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通常の繰り返しゲームと違って，実際の社会では約束を破って逃げることが可能であることが多い．本稿ではプレイヤーが合意しないとゲームが継続できないというルールの下で，囚人のジレンマを自発的に繰り返すパートナーシップが生成・消滅する社会ゲームのモデルを構築し，モラル・ハザードが起きやすい状況において，どのような社会的制裁の仕組みがそれを防止するかを分析した．結論は三つある．第一に，逃げることが可能な場合でも，信頼構築によって自発的協力が可能になること．第二に，複数の戦略が共存する社会においては必要な信頼構築期間が短縮できること．第三に，やむを得ない事情でパートナーシップが崩壊した場合はその情報が伝わるという紹介状を導入することも，信頼構築期間を短縮することである．これにより，逃げることが可能であっても社会的規範を強制することが可能であり，しかも多様な戦略の共存はむしろ効率性を高めることがわかった．, Unlike the ordinary repeated games, in the real world, people can run away after cheating. In this paper we construct a social game, in which players can repeat Prisoners' Dilemma only if both players agree to continue the partnership. We investigate how a social sanction prevents moral hazard in such a voluntary relationship. We have three conclusions. First, it is possible to enforce voluntary long-term cooperation by trust-building. Second, the trust-building periods can be shortened under diverse strategy distributions. Third, if there is a reference letter system which conveys information that a partnership ended due to an unavoidable cause, then the trust-building periods can be shortened as well.

民主化に先駆けて工業化を行う経済開発戦略を「開発国家戦略」として定義した上で，このような戦略が有効に働く経済環境を分析する．途上国段階ではこの戦略はきわめて有効だが，工業化によって成長した国家では，民主化をしない「強権的政府」は一部の既得権益層に「キャプチャー」され，自ら民主化するインセンティブを持たないために経済危機を引き起こしやすいことを論証する．現代日本で進行中の行政改革を，強権国家としての日本政府を民主化するための自発的な動きとしてとらえ，行政改革が強権国家を民主化するために必要な要因を分析する．, We define the "Developmental State Strategy" as a strategy to industrialize the country before democratization. Types of state system, developmental stages and international environments that are complementary to this strategy are identified. This strategy is quit effective in earlier stages of economic development. However, once the country succeeds in economic development, any "authoritarian government" without democratization is likely to be "captured" by vested interests and to induce crises because there is no incentive to democratize the country within its system. The administrative reform, which is currently proceeding in Japan, should be regarded as a spontaneous effort to democratize the country. We examine the necessary factors that make such an administrative reform to democratize the authoritarian government.

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In today's science-driven industries, such as the semiconductor industry, firms are increasingly engaged in across-firm research and development projects in the form of a research consortium or a strategic alliance. Those collaboration processes, however, have complex aspects due to the competing relationship of the firms in product markets and will not be successful unless the participating firms have enough incentives to reveal their private information and to exert sufficient efforts. The paper attempts to explore the conditions under which firms have enough incentives to reveal their information and/or to expend collaborative efforts. Three existing economic models are examined for this purpose. It is argued that those incentives depend upon the nature of competition in the product markets, information structure, and the way that each firm's private information affects this competition. The models examined in the paper suggest that some mechanism is necessary to evaluate private technical information of each firm and to convey it to the other firms without distortion. This conclusion coincides with the observed fact that a neutral third-party plays an indispensable role in a successful research consortium.

application/pdf, 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと

application/pdf, 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと