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We analyzed >4,000 pig samples from slaughterhouses in Cambodia and found higher influenza A seroprevalence (40.0%) and prevalence (1.5%) among pigs from commercial farms than smallholder farms (seroprevalence 8.9%; prevalence 0.6%). Multivariable analyses revealed evidence of transmission after leaving farms. Findings have implications for influenza risk and surveillance in emerging livestock systems.

In July 2023, cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) were reported at 2 shelters for stray cats in Seoul, South Korea. The cause of infection was suspected to be improperly sterilized raw food made from domestic duck meat, which was manufactured in South Korea. All viruses isolated from cats at the shelters and from the raw food belonged to HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b. The gene constellation of all viruses was most similar to that of viruses isolated in Korea in November 2022. Of note, the viruses isolated from infected cats harbored mutations E627K or D701N in polymerase basic 2, which are indicative of adaptation to mammals. Postmortem examination revealed systemic pathologic lesions and the presence of widespread virus in different tissues. Thus, consumption of raw duck meat contaminated with HPAI virus likely caused systemic symptoms and death in cats, indicating the introduction of mammal-adapted mutations of the virus.

During the active surveillance, we isolated nine H4N6 subtype influenza A viruses from wild birds in China. To reveal the epidemiology and biology characteristics of H4 subtype influenza A virus from wild birds, we investigated H4 subtype viruses available in the public source, and found that the H4 viruses have been detected in at least 37 countries to date, and more than 73.6% of the viruses were from wild Anseriformes. Bayesian phylogeographic analysis showed that Mongolia worked as the important transmission centre for Eurasian lineage H4 viruses spreading. Phylogenetic analysis of HA genes indicated that global H4 influenza A viruses were divided into Eurasian and North American lineage, our nine H4N6 isolates fell into the Eurasian lineage. Recombination analysis suggested that nine H4N6 isolates underwent complex gene recombination with various subtypes of influenza A viruses and formed two genotypes. Notably, nine H4N6 isolates acquired mammalian virulence-increasing residues. Two representative H4N6 viruses possessed dual receptor binding specificity, they could efficiently replicate in MDCK and 293 T cells in vitro infection, also could cross the species barrier to infect mice directly without prior adaption in vivo experiments. These findings emphasize the public health issues represented by H4 viruses, and highlight the need to strengthen the active surveillance of H4 viruses from wild birds.

A total of 1019 samples collected on 726 Spanish swine farms suffering from outbreaks of respiratory disease were screened for influenza A viruses (IAVs) using a RT-qPCR method. A subset of positive samples was further analyzed using a subtype-specific RT-qPCR method (n: 142) and Sanger sequencing (n: 64). A total of 19.4% samples from 23% farms tested positive, with infection being most common in suckling (53.6%) and weaning pigs (30.2%). Viruses belonging to four HA subtypes (H1av, H1hu, H1pdm, H3) were detected, with subtypes H1avN2, H1huN2 and H1avN1 accounting for over half of the specimens. An optimized protocol with newly designed primers allowed the detection of H3 viruses in a significant number of samples (21%). A comparison of antigenic positions revealed that circulating strains exhibited mutations with vaccine strains in a significant percentage of amino acid residues, both in the NA protein (27.8-43.3%) and particularly in the HA protein (51-75.3%)., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Multiple genetic variants of H1 and H3 influenza A viruses (IAVs) circulate concurrently in US swine farms. Understanding the spatial transmission patterns of IAVs among these farms is crucial for developing effective control strategies and mitigating the emergence of novel IAVs. In this study, we analysed 1909 IAV genomic sequences from 785 US swine farms, representing 33 farming systems across 12 states, primarily in the Midwest from 2004 to 2023. Bayesian phylogeographic analyses were performed to identify the dispersal patterns of both H1 and H3 virus genetic lineages and to elucidate their spatial migration patterns within and between different systems. Our results showed that both intra-system and inter-system migrations occurred between the swine farms, with intra-system migrations being more frequent. However, migration rates for H1 and H3 IAVs were similar between intra-system and inter-system migration events. Spatial migration patterns aligned with expected pig movement across different compartments of swine farming systems. Sow-Farms were identified as key sources of viruses, with bi-directional migration observed between these farms and other parts of the system, including Wean-to-Finish and Gilt-Development-Units. High intra-system migration was detected across farms in the same region, while spread to geographically distant intra- and inter-system farms was less frequent. These findings suggest that prioritizing resources towards systems frequently confronting influenza problems and targeting pivotal source farms, such as sow farms, could be an effective strategy for controlling influenza in US commercial swine operations.

We detected highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in wild rats collected from a rural area in Giza, Egypt, near poultry farms, markets, and backyard flocks. Sequence and phylogenetic analyses indicated that the virus from the rats belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, which has been the predominant virus genotype circulating in Egypt and worldwide since 2021-2022. Active surveillance of avian influenza viruses in wild and domestic mammals is recommended to prevent further spread to mammals and humans.

