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The paper investigates the influence of ownership structures and board of directors’ characteristics on the extent of conservative accounting practiced by listed companies in Vietnam covering 558 firms with 2,161 observations in the period of 2011–2022. The authors rely on the quantitative method and multivariate regression analyses to verify the proposed hypotheses. Concerning the influence of ownership variables, the findings explore that state ownership (SO) and foreign ownership (FO) demonstrate a significant negative association with firms’ conservatism level, whereas large ownership (LO) indicates a significant positive association with firms’ conservatism degree. No association between management ownership (MO) and firm’s conservatives was found in this study. With regard to board of directors’ characteristic variables, the study results show that size of the board (BS), independence of the board (BI), and women on the board (GD) positively associated with firms’ conservatism report, while duality (DUAL) demonstrates a significant negative association with firms’ conservatism level. The research suggests some implications and recommendations for regulatory agencies, listed firms, investors, and other stakeholders to have appropriate behavioral decisions related to ownership structures and board characteristics of listed firms to ensure high level of accounting conservatism in a frontier market as Vietnam.

This study investigates the relationship between diverse ownership structures and the quality of governance in firms within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a follow-up to the work of Munisi (2020). The study sources annual report data on 104 firms from 2007 through 2019 from African financials and Machameratios databases for its analysis via both panel linear and non-linear regression models. The study finds that institutional ownership and foreign ownership structures enhance governance. On the other hand, block, family, management, and government ownership structures tend to have adverse effects on the quality of governance of firms in SSA. However, these adverse effects tend to be attenuated by the financial reporting regulatory framework for these firms. The current study extends the work of Munisi (2020) by providing fresh empirical evidence of the nuanced effects of several concentrated ownership structures on governance quality within SSA firms. It also provides novel theoretical insights using Foucault’s panopticon metaphor. The findings imply that governance reform efforts should consider diverse firm characteristics, particularly ownership structure, when formulating policies to improve governance in firms.

Against the background of price increases on the one hand and strong tenement regulations in Vienna's historic housing stock on the other, this article analyses the actors and strategies of commodification. Following a mixed-methods approach, this case study analyses 90 historic tenement buildings in nine neighbourhoods. Our analysis reveals the increasing relevance of institutional actors as (co-)owners, which goes hand in hand with declining holding periods. As local actors are highly diverse, we have identified five types of actors and four commodification strategies, pointing towards a spatially differentiated division of labour. This actor constellation, dominated by micro actors, suggests that the specific situation and regulation of a market brings different types of actors to the fore. Most of the identified actors, and particularly the funding of their projects, have no relation to financial markets and sources; from this perspective, the concept of commodification provides greater insight into the dynamic of this specific housing market segment than the lens of financialisation does. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our study is the first to analyze the influence of CEO power and ownership structures on earning manipulation. This study also clarifies whether different ownership structures discourage powerful CEOs from manipulating earnings in family businesses. The sample data is a balanced panel with 985 observations of 116 family businesses in Vietnam from 2005 to 2020. We primarily employ the dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments with cross-sectional fixed effect to overcome endogeneity and heterogeneity issues. Our findings indicate the negative relationship between CEO power and earning manipulation. Higher state or institutional ownership restrains powerful CEOs from manipulating earnings in family businesses. However, Powerful CEOs in family businesses with higher participation of blockholders increase the earning manipulation. Our robustness results show that CEOs from 50 to 70 years old reduce earning manipulation the most in family businesses. Our findings support agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, monitoring and accountability theory, legal framework theory, reputation theory, monitoring theory, Maslow's need hierarchy, and prior literature. Our study contributes practical policy and management implications to sustainably reduce earning manipulation in family businesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firm ownership structures in emerging economies possess unique institutional arrangements and influence firm decisions in various ways. Firm decisions and investments are essential for a company to sustain. Primarily driven by the economic dimension, the traditional economic performance of companies is no longer sufficient in the modernised and competitive business environment. Focusing on short-term profits often ignores social and environmental impacts, giving rise to social problems, pollution, environmental degradation and global warming, among others. Corporate governance is a mechanism that can align the interests of various stakeholders and ensure a firm's long-term success. This study investigates the effect of family (FOWN) and government ownership (GOWN) on corporate sustainability performance (CSP) and the moderating role of corporate governance (CG), using data from 762 annual reports of Malaysian Public Listed Companies from 2020 to 2022. Results indicated a significant negative relationship between FOWN and CSP, while GOWN presented a significant positive relationship