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The decision to establish a nuclear power program is a significant undertaking by any country. Such a decision should be based on a commitment by the government to use nuclear power safely, securely and peacefully. This commitment requires establishing a sustainable national infrastructure including robust safeguards infrastructure supporting the functions of the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). The IAEA has developed the Milestones Approach to help Member States embarking on nuclear power to plan and develop the necessary infrastructure in a phased way. Safeguards is one of the 19 infrastructure issues described in the Milestones Approach. The primary objective of this publication is to provide guidance and references for safeguards related activities that need to be carried out during each of the three phases of nuclear power infrastructure development in line with the nuclear power program implementation. This publication includes several case studies from different countries on how they developed their national safeguards infrastructure to meet the requirements of their nuclear power programs.

In recent years, the scale of environmental hazards has been growing, emergencies occur more often at special facilities, in particular nuclear power, the largest of which was the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine on April 26, 1986. With the advent of nuclear power, it was believed that nuclear power reactors were safe enough, control and monitoring systems, protective screens and trained personnel would guarantee their trouble-free operation. There is also a trend now that nuclear power is'environmentally friendly'because it provides a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions with replacing power plants working on fossil fuels. Some countries, such as the United States, have recently classified nuclear energy as a renewable energy source. Despite this, nuclear power is potentially dangerous due to: - possible accidents at power plants, accompanied by the ejection of radioactive materials into the environment; - ejections of about 250 radioactive isotopes into the environment as a result of the operation of nuclear reactors; - emissions of 85Kr, which changes the electrical conductivity of the atmosphere. This gas behaves like a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thereby contributing to anthropogenic climate change on Earth; - pollution of the biosphere with plutonium; - radioactive waste is the most important cause of environmental hazard, which remains unresolved. Civilian nuclear power reactors operating throughout the world annually generate large amounts of low-, medium- and high-level radioactive waste. Radioactive pollution accompanies all parts of the complex production of nuclear energy: the extraction and processing of uranium, the operation of nuclear power plants, the storage and regeneration of fuel, which has a significant impact on the environmental friendliness of nuclear energy. In addition, up to 300 natural and technogenic emergencies are registered annually, as a result of which people die and great economic damage is caused. The main reasons for the occurrence of technogenic accidents and catastrophes and the strengthening of the negative impact due to the occurrence of natural and technogenic emergencies in Ukraine are: obsolete fixed assets, in particular for environmental purposes; large volume of transportation, storage and use of hazardous substances; the emergency state of a significant part of public utility networks; insufficient investment support for the process of introducing the latest resource-saving and environmentally friendly technologies in environmentally hazardous industries, primarily in the metallurgical, chemical, petrochemical and energy sectors; environmental problems associated with significant changes in the state of the geological and hydrogeological environment and caused by the closure of unprofitable mining enterprises and mines; unwillingness of economic subjects to take measures to prevent accidents and catastrophes at high-risk and potentially hazardous facilities.

With rapidly advancing digital technologies, smart devices are increasingly used in nuclear power plants. These smart devices can be implemented as separate or standalone field components or embedded as components in other equipment or systems and can be used to increase plant reliability, enhance safe operation and improve testing and monitoring functions. However, the use of smart devices may potentially introduce new hazards, vulnerabilities and failure modes. The safety aspects and design criteria associated with the safe use of industrial commercial smart devices in systems important to safety considered in this publication include: functional suitability and the evidence required to demonstrate this suitability, quality, qualification, the consideration of certification by non-nuclear organizations using non-nuclear standards, and aspects affecting integration of the smart device into existing systems in order to ensure that the smart device will retain its suitability for the required lifetime.

This book presents an overview of state-of-the art approaches to determine thermal safety margins in nuclear reactors. It presents both the deterministic and probabilistic aspects of thermal safety margins of nuclear reactors to facilitate the understanding of these two difficult topics at various academic levels, from undergraduates to researchers in nuclear engineering.It first sets out the theoretical background before exploring how to determine thermal safety margins in nuclear reactors, through examples, problems and advanced state-of-the-art approaches. This will help undergraduate students better understand the most fundamental aspects of nuclear reactor safety. For researchers and practitioners, this book provides a comprehensive overview of most recent achievements in the field, offering an excellent starting point to develop new methods for the assessment of the thermal safety margins.This book is written to bridge the gap between deterministic and appropriate treatment of uncertainties to assess safety margins in nuclear reactors, presenting these approaches as complementary to each other. Even though these two approaches are frequently used in parallel in real-world applications, there has been a lack of a consistent teaching approach in this area.This book is suitable for readers with a background in calculus, thermodynamics, fluid mechanics, and heat transfer. It is assumed that readers have previous exposure to such concepts as laws of thermodynamics, enthalpy, entropy, and conservation equations used in fluid mechanics and heat transfer.Key Features: Covers the theory, principles, and assessment methods of thermal safety margins in nuclear reactors whilst presenting the state-of-the-art technology in the field Combines the deterministic thermal safety considerations with a comprehensive treatment of uncertainties, offering a framework that is applicable to all current and future commercial nuclear reactor types Provides numerous examples and problems to be solved

