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Demoralising ethical theory involves eschewing the deontic categories of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility from our ethical thought. In this paper, I evaluate the case made in Alastair Norcross's recent book, Morality By Degrees (2020), for a consequentialist version of such demoralisation. Norcross defends scalar consequentialism, a radical variant of consequentialism which restricts fundamental normative verdicts to a scalar ranking of available actions, ordered according to the goodness of the consequences they produce. Following an introductory Sect. 1, I assess the positive case for scalar consequentialism in Sect. 2, concluding that no strong case has been made for the view. In Sect. 3, I assess the case against the view, concluding that while scalar consequentialism may be able to avoid the action-guidingness objection, it falls foul of the force objection. In Sect. 4, I expand on this critique, showing that Norcross gives an unstable account of how to assess attitudes, such as desires, beliefs and emotions. In Sect. 5, I argue that appeal to a contextualist reductionism does little to make the scalar view appealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Interest in and debates around meaningful movement and embodiment in physical education (EPE) have grown over the last ten years. The quality of these discussions centre on a degree of conceptual clarity for talking pedagogically about embodiment, and consideration of ways of applying it in practice in meaningful ways. The aim of this study is to systematically analyse the theoretical concept of embodiment presented within physical education (PE) literature, in order to support a conceptual clarity upon which to build well-grounded pedagogical insights and practices for school-teachers and their students, as well as PE teacher educators. Method: A narrative literature review methodology was used to identify twenty-three (23) papers from peer-reviewed literature between 2010 and 2021 that had some focus on embodiment. These were analysed using [Rodgers, B. L. 2000. "Concept Analysis: An Evolutionary View." In Concept Development in Nursing: Foundations, Techniques, and Applications, edited by B. K. Rodgers and K. A. Knafl, 77–102. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.] theoretical evolutionary concept analysis method to systematically identify characteristics associated with the concept in published literature. Evolutionary concept analysis typically involves a six-phase process of usage over time. Data analysis involved the systematic extraction and analysis of the literature for surrogate terms, related concepts, attributes, antecedents, consequences, and references to the concept. Results: Despite conceptual variances across the articles analysed, a set of common attributes that included intentionality, affect, meaning, sharing, and unity were identified. The review identified potential consequences of EPE including deeply transformative and meaningful change in the learner, the context, and the teacher. Events, situations or phenomena that precede EPE are broadly linked to the teacher, the learner, and the context. Conclusions: The concept of embodiment as it pertains to its theoretical/philosophical deployment in PE, is both complex and varied, limiting its potential to inform the pedagogical practices of teachers and therefore realise the consequences espoused. To temper this disconnect the paper provides accessible, yet provisional guidance for teachers via clusters of familiar characteristics with accompanying descriptions of what the literature suggests as important for embodied approaches. Together the tables and analysis encourage and enable educators and researchers to believe in, commit to, and to operationalise embodiment as practice in their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L. J. Henderson was a central figure in Harvard discussions of the nature of science in the interwar period and served as a bridge between the sciences and the social sciences. Two key ideas were promoted by Henderson: systems and conceptual schemes, both of which spread quickly at Harvard and then beyond. In this article the focus will be on conceptual schemes , a term which had a distinctive origin in Henderson that accounts for some of the ambiguities in its adaptations. Henderson spoke as a scientist speaking to philosophers rather than doing philosophy and sharply distinguished his aims from those that followed from Immanuel Kant. Henderson's model was the scheme of ancient Greek medicine, which had persisted for millennia and was replaced by modern medicine. This was differentiated from earlier neo-Kantian and later Kuhnian variations. Henderson's account was distinctive in placing the origins of conceptual schemes in intuitions about patterns formed in practice by people operating on concrete phenomena. The resulting schemes, he thought, had to be accepted on faith by students, but were, as he put it, walking sticks to enable communication and understanding rather than exclusive dogmas. Henderson was an enthusiast for Vilfredo Pareto, who was vilified at Harvard during the war by Carl J. Friedrich, which led not to the disuse of his ideas but to the erasure of their origins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mixed methods research (MMR) is suitable for studying research problems that cannot be adequately investigated through qualitative and quantitative methods alone. Nevertheless, the MMR literature offers a very limited discussion about "research problems." To address this gap, this paper uses Elliott's conceptual framework to offer guidance on how to identify and formulate research problems in MMR and understand their nature. This article contributes to the field of MMR by reframing the concept of research problems in this type of research and offering a conceptual and methodological approach to describing and characterizing research problems for investigation in social and cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integration is a hallmark of mixed methods research and is constantly evolving. Joint displays have emerged as an effective method of integration at the analysis and interpretation level, facilitating visual comparison of quantitative and qualitative findings to present inferences greater than the quantitative and qualitative findings alone. Although literature reviews and concept analyses frequently precede mixed methods investigations, these are not commonly included in the integration process. To advance mixed methods research, we present a novel method of integrating data sources including rigorous literature reviews using joint display, that builds on the concept of creating a sum that is greater than quantitative and qualitative findings alone, with examples from two research studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A long time ago, architecture and interior design were most concerned with taking nature into consideration, while nowadays the architect and interior designer constructs buildings without having a specific goal that reduces the value of buildings. Architecture and interior design cannot be separated from nature, as many designers use the concepts of Inspired by nature objects, but with some parts missing in one of their forms, functions, structure, or behavior, so the best solution to increase improvement in interior design work is to draw inspiration from nature with a deeper perspective and try to apply it in designs, and try to understand nature in form and construction, as nature is always What affects human perception, and this research deals with the importance of studying interior design and architecture that mimics nature and living organisms as one of the directions of the structural intellectual development of architecture. In the user, the goal is to understand the relationship between nature and human perception and the role that biomicry plays in designs to achieve buildings that are compatible with the surrounding environment. Guidelines for designing an environmental structure integrated with nature and achieving full integration between exterior and interior design, furniture and the surrounding nature using the biomicry concept.

