Search

The project reported in this paper has been organized to scrutinize current incident data on near fires and fully developed fires in Norwegian road tunnels longer than 500 m. This length is chosen because it is assumed that shorter tunnels are less critical in case of fires. The project included collecting data and transferring it into formats enabling mathematical modelling. The major issue of this work has been to resolve: What are the major contributing tunnel infrastructure factors leading to heavy goods vehicle (HGV) fires in Norwegian tunnels? By using Poisson regression modelling, several models are developed showing good fit with the observations. All models reveal that slope, length, annual average daily traffic of heavy goods vehicles, and whether a tunnel is subsea are significant factors. The most important is the subsea factor, and the effect of other risk factors is also more severe for subsea tunnels. The work also discusses weaknesses in the data material and the fact that there are several other interesting factors, for example related to the state of HGVs and driver behavior that are currently missing. The research potential for better modelling and understanding of HGV fires in tunnels is huge.

Simultaneously with a decreasing sea ice cover in the Arctic region an increase in ship traffic is experienced in these waters, meaning a higher probability of accidents and incidents to occur. The capability to handle emergency situations for shipowners, operators and rescuers in a cold climate environment are heavily affected by the risks present in polar waters and depends on limited emergency response resources covering extremely large areas. In 2017, the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (The Polar Code) was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), applicable for the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The goals of the functionally based regulation are to provide for safe ship operations and the protection of the polar environment, by addressing risks present in polar waters and to ensure these are mitigated sufficiently. A qualitative pilot study, with individual expert interviews, has been conducted in order to examine the Polar Code's implications for safe ship operations in the Arctic region. The study concludes that the discussions raised in the aftermath of the Polar Code has led to an increase in focus and a strengthen consciousness about hazards and risks associated with polar water ship operations and additional measures required to mitigate these. Further, the implementation of the Polar Code is considered as a milestone by establishing an international regulation, mandatory for polar water ship design and for voyage planning. However, the study points out that the main principle of the Polar Code is risk-based, meaning the performance of safe ship operations are depending on those subjects to the regulation, to conduct thorough operational risk assessments covering all actual hazards, and to ensure that those are mitigated sufficiently. In this regard, authority presence is found crucial, to validate the adequacy and the dimensioning of the implemented measures. Key words: Arctic ship operations; regulatory governance; emergency response; risk management.

This paper explores the application of real-time spatial information from urban transport systems to understand the outbreak, severity and spread of seasonal flu epidemics from a spatial perspective. We believe that combining travel data with epidemiological data will be the first step to develop a tool to predict future epidemics and to better understand the effects that these outbreaks have on societal functions over time. Real-time data-streams provide a powerful, yet underutilised tool when it comes to monitoring and detecting changes to the daily behaviour of inhabitants. In this paper, we describe and discuss the design of the geospatial project, in which we will draw upon data sources available from the Norwegian cities of Oslo and Bergen. Historical datasets from public transport and road traffic will serve as an initial indication of whether changes in daily transport patterns corresponds to seasonal flu data. It is expected that changes in daily transportation habits corresponds to swings in daily and weekly flu activity and that these differences can be measured through geostatistical analysis. Conceptually one could be able to monitor changes in human behaviour and activity in nearly true time by using indicators derived from outside the clinical health services. This type of more up-to-date and geographically precise information could contribute to earlier detection of flu outbreaks and serve as background for implementing tailor-made emergency response measures over the course of the outbreaks.

Efficient emergency response is key to preventing major losses in tunnel fires. Our general concern in this paper is the degree to which tunnel systems are prepared and the means by which we can be prepared for a major fire in a single-tube road tunnel. Conformance to prescriptive regulations dominates existing practice in the area of emergency preparedness. Risk-based approaches exist but have little influence on emergency preparedness designs for tunnel systems. A successful emergency response to tunnel fires is dependent on many actors collaborating under serious time constraints. Safety becomes a matter of controlling critical processes necessary to keep the system in a safe state. Efficient decision-making in situations of major uncertainty is vital, to achieve safety goals. This essentially means that efficient emergency preparedness for road tunnels is a matter that needs attention in the early design phases and continuous improvements during the operational phase. To achieve high-performance emergency preparedness against tunnel fires, there is a need for radical changes to the design and operation of tunnels. In this paper, it is claimed that a system-theoretic approach is appropriate to deal with the tunnel system’s complexity and to drive the design of appropriate control structures for critical processes, from the design phase to the actual emergency. It is shown how system theoretic approaches will change the safety management practices for tunnels and how this will increase consistency between potential fire scenarios and associated control actions.

