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Z.13 1038b8–1039a3 introduces a Platonic view that takes universals to be substance. 1038b8–16 offers two arguments against it. 1038b16–1039a3 then introduces the view of an interlocutor who thinks he can rescue universals in spite of 1038b8–16 and offers Aristotle’s response to that view. All of this gives rise to a host of problems, including the following: How is ‘substance’ being used here? What conclusion(s) does 1038b8–16 support? How do the two arguments in 1038b8–16 fit one another? How should 1038b8–15’s idion assumption be understood? What is the interlocutor’s view, and how can he think it escapes the augments in 1038b8–16? What is Aristotle’s response to this view? How does all of this fit with what is said in 1038b8–16?

In Physics I, Aristotle introduces matter as the substratum of substantial change. Since it satisfies the Categories criterion of a subject not said of something else, it seems a candidate for a basic constituent. De Anima’s taking form to be the cause of being of an individual candidate makes it another candidate for a basic constituent. Since everything else depends on individual composites, everything else will now depend on substantial forms for its being. Individual composites can also seem to be compounds that depend for their existence on one or more their components, matter, and form. None of this is decisive. But a reexamination of substance is in order, and Zeta can be understood to undertake it.

There is an interpretation that best solves 1038b8–1039a3’s problems. Its target argues that—as with substantial forms and individual composites—universals at the level of genera are the essences of substantial forms and make them basic constituents and similarly for higher level universals. This implies that higher level universals are essences of lower objects in virtue of being the essences of intermediate objects. 1038b8–15 argues that this violates its idion assumption, which denies there are such intermediate objects. 1038b15–16 argues that no universal is a basic constituent, implying individual composites basic constituents. Aristotle’s interlocutor thinks his view satisfies Z.13’s idion assumption because its universals are essences only of objects immediately below them. Aristotle argues that this is mistaken, and adds two arguments that parallel 1038b8–15 and 1038b15–16.

Taking Platonic Forms to be basic constituents, Aristotle argues that forms are the same as their essences, but it’s clear that this argument is meant to be generalizable to any plausible candidate for basic constituents. His argument contains two reductio arguments. The first is generalizable whether sameness in it is identity or sameness in formula. If sameness in the second is identity, it is generalizable only if individual composites are excluded from its generalization. If sameness is sameness in formula, individual composites will be included in its generalization. Given what has been said in Z.1–5 and about the pale man argument, one has reason to understand sameness in it as sameness in formula. This allows individual composites to be candidates for basic constituents.

Z.4–5 can be understood to investigate form under the guise of essence. Chapter 8 explains why Z.4 says that, strictly speaking, only substantial species have and are essences. Only they have essences said of them simply in virtue of themselves. Other things, including individual composites, have essences secondarily and derivatively. Z.5 sets out an aporia about snub’s essence that can be generalized to be about matter-form essences without offering a solution. Z.4 says that what have essences, strictly speaking, substantial forms, are primary, and not one thing said of another. This doesn’t commit Aristotle to substantial forms as basic constituents. It only means that substantial forms are primary when it comes to having an essence. Individual composites could still be basic constituents.

In an argument that generates an infinite regress of essences, Aristotle argues that substantial forms are identical with their essences. This might be thought to support basic constituents being identical with their essences. But it can quite naturally be understood to support basic constituents being the same in formula as their essences. Substantial forms are the essences of basic constituents whether basic constituents are individual composites or substantial forms, and a basic constituent is the same in formula as its essence if and only if its essence is its own essences. This way of understanding sameness in Z.6 receives additional support from a sophistical argument about Socrates mentioned near the end of Z.6. Again, individual composites are candidates for basic constituents.

Using aporia about form, Z.10–11 asks whether form has matter as part of it. Z.10 argues that it contains neither remote nor proximate matter. Z.11 raises two considerations that could imply that form has matter as part of it. However, they don’t imply that form has remote matter as part of it, and one can at least argue that form doesn’t have proximate matter fully specified as part of it. Z.11 then takes the essence of an individual or universal matter-form composite to be the form in it. It also recognizes particular forms. When understood in certain ways, they too should be regarded as candidates for basic constituents. Finally, the chapter explains why Z.12 can be set aside when trying to understand Z.

Z.7–9 has been thought to have been written elsewhere and inserted between Z.6 and Z.10. If so, it is well-suited to have been so inserted. It fits Z better than one might first think; it provides a needed reintroduction of matter and form; and it contributes to Z.10–11’s topic of whether form has matter as part of it. It should be taken seriously when trying to understand Z, including passages that might be thought to commit Aristotle to a particular view about basic constituents. The most important of these says that form is primary substance. But its context makes clear that its concern is the primary essence when things have essences secondarily and derivatively. Z.7–9 also leaves individual composites as candidates for basic constituents.