with CSP. The CG was also found to play an amplified role in the relationship between FOWN and CSP. However, the moderating role of CG failed to prevail in the association between GOWN and CSP. Additional analysis demonstrated that FOWN significantly and positively affected economic and environmental performance. In contrast, GOWN affected the environmental and social dimensions. The current study enriches people's understanding of how ownership and governance interact to drive sustainability outcomes, underlining the need for robust governance practices to improve sustainability in family and government-owned enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examined the relationship between ownership structures and the level of corporate disclosure (LCD) among Tanzanian listed companies. Relationships between director, government, institutional and foreign ownership and LCD were examined. The 105 firm-year observations for 21 listed companies were examined from 2016 to 2020. The agency theory was used. An explanatory research design was employed. Data were gathered through balanced panel data using a survey method. Descriptive and inferential analysis using Ordinary Least Square was used. Descriptive and inferential analysis using Ordinary Least Square was used. The study found that director, government, and foreign ownership positively affect the LCD, while institutional ownership negatively affects it. This implied that in Tanzania, ownership structures were very important in determining LCD. The study concluded that Tanzania's LCD is moderate, and companies should disclose director ownership, establish independent oversight mechanisms, collaborate with foreign investors, and engage with institutional investors to align corporate governance practices with international standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abusive transactions with related parties are more common in a concentrated ownership structure. Previous studies have debated that the fallout of concentrated corporate ownership (i.e. sizable corporate conglomerates and corporate enterprises owned by business families or the government of the state) is high in a relatively close market. Despite the adoption of the Anglo–US model in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) for improving transparency, accountability, and fairness, the rate of corporate failure involving abusive related party transactions has been high. This study examines differences in related party transactions (RPT) regulatory strategies among BRICS with respect to international standards (Anglo–US model) and local conditions. The study analyses to what extent BRICS nations have adopted the Anglo–US model by comparing the RPT regulatory framework with the convergence towards the Anglo–US model, divergence from the Anglo–US model, and unfolding of a new construct in BRICS. Overall, the study finds Brazilian and Russian RPT legislation the least convergent towards the Anglo–US model and RPT legislation in India, China, and South Africa fully convergent towards the Anglo–US model. BRICS have shown persistence or resistance towards the Anglo–US RPT legal transplantation. In certain aspects, BRICS have made a concerted effort to regulate abusive RPTs suitable to their local conditions. However, RPT legislation in BRICS nations has failed to address some major governance problems caused by concentrated ownership structures (monitoring of RPTs in pyramidal companies, same RPT thresholds for group and non-group companies, dominance of controlling shareholders on independent directors' appraisal of RPTs, and the lack of adequate disclosure requirements for RPTs). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Brazilian Review of Finance / Revista Brasileira de Finanças is the property of Sociedade Brasileira de Financas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The COVID-19 pandemic forced Canadian Football League (CFL) commissioner Randy Ambrosie to cancel the League's 2020 season, and given CFL teams' financial dependence on gate and game-day revenues, the League had suffered substantial financial losses. The pandemic also caused the Xtreme Football League (XFL) to fold five games into its 2020 season; however, the XFL was purchased by an ownership group led by Dwayne "The Rock" Johnson, with plans to resume play in 2022. Shortly thereafter, the CFL and XFL jointly announced that they would explore the possibility of partnering to grow the game of football and their respective leagues. This case challenges students to determine the best option for the CFL and commissioner Ambrosie moving forward by completing a Porter's value chain analysis for both leagues. This analysis will help students to make an informed, evidence-based decision about how well the two leagues align with one another. While there are several benefits to a potential partnership, there are also challenges that must be overcome if some type of partnership with the XFL is to be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sustainable management of materials and resources provides sustainable solutions that form the basis for a circular economy (CE). However, there is limited empirical research that represents the effects of business models on the triple bottom line of sustainability and ultimately contribute to the implementation of CE systems. Therefore, in this study, we aim to explore the role of second-hand firms with different ownership structures and their specific impact in promoting CE. A multiple case study based on semi-structured interviews was conducted in Finland. Findings show that ownership structures and the underlying motivations determine the societal legitimacy and transparency of the second-hand firms that in turn contribute to reducing the environmental burden and improving societal well-being locally. Similarly, results reveal that collaborative approaches among second-hand firms and other stakeholders might improve the circular flow of products and materials, ultimately contributing to the implementation of CE. The main contribution of this study is that it highlights the role of second-hand firms and their ownership structures on the implementation of CE systems at the local level and therefore moves away from traditional business models where production firms are usually the unit of analysis.

