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Copyright of Canadian Social Work Review / Revue Canadienne de Service Social is the property of Canadian Association for Social Work Education and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This Note justifies disparate-impact liability for police practices. It develops the first structured analysis of the Safe Streets Act's (SSA's) antidiscrimination power and argues that the SSA imposes disparate-impact liability on police departments. The analysis includes an examination of the statute's text, the historical meaning of "discrimination," statutory purposes, and subsequent lawmaking on policing. The Note then considers the implications of disparate-impact liability under the SSA. Most notably, individuals can use the SSA's private right of action to hold police departments accountable for disproportionate racial effects. While conventional legal tools for police reform appear inadequate, the SSA emerges as an unrecognized path forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In United States v. Dahda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III"), the lower court properly denied Dahda's motion to suppress evidence gathered by law enforcement using a mobile interception device- a device that wiretaps cell phones. A key part of the decision focused on the definition of mobile interception devices. The Tenth Circuit defined them as devices used to intercept communications that are movable. The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has defined mobile interception devices as devices used to intercept mobile communications. This Comment argues that both definitions are overly broad in the modern context and are at odds with the congressional intent underlying Title III. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on laws governing wiretapping in the U.S. It mentions about U.S. Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United States addressing Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution implications of wiretapping; laws governing warrant requirements for wiretapping and electronic surveillance; and enactment of Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968 for the same.

The United States government's use of what it refers to as "Network Investigative Tools," presents several constitutional and privacy-related issues. Revelations stemming from the use of these NITs-a form of malware-warrant a difficult discussion on the conflict between public transparency and the level of secrecy required to maintain effective law enforcement. It is especially difficult to focus upon this concern in the context of investigations tackling child pornography, given the unforgiveable nature of crimes against children, and the dire need to apprehend predators. However, the real unease is regarding how online surveillance is conducted, rather than that it is conducted at all. The problem is that unlike certain other forms of technology (for example, phones), there is currently no statutory framework in place to guide law enforcement, the courts, or the public for government hacking. This Note seeks to convey the importance of remaining unblinded by the ends and careful with the means so as not to conflate the significance of the need to capture serious offenders with the justification of ignoring civil liberties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two key trends were present in the successful prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam and his coconspirators in one of the largest insider-trading conspiracies in history: the use of wiretaps to investigate and prosecute insider trading and a joint effort between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct the investigation. Despite the close working relationship between the DOJ and the SEC, the DOJ never disclosed the fruits of the wiretaps to the SEC, presumably due to its belief that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (as amended, the "Wiretap Act")--the comprehensive framework that authorizes the government to conduct wiretaps in certain circumstances--prohibited it from doing so. Though the Second Circuit in SEC v. Rajaratnam ultimately held that the SEC could obtain wiretap materials from the criminal defendants as part of civil discovery, the question of whether direct disclosure of the wiretap materials from the DOJ to the SEC is prohibited has been raised but not yet addressed. This Note analyzes previous cases addressing the construction of the Wiretap Act's disclosure provisions and concludes that direct disclosure from the DOJ to the SEC is not prohibited by the Act. It further proposes a process by which civil enforcement agencies, such as the SEC, can request disclosure of wiretap materials through the DOJ in such a way that balances the benefits of disclosure against the privacy interests of the parties whose conversations were intercepted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As United States Federal Appeals Courts continue to hold that private citizens have a fundamental right, protected by the First Amendment, to record on-duty police officers, states must end their practice of charging these citizens with violating outdated wiretapping and eavesdropping laws. Advances in technology, particularly the proliferation of personal cell phones with audio and video recording capabilities, creates an urgency to reexamine these outdated laws. Laws that prohibit an individual's right to record, such as the United Kingdom's Counter Terrorism Act of 2008, go too far and will surely fail Constitutional scrutiny under recent Federal Appeals Court holdings. Moreover, any proposed legislation that seeks to strike a balance between the individual liberties espoused by the courts, and public safety and national security, ignores the fact that laws already exist which address these factors. Instead, Congress should amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 - the federal wiretapping law - to create an exception allowing for the recording of on-duty police officers carrying out their official duties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Police misconduct is still prevalent throughout the United States. Unfortunately for members of minority communities, this misconduct often comes in the form of racially discriminatory police practices. In many cases, such practices are deeply rooted in the police department's culture. It is imperative that all citizens are equipped with every possible safeguard from such abuse at the hands of the police. In Massachusetts and Illinois, however, wiretapping and eavesdropping laws prevent people from employing one such safeguard that has proven to help change unconstitutional police practices. The safeguard that those laws criminalize is the ability to surreptitiously record on-duty police. This Note recommends that state legislatures in Massachusetts and Illinois create exceptions to their wiretapping and eavesdropping laws so as to allow surreptitious recording of on-duty police officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on lawyers governing recording private calls in the U.S. It mentions that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act provides protection against recording of private telephone conversations among private individuals. It also mentions that situation warrants preemption, choice of law, ethical, and evidentiary considerations must be taken into consideration while analyzing the same.

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article related to the Safe Streets Amendment being considered by the U.S. Congress in the previous issue.