The recommendations provided in this Safety Guide are aimed primarily at operating organizations of nuclear power plants and regulatory bodies. It covers the concept of operational limits and conditions (OLCs), their content as applicable to nuclear power plants, and the responsibilities of the operating organization for their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. Operating procedures (including emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines) to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide.

In recent decades, the number of IAEA Member States planning to extend the operation of their nuclear power plants (NPPs) beyond the time frame originally anticipated has steadily increased. These decisions have been influenced by the significant economic advantages offered by the long term operation (LTO) of existing NPPs. This Safety Report complements IAEA Safety Standards Series Nos SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, and SSG-48, Ageing Management and Development of a Programme for Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. It provides information on selected topics from the latter, and specifically, it addresses data collection and record keeping, scope setting for structures, systems and components, plant programmes, corrective action programmes, and documentation of ageing management and LTO assessment. The publication focuses on NPPs throughout their lifetime, including operation beyond the time frame originally established for their operation and decommissioning, while considering the different reactor designs that exist around the world. It is also relevant for facilities for spent fuel storage and radioactive waste management at NPPs. It may also be used as a basis for managing the ageing of other nuclear installations and for radioactive waste management facilities. This Safety Report is intended to provide information for operating organizations but may be also used by regulatory bodies.

Cette deuxième édition revue et augmentée présente de façon didactique et accessible au non-spécialiste, les éléments techniques et historiques permettant de comprendre les véritables risques et les conséquences d'un accident nucléaire. Ce livre développe une analyse, faite par un expert du domaine, des accidents de réacteurs qui ont émaillé l'Histoire du Nucléaire depuis ses origines en 1942 jusqu'à nos jours. De nombreux accidents, célèbres ou inconnus, sont replacés dans leur contexte, et permettent au lecteur de se faire une opinion éclairée. Dans un contexte de crise énergétique des énergies fossiles et d'un réchauffement climatique global dont les conséquences sur l'Homme et la Nature risquent d'être cataclysmiques, il est important de réfléchir sur la part du Nucléaire dans la production d'énergie du futur. Quel que soit votre point de vue initial, la lecture de ce livre vous permettra de maitriser la peur du Nucléaire, sans en sous-estimer les risques.

Are you afraid of a nuclear reactor accident? Should you be? This book will arm you with the scientific knowledge necessary to make a rational and informed opinion on the subject, without having to be an expert in nuclear physics. Written so that a non-specialist can easily approach the highly technical aspects, it looks at all significant nuclear reactor accidents since the dawn of the Atomic Age and brings to light many crucial details that rarely, if ever, appear in the general media. Serge Marguet, an internationally renowned expert in reactor physics, breaks down the must-know technical aspects of numerous nuclear reactor accidents throughout history — both famous and unknown — from the first ever nuclear accident in Leipzig to the Chernobyl explosion and, finally, the Fukushima affair and its most recent developments. With many high-quality photographs and diagrams, this book is essential reading for anyone concerned about nuclear safety, curious about nuclear reactors, or simply interested in the history — and future — of nuclear power.

Le présent guide de sûreté fournit des recommandations sur la mise en place d'un cadre de sûreté conforme aux normes de sûreté de l'AIEA à l'intention des États qui décident de lancer un programme électronucléaire et s'y préparent. À cet égard, il propose 197 actions liées à la sûreté à mener pendant les trois premières phases du développement d'un programme électronucléaire afin de parvenir à un niveau élevé de sûreté pendant la durée de vie de la centrale nucléaire. Ces recommandations portent sur la sûreté pendant la construction, la mise en service et l'exploitation de la centrale nucléaire, sur la gestion connexe des déchets radioactifs et du combustible usé, et sur la sûreté dans le domaine du déclassement. Ainsi le présent guide contribue-t-il à renforcer la capacité de direction et de gestion pour la sûreté et à instaurer une solide culture de sûreté, et sert-il à orienter l'autoévaluation de tous les organismes qui participent à la mise en place d'une infrastructure de sûreté.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the structure and content of the safety analysis report to be submitted by the operating organization to the regulatory body for authorization of the siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. It is intended to facilitate both the development of the safety analysis report by the operating organization and the checking of its completeness and adequacy by the regulatory body. The publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-4.1, Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report for Nuclear Power Plants, which it supersedes. The revision reflects feedback experience from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the subsequent stress tests performed. It also describes good practices and experience from the use of safety analysis reports for newly built nuclear power plants in different States and informs on recent progress made in approaches to safety assessment.

