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INTRODUCTION 1380 I. IMMIGRATION AS A CIVIL MATTER 1386 A. The Origin of Immigration Hearings as Civil Proceedings 1386 B. Immigration Court Process 1388 II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL [...], Government lawyers frequently argue, and courts have frequently held, that noncitizens in removal proceedings do not have the same rights as defendants in criminal proceedings. A common argument made to support this position is that removal proceedings are civil matters. Accordingly, a noncitizen facing deportation has fewer due process protections than a criminal defendant, and deportation proceedings similarly provide fewer protections than criminal proceedings. In many ways, however, the rules governing immigration proceedings differ markedly from those governing civil actions in court. Immigration proceedings suffer from arcane and hypertechnical procedures that impede immigrants from having their claims reviewed on the merits. Notably, similar problems plagued the civil justice system back in the early twentieth century. The response was to create the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which emphasized a preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural technicalities. The modern Federal Rules have substantially simplified pleading requirements and emphasized flexibility in order to foster the goals of fairness, efficiency, and decisions on the merits. This Article argues that the process that spawned the Federal Rules can offer valuable lessons for reforming immigration proceedings. The Article identifies several examples where immigration rules differ from the Federal Rules in ways that inhibit decisions on the merits. It then proposes a fundamental reexamination of immigration rules with an eye toward promoting decisions based on substance rather than procedure, as well as a structure for ongoing reform. Given the high stakes in removal proceedings, if society continues to treat immigration proceedings as civil matters, the least it can do is incorporate those aspects of the Federal Rules that best promote access to justice for noncitizens.

INTRODUCTION 2054 I. SCOPING THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATIONS AND 2058 STATUTORY SUBDELEGATIONS A. Delegating Constitutional Powers 2059 B. Subdelegating Statutory Powers 2061 II. THE COSTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY DELEGATIONS AND [...], The President sometimes delegates important constitutional and statutory powers to use force or conduct other national security operations. Although these delegations are understudied, there may be reason for concern. Sometimes the President's national security subdelegations have been unfaithful to Congress's strictures. Sometimes the delegations are high stakes, as where President Eisenhower delegated to seven military officials the authority to launch nuclear weapons. Presidents sometimes even resist seemingly reasonable statutory limits on the power to delegate decisions that could lead the United States into armed conflict. National security delegations can be costly. They may diffuse political accountability for high-stakes decisions. The agent may fail to act in a way that reflects the principal's intent. Inferior officials are generally less sensitive to the full scope of foreign policy concerns that may operate at a given moment. And delegations of war-related decisions to actors below the Secretary of Defense shift control of war from civilian officials to military ones. Classified national security delegations-and congressional efforts to regulate those delegations-raise difficult legal questions, including the extent to which Congress may restrict or require reporting about them. Yet the pressure on the President to delegate authorities to respond to "hyperwar," and the coming autonomy revolution in which the President may delegate decisionmaking to artificial intelligence systems, will keep delegation questions at the fore. This Article analyzes the legal doctrine and historical practice surrounding presidential national security delegations, the costs and benefits of such delegations, and Congress's powers to constrain delegations and subdelegations. After identifying gaps in congressional and even presidential awareness of the full range of existing delegations, it proposes ways in which Congress and the President herself can more consistently surface and structure those delegations.

INTRODUCTION 418 I. THE SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION OF BIOMETRICS 421 A. BIOMETRICS IN THE MODERN WORLD 422 B. MODERN RISKS IN THE BIOMETRICS FIELD 424 C. STATE BIOMETRIC REGULATION 427 [...]

INTRODUCTION 510 I. FACTS AND HOLDING 511 II. BACKGROUND LAW: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION 515 A. THIRTY-YEAR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND PRECARIOUS POSSESSION 517 1. A PRECARIOUS POSSESSOR CANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP THROUGH ACQUISITIVE [...]

INTRODUCTION 1198 I. AESTHETIC FLAT CLOSURE 1201 A. HIGH-RISK WOMEN AND THEIR GENETIC MUTATIONS 1201 B. PROPHYLACTIC MASTECTOMY VERSUS SCREENING 1205 C. RECONSTRUCTION CHOICES 1208 1. Implant Reconstruction & Self-Tissue [...], Breast cancer takes away womens choices. Many women decide to regain control of their bodies and prevent future cancer or follow-up surgeries by having a double mastectomy without any reconstruction, leaving a flat chest. When their doctors refuse to perform this surgery or their insurers refuse to cover this form of chest reconstruction, women are traumatized by their loss of choice in a system that clings to the outdated idea that women cannot be feminine without breasts. The Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 was intended to protect women facing cancer from the second trauma of being unable to afford their breast reconstruction. New York has passed legislation making it explicit that flat chest reconstruction is breast reconstruction and must be covered. Other states should follow suit, especially in the face of the surge in anti-trans legislation banning gender-affirming surgeries for trans men, which could further limit women's options by banning the surgical creation of flat chests for cancer patients. In the absence of such state legislative action, insurers and courts should read the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act to include reconstruction of both protruding breasts and flat chests in order to make women whole again after cancer.

