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We explore increases in the nominal minimum wage in a difference-in-differences setting to estimate match survival wage elasticity. The elasticity is negative and larger than one for matches directly affected by minimum wage increases, those with paying below the new minimum wage. The impact of the minimum wage is stronger for young workers and the manufacturing sector, groups with a large and increasing share of low-wage workers. Given the low-wage mobility in the Portuguese labor market and the large share of workers directly affected by the minimum wage increase (reaching almost 18%), these results call for a careful analysis of the set of policies that interfere with low-wage employment.

In a segmented labor market, theory predicts that employment protection has an asymmetric impact on entry and incumbent wages. We explore a reform that increased the protection of open-ended contracts for a well-defined subset of firms, while leaving it unchanged for other firms. The causal evidence points to a reduction in wages for new open-ended and fixed-term contracts and no impact for more tenured workers. The reductions estimated for entrants oscillate between -0.9 and -0.5 p.p., covering a significant part of the expected increase in firing costs. Firms with larger shares of fixed-term contracts shifted the burden to these workers.

The fact that unemployed workers have different abilities to smooth consumption entails heterogeneous responses to extended unemployment benefits. Our empirical exercise explores a quasi-experimental setting generated by an increase in the benefits entitlement period. The results point towards a hump-shape response of unemployment duration over the one-year pre-unemployment wage distribution; individuals at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution reacted less than those in the interquartile range. This behavior of job searchers is consistent with labor supply models with unemployment insurance and savings. It questions the optimality of very long entitlement periods to target the unemployment experiences of low-wage workers.

Many pay-as-you-go pension systems have increased or plan to increase their legal retirement age (LRA) to address the financial consequences of ageing. Although the success of these policies is ultimately determined at the labour market, little is known about the effects of higher LRAs at the firm level. Here, we identify this effect by considering a legislative reform introduced in Portugal in 1994: women's LRA was gradually increased from 62 to 65 years while men's LRA stayed unchanged at 65. Using detailed matched employer-employee panel data and difference-in-differences matching methods, we analyse the effects of the reform in terms of a number of worker- and firm-level outcomes. After providing evidence of compliance with the law, we find that the wages and hours worked of older women (those required to work longer) were virtually unchanged. However, firms employing older female workers significantly reduced their hirings, especially of younger female workers. Those firms also lowered their output although not their output per worker.

Portuguese firms engage in intense reallocation, most employers simultaneously hire and separate from workers, resulting in a large heterogeneity of flows and excess turnover. Large and older firms have lower flows, but high excess turnover rates. In small firms, hires and separations move symmetrically during expansion and contraction periods, on the contrary, large firms adjust their employment levels by reducing entry and not by increasing separations. Most hires and separations are on fixed-term contracts and shrinking firms replace a larger share of their separations under fixed-term contracts, while expanding firms replace most of the separations under open-ended contracts. The comparison with the U.S. shows that while worker and job flows are lower in Portugal, the excess turnover is remarkably close in the two countries.