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Scott Sagan asked me to revisit Nuclear Ethics , a book I published in 1986, in light of current developments in world affairs. In doing so, I found that much had changed but the basic usability paradox of nuclear deterrence remains the same. As do the ethical dilemmas. To deter, there must be some prospect of use, but easy usability could produce highly immoral consequences. Some risk is unavoidable and the moral task is how best to lower it. Nuclear weapons pose moral problems but nuclear use is the greater evil. Abolition may be a worthy long-term goal, but it is unlikely in the short-term relations among the nine states now possessing nuclear weapons. Drawing on just war theory, I examine the three dimensions of intentions, means, and consequences to outline a ten-point agenda for just deterrence that seeks to lower risks of nuclear war. The world has changed since the book was published but the basic moral dilemmas remain the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broadly defined, power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants. One can affect other individuals' behavior in three main ways: by threatening coercion ('sticks'), by [...]

Orchids to the WQ for highlighting, in its essay cluster 'America in the Footlights' [WQ, Summer '05], some of the contradictions that confuse efforts to rescue the U.S. image abroad [...]

Anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years. Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 'as high a zenith of anti-Americanism as we've seen for a long time.' (1) Polls [...]

This is an exposition of soft power's provenance, co-option by world powers, and continuing relevance in the unfolding geopolitical context. It is the text of the 2021 SPARC Soft Power Oration. The acknowledgement, at the end of the article, elaborates on the SPARC Soft Power Oration. It was a pleasure to return to Macquarie, even if only virtually. Ten years ago, Naren Chitty was a splendid host during my real visit at the inauguration of the Soft Power Analysis and Research Center, and I was delighted to add my congratulations at this tenth anniversary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others. In the words of The Economist, 'the United States bestrides the globe like a colossus. It dominates business, [...]

Nuclear proliferation is not one but a complex of problems. One relates to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its effect on the spread of nuclear weapons and knowledge. Second, Iraq's violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation has exposed certain weaknesses in the traditional regime of multilateral nonproliferation institutions and treaties. Third, Pakistan's achievement of a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1980s brings the postproliferation question to the forefront in South Asia. There is no single solution to this complex set of problems, but the beginning of wisdom is to build upon the successes of the past, add new policy procedures, and, above all, increase the priority given to the issue. Otherwise, we may be faced with the ironic outcome that the widely welcomed end of the Cold War may increase the prospect of nuclear use., In the aftermath of the Cold War and the Gulf War, the problem of nuclear proliferation has risen to new prominence. The end of the Cold War has reduced the [...]

President Bill Clinton has proclaimed that the age of big government is over. He may be right. Certainly American confidence in government has declined. In 1964, three-quarters of the American [...]

IT HAS become fashionable to say that the world after the Cold War has moved beyond the age of power politics to the age of geoeconomics. Such cliches reflect narrow [...]

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AFTER THE COLD WAR As the Soviet Union, Germany and the Middle East have recently reminded us, no one knows the future. Yet, consciously or not, foreign policy [...]

Americans are worried about Japan. Opinion polls and popular novels reflect the concern that Japan will become a major challenger to the United States in the post-Cold War era. According [...]

Globalization is often treated by politicians and journalists as something new. Although it is true that the end of the Cold War and the information revolution accelerated interdependence at multicontinental [...]

Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power -- its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them [...]

Seattle; Washington, D.C.; Prague; Quebec City. It is becoming difficult for international economic organizations to meet without attracting crowds of protesters decrying globalization. These protesters are a diverse lot, coming [...]

Long-distance military interdependence is taking new forms. When people say that our era is defined by rapid globalization, they are quick to cite the usual evidence: a litany of impressive [...]

'Globalization' emerged as a buzzword in the 1990s, just as 'interdependence' did in the 1970s, but the phenomena it refers to are not entirely new. Our characterization of interdependence more [...]

Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors, such as crime, that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when punishment is used, deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general behavior as well as specific acts. Cyber threats are plentiful, often ambiguous, and difficult to attribute. Problems of attribution are said to limit deterrence and dissuasion in the cyber domain, but three of the major means—denial by defense, entanglement, and normative taboos—are not strongly hindered by the attribution problem. The effectiveness of different mechanisms depends on context, and the question of whether deterrence works in cyberspace depends on "who and what." Not all cyberattacks are of equal importance; not all can be deterred; and not all rise to the level of significant national security threats. The lesson for policymakers is to focus on the most important attacks and to understand the context in which such attacks may occur and the full range of mechanisms available to prevent them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a letter regarding college courses on arms race and nuclear war in the U.S.

The article discusses the weaknesses of current international nonproliferation agreements. There was a degree of satisfaction about non-proliferation in the early 1970s. Plans for early commercial use of plutonium fuels have been developed by various nations. Political solutions are required by non-proliferation problems of the 1980s. As there are other ways of making bombs, proliferation problems would not be solved by abolishing nuclear energy or nuclear exports. Although high priority is given to non-proliferation, choices regarding its rate and degree is difficult to be made. The nonproliferation regime could be weakened by the nuclear arms relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.