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The Montenegrin economy has yet to recover from the collapse of the lending boom in 2008. The financial crisis hit asset quality, weakening banks’ portfolios. The legacy of pre-crisis rapid increase in indebtedness is adding to banking sector vulnerabilities. The crisis triggered a prolonged period of balance sheet deleveraging, which has translated into a near uninterrupted credit contraction. Slow economic growth and gaps in the legal framework have hampered banks’ efforts to reduce the overhang of nonperforming loans (NPLs). The CBM-managed payment and settlement systems are generally efficient. Some adjustments are needed to minimize any residual liquidity risks, such as facilitating the automatic transfer of balances from the reserves account to the settlement account. The CBM oversight function should be strengthened through the formulation of an oversight policy framework along with improvements to interdepartmental communication and exchange of information. The growth of the financial sector has contributed to greater access to finance for individuals and SMEs, but a number of weaknesses in the regulatory and enabling environment need to be addressed.

This assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel core principles (BCP) for effective banking supervision in Bulgaria has been completed as a stand-alone report on the observance of standards and codes undertaken by the international monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank during March of 2015 at the request of the Bulgarian authorities. It reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the date of the completion of the assessment. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) has an internal governance structure which, by vesting the majority of the powers of supervision in the Deputy Governor for banking supervision, exposes the supervisory function to risks. Under the BNB’s legal structure, supervision and enforcement is dissociated from the Governing Council, and the Governing Council has no right to compel transparency of decision making or to impose a framework to ensure consistency in the use of the enforcement regime. There are material concerns that the BNB is too resource constrained to deliver effective minimum levels of supervision. Despite a broad range of supervisory powers, there are some gaps in the legal framework that unduly restrict the BNB’s locus. The BNB has a good understanding of risk and many strong practices, and also making good use of international standards and guidelines, but there are some important system wide vulnerabilities. The assessment team reviewed the framework of laws, rules, and guidance and held extensive meetings with officials of the BNB, and additional meetings with the Finance Ministry, auditing firms, professional bodies, and banking sector participants. The authorities provided a comprehensive self-assessment of the CPs, as well as detailed responses to additional questionnaires, and facilitated access to supervisory documents and files on a confidential basis as well as staff and systems.

This assessment of the current state of the implementation of the Basel core principles (BCP) for effective banking supervision in Bulgaria has been completed as a stand-alone report on the observance of standards and codes undertaken by the international monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank during March of 2015 at the request of the Bulgarian authorities. It reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the date of the completion of the assessment. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) has an internal governance structure which, by vesting the majority of the powers of supervision in the Deputy Governor for banking supervision, exposes the supervisory function to risks. Under the BNB’s legal structure, supervision and enforcement is dissociated from the Governing Council, and the Governing Council has no right to compel transparency of decision making or to impose a framework to ensure consistency in the use of the enforcement regime. There are material concerns that the BNB is too resource constrained to deliver effective minimum levels of supervision. Despite a broad range of supervisory powers, there are some gaps in the legal framework that unduly restrict the BNB’s locus. The BNB has a good understanding of risk and many strong practices, and also making good use of international standards and guidelines, but there are some important system wide vulnerabilities. The assessment team reviewed the framework of laws, rules, and guidance and held extensive meetings with officials of the BNB, and additional meetings with the Finance Ministry, auditing firms, professional bodies, and banking sector participants. The authorities provided a comprehensive self-assessment of the CPs, as well as detailed responses to additional questionnaires, and facilitated access to supervisory documents and files on a confidential basis as well as staff and systems.

This Technical Note was prepared by IMF and WB staff in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and overseen by the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF, and the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency, World Bank. It contains technical analysis and detailed information underpinning the FSAP’s findings and recommendations. A review of supervisory practices was conducted to assess progress towards implementation of the Basel Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The system of banking supervision oversight has significantly improved since the last review in 2006, but shortcomings remain.

This assessment of the Basel Core Principles (BCP) was conducted as part of the financial sector assessment program (FSAP) update evaluation of the El Salvador financial system from April 22 to May 10, 2010. The supervisory framework was assessed against the BCP methodology issued in October 2006. The assessment of compliance with each principle is made on a qualitative basis. A four-part assessment system is used: compliant; largely compliant; materially noncompliant; and noncompliant. A largely compliant assessment is given if only minor shortcomings are observed, and these are not seen as sufficient to raise serious doubts about the authority's ability to achieve the objective of that principle. A materially noncompliant assessment is given when the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authority's ability to achieve compliance, but substantive progress has been made. A noncompliant assessment is given when no substantive progress toward compliance has been achieved. The ratings assigned during this assessment are not comparable to the ones assigned in the 2000 FSAP, as the bar to measure the effectiveness of a supervisory framework has been raised in the new methodology. This paper is structures as follows: introduction; information and methodology used for assessment; institutional and macroeconomic setting and market structure- overview; preconditions for effective bank supervision; main findings; and recommended action plan and authorities' response.

The assessment of accounting and auditing (A&A) practices in Sudan is part of the joint initiative of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prepare Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). The ROSC A&A assessment focuses on strengths and weaknesses of the corporate accounting and auditing environment that influence the quality of corporate financial reporting and involves a review of both mandatory requirements and actual practices. It uses International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as benchmarks and draws on recent global experiences and good practice in the field of corporate financial reporting and auditing. This assessment used a diagnostic template developed by the World Bank to facilitate collection of information, which was complemented by findings of a due diligence exercise based on meetings with key stakeholders conducted by World Bank staff. The assessment was carried out ensuring participation from the in-country major stakeholders such as regulators of corporate entities, banks and similar financial institutions, professional accountants, bankers and investment analysts, preparers of financial statements, auditors, academics, and representatives from the leading trade bodies. The main purpose of this ROSC A&A assessment is to assist the Government of Sudan in strengthening the private sector's accounting and auditing practices, along with enhancing financial transparency in the corporate sector.

How quickly do the CAMEL ratings regulators assign to banks during on-site examinations become "stale"? One measure of the information content of CAMEL ratings is their ability to discriminate between banks that will fail and those that will survive. To assess the accuracy of CAMEL ratings in predicting failure, Rebel Cole and Jeffery Gunther use as a benchmark an offsite monitoring system based on publicly available accounting data. Their findings suggest that, if a bank has not been examined for more than two quarters, off-site monitoring systems usually provide a more accurate indication of survivability than its CAMEL rating. The lower predictive accuracy for CAMEL ratings “older” than two quarters causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL ratings to fall substantially below that of off-site monitoring systems. The higher predictive accuracy of off-site systems derives from both their timeliness—an updated off-site rating is available for every bank in every quarter—and the accuracy of the financial data on which they are based. Cole and Gunther conclude that off-site monitoring systems should continue to play a prominent role in the supervisory process, as a complement to on-site examinations.