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The temporal structure of heat waves having substantial human impact varies widely, with many featuring a compound structure of hot days interspersed with cooler breaks. In contrast, many heat wave definitions employed by meteorologists include a continuous threshold-exceedance duration criterion. This study examines the hazard of these diverse sequences of extreme heat in the present, and their change with global warming. We define compound heat waves to include those periods with additional hot days following short breaks in heat wave duration. We apply these definitions to analyze daily temperature data from observations, NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory global climate model simulations of the past and projected climate, and synthetically generated time series. We demonstrate that compound heat waves will constitute a greater proportion of heat wave hazard as the climate warms and suggest an explanation for this phenomenon. This result implies that in order to limit heat-related mortality and morbidity with global warming, there is a need to consider added vulnerability caused by the compounding of heat waves.

Michael Oppenheimer and Jesse Anttila-Hughes begin with a primer on how the greenhouse effect works, how we know that Earth is rapidly getting warmer, and how we know that the recent warming is caused by human activity. They explain the sources of scientific knowledge about climate change as well as the basis for the models scientists use to predict how the climate will behave in the future. Although they acknowledge the large degree of uncertainty that surrounds predictions of what will happen decades or even centuries in the future, they also emphasize the near certainty that climate change has the potential to be extremely harmful to children. Most children around the world will face hotter, more extreme temperatures more frequently. Higher temperatures will directly affect children's health by increasing the rates of heatstroke, heat exhaustion, and heat-related mortality. Excessive heat is also likely to affect children indirectly by disrupting agricultural systems, driving up prices, and increasing food scarcity. Many of the world's children may see local demand for water outstrip supply, as shifting precipitation patterns dry out some regions of the world, make other regions wetter, and increase the frequency of both unusually dry periods and unusually severe rains. Mountain glaciers will recede further, significantly reducing storage of winter snows and thus springtime runoff, which has traditionally been used to water fields and recharge reservoirs. Melting ice will also raise sea levels, triggering direct physical threats to children through flooding and erosion and indirect threats through migration and expensive adaptation. Climate change is also expected to make weather-based disasters more frequent and more damaging. This is particularly worrisome for children, not only because of the physical peril disasters pose but also because disasters can have debilitating long-term indirect effects on children. Damage to ecosystems from climate change may also harm children; for example, acidification the world's oceans will reduce food supplies, and disease-carrying insects will invade new areas in response to changing rains and temperatures. In the face of such dire forecasts, Oppenheimer and Anttila-Hughes argue, climate change forces us to directly confront the value we put on future children's wellbeing. Fortunately, we have reason for hope as well as for concern: "History," they write, "has demonstrated time and again that humans can tackle uncertain threats in times of need."

Heat waves (HWs) are among the most damaging climate extremes to human society. Climate models consistently project that HW frequency, severity, and duration will increase markedly over this century. For urban residents, the urban heat island (UHI) effect further exacerbates the heat stress resulting from HWs. Here we use a climate model to investigate the interactions between the UHI and HWs in 50 cities in the United States under current climate and future warming scenarios. We examine UHI2m (defined as urban-rural difference in 2m-height air temperature) and UHIs (defined as urban-rural difference in radiative surface temperature). Our results show significant sensitivity of the interaction between UHI and HWs to local background climate and warming scenarios. Sensitivity also differs between daytime and nighttime. During daytime, cities in the temperate climate region show significant synergistic effects between UHI and HWs in current climate, with an average of 0.4 K higher UHI2m or 2.8 K higher UHIs during HWs than during normal days. These synergistic effects, however, diminish in future warmer climates. In contrast, the daytime synergistic effects for cities in dry regions are insignificant in the current climate, but emerge in future climates. At night, the synergistic effects are similar across climate regions in the current climate, and are stronger in future climate scenarios. We use a biophysical factorization method to disentangle the mechanisms behind the interactions between UHI and HWs that explain the spatial-temporal patterns of the interactions. Results show that the difference in the increase of urban versus rural evaporation and enhanced anthropogenic heat emissions (air conditioning energy use) during HWs are key contributors to the synergistic effects during daytime. The contrast in water availability between urban and rural land plays an important role in determining the contribution of evaporation. At night, the enhanced release of stored and anthropogenic heat during HWs are the primary contributors to the synergistic effects.

This study investigated how subsurface and atmospheric leakage from geologic CO2 storage reservoirs could impact the deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in the global energy system. The Leakage Risk Monetization Model was used to estimate the costs of leakage for representative CO2 injection scenarios, and these costs were incorporated into the Global Change Assessment Model. Worst-case scenarios of CO2 leakage risk, which assume that all leakage pathway permeabilities are extremely high, were simulated. Even with this extreme assumption, the associated costs of monitoring, treatment, containment, and remediation resulted in minor shifts in the global energy system. For example, the reduction in CCS deployment in the electricity sector was 3% for the “high” leakage scenario, with replacement coming from fossil fuel and biomass without CCS, nuclear power, and renewable energy. In other words, the impact on CCS deployment under a realistic leakage scenario is likely to be negligible. We also quantified how the resulting shifts will impact atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Under a carbon tax that achieves an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 480 ppm in 2100, technology shifts due to leakage costs would increase this concentration by less than 5 ppm. It is important to emphasize that this increase does not result from leaked CO2 that reaches the land surface, which is minimal due to secondary trapping in geologic strata above the storage reservoir. The overall conclusion is that leakage risks and associated costs will likely not interfere with the effectiveness of policies for climate change mitigation.

Estimates of climate change damage are central to the design of climate policies. Here, we develop a flexible architecture for computing damages that integrates climate science, econometric analyses, and process models. We use this approach to construct spatially explicit, probabilistic, and empirically derived estimates of economic damage in the United States from climate change. The combined value of market and nonmarket damage across analyzed sectors-agriculture, crime, coastal storms, energy, human mortality, and labor-increases quadratically in global mean temperature, costing roughly 1.2% of gross domestic product per +1°C on average. Importantly, risk is distributed unequally across locations, generating a large transfer of value northward and westward that increases economic inequality. By the late 21st century, the poorest third of counties are projected to experience damages between 2 and 20% of county income (90% chance) under business-as-usual emissions (Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5).

We present a microlevel study to simultaneously investigate the effects of variations in temperature and precipitation along with sudden natural disasters to infer their relative influence on migration that is likely permanent. The study is made possible by the availability of household panel data from Indonesia with an exceptional tracking rate combined with frequent occurrence of natural disasters and significant climatic variations, thus providing a quasi-experiment to examine the influence of environment on migration. Using data on 7,185 households followed over 15 y, we analyze whole-household, province-to-province migration, which allows us to understand the effects of environmental factors on permanent moves that may differ from temporary migration. The results suggest that permanent migration is influenced by climatic variations, whereas episodic disasters tend to have much smaller or no impact on such migration. In particular, temperature has a nonlinear effect on migration such that above 25 °C, a rise in temperature is related to an increase in outmigration, potentially through its impact on economic conditions. We use these results to estimate the impact of projected temperature increases on future permanent migration. Though precipitation also has a similar nonlinear effect on migration, the effect is smaller than that of temperature, underscoring the importance of using an expanded set of climatic factors as predictors of migration. These findings on the minimal influence of natural disasters and precipitation on permanent moves supplement previous findings on the significant role of these variables in promoting temporary migration.