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Concern for potential bioterrorist attacks causing mass casualties has increased recently. Particular attention has been paid to scenarios in which a biological agent capable of person-to-person transmission, such as smallpox, is intentionally released among civilians. Multiple public health interventions are possible to effect disease containment in this context. One disease control measure that has been regularly proposed in various settings is the imposition of large-scale or geographic quarantine on the potentially exposed population. Although large-scale quarantine has not been implemented in recent US history, it has been used on a small scale in biological hoaxes, and it has been invoked in federally sponsored bioterrorism exercises. This article reviews the scientific principles that are relevant to the likely effectiveness of quarantine, the logistic barriers to its implementation, legal issues that a large-scale quarantine raises, and possible adverse consequences that might result from quarantine action. Imposition of large-scale quarantine-compulsory sequestration of groups of possibly exposed persons or human confinement within certain geographic areas to prevent spread of contagious disease-should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most imaginable circumstances. In the majority of contexts, other less extreme public health actions are likely to be more effective and create fewer unintended adverse consequences than quarantine. Actions and areas for future research, policy development, and response planning efforts are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the availability of less nutritious snack food and beverages in secondary schools in selected U.S. from 2002-2008 according to survey data from School Health Profiles for secondary schools of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). During such period, the percentage of schools in which students could not purchase candy or salty snacks not low in fat rose in 37 of 40 states. The percentage of secondary schools in which students could not purchase soda pop was higher from 2006 to 2008 in all 34 states.

Background: Portal vein thrombosis (PVT) in cats is sparsely reported. Purpose of Study: To evaluate the clinical signs and diseases associated with PVT in cats. Animals: 6 client-owned cats. Methods: Medical records for cats with a portal vein thrombus diagnosed on abdominal ultrasound or at necropsy were reviewed. Signalment, historical data, underlying disorders, clinical findings, clinicopathologic and histopathologic data, diagnostic imaging findings, treatment, and outcome were recorded. Results: All 6 cats identified with PVT also had hepatic disease. Evidence of a congenital portosystemic shunt was present in 3/6 cats. Two cats had primary or metastatic hepatic neoplasia. One cat had acute cholangitis, acute pancreatitis, and locally extensive acute centrilobular hepatic necrosis. Two cats were suspected to have acute thrombi and 4 cats had chronic thrombi. Conclusion and Clinical Significance: PVT might be an important concurrent finding in cats with hepatic disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On October 9, 2001, a letter containing anthrax spores was mailed from New Jersey to Washington, DC. The letter was processed at a major postal facility in Washington, DC, and opened in the Senate's Hart Office Building on October 15. Between October 19 and October 26, there were 5 cases of inhalational anthrax among postal workers who were employed at that major facility or who handled bulk mail originating from that facility. The cases of 2 postal workers who died of inhalational anthrax are reported here. Both patients had nonspecific prodromal illnesses. One patient developed predominantly gastrointestinal symptoms, including nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. The other patient had a "flulike" illness associated with myalgias and malaise. Both patients ultimately developed dyspnea, retrosternal chest pressure, and respiratory failure requiring mechanical ventilation. Leukocytosis and hemoconcentration were noted in both cases prior to death. Both patients had evidence of mediastinitis and extensive pulmonary infiltrates late in their course of illness. The durations of illness were 7 days and 5 days from onset of symptoms to death; both patients died within 24 hours of hospitalization. Without a clinician's high index of suspicion, the diagnosis of inhalational anthrax is difficult during nonspecific prodromal illness. Clinicians have an urgent need for prompt communication of vital epidemiologic information that could focus their diagnostic evaluation. Rapid diagnostic assays to distinguish more common infectious processes from agents of bioterrorism also could improve management strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: To describe primary care office policies regarding care of uninsured patients.Design: Telephone survey of all adult primary care sites advertising in the area telephone directory. Sites were defined by ownership status, number of physicians, use of physician-extenders, and location. Policies assessed were whether the site was accepting new uninsured patients, billing policies, the availability of free or discounted care, and payment plans.Setting: Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.Participants: Of the 359 sites identified, 240 (66.9%) responded, representing 794 physicians. Survey respondents included receptionists (40.4%), office managers (36.2%), and physicians (22.9%).Results: While the majority of all sites reported accepting new patients without health insurance (87.5%), policies regarding these patients varied significantly by ownership status and the number of physicians. Sites with 3 or fewer physicians were more likely to accept uninsured patients. Self-owned practices were more likely to require payment at the time of service, and provide discounted care, free care, and payment plans compared with hospital/health system practices or multisite group practices.Conclusions: Willingness to accept uninsured patients does not always equate to affordable or accessible care. Office policies have the potential to be substantial obstacles to primary care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population.Participants: The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies.Evidence: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources.Consensus Process: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft.Conclusions: A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population.Participants: The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine.Evidence: The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement.Consensus Process: The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.Conclusions: An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]