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This article explores two questions. What generates the political division over climate change policy in the United States? How is the division over climate change policy related to the broader polarization of contemporary American politics? I argue that the geographies of America's dual economy—the knowledge economy and the carbon economy—and exposure to the climate crisis intersect to generate a new axis of conflict, which I call the carbon–climate cleavage. This cleavage produces political division over climate change and provides materialist elements that accompany the sociocultural factors that shape contemporary polarization. I demonstrate the existence of the cleavage and its impact using data on economic geography, political attitudes on climate change policy, and support for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The empirical analysis indicates that carbon economy communities oppose climate change policy and support Trump, while knowledge economy residents support climate change policy and oppose Trump. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing work on the politics of stabilization has failed to find compelling evidence of a regime-type effect. This article reformulates and reevaluates the regime-type hypothesis. It is argued that regime type does not have an independent impact on the timing of stabilization. Instead, regime type influences the extent to which societal opposition and distributive conflict will delay stabilization. Societal opposition and distributive conflict are likely to delay stabilization in democratic regimes, because governments must worry about maintaining power. Such societal dynamics are less likely to delay stabilization in authoritarian regimes. Using a sample of 92 high-inflation episodes, precisely these regime-specific dynamics surrounding the politics of stabilization were found. Governments in democratic regimes want to stabilize rapidly but often cannot overcome societal opposition and distributive conflict to do so. Authoritarian regimes are substantially less constrained by societal opposition and distributive conflict but have less incentive to stabilize rapidly. Keywords: inflation; macroeconomic stabilization; distributive conflict

The growth of the American financial services remains a bit of a puzzle. The standard approach, the deregulation hypothesis, posits that the industry expanded in response to national deregulation. Yet, when viewed in a comparative context, US finance was deregulated significantly less than other national financial systems and yet grew significantly more than most. We propose the global deregulation hypothesis as a solution to this puzzle. The hypothesis posits that American finance grew in response to deregulation in Europe and the emerging market economies. The article develops two theoretical mechanisms that link global deregulation to US financialization. It reports statistical tests that support two central implications of the global deregulation hypothesis. First, global deregulation is positively associated with the growth of US financial services, while US deregulation is not. Second, global deregulation is not systematically related to the growth of financial services in other industrial democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]