Influenza A viruses (IAV) impose significant respiratory disease burdens in both swine and humans worldwide, with frequent human-to-swine transmission driving viral evolution in pigs and highlighting the risk at the animal-human interface. Therefore, a comprehensive One Health approach (interconnection among human, animal, and environmental health) is needed for IAV prevention, control, and response. Animal influenza genomic surveillance remains limited in many Latin American countries, including Colombia. To address this gap, we genetically characterized 170 swine specimens from Colombia (2011-2017). Whole genome sequencing revealed a predominance of pandemic-like H1N1 lineage, with a minority belonging to H3N2 and H1N2 human seasonal-like lineage and H1N1 early classical swine lineages. Significantly, we have identified reassortant and recombinant viruses (H3N2, H1N1) not previously reported in Colombia. This suggests a broad genotypic viral diversity, likely resulting from reassortment between classical endemic viruses and new introductions established in Colombia's swine population (e.g. the 2009 H1N1 pandemic). Our study highlights the importance of a One Health approach in disease control, particularly in an ecosystem where humans are a main source of IAV to swine populations, and emphasizes the need for continued surveillance and enhanced biosecurity measures. The co-circulation of multiple subtypes in regions with high swine density facilitates viral exchange, underscoring the importance of monitoring viral evolution to inform vaccine selection and public health policies locally and globally.

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) pose a persistent potential threat to human health because of the spillover from avian and swine infections. Extensive surveillance was performed in 12 cities of Guangxi, China, during 2018 and 2023. A total of 2540 samples (including 2353 nasal swabs and 187 lung tissues) were collected from 18 pig farms with outbreaks of respiratory disease. From these, 192 IAV-positive samples and 19 genomic sequences were obtained. We found that the H1 and H3 swine influenza A viruses (swIAVs) of multiple lineages and genotypes have continued to co-circulate during that time in this region. Genomic analysis revealed the Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swIAVs (G4) still remained predominant in pig populations. Strikingly, the novel multiple H3N2 genotypes were found to have been generated through the repeated introduction of the early H3N2 North American triple reassortant viruses (TR H3N2 lineage) that emerged in USA and Canada in 1998 and 2005, respectively. Notably, when the matrix gene segment derived from the H9N2 avian influenza virus was introduced into endemic swIAVs, this produced a novel quadruple reassortant H1N2 swIAV that could pose a potential risk for zoonotic infection.

Influenza D virus (IDV) plays an important role in the bovine respiratory disease (BRD) complex. Its potential for the zoonotic transmission is of particular concern. In China, IDV has previously been identified in agricultural animals by molecular surveys with no live virus isolates reported. In this study, live IDVs were successfully isolated from cattle in China, which prompted us to further investigate the national prevalence, antigenic property, and infection biology of the virus. IDV RNA was detected in 11.1% (51/460) of cattle throughout the country in 2022-2023. Moreover, we conducted the first IDV serosurveillance in China, revealing a high seroprevalence (91.4%, 393/430) of IDV in cattle during the 2022-2023 winter season. Notably, all the 16 provinces from which cattle originated possessed seropositive animals, and 3 of them displayed the 100% IDV-seropositivity rate. In contrast, a very low seroprevalence of IDV was observed in pigs (3%, 3/100) and goats (1%, 1/100) during the same period of investigation. Furthermore, besides D/Yama2019 lineage-like IDVs, we discovered the D/660 lineage-like IDV in Chinese cattle, which has not been detected to date in Asia. Finally, the Chinese IDVs replicated robustly in diverse cell lines but less efficiently in the swine cell line. Considering the nationwide distribution, high seroprevalence, and appreciably genetic diversity, further studies are required to fully evaluate the risk of Chinese IDVs for both animal and human health in China, which can be evidently facilitated by IDV isolates reported in this study.

Between September and December 2023, Uruguay experienced unusually high pinniped mortality due to an HPAI-H5N1 virus outbreak. We examined and compared the temporal distribution of strandings and swab results. Data on pinniped strandings was compiled from the Stranding Network project and governmental institutions, and the number of positive and total swabs conducted was obtained through government public information requests. A total of 2713 stranded pinnipeds were recorded; 92.4% were dead, including 80 aborted fetuses. Live stranded animals showed clinical signs such as tremors, convulsions, and extreme weakness. Strandings peaked from mid-September to early November. Species was identified in 1121 cases: 56.1% were South American sea lions (SASL), and 42.6% were South American fur seals (SAFS). Out of 159 swabs, 22.6% tested positive for HPAI-H5N1. Most positive cases were unidentified pinnipeds, 33% in SASL and 22% in SAFS. The estimated mortality reached 1465 SASL, about 15% of the population, significantly affecting the declining population and its reproductive stock. The outbreak response revealed weaknesses in disease surveillance, poor institutional coordination, and delayed swabbing efforts. Improved management strategies are necessary to protect vulnerable species from emerging diseases and catastrophic events.

H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus has killed thousands of marine mammals in South America since 2022. Here we report epidemiological data and full genome characterization of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses associated with a massive outbreak in southern elephant seals (Mirounga leonina) at Península Valdés, Argentina, in October 2023. We also report on H5N1 viruses in concurrently dead terns. Our genomic analysis shows that viruses from pinnipeds and terns in Argentina form a distinct clade with marine mammal viruses from Peru, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. Additionally, these marine mammal clade viruses share an identical set of mammalian adaptation mutations which were also present in tern viruses. Our combined ecological and phylogenetic data support mammal-to-mammal transmission and occasional mammal-to-bird spillover and suggest multinational transmission of H5N1 viruses in mammals. We reflect that H5N1 viruses becoming more evolutionary flexible and adapting to mammals in new ways could have global consequences for wildlife, humans, and/or livestock., Competing Interests: Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

