Search

Despite the elimination of the regularly occurring legislative sessions that convened after the November congressional elections with the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933, Congress still occasional meets in a lame duck session. In fact, such sessions are becoming commonplace, with the convening of post-election sessions in 5 of the last 6 congresses. These sessions are comprised of a mix of members who will return to serve in the subsequent congress and of lame ducks: defeated members and retirees. As a result, lame duck sessions would seem to differ significantly from the regular sessions that met prior to the elections. Past opponents of the lame duck sessions argued departing members showed dramatic changes in their voting behavior as a result of the severed linkages with constituents. Lame ducks, it was claimed, sought to p! lacate interests other than those they represented. If that is the case, we might expect to find noticeable differences across regular and lame duck sessions in the effectiveness of party leaders to craft an agenda and to keep their fellow partisans in the fold to support that agenda. We analyze roll call behavior and party cohesion across sessions to answer two questions. First, whether departing members make notable changes in their voting behavior in their days in office. Second, we seek to determine whether the nature of party pressures and party leadership changes in lame duck sessions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]