I. INTRODUCTION "When I was a kid, I walked to school uphill... both ways!" Hidden in this adage is a kernel of truth regarding America's relationship with education: for many [...]

I. Introduction Consider this scenario: a consumer receives a social media advertisement for a discounted price of a service. They sign up for the service thinking it was a one-time [...]

INTRODUCTION 1126 I. PRIVATE EQUITY'S CENTRAL ROLE IN INSOLVENCY 1130 A. The Relevance of Attorney Conflicts Has Increased with the Power of Private Equity 1132 II. CONSTRAINTS AND DUTIES OF [...], Private equity has become a dominant force in distressed investing and Chapter 11 corporate reorganization. As a result, three new types of attorney conflicts have emerged, each of which threatens to undermine the efficacy and credibility of the bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy judges, practitioners, and scholars must respond. This Comment provides those stakeholders with a doctrinal and normative framework to understand the conflicts that pervade the system. In particular, this Comment defines three types of conflicts, explains how each threatens the functionality of Chapter 11 corporate restructuring, lays the doctrinal groundwork for a new understanding of attorney disinterestedness, and provides solutions to mitigate the relevant conflicts. In doing so, this Comment provides much-needed guidance to bankruptcy stakeholders who are keen to ensure debtor estates receive competent, loyal, and zealous representation.

INTRODUCTION On March 8, 2017, Oakton High School band students took a nine-hour bus ride from Vienna, Virginia, to Indianapolis, Indiana, for a music festival. (1) During the bus ride, [...], When students are sexually assaulted at school, Title IX provides victims with recourse against their institutions for failing to protect them. However, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on when exactly schools need to take action. Some circuits hold that institutions are required to address the harassment after a victim notifies the school. Others hold that after notifying the school, students must undergo further harassment before a court can find the institution liable. This Recent Development advocates for the former approach, and also presents a third possible method of analysis, with the ultimate goal of centering victims and reconciling the legal system with the #MeToo movement.

"[I]f the large property owner is viewed, as he ought to be, as a wielder of power over the lives of his fellow citizens, the law should not hesitate to [...], Substantive due process provides heightened protection from government interference with enumerated constitutional rights and unenumerated--but nevertheless "fundamental"--rights. To date, the United States Supreme Court has never recognized any property right as a fundamental right for substantive due process purposes. But in Yim v. City of Seattle, a case recently decided by the Ninth Circuit, landlords and tenant screening companies argued that the right to exclude from one's property should be a fundamental right. Yim involved a challenge to Seattle's Fair Chance Housing Ordinance, which, among other things, prohibits landlords and tenant screening companies from inquiring about or considering a rental applicant's criminal history when making tenancy decisions. The plaintiffs contended that the Ordinance deprived them of their right to exclude by restricting a highly relevant consideration for tenancy decisions. This Comment argues against the existence of a fundamental right to exclude in the substantive due process context, at least as far as commercial property is concerned. At its core, property is a thing--a resource. When property is used commercially, whether as an apartment or office building or something else, its owner's power to limit access becomes the power to affect others engaged in the marketplace. This broad power over the public brings commercial property within the concern of the community. So, when the government places limits on the power to exclude from commercial property, it is regulating the marketplace and ensuring access is not being improperly denied to certain persons. Protecting the ability of its citizens to get by is inherently an exercise of legitimate government authority. As such, placing heightened substantive due process limits on the government's power over the right to exclude would have dramatic consequences for the operation of government and for some individuals' capacities to access shelter. It would seriously misapply and disfigure the law of substantive due process. The costs of recognizing a fundamental right to exclude from commercial property simply are not justified.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BACKGROUND 815 A. Social Developments 815 B. Judicial Developments 821 C. Legislative Developments 823 II. EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND 826 A. Logistics of Amending the Rules of Evidence [...], Creative expression depicting illicit activity can cause jurors to infer improper conclusions about a defendant, even when the jurors attempt to analyze such evidence objectively. When the government seeks to admit a defendant's creative work into evidence in a criminal trial, courts use existing evidentiary rules to balance the work's probative value against its risk of unfair prejudice. These rules are supposed to prevent unfair prejudice, but various scholars have shown that courts do not always appreciate how unfairly prejudicial art can be. Rap music presents unique challenges because jurors may fail to discern the work's literal versus symbolic meaning. Similarly, several decades ago courts struggled to exclude improper evidence of victims' sexual histories from the courtroom until social pressure encouraged legislators to pass "rape shield" laws. Now, legislators in several states as well as Congress have proposed "rap shield" laws to exclude improper artwork evidence. This Note analyzes proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 416, "Limitation on admissibility of defendant's creative or artistic expression," in the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which governs admission of a victim's sexual history in sex offense cases. Although proposed Rule 416 would protect artistic defendants and Rule 412 protects sexual assault victims, the two rules share various similarities; in particular, they both entail categorical rules of exclusion. This Note summarizes the Rule's social and legal background and concludes by offering recommendations for its improvement.