Using the Categories said of and present in relations, this chapter sets out the Categories conception of primary substances, paradigm examples of which are individual living organisms. These are things that have characteristics essential to them as well as characteristics they can lose and continue to exist. They are basic constituents because everything else depends on them. The chapter then offers two kinds of dialectical support for this view, as well as some residual problems that could lead one to revise or reject it.

Z.6 argues that kath’ hauto legomena, including basic constituents, are the same as their essences but kata sumbebēkos legomena are not. Sameness here is important. If it is identity, Aristotle is committed to substantial forms as basic constituents. If it is the weaker sameness in formula, individual composites are also candidates for basic constituents. Using a pale man as his example of a kata sumbebēkos legomena, Aristotle offers two arguments that a pale man is not the same as its essence, both of which he recognizes are fallacious. An investigation of the details of what he says supports taking sameness in the pale man argument to be sameness in formula, and so to leave individual composites as candidates for basic constituents.

Z.1 gives rise to three interpretations. One takes substantial forms to constitute substantial being and individual composites to be the basic constituents that have this being. The other two take universal substantial forms, or particular substantial forms, to be basic constituents. Support can be found in Z.1 for each of them, but questions also arise for each of them. Z.1 doesn’t seem to contain enough to decide between them. So, one should accept the interpretation that best fits the rest of Z. But until the rest of Z has been investigated, individual composites and substantial forms should each be regarded as candidates for basic constituents.

Z.17 starts with substance as a principle and cause. This principle and cause is form, and it is a matter-form composite’s cause of being. Form also isn’t an element of such a composite. All of this allows individual composites to be basic constituents. Although they depend for their being on the cause of their being, substantial forms, substantial forms depend for their being on being instantiated by individual composites. Either of these dependencies could determine which things are basic constituents. But Z.13–16 opts for the latter. Individual composites also aren’t compounds that depend for their being on their components. If they were, form would be an element of them. Thus, substantial forms constitute substantial being, and individual composites are the basic constituents that have this being.

Chapter 7 sets out and explains Z.3’s arguments that if being a subject not said of another is sufficient for being a basic constituent, matter is a basic constituent. But this is impossible because matter fails to be a separate ‘this’—not being ‘this’ when separate, and it not being separate when a ‘this’. Since individual composites and substantial forms are each in their own way separate ‘this-es’, they are candidates for basic constituents, form being what is puzzling and needs investigations. Two passages in Z.3 that have been thought to reject individual composites as basic constituents can be seen not to do so. Z.3 leaves substantial forms and individual composites as candidates for basic constituents.

The Metaphysics is a collection of works that were written on other occasions and collected by an editor into a single volume. Still, most of what is in it share a common theme—the science of being. After explaining how such a science is possible and how it turns out to be the science of substance, the chapter points out that Zeta is meant to contribute to this science by explaining what substantial being in the sensible world is and what the basic constituents are that have this kind of being.

Z.13 also raises an aporia whose bases imply that substance is indefinable. Rather than providing a reason to revise any arguments in 1038b8–1039a3, it begins an additional series of arguments against 1038b8–1039a3’s Platonic target. Z.14 raises a dilemma that can be seen to commit this target to the bases of Z.13’s aporia, making that aporia ta problem for it. Z.15 argues that Platonic Forms are indefinable, the conclusion that generated Z.13’s aporia, again making it a problem for that Platonic view. Among other things, Z.16 offers a pair of arguments that parallel the pairs of arguments in 1038b8–1039a3—the first relying on Z.13’s idion assumption, and the second committing Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents. None of this requires any revision in 1038b8–1039a3’s arguments.

In this study, we examined the relation between naturally occurring rates of self-injurious behavior and appropriate communicative behavior using prospective sequential and matching analyses of descriptive data. Results from both analyses suggested reliable covariation between both forms of behavior and staff attention. Findings are discussed in terms of the applicability of quantitative descriptive analyses to characterize behavior-environment relations in natural contexts.

This paper formed the 1993 Anderson Memorial Lecture. It was presented by the President at a meeting of the Bristol Channel Branch on Tuesday 10 March. At that time, the second Way Ahead Group (WAG 2) was still sitting. This Group has since reported to Council (see Navigation News, July/August) but the discussion of the future of the Institute is ongoing (see also the following paper).

As the title indicates, this paper is principally concerned with navigation as a profession, rather than the essential activity of finding the way there and back again that is continually practised by the whole of humankind. By a profession, I mean the acquisition of a set of defined skills through training and the exercising of those skills as a way of earning a living for most, if not all, of a working lifetime. And looking at the profession of navigation, two interesting facts emerge; one is that it is not a particularly old profession - a century and a half, maybe. The second is that it is not likely to get very much older, at least in the form we know it today.