This publication was developed from the exchange of information, experiences and practices by participating Member States at the IAEA Technical Meeting on the Safety and Security Interface — Approaches and National Experiences, held in Vienna in 2018. It aims to provide a better understanding of the important elements of the interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security for facilities and activities and to highlight the challenges, opportunities and good practices for its effective management when planning and implementing different programmes and activities.

Sustainability of Life Cycle Management for Nuclear Cementation-Based Technologies, edited by Dr. Rahman and Dr. Ojovan, presents the latest knowledge and research on the management of cementitious systems within nuclear power plants. The book covers aging, development and updates on regulatory frameworks on a global scale, the development of cementitious systems for the immobilization of problematic wastes, and the decommissioning and decontamination of complex cementitious systems. The book's editors and their team of experts combine their practical knowledge to provide the reader with a thorough understanding on the sustainability of lifecycle management of cementitious systems within the nuclear industry. Sections provide a comparative tool that presents national regulations concerning cementitious systems within nuclear power plants, check international and national evaluation results of the sustainability of different systems, help in the development of performance test procedures, and provide a guide on aging nuclear power plants and the long-term behavior of these systems in active and passive safety environments. - Presents the latest information on the behavior of different cementitious systems used in the nuclear industry in one comprehensive resource - Includes scientific justifications of system behavior during the design, operation, maintenance and decommissioning phases - Aids the reader in the development of evaluation tests for problematic wastes

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on a structured approach to the establishment and preservation of equipment qualification in nuclear installations, to confirm reliable performance of safety functions by such equipment during operational states and accident conditions, to avoid vulnerability due to common cause failure of the equipment. It applies primarily to equipment that performs one or more safety functions, but it may also be applied to items not important to safety, in accordance with national requirements. The qualification process covers electrical, instrumentation and control, and active mechanical equipment, and components associated with it, for example, seals, gaskets, lubricants, cables, connections, and mounting/anchoring structures. The qualification process for passive mechanical components for which the safety performance is assured by design in accordance with applicable codes, is outside the scope of this publication. The recommendations in this Safety Guide apply to new nuclear installations, and as far as is reasonably practicable to existing nuclear installations.

This publication provides practical guidance and information to Member States on how to manage nuclear safety knowledge at the national level, beyond the boundaries of individual organizations. It describes the underlying concepts, challenges and available approaches and tools, as well as summarizing the experience gained by Member States to date. The publication is in line with the ultimate objective of all nuclear safety knowledge management activities, which is to sustain and improve the competence of individuals and the capacity of organizations or countries to use such knowledge effectively and responsibly.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the establishment of a framework for safety in accordance with the IAEA safety standards for States deciding on and preparing to embark on a nuclear power programme. In this regard, it proposes 197 safety related actions to be taken in the first three phases of the development of the nuclear power programme, to achieve the foundation for a high level of safety throughout the entire lifetime of the nuclear power plant (NPP). This includes safety in the construction, commissioning and operation of the NPP, and the associated management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, and safety in decommissioning. Thus, it contributes to the building of leadership and management for safety and of an effective safety culture, and serves as guidance for self-assessment by all organizations involved in the development of a safety infrastructure.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on how to meet the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, in relation to fuel handling and storage systems. The publication addresses the design aspects of handling and storage systems for fuel that remain part of the operational activities of a nuclear reactor. It covers the following stages of fuel handling and storage in a nuclear power plant: receipt, storage and inspection of fresh fuel before use and transfer of fresh fuel into the reactor; removal of irradiated fuel from the reactor and transfer of the irradiated fuel to the spent fuel pool; and reinsertion of irradiated fuel from the spent fuel pool into the reactor. Recommendations are also provided on the storage, inspection and repair of irradiated or spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, and the preparation for the removal of this fuel from the spent fuel pool and on the handling of fuel casks in the spent fuel pool and on their transfer.