The present study aimed to determine the dynamics of influenza A virus (IAV) infection in two endemically infected farms (F1 and F2), where a longitudinal follow-up of piglets was performed from birth to 8-12 weeks of age. During the study, a highly virulent isolate of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) was introduced on both farms. This allowed us to examine the impact of such introduction on the patterns of infection, disease, and the antibody response of pigs to IAV infection. The introduction of the new PRRSV strain coincided with a change in the dynamics of IAV infection on both farms. In F1, the cumulative incidence of IAV increased from 20% before the outbreak to 67.5%, together with the existence of animals that tested positive for IAV (RT‒qPCR) in nasal swabs for two or more consecutive samples. In F2, the cumulative incidence of IAV increased from 50% before the PRRSV outbreak to 70%, and the proportion of prolonged IAV shedders increased sharply. Additionally, some animals were infected with the same IAV twice during the observation period. In contrast to previous reports, our study revealed that prolonged shedding was not related to the titres of maternally derived antibodies at the time of infection but was significantly (p < 0.05) related to PRRSV infection status. Notably, both before and after the PRRSV outbreak, a high proportion of IAV-infected piglets did not seroconvert, which was significantly (p < 0.05) related to the hemagglutination inhibition titres against IAV when infected., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

How avian influenza virus will continue to spread and circulate among wildlife is unclear.

Despite the efforts of practical medicine and virology, influenza viruses remain the most important pathogens affecting human and animal health. Swine are exposed to infection with all types of influenza A, B, C, and D viruses. Influenza viruses have low pathogenicity for swine, but in the case of co-infection with other pathogens, the outcome can be much more serious, even fatal. Having a high zoonotic potential, swine play an important role in the ecology and spread of influenza to humans. In this study, we review the state of the scientific literature on the zoonotic spread of swine influenza A viruses among humans, their circulation in swine populations worldwide, reverse zoonosis from humans to swine, and their role in interspecies transmission. The analysis covers a long period to trace the ecology and evolutionary history of influenza A viruses in swine. The following databases were used to search the literature: Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and PubMed. In this review, 314 papers are considered: n = 107 from Asia, n = 93 from the U.S., n = 86 from Europe, n = 20 from Africa, and n = 8 from Australia. According to the date of publication, they are conditionally divided into three groups: contemporary, released from 2011 to the present (n = 121); 2000-2010 (n = 108); and 1919-1999 (n = 85).

The rapid geographic spread of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus in poultry, wild birds, and other mammalian hosts, including humans, raises significant health concerns globally. The recent emergence of HPAI A(H5N1) in agricultural animals such as cattle and goats indicates the ability of the virus to breach unconventional host interfaces, further expanding the host range. Among the four influenza types-A, B, C, and D, cattle are most susceptible to influenza D infection and serve as a reservoir for this seven-segmented influenza virus. It is generally thought that bovines are not hosts for other types of influenza viruses, including type A. However, this long-standing viewpoint has been challenged by the recent outbreaks of HPAI A(H5N1) in dairy cows in the United States. To date, HPAI A(H5N1) has spread into fourteen states, affecting 299 dairy herds and causing clinical symptoms such as reduced appetite, fever, and a sudden drop in milk production. Infected cows can also transmit the disease through raw milk. This review article describes the current epidemiological landscape of HPAI A(H5N1) in US dairy cows and its interspecies transmission events in other mammalian hosts reported across the globe. The review also discusses the viral determinants of tropism, host range, adaptative mutations of HPAI A(H5N1) in various mammalian hosts with natural and experimental infections, and vaccination strategies. Finally, it summarizes some immediate questions that need to be addressed for a better understanding of the infection biology, transmission, and immune response of HPAI A(H5N1) in bovines.

BackgroundHighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5Nx and human H1N1pdm2009 influenza viruses can infect cats. Infections in cats may result in viral adaptations or recombinant viruses, which may facilitate zoonotic transfer.AimWe aimed to investigate the presence of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 and H1 influenza viruses and antibodies to these viruses in domestic and rural stray cats in the Netherlands and factors associated with exposure.MethodsSera from stray and domestic cats, sampled 2020-2023, were analysed by ELISA and confirmed by hemagglutination inhibition assay (HAI) and pharyngeal swabs and lung tissue for influenza A virus by RT-qPCR.ResultsIn 701 stray cats, 83 (11.8%; 95% confidence interval (CI): 9.5-14.5) sera were positive for HPAI H5 and 65 findings were confirmed. In HAI, two sera were positive for both HPAI H5 and H1. In 871 domestic cats, four (0.46%; 95% CI: 0.13-1.2) sera were HPAI H5 positive and none were confirmed but 40 (4.6%; 95% CI: 3.3-6.2) sera were seropositive for H1 and 26 were confirmed. Stray cats living in nature reserves (odds ratio (OR) = 5.4; 95% CI: 1.5-20.1) and older cats (OR = 3.8; 95% CI: 2.7-7.1) were more likely to be HPAI H5 seropositive. No influenza A virus was detected in 230 cats.ConclusionThe higher HPAI H5 seroprevalence in stray cats compared with domestic cats suggests more frequent viral exposure, most likely due to foraging on wild birds. In contrast, exposure to H1 was more common in domestic cats compared with stray cats.

In January 2023, a Swedish piglet-producing farm with 2800 sows in production (SIP) was diagnosed with IAV (Influenza A virus) and the isolates were shown to cluster with the human seasonal influenza (2022/2023). In December 2022, employees with flu like symptoms tended to the pigs and a few weeks later, respiratory signs appeared in different age groups; sows in farrowing units were anorectic and pyrectic. Lung and nasal swabs were tested positive for IAV and other respiratory infectious agents. Blanket vaccination against H1N1pdm09 of sows and gilts was initiated but discontinued for sows after 2 treatments. Biosecurity measures aiming to reduce the spread of virus were implemented. However, the compliance to follow the protocol was moderate.Combining immunity and strict sanitary measures is crucial to control virus circulation. As the farmer discontinued sow vaccination and just partly increased biosecurity, this may have contributed to ongoing virus circulation and clinical signs in pigs, even 5 months post-diagnosis. Although H1N1pdm09 already had been found in the herd in 2017, there were no clinical signs or diagnostic results indicating continuous circulation of this or other IAV strains afterwards. However, this cannot be entirely excluded. Swine IAVs pose a risk of reintroduction into the human population, highlighting the importance of vaccination of farm workers against seasonal influenza., Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no competing interests., (Thieme. All rights reserved.)

The prevalence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses has increased in wild birds and poultry worldwide, and concomitant outbreaks in mammals have occurred. During 2023, outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 virus infections were reported in cats in South Korea. The H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses isolated from 2 cats harbored mutations in the polymerase basic protein 2 gene encoding single amino acid substitutions E627K or D701N, which are associated with virus adaptation in mammals. Hence, we analyzed the pathogenicity and transmission of the cat-derived H5N1 viruses in other mammals. Both isolates caused fatal infections in mice and ferrets. We observed contact infections between ferrets, confirming the viruses had high pathogenicity and transmission in mammals. Most HPAI H5N1 virus infections in humans have occurred through direct contact with poultry or a contaminated environment. Therefore, One Health surveillance of mammals, wild birds, and poultry is needed to prevent potential zoonotic threats.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus was detected in dead seals on Tyuleniy Island in eastern Russia, in the Sea of Okhotsk. Viruses isolated from dead northern fur seals belong to clade 2.3.4.4b and are closely related to viruses detected predominantly in the Russian Far East and Japan in 2022-2023.

Swine influenza viruses (SIVs), including H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2, have spread throughout the global pig population. Potential pandemics are a concern with the recent sporadic cross-species transmission of SIVs to humans. We collected 1421 samples from Guangdong, Fujian, Henan, Yunnan and Jiangxi provinces during 2017-2018 and isolated 29 viruses. These included 21H1N1, 5H1N2, and 3H3N2 strains. Genome analysis showed that the domestic epidemic genotypes of H1N1 were mainly G4 and G5 reassortant EA swine H1N1. These genotypes have a clear epidemic advantage. Two strains were Clade 6B.1 pdm/09H1N1, suggesting a possible pig-to-human transmission route. Notably, three new H1N2 genotypes were identified using the genomic backbones of G4 or G5 viruses for recombination. The identification of various subtypes and genotypes highlight the complexity and diversity of SIVs in China and need for continuous monitoring of SIV evolution to assess the risks and prepare for potential influenza pandemics., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus clade 2.3.4.4b has caused the death of millions of domestic birds and thousands of wild birds in the USA since January 2022 (refs. 1-4 ). Throughout this outbreak, spillovers to mammals have been frequently documented 5-12 . Here we report spillover of the HPAI H5N1 virus to dairy cattle across several states in the USA. The affected cows displayed clinical signs encompassing decreased feed intake, altered faecal consistency, respiratory distress and decreased milk production with abnormal milk. Infectious virus and viral RNA were consistently detected in milk from affected cows. Viral distribution in tissues via immunohistochemistry and in situ hybridization revealed a distinct tropism of the virus for the epithelial cells lining the alveoli of the mammary gland in cows. Whole viral genome sequences recovered from dairy cows, birds, domestic cats and a raccoon from affected farms indicated multidirectional interspecies transmissions. Epidemiological and genomic data revealed efficient cow-to-cow transmission after apparently healthy cows from an affected farm were transported to a premise in a different state. These results demonstrate the transmission of the HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus at a non-traditional interface, underscoring the ability of the virus to cross species barriers., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Relevance: Influenza A virus is characterized by a segmented single-stranded RNA genome. Such organization of the virus genome determines the possibility of reassortment, which can lead to the emergence of new virus variants. The main natural reservoir of most influenza A virus subtypes are wild waterfowl. Seasonal migrations gather waterfowl from all major migration routes to nesting areas near the northern and southern polar circles. This makes intercontinental spread of influenza A viruses possible. Objective ‒ to conduct molecular genetic monitoring and study the phylogenetic relationships of influenza A virus variants circulating in Antarctica in 2023., Materials and Methods: We studied 84 samples of biological material obtained from birds and marine mammals in April‒May 2023 in coastal areas of Antarctica. For 3 samples, sequencing was performed on the Miseq, Illumina platform and phylogenetic analysis of the obtained nucleotide sequences of the influenza A virus genomes was performed., Results: The circulation of avian influenza virus in the Antarctic region was confirmed. Heterogeneity of the pool of circulating variants of the influenza A virus (H3N8, H1N1) was revealed. Full-length genomes of the avian influenza virus were sequenced and posted in the GISAID database (EPI&#95;ISL&#95;19032103, 19174530, 19174467)., Conclusion: The study of the genetic diversity of influenza A viruses circulating in the polar regions of the Earth and the identification of the conditions for the emergence of new genetic variants is a relevant task for the development of measures to prevent biological threats.

