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La Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción (2006) impone a los estados signatarios el deber de establecer y fomentar prácticas para prevenir la corrupción. Sin perjuicio de dicha obligación, la lucha contra cualquier tipo de práctica que pueda desviar a las instituciones públicas de su objetivo, que es responder a su finalidad pública. El lector encontrá una explicación de la prevención de la corrupción desde de la gestión de riesgos; propuesta de la Oficina Antifraude de Cataluña para las instituciones para garantizar su integridad y favorecer la confianza de la ciudadanía.También encontrará explicación de la metodología de gestión de riesgos para la integridad, y una propuesta de actuación sobre un riesgo en concreto: los conflictos de interés.

The loss of traditional knowledge, concomitant with changes in livelihoods, languages, and demographics of indigenous and local groups, is a global concern. However, documenting such loss poses serious methodological challenges. Comparing the results of contemporary studies with past research is often problematic due to methodological differences. Here, comparing studies that attempted to document the traditional ethnobotanical knowledge of the Chacobo of Bolivia, we tried to examine whether knowledge loss was really occurring across more than 100 years or was only researcher’s perception. The Chacobo are a Panoan-speaking tribe of about 1000 members, first visited by researchers in 1911, and subsequently in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Each study had different foci, but all recorded ethnobotanical data. The first more detailed anthropological report exists from the late 1960s, and ecological-ethnobotanical studies were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. Based on available literature, in particular the botanical studies of Boom (1987) and Bergeron (1998), it seemed that Chacobo plant use now centers on income generation. Both Boom (1987) and Bergeron (1998) perceived that traditional plant use related to household artifacts and medicine, as well as traditional crop varieties had almost disappeared. Here, we hypothesized that plant knowledge documented and the perception of so-called knowledge loss observed in these depended completely on the background of the interviewers and the methods employed, and that in a sufficiently comprehensive ethnobotanical study, we would be able to document all species and uses mentioned in previous studies. We tested this hypothesis by conducting a complete ethnobotanical inventory of almost the entire adult Chacobo population, with interviews and plant collection conducted directly by Chacobo counterparts. The results verify our initial hypothesis and showed that the loss of knowledge perceived in previous studies simply was an artifact of the research methods employed. Traditional crop varieties are still widely grown, most Chacobo know, and can name, traditional artifacts, and many still know the names and uses of medicinal species. However, some knowledge, including the manufacture of artifacts and proficient identification of many medicinal plants, is limited to the older generation.

Although freelisting and semi-structured interviews are widespread methods in ethnobotany, few studies quantitatively examine how these methods may bias results. Using a comprehensive ethnobotanical inventory of palm species, uses and names in the Chacobo tribe of Bolivia, we show that interviews elicit more items than freelists, but the effect is sensitive to sample size, item type and data categorization. This implies that even subtle methodological choices may greatly affect reported results.

This paper describes Peru's experiences with its National Blood Banking Program. Until the mid-1990s, the country faced a host of problems, including the lack of a legal framework to regulate blood banks, a high maternal mortality rate due to a shortage of blood, virtually no voluntary donations, a high risk of infection from transfusions, the use of only whole blood for transfusion, serious disorganization in the blood banks, deficiencies in blood bank supervision and control, no training programs, indifference on the part of health officials, frequent selling of blood, and limited community awareness. Subsequently, a strategic plan was prepared that made it possible to solve many of those problems. Legal instruments were prepared; the rate of voluntary donations rose from 0% to 19.5%; the safety of the blood was improved through compulsory screening of all donated blood units for seven markers of infectious diseases, as well as by placing a national seal of quality on all screened units. The availability of blood doubled, thus meeting 70% of the need; sales of blood decreased; and the use of blood components was improved, with 80% of the blood being fractionated. In addition, supervisory control of 100% of the blood banks in the country was achieved, a national registry was established, the cost-benefit relationship for blood units was improved through centralized screening, internal and external quality control was made mandatory, and prodonation campaigns led to commitments from civil society. While important, all these achievements represent just a first step. This is especially true given that developing the National Blood Banking Program required the participation of outside organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization, whose support, together with the experience provided by other countries, was key. The Program is facing a number of new challenges, and the progress that has been achieved could be threatened if current activities stagnate or if officials become complacent.

This paper describes Peru's experiences with its National Blood Banking Program. Until the mid-1990s, the country faced a host of problems, including the lack of a legal framework to regulate blood banks, a high maternal mortality rate due to a shortage of blood, virtually no voluntary donations, a high risk of infection from transfusions, the use of only whole blood for transfusion, serious disorganization in the blood banks, deficiencies in blood bank supervision and control, no training programs, indifference on the part of health officials, frequent selling of blood, and limited community awareness. Subsequently, a strategic plan was prepared that made it possible to solve many of those problems. Legal instruments were prepared; the rate of voluntary donations rose from 0% to 19.5%; the safety of the blood was improved through compulsory screening of all donated blood units for seven markers of infectious diseases, as well as by placing a national seal of quality on all screened units. The availability of blood doubled, thus meeting 70% of the need; sales of blood decreased; and the use of blood components was improved, with 80% of the blood being fractionated. In addition, supervisory control of 100% of the blood banks in the country was achieved, a national registry was established, the cost-benefit relationship for blood units was improved through centralized screening, internal and external quality control was made mandatory, and prodonation campaigns led to commitments from civil society. While important, all these achievements represent just a first step. This is especially true given that developing the National Blood Banking Program required the participation of outside organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization, whose support, together with the experience provided by other countries, was key. The Program is facing a number of new challenges, and the progress that has been achieved could be threatened if current activities stagnate or if officials become complacent.

This paper describes Peru's experiences with its National Blood Banking Program. Until the mid-1990s, the country faced a host of problems, including the lack of a legal framework to regulate blood banks, a high maternal mortality rate due to a shortage of blood, virtually no voluntary donations, a high risk of infection from transfusions, the use of only whole blood for transfusion, serious disorganization in the blood banks, deficiencies in blood bank supervision and control, no training programs, indifference on the part of health officials, frequent selling of blood, and limited community awareness. Subsequently, a strategic plan was prepared that made it possible to solve many of those problems. Legal instruments were prepared; the rate of voluntary donations rose from 0% to 19.5%; the safety of the blood was improved through compulsory screening of all donated blood units for seven markers of infectious diseases, as well as by placing a national seal of quality on all screened units. The availability of blood doubled, thus meeting 70% of the need; sales of blood decreased; and the use of blood components was improved, with 80% of the blood being fractionated. In addition, supervisory control of 100% of the blood banks in the country was achieved, a national registry was established, the cost-benefit relationship for blood units was improved through centralized screening, internal and external quality control was made mandatory, and pro-donation campaigns led to commitments from civil society. While important, all these achievements represent just a first step. This is especially true given that developing the National Blood Banking Program required the participation of outside organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization, whose support, together with the experience provided by other countries, was key. The Program is facing a number of new challenges, and the progress that has been achieved could be threatened if current activities stagnate or if officials become complacent.