This publication provides information and guidance on the establishment of a process for periodic safety review for research reactors, including preparation, conduct of the review and reporting of results. In addition, it covers the regulatory assessment of these results. The publication also provides information on the experience of Member States in establishing and implementing periodic safety reviews of research reactors, including implementation of reasonable and practical improvements based on these reviews.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) in relation to the reactor coolant system and associated systems for nuclear power plants. It is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.9, which it supersedes. The publication takes into account developments, experience and practices in the design of nuclear power plants throughout their lifetime. It references and considers other IAEA safety standards that are relevant and related to the design of the reactor coolant system and associated systems for nuclear power plants. Recommendations to achieve the required reliability of the capabilities designed to transfer residual heat to the ultimate heat sink in the different plant states are also included. As those systems are dependent on specific reactor technologies, more appropriate recommendations have been developed respectively for pressurized light water reactors, boiling water reactors and pressurized heavy water reactors.

The development of the infrastructure for a nuclear power programme includes the establishment of policies and strategies in areas such as human resource development, nuclear fuel cycle and waste management, industrial involvement and nuclear safety. It also requires the establishment of a legal and regulatory framework that creates an environment enabling the project to be implemented in a transparent and effective manner. These elements of this infrastructure will have an impact on the project and will guide the discussions of the future owner/operator with potential vendors. In this regard, it is important that the owner/operator, if already identified, participates in this process from the beginning. This publication provides information on the establishment and development of the owner/operator so that it can discharge its responsibilities throughout the phases of the programme. It also discusses the management of the interfaces between the owner/operator and other stakeholders.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a structured, comprehensive, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems, such as the nuclear power plants. It is also known as probabilistic risk assessment – PRA. This book presents the theoretical basis to understand the numerous and complex aspects that are covered by PSA and it will help the reader to better understand and to effectively manage risks. The book provides PSA methods and techniques and it includes recommended procedures that are based on the experience of the authors and applicable to different levels and types of PSA that are used for nuclear power plants applications. It can be used as extra reading for PSA courses for practitioners and it provides quantitative risk methodology documentation for PSA.

The reactor core is the central part of a nuclear reactor where nuclear fission occurs. It consists of four basic systems and components: the fuel (including fuel rods and the fuel assembly structure), the coolant, the moderator and the control rods, as well as additional structures such as reactor pressure vessel internals, core support plates, and the lower and upper internal structure in light water reactors. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the safety requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, applied to the design of the reactor core for nuclear power plants. The publication addresses the safety aspects of the core design and includes neutronic, thermohydraulic, thermomechanical and structural mechanical aspects. Other aspects considered are those relating to reactor core control, shutdown and monitoring, and core management.

Seismic Risk Analysis of Nuclear Power Plants addresses the needs of graduate students in engineering, practicing engineers in industry, and regulators in government agencies, presenting the entire process of seismic risk analysis in a clear, logical, and concise manner. It offers a systematic and comprehensive introduction to seismic risk analysis of critical engineering structures focusing on nuclear power plants, with a balance between theory and applications, and includes the latest advances in research. It is suitable as a graduate-level textbook, for self-study, or as a reference book. Various aspects of seismic risk analysis - from seismic hazard, demand, and fragility analyses to seismic risk quantification, are discussed, with detailed step-by-step analysis of specific engineering examples. It presents a wide range of topics essential for understanding and performing seismic risk analysis, including engineering seismology, probability theory and random processes, digital signal processing, structural dynamics, random vibration, and engineering risk and reliability.

Originally published in 1986. Nuclear power is now regarded as essential to survival in the twenty-first century. But the safety of nuclear power stations is a highly controversial topic, and where they will be sited is a most vital question.In this independent critique, based on four years of research, Stan Openshaw argues that reactor siting provides a simple means of offering additional, design-independent margins of safety. Reactor siting policies in the UK and USA are examined and it is suggested that UK siting practices need to be updated. The large number of potential alternative sites should be used to devise new planning strategies – strategies which will minimise both the residual health risks from accidents and the danger that a future change in public opinion might lead to calls for the closure of many existing sites on safety grounds.

This book addresses the strategic challenges and proposes alternative international remedies set in historical and regulatory contexts that suggest that nations should increase international scrutiny of atomic power in order to minimize risks..