This article aims to provide a minimal interpretation of the theme of aesthetic justification of life in Birth of Tragedy without relying on any substantial metaphysical claim about reality, presenting it rather as a practical and naturalistic response that is valuable and feasible regardless of one's acceptance of Nietzsche's metaphysical position, if he has any. According to this interpretation, the aesthetic justification of the Apolline and the Dionysiac metaphysical solace are originally instinctual remedies nature provides to address our naturally aroused metaphysical need. The Apolline seeks to cultivate acceptance of suffering, liberating individuals from the burden of attempting to alter their human condition fundamentally. The Dionysiac treatment turns to metaphysical solace in the face of death, seeking to make the human encounter with death bearable by fostering a sense of unity with a higher whole or community and reconnecting individuals with nature and their animality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the complex relationship between agents and their actions, identifying what is referred to as the 'agent-action problem' in action theory. Topics discussed include the philosophical challenges of defining the agent's relation to their actions, the implications of Bradley's Regress in this context, and potential solutions inspired by the insights gained from understanding both issues.

Comparative philosophy is an important and growing field. Increasingly, philosophy instructors are looking to offer philosophy courses that span more than just one regional culture. Developing a syllabus for a course in comparative philosophy for the first time can be a daunting challenge. Among the many questions one has to ask is how much class time should be spent characterizing the cultural differences between the two philosophical traditions before examining the philosophical traditions themselves and what sort of materials should be covered from each tradition. Perhaps surprisingly, my answer to the first question is little to none. Characterizing cultures brings with it a danger of essentializing that should be avoided in the classroom. As to the sorts of materials to be covered, it is best to look at whole works from individual philosophers, rather than try to compare whole traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tension between the pedagogical aim of comparative and cross-cultural inclusion and teaching an introductory-level deductive logic course. On the one hand, those who are interested in including non-"Western" sources are doing so in order to expand the philosophical content under consideration in their courses. On the other, it seems that the student learning objectives for deductive logic classes aimed at novices are narrow and specific for the purpose of developing a particular skill. This paper highlights the challenge of teaching logic cross-culturally by arguing that it is inadvisable to do so. Using Jain logic as a case study, it illustrates that even though there is depth available in the content, the contextual support needed to compare logics without being reductive would interfere with the amount of time needed to develop deductive logic skills in students in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay distinguishes between diversity in the content we teach and diversity in the methodologies we use to practice our discipline and transmit it to students. Of all philosophical methods, dialogue is core to our disciplinary identity. However, dialogues rarely stand on their own; they are vehicles for larger philosophical projects. As Pierre Hadot argues, dialogues for early Greeks constituted "spiritual exercises" guiding practitioners toward metaphysical realities beyond ordinary perception. Dialogues in Buddhism, Jainism, and Confucianism convey similar spiritual dimensions. To incorporate these dimensions into the classroom presents a choice: We can take the content of the dialogue and reconstruct it in a deductive argument, i.e., using it as fodder for teaching critical thinking as we normally teach it. This would diversify content without thereby altering disciplinary methods. Or, we can develop pedagogical tools for the dialogical form that consider historical and cultural context as well as contemporary spiritual relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the British Armed Forces, military education is almost exclusively for the officer class. Below the rank of officer, within the 'other ranks', emphasis is typically placed on physical ability. Yet, it is knowledge, acumen and skill that now prove to be the determining factors in combat performance. Conceptual understanding and tactical success are correlated. This underscores the need to fuse the physical component with the conceptual. James White provides an analysis of tactical understanding at the point at which combat takes place–in the sections and platoons responsible for the conduct of fighting–detailing how an academic approach can be used to achieve tactical excellence.