Ownership structure, an important feature of corporate governance, acts as a determinant of the opacity of firms. This study penetrates the "black box" of the ownership structures of Russian corporations, identifies their salient features, and examines the effects of those features on the information environment (stock price synchronicity) of the corporations. Examining a sample of companies listed on the Moscow Exchange, we find that stock price synchronicity is: (1) positively associated with divergence between control and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner; (2) negatively associated with the ownership concentration of the ultimate owner; (3) negatively associated with companies controlled indirectly by the state through holding corporations with the presence of oligarchs; and (4) negatively associated with firms with transparent oligarchs. Analyzing the economic impact of the results, we find the presence of non-transparent oligarchs and foreign-offshore holdings has the most adverse effect on stock price synchronicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence on how ownership structures influence decision to pay dividends remain unclear in the dividend policy literature. This paper is set to investigate the association between ownership structures and decision to pay dividends. The sample firms of this study consist of non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2015 with 270 firm-year observations and logit regression models used to examine the relationship. The study revealed strong evidence that institutional investors were positively related to the decision to pay dividends. However, managerial shareholding was found to have an inverse effect on firms’ probability to pay dividends. Additional analysis was carried out only on dividend payers and the results were also consistent with the hypothesis. Despite this, the managerial investors were somehow weak when the sample was reduced to dividend payers. Cumulatively, the results are robust and show support of the agency theory and hence, imply that institutional investors in Nigeria have preference for dividend payers.

Disclosure of corporate information forms an integral part of the corporate governance framework and lies at the center of most of the corporate governance codes, principles and reports around the world given its indispensable contribution to market and firm performance. Unfortunately, corporate disclosure is not a central aspect of corporate governance in Tanzania. It is noted that the lack of adequate voluntary corporate disclosure is one of the biggest challenges facing the implementation of effective corporate governance in Tanzania. In turn, lack of sound corporate governance has fueled corruption and cronyism while suppressing sound and sustainable economic decisions. To address this major problem, this paper investigates the determinants of voluntary disclosure in 107 private Tanzanian mining and manufacturing firms. This study uses a longitudinal approach as variation across firms and over time. To this end, 2011-2015 is selected for the longitudinal analysis. Annual reports of 107 private firms was used to collect data in relation to ownership structures, financial performance and firm size. This data was analyzed using a random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model with Mundlak (1978) corrections. Our results show that ownership structures are associated with voluntary disclosure. Specifically, ownership concentration is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure in mining companies while it is positively associated in manufacturing firms. Foreign ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosure for both mining and manufacturing firms. Further, the results reveal that financial performance is associated with voluntary disclosure where leverage is positively related to voluntary disclosure in mining and manufacturing firms while liquidity is significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in mining companies only. Our results also show that mining companies disclose 3.2% more information than manufacturing firms. Relevant policies to promote voluntary disclosure should be directed at facilitating foreign direct investment and leverage. These policies include developing impartial court systems, development of infrastructure, provision of quality education, tax holidays and tax credit. It is recommended that loan guarantee provided by public financial institutions can be used to reduce risk. In addition, foreign exchange liquidity facilities can reduce risk associated with borrowing money in different currencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Ownership structures in waste management firms affect accounting choices. • Ownership concentration in waste management firms increases earnings smoothing. • Waste management family firms provide higher quality financial reporting. • Corporate governance in waste management firms affects accounting choices. • Board diversity boosts financial reporting making waste management firms sustainable. Drawing on stakeholder theory, the premise in this manuscript is that moral and ethical behavior in terms of correct financial information contribute to higher sustainable performance that satisfies the wide range of stakeholders who are interested in the economic feasibility and environmental viability of waste management firms. On the basis of a scientific literature review and by using a balanced panel data set of 416 waste management firms worldwide over the period 2013–2016, the empirical evidence shows that ownership structures (e.g. governmental, institutional, corporate group, family, and concentrated) as well as corporate governance characteristics (e.g. size of the board, directors' gender, nationality, and expertise) diversely affect waste management firms' accounting behavior in terms of both discretionary accruals and earnings smoothness. The findings bring into focus the "black boxes" of ownership structures and corporate governance encouraging the policy makers to shape up laws that can constrain accounting misbehavior in waste management firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study used a researcher self-constructed corporate governance index as a proxy to measure the firm-level corporate governance compliance and disclosure with the 2002 Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital. We found a negative and significant association between the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) and block ownership with the firm-level cost of capital. On average, better-governed Pakistani listed firms tend to be associated with a lower cost of capital than their poorly governed counterparts are. As an emerging market, good corporate governance practices are mainly related to minimise corporate failure and assist firms in attracting capital at a lower cost.

