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Practical models of competition among power generators who possess market power have generally had to use simplified models of transmission costs and constraints in order to be tractable. In particular, the linearized dc load flow model has been popular in complementarity and other types of oligopoly models. In this paper, we show how such models can be generalized to include quadratic losses, controilable DC lines, and phase shifting transformers. These generalizations preserve convexity of the feasible region, a property that facilitates computation and proof of solution uniqueness and existence. Piecewise and successive linearization formulations are also provided that allow consideration of nonlinear losses in models that require linear constraints. A simple six-bus example illustrates the application of these generalizations. In that example, the impact of losses on prices is much greater under strategic behavior than under competition. Large-scale applications of these approaches to markets in western North America and the European Union illustrate how inclusion of nonlinear losses and controllable DC lines can affect estimates of prices, flows, and economic efficiency indices resulting from oligopoly models. Index Terms--Economics, optimization methods, power generation, power transmission economics.

Since deregulated power markets are very often oligopolistic ones, efficient models that are able to describe strategic behavior of firms must be developed. In particular, transmission constraints can easily increase the opportunities of market players to exercise market power. This paper presents a model that describes the firms strategic interaction, based on Nash-Cournot equilibrium, when the power network is taken into account. Specifically, this paper introduces a new iterative algorithm, that explicitly considers how the production at a certain bus affects the whole network, and consequently models the opportunities for the firms of exercising market power, taking into account their ability to influence the composition of the set of constrained lines. The theoretical basis of the method as well as a case study based on the Central European network is included. Index Terms--Game theory, interconnected power systems, oligopoly models, power system economics, transmission.

The usage of stochastic programming approach for evaluating the oligopolistic market in Canadian electricity industry is presented.

The firms producing a homogeneous product with identical technologies in an oligopolistic market where irrationality or ignorance lead to higher profits are discussed in detail. The profits made by a naive price taker will always be higher than or atleast as much as the other rivals.

A demonstration is given on how the government can maximise its true objective by assigning a public firm a different objective function. Furthur, these results are integrated into a model of Cournot competition with a private firm in order to see the changes.

Restructuring of the power industry worldwide has brought the issue of market competitiveness to the forefront. While 'vertical' market power has been limited by disaggregating generation and transmission, nondiscriminatory access to the transmission system by power suppliers, and the creation of the Independent System Operator (ISO), 'horizontal' and localized market power still survives. In the last few years, the issue of a small number of generators exercising market power has received a great deal of attention, and much has been published on how to identify and mitigate such abuse by market management measures. This paper focuses on the analysis and mitigation of market power in electricity supply. Index Terms--Electricity market, market concentration, market power, oligopoly.

Public utilities are complex systems of supply that are an integral part of national and global infrastructures. To maximize the overall contribution of resources committed to these systems, it is [...]

The effects of taxation on spatial oligopoly in a small open economy were determined. It was shown that mill prices by domestic producers may be lowered by tariff thereby benefiting some domestic consumers. An evaluation of a small open economy was also evaluated on the basis of the source of the utility, mobility of consumers and the adjustment of location patterns and land rents to tax-induced changes in mill prices.