Commanders have an important role in the management of emergencies, as their responsibility is to lead and coordinate the response. This study examines how police officers with command responsibilities learn to carry out emergency response work and manage emergencies. The empirical data was collected through participant observation in the police service before the terrorist attacks on the Government Complex and on the Labor Party youth camp on Utoya Island in Norway on 22 July 2011, thus giving the opportunity firstly to gain direct experience from police officers’ work and learning activities and then to analyze how appropriate and sufficient these activities are for actually preparing personnel to manage a major emergency. The response to and management of the terrorist attacks was, on the whole, not as good as it should have been, mainly because of inadequate exercise of command by the police. From a learning point of view, these weaknesses are not surprising. This study shows that the learning activities in the police service are mainly directed toward daily police work and normal emergencies, and do not sufficiently prepare police officers and commanders to manage major novel crises such as the terrorist attacks on 22 July.

The Mont Blanc tunnel fire March 1999 killed 39 persons, of which most died within 15 min due to intoxication. In Norway there have been several fires the recent seven years. No single road-user has died from intoxication in those fires, in spite of being engulfed with smoke for more than 1.5 h. The tunnel safety discourse amongst tunnel owners and researchers turns towards questioning whether current longitudinal ventilation strategies can be used to design the tunnel system to meet the self-rescue principle. Smoke control would then be the design criterion. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration could in this perspective re-duce its effort to invest in safety measures ensuring safe havens for road users trapped in smoke and other fire preventive measures. We are very critical to such a development of tunnel fire safety. This paper raises questions about predictability of smoke dispersions in case of tunnel fires as well as human tolerability of toxic gases from fires. We conclude with issuing designs of research studies to reduce the gaps of knowledge revealed in the literature.

The Commission Directive 2004/54/EC provides minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network and has been implemented in the Norwegian regulatory framework. The Directive states that the tunnel owner shall ensure a sufficient emergency response performance. This is a goal oriented and functional requirement, but its contents and interpretation is uncertain. In order to ensure an adequate emergency response it is expected that administrative authorities shall put in place organizational and operational schemes for the training and equipping of emergency services. The tunnel fire safety systems are complex systems that need to be understood by its safety constraints controlled by personnel that is supposed to interact in order to ensure a holistic and robust system. Currently, we cannot find any recommendations or outlines of risk acceptance criteria to road tunnels. This means that risk acceptance must be revealed from risk analyses and their associated system designs. The emergency response arrangements and related competence of the involved organizations and personnel contribute to specific risk levels. However, these connections are rarely seen in the safety documents. This article challenges the relationships between the risk analyses and the established competence constraints set by the fire and rescue departments. We scrutinize the fire and rescue personnels' governing curricula in order to identify its contribution to risk acceptance. The major goal is to clarify how safety and performance requirements are developed and specified for fire and rescue personnel involved in tunnel fire safety.

A strategy for cooperation in emergency management has been developed and politically agreed upon by the Rogaland County Council, Norway. The region comprised by the strategy consists of many different actors within societal safety and emergency management. The strategy aims at strengthening the existing cooperation, establishing professional centres and further developing competencies in their emergency response efforts within the region. The region has more than twenty road tunnels either in the planning phase, under construction or in operation. The emergency services have established a new organisation of their cooperation to ensure coordination, learning and supervision. This relates both to exercises and real event operations. An important tool in this respect is a recently developed handbook for cooperative exercises. The book is used in planning, execution and follow-up of all cooperation exercises. In this paper we present our newly developed evaluation model for following up the cooperation exercise guidelines, with special attention to events in road tunnels. We employ a learning model that extends the notion of learning from observed changes to also include confirmation and comprehension of cooperation activities.

In Norway, snow avalanches hitting roads are a considerable safety challenge for the rescue services. Previous studies have given rise to concern about the rescuers´ levels of exposure to avalanche risk during these missions. The safety of the rescuers must balance a quick and lifesaving response. The ability to meet both demands constitutes the performance of the rescue service. In the period 2010–2014 the rescue services registered 58 avalanches hitting public roads in Norway. The study reported in this article includes all those events. It explored the characteristics of the rescue missions and which risk indicators that contributed to overall risk to rescuers' health and victims' survival. 45 out of these 58 incidents were analyzed using organizational risk indicators. Risk influencing factors (RIF) and other relevant variables were then included in a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) in order to model both the associated risk and the overall performance of the rescue service. The analyses showed that rescue management in the alert phase, professional assessment of avalanche conditions, and continuous risk assessment are the most important RIFs to control when aiming at an effective and safe rescue operation. In addition, actions to control undue haste and over-commitment, and enhance risk awareness will contribute to increased safety in this line of rescue work.

