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Hegel è il filosofo del cerchio. Egli pone notoriamente la logica circolare contro la quasi totalità della filosofia moderna, che equipara il cerchio alla tautologia, alla petitio principii e, in ultima analisi, alla falsità. In linea con tale visione, il presente lavoro si pone la domanda: qual è il rapporto tra la logica lineare e la logica circolare di Hegel quando si tratta della famiglia come istituzione nella sfera dello spirito oggettivo? Per Hegel, le istituzioni, per essere degne di tale nome (o concetto), implicano una logica circolare e non solo lineare. Le istituzioni, tuttavia, possono essere create dalla logica lineare della sovversione e dell'irruzione nella storia, ma la loro persistenza o meno è interamente una questione di resistenza e quindi di circolarità, cioè della loro stessa ripetizione e riproduzione nel tempo e attraverso la storia. A seguito di ciò, il documento sostiene che la posizione peculiare della famiglia all'interno del sistema di istituzioni di Hegel deriva da quelli che qui vengono definiti i "due corpi della famiglia". I due corpi della famiglia ci permettono di comprendere la posizione contraddittoria che la famiglia occupa e si assegna ancora oggi, ponendola in una tensione dialettica permanente tra linea e cerchio, resistenza e sovversione. Hegel is the philosopher of the circle. He famously posits the circular logic against virtually the entirety of modern philosophy, which equates the circle with tautology, petitio principii and ultimately falsehood. In line with such a view, this paper poses the question: what is the relationship between the linear logic and Hegel’s circular logic when it comes to the family as an institution within the sphere of objective spirit? For Hegel, institutions, in order to be worthy of such a name (or concept), imply a circular, rather than merely linear logic. Institutions, however, may be created by linear logic of subversion and irruption in history, but whether they persist or not is entirely a question of resistance and thus circularity, that is, their own repetition and reproduction in and through time and history. Following on from this, the paper argues that the peculiar position of the family within Hegel’s system of institutions stems from what here is termed the «two bodies of the family». The two bodies of the family enable us to understand the contradictory position that the family occupies and is assigned to this day, placing it in a permanent dialectical tension between the line and circle, resistance and subversion., B@belonline vol. 9 Subversion and resistance in Hegel: paradigms, figures, resonances /Sovversione e resistenza in Hegel: paradigmi, figure, risonanze

This thesis explores the question of autonomy in Kant and Foucault. It aims to provide an understanding of theoretical-political consequences implied in the relationship existing between Kant and Foucault. In particular, it seeks to explain why Foucault towards the end of his life returns to ethics in general and the notion of autonomy in particular, when this would appear to contradict almost his entire previous philosophical stance. On this basis, the thesis follows five problematics in the form of separate chapters which interrogate the relationship between these two philosophers, often challenging the doxa within dominant interpretations. These chapters are intended as at once as treating separate problems and functioning as chronological axis which follows the development of Foucault’s philosophy in relation to Kant. The aim is to reconstruct Foucault’s reading of the Enlightenment generally and of Kant specifically as both: real historical event/process and as particular philosophical position. The objective is not to discuss the Enlightenment in all its various national iterations and forms, but to try to understand the role of Kant, who after all comes at the very end as, so to speak, a closing figure of the Enlightenment. Although Foucault initially himself expressed negatively towards the Enlightenment as historical event and its proclamation of the autonomy of subject, in the end he endorsed it, attempting however to go beyond the Kantian separation between theoretical and practical reason. This is what this thesis proposes to call Foucault’s “politics of autonomy”. It is not just Kant, but also Foucault who developed his own philosophy of the subject “in the tension field between metaphysics and critique of knowledge, between practical and theoretical philosophy.” In order to understand the tensions and contradictions in the long and difficult philosophical encounter between Foucault and Kant, this thesis argues for historical, theoretical and political importance of the relation between the subject and autonomy throughout modernity. In Foucault’s interpretation, this relation conditioned modernity as a whole, and almost all of the issues we have inherited stem directly from the “long18th century” and the problems of normativity relating to the very form in which we relate to ourselves and to others.