On pig farms ample opportunity exists for pig-to-human and human-to-pig (cross-species) influenza transmission. The purpose of this study was to assess the risks of cross-species influenza transmission within an indoor pig grower unit in the United States and to prioritize data gaps. Using the World Organization for Animal Health risk assessment framework we evaluated influenza transmission across two risk pathways: 1. What is the likelihood that based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one hog becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with swine (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 1a] and that at least one worker becomes infected as a result [step 1b] and that the worker develops symptoms [step 1c]? And 2. What is the likelihood that, based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one worker becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with people (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 2a] and that at least one pig becomes infected as a result [step 2b] and that the pig(s) develop(s) symptoms [step 2c]? Semi-quantitative probability and uncertainty assessments were based on literature review including passive and active influenza surveillance data. We assumed a typical pig-grower farm has capacity for 4,000 pigs, two workers, and minimal influenza control measures. Probability and uncertainty categories were assessed for each risk step and the combined risk pathway. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway one was estimated to be Very Low for H1N1 and H1N2 with an overall High level of uncertainty. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway two was estimated to be Extremely Low for H1N1 and H3N2 with a High degree of uncertainty. Scenario analyses in which influenza control measures were assumed to be implemented separately (implementing vaccinating sows, mass vaccinating incoming pigs or improved personal protective equipment adherence) showed no reduction in the combined risk category. When implementing three influenza control methods altogether, the combined risk could be reduced to Extremely Low for risk pathway one and remained Extremely Low for risk pathway two. This work highlights that multiple influenza control methods are needed to reduce the risks of inter-species influenza transmission on swine farms., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright © 2024. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Influenza A virus (IAV) is an important pathogen in Brazilian swine herds, and monitoring the viral circulation is essential to control and reduce the transmission. Surveillance programs for IAV are often based on individual piglets level sampling, making the evaluation of the available diagnostic tools crucial to assessing IAV circulation in herds. Thus, two sample collection methodologies were compared in pig herds in southern Brazil to detect IAV by RT-qPCR: nasal swab (NS) and nasal wipe (NW). A Bayesian latent class model (BLCM) was set for two tests and two populations. The NW and NS used are more specific (higher than 95 % for both) than sensitive. The sensitivity for NW was lower than the NS, 84.14 % (70 % - 95 %; posterior probability interval (PPI): 95 %) and 87.15 % (73 % - 97 %; PPI: 95 %), respectively, and the specificity was 95 % (90 % - 99 %; PPI: 95 %) and 99 % (96 % - 100 %; PPI: 95 %), respectively. Although the wipe sample collection loses both sensitivity and specificity compared with nasal swab, differences in test performance were very limited and PPIs largely overlapped. Therefore NW can also be considered a valuable tool. The decision about the use of both techniques should be based on the trade-off between their performance limitations and feasibility in routine monitoring., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest none., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza (HPAI H5N1) viruses occasionally infect, but typically do not transmit, in mammals. In the spring of 2024, an unprecedented outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in bovine herds occurred in the USA, with virus spread within and between herds, infections in poultry and cats, and spillover into humans, collectively indicating an increased public health risk 1-4 . Here we characterize an HPAI H5N1 virus isolated from infected cow milk in mice and ferrets. Like other HPAI H5N1 viruses, the bovine H5N1 virus spread systemically, including to the mammary glands of both species, however, this tropism was also observed for an older HPAI H5N1 virus isolate. Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus bound to sialic acids expressed in human upper airways and inefficiently transmitted to exposed ferrets (one of four exposed ferrets seroconverted without virus detection). Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus thus possesses features that may facilitate infection and transmission in mammals., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

The emergence and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A subtype H5N1 (HP H5N1-IAV), particularly clade H5N1 2.3.4.4b, pose a severe global health threat, affecting various species, including mammals. Historically, cattle have been considered less susceptible to IAV, but recent outbreaks of H5N1-IAV 2.3.4.4b in dairy farms suggest a shift in host tropism, underscoring the urgency of expanded surveillance and the need for adaptable diagnostic tools in outbreak management. This study investigated the presence of anti-nucleoprotein (NP) antibodies in serum and milk and viral RNA in milk on dairy farms affected by outbreaks in Texas, Kansas, and Michigan using a multi-species IAV ELISA and RT-qPCR. The analysis of ELISA results from a Michigan dairy farm outbreak demonstrated a positive correlation between paired serum and milk sample results, confirming the reliability of both specimen types. Our findings also revealed high diagnostic performance during the convalescent phase (up to 96%), further improving sensitivity through serial sampling. Additionally, the evaluation of diagnostic specificity using serum and milk samples from IAV-free farms showed an excellent performance (99.6%). This study underscores the efficacy of the IAV NP-blocking ELISA for detecting and monitoring H5N1-IAV 2.3.4.4b circulation in dairy farms, whose recent emergence raises significant animal welfare and zoonotic concerns, necessitating expanded surveillance efforts.