This paper explores the application of real-time spatial information from urban transport systems to understand the outbreak, severity and spread of seasonal and pandemic influenza outbreaks from a spatiotemporal perspective. We believe that combining travel data with epidemiological data is the first step to develop a tool to predict future epidemics and better understand the effects that these outbreaks have on societal functions over time. Real-time data-streams provide a powerful, yet underutilised tool when it comes to monitoring and detecting changes to the daily behaviour of inhabitants. Historical datasets from public transport and road traffic serves as an initial indication of whether changes in daily transport patterns corresponds to seasonal influenza data. It is expected that changes in daily transportation habits corresponds to swings in daily and weekly influenza activity and that these differences can be measured through geostatistical analysis. Conceptually one could be able to monitor changes in human behaviour and activity in nearly true time by using indicators derived from outside the clinical health services. This type of more up-to-date and geographically precise information could contribute to earlier detection of influenza outbreaks and serve as background for implementing tailor-made emergency response measures over the course of the outbreaks.

The research reported focuses on the multi-causal landslide risk in Sandnes (Norway) in connection with the climate change, the use of the land and the geological/geotechnical properties of the urban subsoil. The municipality is giving special focus on the potential climate change challenges in the development plans of the city and the weather is a significant triggering factor of landslides. The average annual precipitation is 1290 mm and the Norwegian Environmental Agency (NEA) estimates a 10 % increase by 2100 and a 40 % increase for the short-term rainfall (3 h). In addition, the NEA expects sea level to rise between 59 and 89. The study includes records of land use, demographic growth (+1.5 % annually), historical maps and aerial imagery. Events occurred in the past have been inventoried by interviews and document retrieval. Additionally, geological, geotechnical and hydrogeological data from surveys performed in the area have been gathered. The data material is georeferenced in a GIS database for visualization and further treatment. We give special attention to the quality and density of the data to account for the uncertainty and lack of information for certain subareas within the geographical boundaries. This will provide guidance for future work such as soil sampling campaigns. A multi-layered model has been created combining the different aspects studied: elevation, slope, hydrology, historical information and geological data. We model the urban area theoretically affected by the sea level rise and the potential effects on different soils. Finally, the work includes preliminary landslide hazard and vulnerability maps of the present urban plot.

In fire safety engineering, the concepts of design fire scenarios and design fires are important for several reasons. In the design phases of a construction project the performance of safety measures, and the potential consequences of a fire, must be assessed by exploring design fire scenarios and design fires. Active and passive fire safety measures are dimensioned by exposing the systems to predetermined fire events. A predetermined fire event can also be used to extract fire-related quantities, such as smoke production rates, temperatures, and heat fluxes. Therefore fire events, which form the basis of these analyses, must be established. In this paper we report results from our investigation of current approaches used to determine design fires and their associated input variables. We present a framework to categorize design fires based on various engineering principles, in which fuel properties and environmental factors are emphasized. The framework provides a more consistent methodology than seen elsewhere, taking the perspective of the practicing engineer into account. Furthermore the creation of design fires encompasses considerations of uncertainty and validity.

Snow avalanches crossing roads constitute a major safety challenge to both road users and avalanche rescuers in Norway. In this paper, we reassess the current emergency response situation by using systems safety theory. The rescue system is regulated and operated through instructions and guidelines that are based on critical assumptions. We designed the study to challenge critical assumptions in the organized complex rescue system using experiences from operational experts. In two seminars the experts conducted a systemic safety analysis based on the “Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) approach and the “Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis” (STPA) technique, deriving goals, hazards, requirements, constraints, a safety control structure and unsafe control actions. The gap analysis revealed that both dispatchers and emergency services are commonly not provided with the recommended training and basic avalanche safety equipment. The causal analysis provided common explanations of recurrent unsafe control actions, allowing plausible accident scenarios to be identified. This study supports a recommendation that the safety control structure of the Norwegian avalanche rescue service should be operationalized in accordance with assumptions and requirements. Contrary to critics, the STAMP/STPA systemic safety analysis proved manageable and productive, as it unceasingly directed the analyst’s attention towards organizational challenges at the blunt end.

This paper examines how investigations played a part in ongoing learning processes at a Scandinavian refinery. Data regarding the roles of investigations was collected during six months of observations at the refinery and interviews with 70 employees. We focus on two investigated incidents, the rupture of a blowdown pipe from a steam drum and an incident that could have led to the injury of mooring operators during the mooring of an oil tanker. We found that investigations were used as part of efforts to learn from incidents at the refinery, but by far from all the interviewed employees. Investigations were described as having several roles. They generated new knowledge about the causes of incidents and confirmed existing knowledge regarding the dangers of corrosion for plant integrity and the importance of following mooring procedures. However, they also suggested measures that were not considered economically feasible or well suited for the refinery. In addition, investigations contributed to learning regarding issues that were not addressed directly in suggested measures, because findings were also applicable to other safety issues at the refinery. In light of these roles, we suggest that investigation groups should ensure closer cooperation with investigated units when developing measures, and work to ensure that investigation reports are used systematically as a learning tool among employees. This may increase the integration of investigation findings in important safety improvement initiatives and thereby the potential for learning from incidents.