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. DATA SECURITY A. Data Security Law 1. Purpose 2. Structure a. Protection Duties i. Data Security Rules ii. Reasonable Security Standards b. Notification Duties c. Remedies 3. [...], By broad consensus, data security laws have failed to stem a rising tide of data breaches. Lawmakers and commentators blame these failures on some combination of underenforcement and the laws failure to recognize the full range of data breach harms. Proposed solutions would augment or expand existing data security laws. These proposed solutions share a fatal flaw: they are rooted in traditional theories of deterrence by punishment. Data security laws come in three forms: duties to protect data, duties to notify consumers after a breach, and post-breach remedies. Almost every data security law is enforced through sanctions, most of which are applied after a company discovers a data breach. In theory, companies increase their data security efforts to avoid sanctions. While appropriate for companies that purchase software, this approach is ineffective when applied to companies that build and provide software as an online service. In the cloud context, improving cybersecurity practices increases expected sanctions. And the cloud context matters. Online data security implicates almost all personal data; online services hold the lion's share of personal data and offline firms rely heavily on cloud software to operate their businesses. This Article calls for a new approach to data security regulation, founded on a systemic view of data security practice. By focusing on system-level incentives instead of individual outcomes, lawmakers can bring data security law back into harmony with policy goals.

INTRODUCTION 2072 I. THE CHALLENGES POSED 2075 A. The APA's Textual Underdeterminacy 2075 B. Shades of Textualist Reasoning 2079 C. Which Context? 2081 D. A Statute of Standards Versus Rules [...]

INTRODUCTION 1894 I. THE APA AS A DEEP COMPROMISE ELABORATED AND ENTRENCHED BY ONGOING PUBLIC DELIBERATION 1907 A. Fierce Compromise? Modus Vivendi? 1907 B. The APA as a Deep Compromise [...], The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) is a "super-statute," creating a robust, enduring governance structure for the modern regulatory state. An emerging literature on "APA originalism" maintains that some of the judge-created rules of administrative law are inconsistent with the APA's original public meaning and therefore illegitimate. In the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking, some academics and judges wield APA originalism as a reason to abrogate the presumption of judicial review, hard-look review of agency factual conclusions, and judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. Some of the judges who would apply original public meaning to those issues have asserted an even more aggressive judicial role to limit agency rulemaking that has large-scale social or economic impact. As an initial matter, this Article responds to the methodological premises of some of the APA originalists. They tend to approach the APA as through a time machine and seek the answers to today's issues that they say are embedded in the 1946 law. APA originalists also tend to view the APA as a "shallow compromise," enacted because the exhausted stakeholders wanted closure, and seek to limit administrative law to what they consider the narrow parameters of that compromise. This Article contests these premises. The APA was what political philosophers call a "deep compromise," where stakeholders' positions evolved in the course of the long debate and reached a creative resolution of governance issues that has proven to be lasting. Original public meaning for super-statutes such as this one ought to focus on the law's important concepts, which in this case are rooted in democratic theory. Even viewed as a shallow compromise through the mechanism of a time machine, the APA presumes the availability of judicial review for agency rules, encourages a hard look at fishy agency reasoning, and tolerates or even valorizes a deferential attitude toward agency interpretations under many circumstances. Understood as a deep compromise whereby conservatives accepted the legitimacy of the modern administrative state and liberals accepted procedural guardrails protecting against secret or arbitrary agency rules, the APA supports a presumption of judicial review, hard-look examination of agency reasoning, and deferential consideration of agency reasoning. The doctrine that is most offensive to a serious APA originalism--whether the law is treated as a shallow or a weep compromise--is the Roberts Court's creation of a "major questions doctrine" that antidefers to agency rulemaking having large social or economic effects, even when the agency action is authorized by the plain meaning of statutes broadly delegating rulemaking authority.