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite ongoing development of the international understanding of the values and goals of inclusive education, attempts to implement it remain incomplete. This study's aim was to clarify how participation and agency are defined in research on inclusive education and how participation and agency might be more effectively promoted to enhance inclusive education. The research was conducted as a conceptual analysis with the concepts of student participation and agency as the main focus of the analysis. The conceptual analysis process surfaced five emergent themes: recognition of societal barriers at school; appreciation of student diversity and cultural competence; community and collaboration with various stakeholders; promoting students' engagement; and enabling learning for all students. These themes include academic, social, and emotional and collective dimensions. Inclusive education appears as an institution whose everyday modes of interaction, pedagogical solutions and power dynamics can be difficult to recognise, let alone change towards a participative direction. Promoting student participation and agency requires professionals in schools to have the ability to primarily renew their own agency so that they can enable students to foster future orientation and active adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at examining Virginia Hamilton's survival writing in the novel M.C. Higgins, the Great through the analogical lens with the traditional Chinese philosophy of "shengsheng (生生)". Current research on Hamilton's survival writing has ignored the cosmological aspect. In fact, what the novel reveals is not limited to the aspects of social and emotional survival, but also the ecological or cosmical co-existence. Considering Hamilton's global awareness and some similarities between African and Chinese traditions, this article resorts to the cross-cultural reference of the Chinese "shengsheng" philosophy. The concept originating from Xici (《系辞》), the commentaries on Zhouyi (《周易》), is well known for its wisdom on how all things in the universe can be born and how they can coexist, and thus it can be drawn upon for exploring Hamilton's survival writing. Specifically, this article takes a comprehensive analogical examination and discussion of the four aspects, namely, shengsheng virtue (生生之德), shengsheng affect (生生之情), shengsheng disposition (生生之性), and shengsheng fate (生生之命). This is to supplement the covering of Hamilton's survival writing and to enlarge the interpretation of Hamilton's works with philosophical and cosmopolitan visions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many critics of morality seem nonetheless committed to a normative stance of some kind. This paper uses the context of Nietzsche studies as a laboratory to experiment with a solution to this problem. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of normativity and his promulgation of normative judgments can be made consistent if we understand Nietzsche as pursuing the criterion of the size of future history. First (§1) I present the problem of normativity as it appears in Nietzsche's work and the literature. Then (§2), I introduce the criterion of the size of future history and show that it addresses the requirements established in §1. I then address some objections to this criterion (§3). Finally, I suggest some applications of this criterion to specific areas of Nietzsche's discourse and to some of our broader normative intuitions (§4). I conclude that the criterion of the size of future history, if well understood, can provide a solution to the problem of normative inescapability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that there is a simple derivation of triviality with very few assumptions involving the formula that the negated conditional entails the antecedent of the conditional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the potential redundancy of the third noble truth in Buddhism through the lens of interventionist causation. Topics discussed include the relationship between craving and suffering, the dialectical structure of the four noble truths, and various responses to the claim that the third noble truth is superfluous.

What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities' joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on evolving scholarly perspectives on the Carnap–Quine debate, particularly regarding the analytic-synthetic distinction's role in philosophy. Topics include reassessment of Quine's critique, the Kantian and Neo-Kantian influences on Carnap's philosophy; and the fundamental incommensurability of their philosophical positions.