Risk and vulnerability analyses are a required decision support tool in processes to improve societal safety and crisis preparedness at national, regional and local levels in several European states. Analyses result in risk images, which are the stakeholders’ views of events that must be addressed in planning processes related to topics such as land use and crisis management. Hence, risk and vulnerability analyses are used to support decisions regarding which issue areas to prioritize, as well as to choose between alternatives. In Norway and Sweden, municipal risk and vulnerability analyses are mandated and described in regulations, laws and guidelines. This article examines how the two countries’ regulation regimes address, characterize and facilitate risk-based decision-making. We found that the Swedish regulation regime emphasizes use of risk and vulnerability analyses in decision-making regarding emergency preparedness. In Norway, this is also an important issue, but decision-making with regard to long-term and strategic planning is also emphasized. In both regulation regimes, decision-makers must determine on their own how they should use the analyses as a foundation for decision-making regarding emergency preparedness and societal safety. While the regulation regimes contain method and content prescriptions, they do not specify how criteria regarding desirable levels of preparedness and societal safety should be determined, nor who should be involved in such processes. These are challenges that should be addressed in regulation guidelines and in audits carried out by regional authorities.

Directive 2004/54/EC from the European Parliament states that all EU member states should have well defined methodologies for risk analysis. This means that decisions regarding the design of road tunnels must be supported by risk information. TRANSIT, a Bayesian Network (BN) model for conducting quantitative road tunnel risk assessments has been developed to comply with the requirements. The developers of TRANSIT claim that their model represents best practice for risk assessments of road tunnels. This article explores the foundation for this claim. Furthermore, we assess TRANSIT as a tool for decision support regarding the design of new and novel road tunnel designs. The interactions between TRANSIT and the engineering environment and between risk analysts and responsible decision makers are studied by analyzing the engineering process of the 25 km Rogfast subsea road tunnel project in Norway. Our analysis shows that TRANSIT could be a useful tool in combination with other risk assessment activities. We also find that the model has severe limitations, especially when used for novel tunnel design projects such as Rogfast. First, the model applies a definition of risk that in most cases fails to provide an adequate risk picture, and hence fails to communicate risk to important stakeholders. Second, both data and models are rigid and presented to the users as a “black box”. This poses challenges with regard to the ownership of the analysis results and the responsibility for decisions made on the basis of the model, i.e., the relationship between the developer/owner and the analysts. Third, a standardized model will lead to standardized problems and solutions, which means that the results obtained from TRANSIT will be predictable when some experience with the model is gathered. In this way the model will preserve existing design and not promote innovation with regards to traffic safety designs. Fourth, the model emphasizes key performance indicators such as average annual daily traffic (AADT), tunnel length and curvature, while causes found in accident reports such as driving behavior, latent conditions and organizational and managerial factors may be neglected in the design process.

This article discusses how the concepts of safety level and safety margin have been approached in recognized peer-reviewed journals within the field of fire safety science. The aim is to explore the scientific efforts that have been made to advocate principles for dimensioning fire safety arrangements in buildings. We restrict our discussion to novel buildings in the sense of lack of similar constructions with relevant long term experience. Due to increasing complexity in buildings, infrastructures, technical systems and society in general, we argue that traditional fire safety science based on natural science principles alone is severely limited. We argue that fire safety and safety margins are emergent properties of socio-technical systems that need to be managed rather than verified. The search for objectivity and mechanistic decision criteria is futile and diverts attention from the main purpose of engineering: to guide decisions during the whole design process and thus enable safe operation. An adapted framework for fire safety engineering is proposed, built around traditional fire safety engineering principles, and founded on constructivist systems theory. The focus is observable quantities and how these quantities can be managed during design and operation of a building project. The framework eases the involvement of stakeholders who are required to consider the safety aspects of the building design. The end goal of fire safety design in our framework is the development of a fire safety control structure that must be enforced to keep systems in a safe state, in which safety margins are deemed sufficient.

In this article social and information network theory is used to study information flows through the incident command post in a large-scale emergency operation. The case presented is the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. The data were collected from evaluation reports, media and interviews with the incident, fire, medical and ambulance commanders. The article presents the incident command system in Norway and how this was used as a base for improvisation during the operation on initiative from rescue workers on scene. The main internal information flows in each separate rescue service were connected and coordinated at the incident command point through strong ties between the commanders. Important and novel information also reached the commanders through weak and informal ties to more peripheral actors.