The second edition of Nuclear Safety provides the most up to date methods and data needed to evaluate the safety of nuclear facilities and related processes using risk-informed safety analysis, and provides readers with new techniques to assess the consequences of radioactive releases. Gianni Petrangeli provides applies his wealth of experience to expertly guide the reader through an analysis of nuclear safety aspects, and applications of various well-known cases. Since the first edition was published in 2006, the Fukishima 2011 inundation and accident has brought a big change in nuclear safety experience and perception. This new edition addresses lessons learned from the 2011 Fukishima accident, provides further examples of nuclear safety application and includes consideration of the most recent operational events and data. This thoroughly updated resource will be particularly valuable to industry technical managers and operators and the experts involved in plant safety evaluation and controls. This book will satisfy generalists with an ample spectrum of competences, specialists within the nuclear industry, and all those seeking for simple plant modelling and evaluation methods. New to this edition: - Up to date analysis on recent events within the field, particularly events at Fukushima - Further examples of application on safety analysis - New ways to use the book through calculated examples - Covers all plant components and potential sources of risk, including human, technical and natural factors - Brings together, in a single source, information on nuclear safety normally only found in many different sources - Provides up-to date international design and safety criteria and an overview of regulatory regimes

This book is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book summarizes presentations and discussions from the two-day international workshop held at UC Berkeley in March 2015, and derives questions to be addressed in multi-disciplinary research toward a new paradigm of nuclear safety. The consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011 have fuelled the debate on nuclear safety: while there were no casualties due to radiation, there was substantial damage to local communities. The lack of common understanding of the basics of environmental and radiological sciences has made it difficult for stakeholders to develop effective strategies to accelerate recovery, and this is compounded by a lack of effective decision-making due to the eroded public trust in the government and operators. Recognizing that making a society resilient and achieving higher levels of safety relies on public participation in and feedback on decision-making, the book focuses on risk perception and mitigation in its discussion of the development of resilient communities.

Originally published in 1991, this comprehensive volume provides not only technical information regarding the global nuclear power industry, but also discusses the economic, social and political issues which have an impact on the industry. There are specific chapters on the nuclear industry in the USA and Canada, Western Europe, the former USSR and Eastern Europe and East Asia which examine in detail the particular set of geographical and economic conditions which affect each area. Including an extensive glossary, figures and tabulated information, this book remains one of the most accessible, impartial and thorough studies of the global nuclear industry.

In Nuclear Meltdowns, readers will learn how nuclear power works, the dangerous work involved, and the systems put in place to protect the public. This title will allow students to track historical facts and future improvements while gauging their understanding with a variety of reading comprehension tools. The Devastating Disasters series captures readers'attention with captivating photographs, descriptions, and factoids of catastrophes ranging from technology failure to destructive weather. Each 48-page book features engaging before- and after-reading sections that prompt readers to understand the impact these events have on society and the environment.

The U.S. Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a technical study on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for improving safety and security of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. This study was carried out in two phases: Phase 1, issued in 2014, focused on the causes of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and safety-related lessons learned for improving nuclear plant systems, operations, and regulations exclusive of spent fuel storage. This Phase 2 report focuses on three issues: (1) lessons learned from the accident for nuclear plant security, (2) lessons learned for spent fuel storage, and (3) reevaluation of conclusions from previous Academies studies on spent fuel storage.

This book—the culmination of a truly collaborative international and highly interdisciplinary effort—brings together Japanese and American political scientists, nuclear engineers, historians, and physicists to examine the Fukushima accident from a new and broad perspective. It explains the complex interactions between nuclear safety risks (the causes and consequences of accidents) and nuclear security risks (the causes and consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks), exposing the possible vulnerabilities all countries may have if they fail to learn from this accident. The book further analyzes the lessons of Fukushima in comparative perspective, focusing on the politics of safety and emergency preparedness. It first compares the different policies and procedures adopted by various nuclear facilities in Japan and then discusses the lessons learned—and not learned—after major nuclear accidents and incidents in other countries in the past. The book's editors conclude that learning lessons across nations has proven to be very difficult, and they propose new policies to improve global learning after nuclear accidents or attacks.

One of the most critical requirements for safe and reliable nuclear power plant operations is the availability of competent maintenance personnel. However, just as the nuclear power industry is experiencing a renaissance, it is also experiencing an exodus of seasoned maintenance professionals due to retirement. The perfect guide for engineers just entering the field or experienced maintenance supervisors who need to keep abreast of the latest industry best practices, Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance: Mechanical Systems, Equipment and Safety covers the most common issues faced in day-to-day operations and provides practical, technically proven solutions. The book also explains how to navigate the various maintenance codes, standards and regulations for the nuclear power industry. - Discusses 50 common issues faced by engineers in the nuclear power plant field - Provides advice for complying with international codes and standards (including ASME) - Describes safety classification for systems and components - Includes case studies to clearly explain the lessons learned over decades in the nuclear power industry

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. Lessons Learned makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, Lessons Learned is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.