Background: Dogs in close contact with humans can serve as a source of potentially dangerous reassortant influenza viruses (IVs) with zoonotic potential. The dog's body can serve as a vessel for the emergence of new IVs. These new viruses can become a source of infection for other animals and humans. The potential for zoonotic transmission of IVs from dogs to humans poses a public health risk., Aim: Study of the circulation of IVs in the dog population in Almaty, Kazakhstan., Methods: Biosamples (oropharyngeal swabs and blood serum) from dogs were collected from veterinary clinics in Almaty in 2023-2024. Samples were screened using RT-PCR, HI assay, and ELISA., Results: RT-PCR analysis of 355 nasopharyngeal swabs showed the presence of influenza A virus (IAV) in 32 samples (9.01% of the total number of samples analyzed). When subtyping IAV H1N1 RNA was detected in 19 swabs (5.35%). IAV subtype could not be determined in 13 PCR-positive samples (3.66%). The genetic material of IAV H3N2, H5, H7, and H9, as well as coronavirus, bocavirus, and adenovirus has not been identified. In a serological analysis of 180 blood sera using ELISA, antibodies to IAV were detected in 5.56% ( n = 10). The results of the HI assay showed the presence of antihemagglutinins to A/H1N1pdm in 6.11% (11 samples), to A/H3N2 in 9.44% (17 samples), and no antibodies to IAV H5, H7, and type B were detected., Conclusion: There is no information about human infection with any canine influenza virus. However, many cases of infection in dogs with human IAVs H1N1, H1N1pdm09, and H3N2 have been described. When dogs are co-infected with different IAVs, new recombinant IAVs may emerge that can infect humans and other animals. Therefore, ongoing global surveillance of animal populations is necessary to monitor the evolution and circulation of viruses dangerous to public health. This is also important for timely preparation for the emergence of a new zoonotic influenza virus that has pandemic potential for humans., Competing Interests: The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Viruses that infect animals regularly spill over into the human population, but individual events may lead to anything from a single case to a novel pandemic. Rapidly gaining an understanding of a spillover event is critical to calibrating a public health response. We here propose a novel method, using likelihood-free rejection sampling, to evaluate the properties of an outbreak of swine-origin influenza A(H1N2)v in the United Kingdom, detected in November 2023. From the limited data available, we generate historical estimates of the probability that the outbreak had died out in the days following the detection of the first case. Our method suggests that the outbreak could have been said to be over with 95% certainty between 19 and 29 days after the first case was detected, depending upon the probability of a case being detected. We further estimate the number of undetected cases conditional upon the outbreak still being live, the epidemiological parameter R 0 , and the date on which the spillover event itself occurred. Our method requires minimal data to be effective. While our calculations were performed after the event, the real-time application of our method has potential value for public health responses to cases of emerging viral infection.

The relentless march of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) strain, known as H5N1, to become an unprecedented panzootic continues unchecked. The leap of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b from Eurasia and Africa to North America in 2021 and its further spread to South America and the Antarctic have exposed new avian and mammalian populations to the virus and led to outbreaks on an unrivaled scale. The virus has infected wild birds across vast geographic regions and caused wildlife deaths in some of the world's most biodiverse ecosystems. Hundreds of millions of poultry have died or been culled, affecting global food security in some of the world's poorest regions. Numerous mammalian species, including sea lions and fur animals, have been infected. Outbreaks in dairy cows in the United States have been occurring for months, seemingly unchecked in most affected states. Why is there not a greater sense of urgency to control these infections?

Human cases of avian influenza virus (AIV) infections are associated with an age-specific disease burden. As the influenza virus N2 neuraminidase (NA) gene was introduced from avian sources during the 1957 pandemic, we investigate the reactivity of N2 antibodies against A(H9N2) AIVs. Serosurvey of healthy individuals reveal the highest rates of AIV N2 antibodies in individuals aged ≥65 years. Exposure to the 1968 pandemic N2, but not recent N2, protected against A(H9N2) AIV challenge in female mice. In some older adults, infection with contemporary A(H3N2) virus could recall cross-reactive AIV NA antibodies, showing discernable human- or avian-NA type reactivity. Individuals born before 1957 have higher anti-AIV N2 titers compared to those born between 1957 and 1968. The anti-AIV N2 antibodies titers correlate with antibody titers to the 1957 N2, suggesting that exposure to the A(H2N2) virus contribute to this reactivity. These findings underscore the critical role of neuraminidase immunity in zoonotic and pandemic influenza risk assessment., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in dairy cattle and cats in Kansas and Texas, United States, which reflects the continued spread of clade 2.3.4.4b viruses that entered the country in late 2021. Infected cattle experienced nonspecific illness, reduced feed intake and rumination, and an abrupt drop in milk production, but fatal systemic influenza infection developed in domestic cats fed raw (unpasteurized) colostrum and milk from affected cows. Cow-to-cow transmission appears to have occurred because infections were observed in cattle on Michigan, Idaho, and Ohio farms where avian influenza virus-infected cows were transported. Although the US Food and Drug Administration has indicated the commercial milk supply remains safe, the detection of influenza virus in unpasteurized bovine milk is a concern because of potential cross-species transmission. Continued surveillance of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in domestic production animals is needed to prevent cross-species and mammal-to-mammal transmission.

Coyotes (Canis latrans) share urban habitats with domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris), providing opportunities for pathogen transmission. In Chicago, Illinois, USA, canine influenza virus (CIV) is prevalent in dogs. Serologic investigation for exposure in 101 coyote samples collected 2000-23 did not detect any antibodies against CIV H3N2 and H3N8., (© Wildlife Disease Association 2024.)