This article presents the results of an analysis of reports from accident investigations, using a specific tool to analyze texts with the aim of demonstrating the premises for learning. Investigation reports are commonly presented as written texts, i.e. one consisting primarily of words and sentences, and occasionally including other elements such as pictures. It is therefore of interest to study the extent to which multimodal texts are able to transform knowledge gained from an investigation into a learning process by relevant organizations and persons. The empirical basis for this study comprises accident investigation reports provided by different actors (operator and authority) in the Norwegian oil and gas industry covering the same events. The main findings are that even though thorough investigation processes are documented in the studied cases, the texts as presented, and possibly also the writing processes, lack central elements necessary for producing texts with optimal learning potential. In particular, the stipulation of clearer goals for follow-up work by different actors, and also more involvement by the relevant actors, should be given attention in future investigations. Up to now the quality of investigation reports as texts has been poorly studied and understood. This article is a contribution to better understanding of investigation reports as texts for learning purposes.

The concept of uncertainty is difficult to comprehend, even when we restrict our focus to safety science. In a world with various scientific philosophical stances, “uncertainty” is debated in various contexts. However, in an effort to go deeper into a more basic understanding of uncertainty our knowledge is quickly challenged. What exists? How do we know what exists? What can we know about it? Aiming these questions at uncertainty reveals that interpreting uncertainty as existing in any ontological sense is difficult to defend. Does this imply that uncertainty can only be understood in an epistemological sense or merely as a construct? Epistemological understandings of uncertainty encompass, in principle, the whole rationality spectrum from relativism to positivism, thus not excluding any form of analyses or understanding of uncertainty. However, we recognize the need for an increased understanding of which elements the uncertainty concept comprises, and possible consequences of an unreflective discarding of elements. Within the framework of a linear time concept consisting of the past, the present and not least the future, we claim that uncertainty’s ontological status exists on various levels. In the present uncertainty is a purely epistemological category, and in the past uncertainty has its meaning related to what has been observed, recognized and comprehended, thus a methodological challenge. In the futuristic perspective uncertainty exists and cannot be reduced.

The concept of validation is an important part of performance-based fire safety engineering. In this context the term validation is often used to describe the accuracy of a model or a calculation used to describe a phenomenon. It is also used to ensure credibility, being applied in statements such as: the model is validated for fires in the open, or, the model is validated for compartment fires. This paper examines the basic concept of validation. It addresses what it means to validate and what the concept of validation implies for performance-based fire safety engineering. The concept of validation has different meanings depending on the discipline and application in which it is used, for instance from an formal, empirical perspective validation may be used to determine the degree to which a model represents the real world, whereas in a functional perspective the concept of validation may be viewed as a way of obtaining credibility and trustworthiness for a model and also to determine the explanatory strength of a model. The field of fire engineering is based on natural science premises, especially in terms of the methods used to calculate the effects of a fire. However, a fire scenario is not only influenced by variables that can be assessed in a strictly physical sense: there are also other elements to consider, such as human and organizational behaviors. The concept of validation adopted in performance-based fire safety engineering should therefore also include wider considerations not directly measurable through experiment.