This article is to investigate the heterogeneous effect of Venture Capital (VC, in abbreviated form) on the profitability performance of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs, in abbreviated form) in China, from the perspective of VC firms' different ownership structures. Based on the panel data of the listed firms on the Chinese SME board, the regression results show that overall the VC backing is significantly correlated with the profitability of the SMEs in a positive way. After focusing on the VCs' characteristics in the ownership structures, it is proven that the foreign VC firms can have the strongest positive impact on the ventures' profitability performance; the Chinese private VC firms can have the positive impact on the SMEs' profitability, but the impact is weaker than that of foreign VCs and stronger than that of governmental VC in a positive way; the governmental VC firms exert the significantly negative effect on the ventures' profitability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a rationale for the delegation of regulatory functions in public transport to a partnership that rebalances social and commercial interests according to an agreed and predetermined objective function. This allows for the improvement of economic efficiency providing a constructive commitment to tariff and subsidy policies. Using a simple model, we determine the optimal corporate structure for such a partnership between the local government and any regulated monopoly. The government's strategic option of using its stake in the partnership to generate budget revenue from sale proceeds and/or dividends encourages the relevant authorities to increase the commercial attractiveness of the joint enterprise by setting appropriate tariffs. We show that such a strategic partnership can lead to improvements in welfare if the local cost of public funds is relatively high. These theoretical findings are then examined through the prism of suburban railway transport reform in Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IAS-24 of the International Financial Reporting Standards focuses on the concept and disclosures of related party transactions (RPTs) for a reporting entity. This study examines the interrelationship between RPTs (as disclosed under IAS- 24), agency theory, ownership structures and firm performance. Our sample includes nonfinancial companies indexed by the KSE-100 of the Pakistan Stock Exchange during 2006-15. To run the regression models, we determine the regression assumptions, normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity. We investigate the impact of different RPTs, including cash inflows and outflows, whereas other studies generally look at the impact of RPTs on firm performance in totality. The empirical analysis suggests that institutional ownership has a positive, significant impact on firm performance. Related party purchases have a significant, negative impact on performance, resulting in the expropriation of institutional ownership. RPTs that generate revenues have a significant, positive impact on performance, such that institutional ownership has a propping-up effect with respect to the related parties. In practice, institutional ownership leads to strong corporate governance and contributes to firm performance. While other studies find family ownership responsible for the expropriation effect, we argue that institutional ownership has a propping-up and expropriation effect on related parties. Our study also suggests that certain ownership structures lead to weaker corporate governance mechanisms, resulting in greater agency problems. This, in turn, badly affects company performance and leads to the exploitation of minority shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Embedded in the literature on financialization and institutional approaches, this study is an examination of the causal factors of employee downsizing in two institutionally dissimilar settings, France and the UK, using the fuzzy sets variant of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The findings show that the roughly equivalent use of large-scale lay-offs in the two countries is coupled with strikingly different causal factors. Our argument suggests the importance of complex causation whereby employee downsizing reflects the growing influence of financial considerations in the governance of companies, but its diffusion across countries is shaped by different configurations of institutional arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2-3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Land exchange can be a major factor driving land-use change in regions with high pressure on land, but is generally not incorporated in land-use change models. Here we present an agent-based model to simulate land-use change arising from land exchange between multiple agent types representing farmers, nature organizations, and estate owners. Methods: The RULEX model (Rural Land EXchange) was calibrated and applied to a 300 km case study area in the east of the Netherlands. Decision rules about which actor will sell and buy land, as well as which specific land to buy or sell are based on historical observations, interviews, and choice experiments. Results: A reconstruction of land-use change for the period 2001-2009 demonstrates that RULEX reproduces most observed land-use trends and patterns. Given that RULEX simulates only one mechanism of land-use change, i.e. land exchange, it is conservative in simulating change. Conclusions: With this model, we demonstrate the potential of incorporating land market processes in an agent-based, land-use change model. This supports understanding of land-use change that is brought about by ownership change, which is an important process in areas where pressure on land is high. The soundness of the process representation was corroborated by stakeholders within the study area. Land exchange models can be used to assess the impact of changes in climate, markets, and policy on land use change, and help to increase effectiveness of alternative land