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7 results on '"OBERPAUL, TOBIAS"'

1. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION COMPLEXITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE.

Author

BURKERT, STEFFEN, OBERPAUL, TOBIAS, TICHY, NICOLAS, and WELLER, INGO

Subjects
EXECUTIVE compensation, ORGANIZATIONAL performance, CHIEF executive officers
Abstract

How does the complexity of executive compensation contracts affect firm performance? With unknown consequences, the compensation complexity of executives has been rising. We define and measure executive compensation complexity and relate it to accounting; market; and environmental, social, and governance metrics of firm performance. Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation complexity negatively affects all three types of firm performance. We explore theoretical explanations for this relationship and find that cognitively complex CEOs can better deal with complex contracts. The negative complexity effects disappear if firms use only financial goals. Complexity is more harmful in unstable and munificent industries. Complexity also mitigates the negative effect of CEO tenure on long-term performance. In addition, firm performance suffers if the top management team members have heterogeneously complex contracts. Robustness checks support these findings. We conclude that the trend of adding more metrics to executive compensation contracts is not a generally preferable solution to the new and more intense agency problems that firms encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2024
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4. Observability and Fairness

Author

Bölingen, Felix and Oberpaul, Tobias

Subjects
Business, Social and Behavioral Sciences
Abstract

Experimental studies show that decisions about reward distributions can be explained by two factors (1) the weight attached to fairness, and (2) a variety of fairness ideals, specifically strict egalitarian, liberal egalitarian, and libertarian (Cappelen et al., 2007). Although observation, as in observability of own or others’ action, is a foundational element of management literature, our understanding on its effect on fairness is still incomplete. While the effect of observability on individual’s weight attached to fairness has been researched, there is so far no evidence on how observability influences their fairness preferences. To test the impact of observability on fairness, individuals work in teams of two and provide real effort under mutual, partial or no observability. The return on effort is varied exogenously in order to simulate inequality of opportunity. Thereafter, team members distribute the earnings among themselves. Finally, participants respond a survey about potential mediators of the observability – fairness relationship. This experiment is the first in a series of experiments that focuses on the potential mediators. It aims to answer the following research question: What effects does observability have on potential mediators of the observability – fairness relationship, specifically on constructs related to power, accountability, closeness and conformity. Future experiments will focus on the observability – fairness relationship and estimate the weight attached to fairness and the prevalence of fairness ideals in each treatment group following Cappelen et al. (2007). These are, however, not included in this preregistration.

Published
2022
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6. Compensation Design Dispersion and Executive Turnover.

Author

Burkert, Steffen, Oberpaul, Tobias, and Weller, Ingo

Abstract

Executives care about their pay compared to their peers, e.g. their top management team colleagues. Dispersion in pay is associated with negative effects for both performance and turnover. While existing researched has focused on dispersion in pay levels and thus distributive fairness concerns, the differences in pay contract design have largely been overlooked. Building on procedural fairness we investigate how differences within the pay design -- namely the share of pay for performance relative to a fixed salary, the number of performance grants, and the number of performance goals -- influence individual executive turnover. Our results suggest that disparities in design lead to more executive turnover, especially for those with more pay at risk and fewer goals relative to their peers. We discuss implications for research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2023
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7. CEO Compensation Complexity and Firm Performance.

Author

Oberpaul, Tobias, Tichy, Nicolas, and Weller, Ingo

Abstract

How does the complexity in CEO compensation affect firm performance? With unknown consequences, the complexity of executive compensation contracts is rising. In this study, we explore how the complexity of executive compensation relates to ?rm performance. We conceptualize and operationalize the objective constituents of complex compensation contracts and find negative outcomes on both accounting-and marked-based measures of firm performance for CEOs. Based on these findings, we furthermore offer and explore theoretical explanations for the relationship, namely multitasking and cognitive limitations. We link these findings to the top management team (TMT) and suggest that compensation complexity is an important extension for the TMT pay dispersion and behavioral integration literature. We discuss these findings and close with potential research opportunities in the nascent research field of compensation complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2022
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