Influenza A viruses in swine have considerable genetic diversity and continue to pose a pandemic threat to humans due to a potential lack of population level immunity. Here we describe a pipeline to characterize and triage influenza viruses for their pandemic risk and examine the pandemic potential of two widespread swine origin viruses. Our analysis reveals that a panel of human sera collected from healthy adults in 2020 has no cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies against a α-H1 clade strain (α-swH1N2) but do against a γ-H1 clade strain. The α-swH1N2 virus replicates efficiently in human airway cultures and exhibits phenotypic signatures similar to the human H1N1 pandemic strain from 2009 (H1N1pdm09). Furthermore, α-swH1N2 is capable of efficient airborne transmission to both naïve ferrets and ferrets with prior seasonal influenza immunity. Ferrets with H1N1pdm09 pre-existing immunity show reduced α-swH1N2 viral shedding and less severe disease signs. Despite this, H1N1pdm09-immune ferrets that became infected via the air can still onward transmit α-swH1N2 with an efficiency of 50%. These results indicate that this α-swH1N2 strain has a higher pandemic potential, but a moderate level of impact since there is reduced replication fitness and pathology in animals with prior immunity., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

We describe an unusual mortality event caused by a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b involving harbor (Phoca vitulina) and gray (Halichoerus grypus) seals in the St. Lawrence Estuary, Quebec, Canada, in 2022. Fifteen (56%) of the seals submitted for necropsy were considered to be fatally infected by HPAI H5N1 containing fully Eurasian or Eurasian/North American genome constellations. Concurrently, presence of large numbers of bird carcasses infected with HPAI H5N1 at seal haul-out sites most likely contributed to the spillover of infection to the seals. Histologic changes included meningoencephalitis (100%), fibrinosuppurative alveolitis, and multiorgan acute necrotizing inflammation. This report of fatal HPAI H5N1 infection in pinnipeds in Canada raises concerns about the expanding host of this virus, the potential for the establishment of a marine mammal reservoir, and the public health risks associated with spillover to mammals.Nous décrivons un événement de mortalité inhabituelle causé par un virus de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b chez des phoques communs (Phoca vitulina) et gris (Halichoerus grypus) dans l'estuaire du Saint-Laurent au Québec, Canada, en 2022. Quinze (56%) des phoques soumis pour nécropsie ont été considérés comme étant fatalement infectés par le virus H5N1 de lignées eurasiennes ou de réassortiment eurasiennes/nord-américaines. Un grand nombre simultané de carcasses d'oiseaux infectés par le H5N1 sur les sites d'échouement a probablement contribué à la contamination de ces phoques. Les changements histologiques associés à cette infection incluaient : méningo-encéphalite (100%), alvéolite fibrinosuppurée et inflammation nécrosante aiguë multi-organique. Cette documentation soulève des préoccupations quant à l'émergence de virus mortels, à la possibilité d'établissement de réservoirs chez les mammifères marins, et aux risques pour la santé publique associés aux propagations du virus chez les mammifères.

We detected antibodies to H5 and N1 subtype influenza A viruses in 4/194 (2%) dogs from Washington, USA, that hunted or engaged in hunt tests and training with wild birds. Historical data provided by dog owners showed seropositive dogs had high levels of exposure to waterfowl.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has caused widespread mortality in both wild and domestic birds in Europe 2020-2023. In July 2023, HPAI A(H5N1) was detected on 27 fur farms in Finland. In total, infections in silver and blue foxes, American minks and raccoon dogs were confirmed by RT-PCR. The pathological findings in the animals include widespread inflammatory lesions in the lungs, brain and liver, indicating efficient systemic dissemination of the virus. Phylogenetic analysis of Finnish A(H5N1) strains from fur animals and wild birds has identified three clusters (Finland I-III), and molecular analyses revealed emergence of mutations known to facilitate viral adaptation to mammals in the PB2 and NA proteins. Findings of avian influenza in fur animals were spatially and temporally connected with mass mortalities in wild birds. The mechanisms of virus transmission within and between farms have not been conclusively identified, but several different routes relating to limited biosecurity on the farms are implicated. The outbreak was managed in close collaboration between animal and human health authorities to mitigate and monitor the impact for both animal and human health.

Background: Influenza A virus infections can occur in multiple species. Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses (EAS-H1N1) are predominant in swine and occasionally infect humans. A Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A (H1N1) virus was isolated from a boy who was suffering from fever; this strain was designated A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1). The aims of this study were to investigate the characteristics of this virus and to draw attention to the need for surveillance of influenza virus infection in swine and humans., Methods: Throat-swab specimens were collected and subjected to real-time fluorescent quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT‒PCR). Positive clinical specimens were inoculated onto Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells to isolate the virus, which was confirmed by a haemagglutination assay. Then, whole-genome sequencing was carried out using an Illumina MiSeq platform, and phylogenetic analysis was performed with MEGA X software., Results: RT‒PCR revealed that the throat-swab specimens were positive for EAS-H1N1, and the virus was subsequently successfully isolated from MDCK cells; this strain was named A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1). Whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis revealed that A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1) is a novel triple-reassortant EAS-H1N1 lineage that contains gene segments from EAS-H1N1 (HA and NA), triple-reassortant swine influenza H1N2 virus (NS) and A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses (PB2, PB1, PA, NP and MP)., Conclusions: The isolation and analysis of the A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1) virus provide further evidence that EAS-H1N1 poses a threat to human health, and greater attention should be given to the surveillance of influenza virus infections in swine and humans., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Equine influenza is a viral disease caused by the equine influenza virus (EIV), and according to the WOAH, it is mandatory to report these infections. In Latin America and Colombia, EIV risk factors have not been analyzed. The objective of this research is to perform an epidemiological and molecular analysis of the EIV in horses with respiratory symptoms from 2020 to 2023 in Colombia. Molecular EIV detection was performed using RT-qPCR and nanopore sequencing. A risk analysis was also performed via the GEE method. A total of 188 equines with EIV respiratory symptoms were recruited. The positivity rate was 33.5%. The descriptive analysis showed that only 12.8% of the horses were vaccinated, and measures such as the quarantine and isolation of symptomatic animals accounted for 91.5% and 88.8%, respectively. The variables associated with the EIV were the non-isolation of positive individuals (OR = 8.16, 95% CI (1.52-43.67), p = 0.014) and sharing space with poultry (OR = 2.16, 95% CI (1.09-4.26), p = 0.027). In conclusion, this is the first EIV investigation in symptomatic horses in Colombia, highlighting the presence of the virus in the country and the need to improve preventive and control measures.

