes place with imperfect information. The large majority of those subjects who monitor subsequently punish non-cooperative behavior, leading to a substantial and significant improvement in efficiency.