purchasing strategies by stakeholders or spatial planning policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examined six corporate governance variables which are hypothesized to have an influence on firm's financial performance in Malaysia. The variables encompassed four internal monitoring measures (CEO and chairman of the board, non-executive directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership) with the remaining two variables being external measures (institutional investors and lenders). An empirical study was conducted based on data involving 420 Malaysian listed companies over a four-year period from 2009 to 2012. A combination of cross-sectional and time-series data was employed in the analysis. An econometric model using panel data regression techniques was employed to analyse performance of the firms using both fixed effects and random effects models. Using return on equity as the dependent variable, it was established that CEO duality (an internal monitoring measure) significantly influences the performance of firms. The study showed that a CEO who is also chairman of the board exerts a positive influence on company earnings. It suggests that CEO duality could increase performance of firms when these CEOs dominate the decision-making process in their companies. None of the other monitoring measures relating to independent directors, institutional investors, ownership structures, audit committee and banks played any role in influencing firm performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical studies show that ownership structures that separate control and cash flow rights create agency problems and are associated with reduced value for minority shareholders. Institutional investors recognise these inefficiencies and expect a discount on the share price of companies with control-enhancing mechanisms like multiple voting rights shares or pyramidal ownership structures.In the US, corporate pyramids are discouraged through the taxation of inter-company dividends, whereas multiple voting rights shares are allowed but have to be issued before the firm goes public. Therefore, controlling shareholders who want to entrench themselves in control by retaining multiple voting rights shares pay the costs of this inefficient capital structure when the firm initially goes public at a discounted price.Some European countries – including Spain, Portugal, Greece and, until very recently, Italy – have adopted a diametrically opposite solution. Multiple voting rights shares have been expressly prohibited by the legislator, but corporate pyramids are commonly used by listed companies and can be created following the IPO of the firm without approval from the shareholders. In this situation, if institutional investors expect that a pyramidal ownership structure will be created in the future, they will discount the price of the shares when the firm goes public. Therefore, if Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are willing to privatise some of their state-owned companies and want to maximise the price of their stocks, they should create the conditions to assure the market that these companies will not be controlled through pyramids in the future.Because of strong opposition from national business elites which control the largest corporate groups, it is very difficult to adopt strict regulations aimed at prohibiting - or at least limiting - the use of pyramidal ownership structures in a relatively short period of time. In order to solve this Olson problem, I suggest that Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece should use regulatory dualism to create new markets with enhanced corporate governance rules that prevent shareholders' control through pyramids. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuscript Type Conceptual and empirical Research Question/Issue Comparative corporate governance performance across countries cannot be captured adequately by ranking of single or a few national governance factors ( NGFs). But it is also intractable to undertake separate comparative analyses of the large number of NGFs that potentially impact corporate governance mechanisms. How can NGFs be combined into national governance bundles ( NGBs) that are informative of the level of agency costs at the firm level and are also convenient to use in comparative analyses? Research Findings/Insights We theoretically motivate and empirically identify the components of two NGBs that, at the firm level, have especially significant impact on controlling shareholder agency costs and the agency costs of debt financing, respectively. These NGBs (1) allow consolidation of the effects of various individual NGFs that have been considered separately in the literature, (2) reveal the complementarity and substitutability effects among NGFs and between NGFs and firm governance mechanisms, and (3) are convenient to apply through aggregate bundle scores. Theoretical/Academic Implications Forming NGBs by combining NGFs that have especially significant impact on specific agency costs is useful both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical analysis guides the identification of NGFs that may be especially influential on specific agency costs and these predictions can be verified empirically. Examining the effects of NGFs on the relation of firm-level governance mechanisms and agency costs is useful in understanding the links between national- and firm-level governance variables. Practitioner/Policy Implications The parsimony and tractability afforded by the NGBs in understanding various aspects of corporate governance performance should prove useful to policymakers, international business managers, and investors. By providing readily available indicators of different agency costs at the firm level, these bundles can guide policymakers in setting the legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of China Tourism Research is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since prior research suggests that some economic competition exists between teams in different sports