I prosjektet; «Helhetlig ROS-analyse i norske kommuner» analyserer vi hvordan kommuner utvikler, bruker og oppdaterer ROS-analyser og risikoforestillinger i sitt samfunnssikkerhetsarbeid. Det legges vekt på hvordan kommuner integrerer ROS-arbeidet og risikoforestillinger i eksisterende plan- og arbeidsprosesser. Hvilke utfordringer opplever kommunene i dette arbeidet? Etter å ha jobbet med risiko og sikkerhet i mer enn 20 år, og en vesentlig del av disse opp mot kommuner, er det etter vårt syn et gjennomgående trekk at kommunalt ansatte som jobber med sikkerhet og beredskap har stor skepsis til akademikere på dette feltet. Den teoretiske «verden» er ikke i stand til å kommunisere med den praktiske og vice versa. Denne utfordringen mener vi står sterkt også i dag, og dermed ble det i prosjektet viktig å finne ut hvordan begrepene ble brukt i kommunene. Hvor kritiske er begrepene for omfanget av bruken av analysene? Står vi ved et markant skille nå med innføring av ny veileder for helhetlig ROS-analyse i kommuner? Eller, er arbeidet omkring samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap fastnet i en praksis uten påvirkning fra ROS-analyse? Datamateriale fra 26 kommuner er inkludert i studien. Kommunene dekker alle landsdelene og de har varierte demografiske og geografiske profiler. Blant deltagerne er kommuner med storulykkesindustri, større bykommuner, mindre øykommuner og grensekommuner. Opptil fem personer med ulikt ansvar for samfunnssikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet er intervjuet i hver kommune. En viktig del av prosjektet er forholdet mellom ROS-analyser på ulike forvaltningsnivåer, hvordan ROS-analysene kommuniserer risikoforestillinger og hvordan kommunene kan bygge på og hente innspill fra hverandre i ROS-analysearbeidet. Siden 2010 har Lov om kommunal beredskapsplikt, sivile beskyttelsestiltak og Sivilforsvaret (sivilbeskyttelsesloven) og underliggende Forskrift om kommunal beredskapsplikt stilt krav til kommunenes ROS-analyse og samfunnssikkerhetsarbeid i stort. Likevel er det ikke opplagt hva det innebærer. Forskriften snakker om begreper og konsepter som; - Jobbe systematisk og helhetlig med samfunnssikkerhet; - Forankring i kommunestyret; - Eksisterende og fremtidige risiko- og sårbarhetsfaktorer; - Særlige utfordringer; - Langsiktige mål, strategier, prioriteringer og plan for oppfølging av samfunnssikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet; - Vurdere forhold som bør integreres i planer og prosesser; og - Overordnet beredskapsplan. Det stiller store krav til kommunens ansattes kunnskap og kompetanse til å fortolke hva alle disse konseptene skal bety for kommunen og hvordan ansatte skal jobbe med kravene. Her ligger kjernen av vår studie. Studien vår viser at det legges betydelig med ressurser og arbeid ned i kommuners helhetlige ROS-analyser, samfunnssikkerhets og beredskapsarbeid. Risikoinformert styring og risikotenkning er en krevende filosofi, hvor det forutsettes at de ansatte med ansvar for kommunens systemer og samfunnssikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet har høy kompetanse på området. I kommunene som deltok i studien synes det å være enklere for kommunene å konkretisere hvordan de arbeidet med beredskap enn med samfunnssikkerhet. Kommunene hadde i varierende grad oversikt over hvordan beredskapsarbeidet var satt i system på tvers av etater. Materialet ble analysert ut fra fire forhold: - Begrepsforståelser og bruk av begreper for å uttrykke samfunnssikkerhet - Planlegging og gjennomføring av ROS-analyseprosesser - Presentasjon av resultater fra ROS-analysearbeidet - Implementering av analyseresultatene i kommunens aktiviteter Datamaterialet viser at kommunene og de fleste respondentene våre er i liten grad bekymret over begrepene de bruker. I hovedsak er det risiko, ROS-analyse (eller andre koplinger av ROS), hendelser, akseptkriterier, beredskap, kriseplaner og tiltak som er konseptene i bruk. Usikkerhet var et begrep som fulgte med, men det var i liten grad reflektert over utover at det var en egenskap med hele ROS-analyseprosessene. Samfunnssikkerhet, ytelse av beredskapstiltak, sårbarhet, resiliens, barrierer, system