Aims: This study aimed to identify exposure to human, swine, and avian influenza A virus subtypes in rural companion and hunting dogs, backyard pigs, and feral pigs., Methods and Results: The study took place in a region of southeastern Mexico where the sampled individuals were part of backyard production systems in which different domestic and wild species coexist and interact with humans. We collected blood samples from pigs and dogs at each of the sites. We used a nucleoprotein enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay to determine the exposure of individuals to influenza A virus. Haemagglutination inhibition was performed on the positive samples to determine the subtypes to which they were exposed. For data analysis, a binomial logistic regression model was generated to determine the predictor variables for the seropositivity of the individuals in the study. We identified 11 positive individuals: three backyard pigs, four companion dogs, and four hunting dogs. The pigs tested positive for H1N1 and H1N2. The dogs were positive for H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2. The model showed that dogs in contact with backyard chickens are more likely to be seropositive for influenza A viruses., Conclusions: We demonstrated the essential role hunting dogs could play as intermediate hosts and potential mixing vessel hosts when exposed to human and swine-origin viral subtypes. These results are relevant because these dogs interact with domestic hosts and humans in backyard systems, which are risk scenarios in the transmission of influenza A viruses. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to implement epidemiological surveillance of influenza A viruses in backyard animals, particularly in key animals in the transmission of these viruses, such as dogs and pigs., (© 2024 Wiley‐VCH GmbH. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Dogs are known to be susceptible to influenza A viruses, although information on influenza D virus (IDV) is limited. We investigated the seroprevalence of IDV in 426 dogs in the Apulia region of Italy during 2016 and 2023. A total of 14 samples were positive for IDV antibodies, suggesting exposure to IDV in dogs.

We describe the evolution of the outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) in sea lions (Otaria flavescens) of South America. At least 24,000 sea lions died in Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil between January-October 2023. The most plausible route of infection is cohabiting with or foraging on infected birds. However, we urge a detailed evaluation of the sea lions actual source of infection given that the concomitant massive wild bird mortalities registered in the Pacific Ocean did not occur in the Atlantic Ocean., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this commentary., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Influenza in dogs holds considerable public health significance due to their close companionship with humans, yet several facets of this phenomenon remain largely unexplored. This study undertook a systematic review and meta-analysis of observational studies to gauge the global seroprevalence of influenza in dogs. We also assessed whether pet dogs exhibited a higher seroprevalence of influenza compared to non-pet dogs, explored seasonal variations in seroprevalence, scrutinised the design and reporting standards of existing studies, and elucidated the geographical distribution of canine influenza virus (cIV). A comprehensive analysis of 97 studies spanning 27 countries revealed that seroprevalence of various influenza strains in dogs consistently registered below 10% and exhibited relative stability over the past decade. Significantly, we noted that seroprevalence of human influenza virus was notably higher in pet dogs compared to their non-pet counterparts, whereas seroprevalence of other influenza strains remained relatively uniform among both categories of dogs. Seasonal variations in seroprevalence of cIV were not observed. In summary, our findings indicated the global circulation of cIV strains H3N2 and H3N8, with other strains primarily confined to China. Given the lack of reported cases of the transmission of cIV from dogs to humans, our findings suggest a higher risk of reverse zoonosis than zoonosis. Finally, we strongly advocate for standardised reporting guidelines to underpin future canine influenza research endeavours., (© 2024 The Authors. Reviews in Medical Virology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Aims: Swine are a mixing vessel for the emergence of novel reassortant influenza A viruses (IAV). Interspecies transmission of swine-origin IAV poses a public health and pandemic risk. In the United States, the majority of zoonotic IAV transmission events have occurred in association with swine exposure at agricultural fairs. Accordingly, this human-animal interface necessitates mitigation strategies informed by understanding of interspecies transmission mechanisms in exhibition swine. Likewise, the diversity of IAV in swine can be a source for novel reassortant or mutated viruses that pose a risk to both swine and human health., Methods and Results: In an effort to better understand those risks, here we investigated the epidemiology of IAV in exhibition swine and subsequent transmission to humans by performing phylogenetic analyses using full genome sequences from 272 IAV isolates collected from exhibition swine and 23 A(H3N2)v viruses from human hosts during 2013-2015. Sixty-seven fairs (24.2%) had at least one pig test positive for IAV with an overall estimated prevalence of 8.9% (95% CI: 8.3-9.6, Clopper-Pearson). Of the 19 genotypes found in swine, 5 were also identified in humans. There was a positive correlation between the number of human cases of a genotype and its prevalence in exhibition swine. Additionally, we demonstrated that A(H3N2)v viruses clustered tightly with exhibition swine viruses that were prevalent in the same year., Conclusions: These data indicate that multiple genotypes of swine-lineage IAV have infected humans, and highly prevalent IAV genotypes in exhibition swine during a given year are also the strains detected most frequently in human cases of variant IAV. Continued surveillance and rapid characterization of IAVs in exhibition swine can facilitate timely phenotypic evaluation and matching of candidate vaccine strains to those viruses present at the human-animal interface which are most likely to spillover into humans., (© 2023 The Authors. Zoonoses and Public Health published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH.)