leagues, economic competition and ownership structure can affect an owner's incentive to invest in talent. This paper uses a theoretical model to examine the differences in owners' incentives to invest in talent when they are operating as monopolists, as duopolists, or as a cross-owned team. Our model shows that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to that of a monopolist. A firm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to a duopolist, but the difference in profits is ambiguous. League policies are studied and are shown to affect the quality of teams in other leagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper examines the association between ownership and director interlocks in Swedish big business during the period 1990–2005. By analyses of the 3-mode network of owners, firms, and directors, multiple director assignments are shown to be highly dependent on owner interlocks. The findings provide a new understanding of the mechanisms behind the formation of director interlocks. Furthermore, the association between the interlock types suggests that the ownership network may potentially (co-)produce some of the phenomena that have been attributed to the director network. Future analyses of director interlocks have to bring the owners back in. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In this study, we study the role of corporate governance and ownership structure on a firm's capability of acquiring new technology. More specifically, we examine how foreign ownership, large shareholder, general manager duality and general manager's working experience influence a firm's capability to acquire and develop new technology. Using data from 807 Indian firms, we found that general manager duality is positively related to a firm's likelihood of technology acquisition; however, a general manager's experience hinders a firm from acquiring new technology. This study suggests that top management motivation plays a critical role in increasing a firm's competitive advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in a weak institutional environment. Specifically, using new survey evidence, we seek to appraise quantitatively the performance of block-holder-controlled firms in Russia and to identify, within the domain of corporate governance theory, factors that may explain such performance. We find evidence of negative association between the size of the dominant owners' shareholding and performance parameters such as investment, capacity utilization, and profitability. At the same time, we establish that control structures with multiple, large shareholders increase efficiency. The ambiguity of the effects of ownership concentration suggests that country-specific factors play an important role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multinationals can start up greenfield entities or acquire existing firms to enter foreign nations. Regardless of the choice of greenfield investment vs acquisition, they can control full equity (i.e., wholly owned subsidiaries) or share ownership with local partners (i.e., joint ventures). Depending on the stake taken in the targets, therefore, international acquisitions can be classified into two major categories -- full or partial -- although this distinction is missing in most previous studies. In this paper, I propose that the motives for acquisitions (vs greenfield investments) are specific to whether entries are made through full or partial ownership, in that full acquisitions are driven mostly by capability procurements, whereas partial acquisitions are motivated by other strategic considerations. By splitting a sample of Japanese investments in the US into two sub-regimes, the study has found that the decision on joint ventures vs wholly owned subsidiaries dictates the determinants that shape the choice between greenfield and acquisitive entries. There is also evidence that Japanese investors self-select the decision on full or partial ownership to justify the strategy that they have chosen to enter the US. These findings offer new insights into the role of ownership structures in shaping the choice of entry strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe question of whether companies' share structure should be based on proportionality between ownership and control has been debated for decades. Powerful institutional investors have over the years tried to convince the EU that a harmonisation of share structures across Europe improves corporate governance. This, however, has been heavily disputed by the several listed companies and their organisations, which fear a standardisation is not in the long-term interests of the firms stakeholders. This paper describes the latest attempt by the EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy to challenge nonproportional share structures such as dual-class voting shares — a highly relevant question, as it turns out that nonproportionality is often more the rule than the exception. The paper provides sound arguments as to why regulators should not set aside the freedom of contract principle in order to standardise listed companies' share structure as ‘one size does not fit all’. However, the freedom of contract principle goes hand in hand with transparency. Moreover, disclosure about a company's share structure is essential in order to give investors information about which types of shares best satisfy the preferences of different investor groups. EU Commissioner McCreevy surprised almost everybody last year when he declared at the European Parliament that he had decided to abandon his quest for imposing a system of ‘one share–one vote’ across Corporate Europe. This does not mean that the debate is over, as the issue of share proportionality will come up again in a few years when the takeover directive is to be reconsidered, hence we may speak about ‘a newer ending story’. This paper seeks to tell the story's most interesting pages.International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2008) 5, 126–139. doi:10.1057/jdg.2008.4 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]