The aim of this book is to summarize probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants with WWER440 reactors and demonstrate that the plants are safe enough for producing energy even in light of the Fukushima accident. The book examines level 1 and 2 full power, low power and shutdown PSA, and summarizes the author's experience gained during the last 35 years in this area. It provides useful examples taken from PSA training courses the author has lectured and organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such training courses were organised in Argonne National Laboratory (Chicago, IL, USA), Abdus Salaam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (Trieste, Italy), Malaysia, Vietnam and Jordan to support experts from developing countries.The role of PSA for the plants is an estimation of the risks in absolute terms and in comparison with other risks of the technical and the natural world. Plant-specific PSAs are being prepared for the plants and being applied for detection of weaknesses, design improvement and backfitting, incident analysis, accident management, emergency preparedness, prioritization of research and development and to support the regulatory activities.There are three levels of PSA, being performed for full power and low power operation and shutdown operating modes of the plants: level 1, 2 and 3 PSA. The nuclear regulatory authorities do not require the level 3 PSA for the plants in the member countries of the European Union. This means that only a limited number of NPPs in Europe have the level 3 PSA available. However, in the light of the Fukushima accident the performance of such analyses is strongly recommended in the future. This book is intended for professionals working in the nuclear industry, researchers and students interested insafety of operational plants.

'This book evaluates the risks inherent to nuclear power and methods of preventing accidents through computer control systems and other such emerging technologies. Students and scholars as well as operators and designers will find useful insight into the latest security technologies with the potential to make the future of nuclear energy clean, safe, and reliable'--Provided by publisher.

This book introduces advanced methods of computational and information systems allowing readers to better understand the state-of-the-art design and implementation technology needed to maintain and enhance the safe operation of nuclear power plants. The subjects dealt with in the book are (i) Full digital instrumentation and control systems and human–machine interface technologies (ii) Risk monitoring methods for large and complex plants (iii) Condition monitors for plant components (iv) Virtual and augmented reality for nuclear power plants and (v) Software reliability verification and validation for nuclear power plants. The target readers of this book are Ph.D. students, researchers and engineers in the field of nuclear power engineering.

Safety has traditionally been defined as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes was as low as possible (Safety-I). From a Safety-I perspective, the purpose of safety management is to make sure that the number of accidents and incidents is kept as low as possible, or as low as is reasonably practicable. This means that safety management must start from the manifestations of the absence of safety and that - paradoxically - safety is measured by counting the number of cases where it fails rather than by the number of cases where it succeeds. This unavoidably leads to a reactive approach based on responding to what goes wrong or what is identified as a risk - as something that could go wrong. Focusing on what goes right, rather than on what goes wrong, changes the definition of safety from'avoiding that something goes wrong'to'ensuring that everything goes right'. More precisely, Safety-II is the ability to succeed under varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible. From a Safety-II perspective, the purpose of safety management is to ensure that as much as possible goes right, in the sense that everyday work achieves its objectives. This means that safety is managed by what it achieves (successes, things that go right), and that likewise it is measured by counting the number of cases where things go right. In order to do this, safety management cannot only be reactive, it must also be proactive. But it must be proactive with regard to how actions succeed, to everyday acceptable performance, rather than with regard to how they can fail, as traditional risk analysis does. This book analyses and explains the principles behind both approaches and uses this to consider the past and future of safety management practices. The analysis makes use of common examples and cases from domains such as aviation, nuclear power production, process management and health care. The final chapters explain the theoret

Atomic Information Technology revaluates current conceptions of the information technology aspects of the nuclear industry. Economic and safety research in the nuclear energy sector are explored, considering statistical methods which incorporate Monte-Carlo simulations for practical applications. Divided into three sections, Atomic Information Technology covers: Atomic economics and management, Atomic safety and reliability, and Atomic safeguarding and security. Either as a standalone volume or as a companion to conventional nuclear safety and reliability books, Atomic Information Technology acts as a concise and thorough reference on statistical assessment technology in the nuclear industry. Students and industry professionals alike will find this a key tool in expanding and updating their understanding of this industry and the applications of information technology within it.