er begreper som får lite eller ingen omtale i kommunenes befatning med samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap. Kommunene er veldige instrumentelle i arbeidet med å utvikle produktene (helhetlig) ROS-analyse og beredskap- og kriseplaner. Beslutningsprosessene som den helhetlige ROS-analysen er en del av, trekkes ikke frem som førende for hvordan ROS-analyser og samfunnssikkerhetsarbeidet gjøres. Fylkesmannen sin rolle som pådriver, rådgiver og tilsynsmyndighet var for de aller fleste kommunene beskrevet med positive fortegn. Alle analysene vi har hatt tilgang til er utført som grovanalyser (hazid-gjennomganger, scenariobeskrivelser, gruppediskusjoner), men med relativt små variasjoner innenfor hvordan risiko måles og uttrykkes. Enkelte kommuner inspireres av innholdet i FylkesROS-analyse eller Nasjonalt Risikobilde, mens andre har et større fokus på lokale forhold og hendelser. I forbindelse med bruk av tiltak fra helhetlig ROS-analyse var det en klar trend at kommunene synes det var vanskelig å sikre implementering av tiltak. Dette skyldes blant annet at det var utfordrende å sikre at den ansvarlige etat tok ansvar for tiltak, at beredskapskoordinatorer ikke anså tiltak som skulle implementeres i enkeltetater som sitt ansvar og at kommunene i mange tilfeller ikke hadde midler til gjennomføring av tiltak. Problemet kan trolig også spores til at helhetlig ROS-analyse ikke var et dokument som var i aktiv bruk i hverdagen til kommunenes ansatte, og som det i de fleste tilfeller ikke ble laget aksjonsplaner for å følge opp. På tiltakssiden var det også tydelig at flere kommuner gjorde det vanskelig for seg selv, ettersom de beskrev svært generelle tiltak i rapportene sine, tiltak som egentlig var på plass i den ansvarlige etat og som var dekket av andre internkontrollrutiner, eller som andre offentlige etater var ansvarlige for. Kommunene i prosjektet hadde i varierende grad koblet beredskapsplanene sine opp mot de helhetlige ROS-analysene. En annen utfordring i forbindelse med «bruk» til beredskapsplanlegging var at kommunene ikke var sikre på hvordan dette skulle tolkes. Skulle man lage øvelser basert på hendelsene som var brukt i helhetlig ROS-analyse, skulle det lages tiltakskort som passet til scenarioene i helhetlig ROS-analyse? Enkelte kommuner hadde inkludert hendelser fra helhetlig ROS-analyse i beredskapsplanverket sitt, mens andre hadde fokusert mer på felles kapasiteter i helhetlig ROS-analyse. Å se sammenhengen mellom helhetlig ROS-analyse og beredskapsplanlegging var et vanskelig tema for kommunene. Beredskapsanalyse og vurdering av «godheten» av beredskapstiltak er også en stor utfordring. Den største utfordringen og det viktigste funnet som har kommet fram gjennom studiet er at prinsippene i risikobasert styring er nærmest fraværende i kommunene. Funksjonelle krav til sikkerhet mangler, en levende diskusjon om samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap mangler, og analysene brukes i svært liten grad. ROS-analyse og intensjoner om risikobasert styring har vært i norske kommuner i mer enn 20 år, og basert på dette mener vi at det er kompetanse og reguleringsregimet det må gjøres noe med, heller enn å innføre nye veiledere og tilsynsaktiviteter. Ansvaret for kommunens samfunnssikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeid må knyttes opp mot spesifikk kompetanse. Det krever at kommunene endrer praksis på i den administrative ledelsen og virksomhetene som eier systemene, tjenestene og aktivitetene, så vel som i kommunikasjonen mellom administrativ og politisk ledelse når det gjelder samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap. Vi mener at politikeren fra bykommune 1 langs kysten i Nord-Norge illustrerer behovet på en betegnende måte: «Veldig få i beredskapsrådet har lest dokumentene. I vårt fylke tror jeg vi er noen av de som har kommet lengst, og det sier etter mitt skjønn sitt». «Vi må involvere oss på et mye tidligere stadium. Skaffe oss oversikt over hva som er beredskapsplanene, og hvor flaskehalsene er. Det tror jeg at jeg deler med veldig mange. Vi strykes med hårene i alt for stor grad. Vi får for mye ros.»

Research on decision-making and expert performance in operational settings generally considers extensive personal experience and deliberate practice to be decisive for development of expertise. Learning and development of decision-making abilities therefore tend to be explained in terms of human cognition. This study examines the dominant learning processes in a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, revealing that personal experience, individual problem-solving, knowledge accumulation, and collective reflection are the key processes in the individual development of decision-making abilities. These findings show that both individual and contextual (including organisational) aspects need to be considered if we are to fully understand the development of decision-making abilities and consequently be better able to explain and analyse decision-making and expert performance in natural settings.

In this article we discuss the concept of risk in an ontological perspective. Risk per se is not a self-explaining concept that ‘exists’ by its own virtue. Our discussion is therefore based on existing methodologies and epistemological claims concerning risk. With these claims as our point of departure, we examine risk in relation to the concept of time, state of affairs (the state of the world) and events and discuss relations and constitutional issues for the risk concept. Drawing on a relation between time and state of affairs, we argue that risk is rooted in the transition from the future to the present. Risk is being constituted by the transition from a myriad of future possibilities into one present reality (one actual contingent world). This implies that risk is not ontologically something of the future, but rather something of the present. However, we argue that risk does not exist in any ontological sense. What actually exist are possible (future) states of affairs and these may or may not be int...

The British sociologist Anthony Giddens has introduced the concept of fateful moments. However, it is not easy to recognise fateful moments in the real world, and lack of time and competence coupled with structural and organisational barriers and unawareness of system complexity make the task difficult. Tools for risk and vulnerability analysis can lend powerful decision-making support and help ensure optimal outcomes. Drawing on the concept of fateful moments and common risk analytic approaches, this article discusses the use of risk-based thinking in two different decision-making settings, neither of which is typical of the current use of risk analyses. Both situations, however, may be interpreted as fateful moments as described by Giddens. First, we deal with demarcated and temporary activities under the responsibility of a local government (municipality), for example, arranging school trips, medical treatment in nursing homes or sports events. These are all activities requiring planning that takes possible adverse effects into consideration. Second, we look into crisis management at the scene of an accident. In crises, the time frame can be extremely short and the choices of action may be potentially fatal for victims or rescuers. An analysis of our two cases leads us to claim that some actors are reluctant to employ proven risk assessment tools in such situations because they see theoretical probability concepts as a major obstacle. The implications are that risk-based decision processes may be undermined and critical reflections omitted in decision making. Furthermore, this reluctance opens the field to ‘risk experts’ and personnel become further distanced from safety considerations. One way forward may be to guide decision makers to accept these tools as practical instruments for establishing a risk image as a basis for decisions in fateful moments.

This article challenges the core assumptions on behavior within the commercial transport sector. It is often taken for granted that actors intend to follow public regulations and that the authorities’ enforcement of criminal liability is a sufficient measure to ensure the expected behavior. Despite limited access to accident data on root causes, we claim that risk in the transport sector has changed significantly over the past ten years. Professional competence increasingly appears to mean competence in the art of bending rules and regulations. The reasons for this perturbing trend need to be investigated. In this article we restrict our analysis to the elucidation of different categories of rule-bending, in the light of possible rationalities for such behaviors. The study does not aim to present evidence of any breaches of law but is rather an attempt to illustrate issues in a sector that is very difficult to regulate, emphasizing the key forces that influence safety-related aspects of the transport sector. For this purpose we need to address the holistic transport chains in the search for multiple attribute preferences in which safety, economy and power play major roles. Finally, we propose the development of much-needed standards of sound professional practice and reasonable conduct.

Safety measures and related costs and benefits have been widely discussed and analysed in academic circles and by the authorities and industrial sectors. The study reported in this paper addresses these aspects from a cognitive based perspective. Risk management is about dealing with the conflict between production and safety. Enterprises which spend too much on safety will meet bankruptcy, and those not concerned with safety measures will meet with severe accidents and related damage. Inspired by James Reason's theoretical framework, managers (n = 106) of commercial transport enterprises were asked about their attitudes towards safety management, what factors have contributed and their belief that further effort and investments in health, environment and safety (HES) measures will pay off. One half of the managers perceive HES work as too expensive and approximately one quarter assess mandatory HES work as compromising their competitiveness. One third of the managers do not find further safety measures than those already implemented necessary or remunerative. They claim that there are no other alternative ways of doing their activities and that there are no technical measures available that could meet outstanding safety challenges. Managers do acknowledge HES work as important for the reputation of the enterprise. The factor analysis gave five HES attitude factors: (I) concerned with formalities, (II) HES work improves health, environment and safety, (III) HES work is ineffective, (IV) HES regulation is appropriate, and (V) HES work can be improved.

The structure of the Norwegian aviation system has undergone several important changes following the international deregulation act of 1994. This paper describes the terms dictated by the political environment and the different administrations for the implementation of the changes. The analysis addresses the inclusion of safety considerations in the specific decisions, and questions whether safety evaluations have had any impact on the change processes. The changes included the restructuring of airlines, new terms of competition, regulatory changes, the separation and relocation of the civil aviation authority, and privatization and efficiency reforms in the new infrastructure company. The paper describes how aviation safety and the risk of aviation accidents were not issues that featured prominently during the early change management processes. These aspects were considered when the parties realized that changes were imminent and conflicts began to emerge. The different parties involved used the safety concept in various ways to legitimize or counteract changes. The paper concludes that risk is a complex concept that is difficult to communicate in a rational political decision process, but the emotive element in the risk concept opens for political speculations that facilitate discussion of ethical responsibilities.

This article presents findings from a study designed to analyze the selection process and formalized training of incident commanders for fire fighting services in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. On the basis of a survey covering all fire services in the three countries and participant observations of commander education from a fire academy in each of the three countries, similarities and differences have been explored. Our main finding is that the similarities between the three countries are greater than the differences. As a general rule, individuals have many years of experience from the fire department through rising from fire fighter through all the ranks until their appointment as incident commander. There are two distinct career paths to the incident commander position. The first path is very practically oriented and the required reading is undemanding. The other path is more academic, for personnel holding a bachelor’s degree in fire engineering. In Sweden, engineers follow a comprehensive commander education, which Norway and Denmark could possibly benefit from. In addition, Sweden provides incident commanders with thorough technical/professional knowledge. Response coordination is given major emphasis in the education at highest level, but transfer of command is not a prioritized topic.

Rescue operations have been organized in accordance with strict hierarchical management structures for decades. There seem to be minor differences between emergency response units within and betwee...