The relevance of this study was conditioned by the reduced level of effectiveness of one of the key social institutions due to the presence of problematic aspects and conflicts of legislation. In this regard, the purpose of this study was to analyse the problematic aspects of the current adoption procedure under the current legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The study employed several methods of scientific cognition, namely logical analysis, formallegal, functional analysis, dogmatic, legal hermeneutics, and others. A study of statistical data on the total number of registered orphans revealed that the current figures are still quite high; however, the number of children raised in orphanages is declining. This study investigated the legislative acts that thoroughly regulate the procedure and order of adoption, namely the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Civil Procedural Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It was noted that a significant role in adoption cases is given to the decisions of the plenums of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which serve as a guide for the courts in considering and resolving civil cases and are applicable to different proceedings. It was also found that the national legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan does not make provision for such a procedure as pre-adoption, compared to the foreign practices of some countries. No less important is the analysis of the adoption procedure for found and abandoned children by foreign nationals. The practical value of the obtained results lies in providing a detailed characterisation of the mentioned process and offering some recommendations for its improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the education policy currently implemented in Poland through the lens of understanding, characteristics, and functions of public policy. The analysis is framed within a metatheoretical perspective, referencing the concept of long duration. To illustrate the practice of education policy as a form of public policy, determinations have been made regarding the nature of public policy, its theoretical foundations, aims, and practical priorities. The conclusion highlights selected examples of actions and phenomena that illustrate how education policy deviates from public policy principles, along with research examples that provide theoretical foundations for the desired changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Philip Kitcher's critique of contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that it has lost its relevance and needs reform. Topics include Kitcher's view that philosophy should focus on moral progress rather than traditional metaphysical and epistemological concerns, his criticism of outdated approaches like conceptual analysis, and his advocacy for deeper engagement with the philosophy of science and societal issues.

The trouble with Likelihood of Success is that it appears to be little more than a rehash of what seems obvious: do not go to war if you do not have much of a chance to win. Is this a distinctive or helpful contribution to contemporary just war thinking? I argue in this essay that while it might be better to simply jettison the term, some considerations of success are not just prudential in that narrow sense of the term. How we think of "success" and the likelihood of achieving it matters significantly to how we think about other elements of jus ad bellum. Success is not just about winning. It is about winning in the right way for the right end. Still, I suggest that it is not clear what "Likelihood of Success" does for those in political authority already inclined to think about war in any sort of rational and even moral way. I suggest we consider discarding Likelihood of Success and instead consider what I am calling "Likely Consequences." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Averroes or Ibn Rushd (520/1126-595/1198), the great Western Islamic thinker, contemplated the relationship between philosophy and religion seriously and created some important works such as Fasl al-maqal fīmā bayn al-ḥikma wa-l-sharīʿa min ittiṣāl (The decisive treatise, determining the nature of the connection between religion and philosophy), al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adillah fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla (Discovery of the methods of proof concerning religious doctrines), and Tahāfut al-tahāfut (The incoherence of the incoherence). Ibn Rushd believed that there is no contradiction between religion and philosophy, and they bear no opposition to each other. He argues that since Sharia (religious law) is true and encourages people to engage in rational reasoning which leads to knowledge of the Truth, then both are the truth; hence, truth does not oppose truth. On the contrary, these two agree and recognize each other. However, this statement that philosophy does not contradict religion is related to the innermost layer of religion and Quranic verses because philosophy or rational contemplation sometimes go against the exoteric meaning of religious ideas and scripture phrases. Achieving the esoteric meaning of the verses through inner interpretation or ta'wīl is Averroes's solution to eliminate this confliction. Unlike some other Islamic philosophers, Ibn Rushd does not accept the unity of religion and philosophy but simply thinks of their consistency with each other and the lack of opposition between them. That is why philosophy and religion are forced to be independent and separated from each other for their own safety. Therefore, we should not confuse the issues related to each of them. This current paper addresses the problem of the coordination between philosophy and religion from Ibn Rushd's point of view in general, and his theory on interpretation, in particular. I will demonstrate that one of the main goals of Averroes in raising the esoteric interpretation in the discussion of the harmony between religion and philosophy is to defend philosophy and to grant the "people of reasoning" (philosophers) the right to interpret the Quran esoterically. In this paper, we attempt to show that Averroes's theory has many insights to offer. Ultimately, we will review and criticize this theory from the perspectives of Khwaja Nasir Tusi and Mulla Sadra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to propose an alternative analytical framework for examining the currently observable ineffectiveness of the international refugee protection regime. The described framework places the principle of temporary refuge and its inherent ambiguities at the centre of the analysis. To that effect, the scope and content of the principle of temporary refuge is considered with the particular focus on the presumable obligations of third states (i.e. states other than the recipient state) stemming from the principle. The analysis then turns to consideration of some of the examples of contemporary practice of temporary refuge in an attempt at framing it as one of the sources of a poor state of functioning of the international refugee regime. The paper also links the identified phenomenon to the concept of protection gaps as it was already outlined in the literature in order to clearly demonstrate the relationship between the content and contemporary practice of temporary refuge and inadequacies of the international refugee regime visible at the global level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to perdurantist accounts of persistence, transtemporal aggregates of stages, 'worms', are 'the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on...on the stage view...it is instantaneous stages rather than worms that play this role'. I argue the stage theory should be preferred as an account of personal persistence. I consider the way in which four‐dimensionalist accounts of personal persistence are organized and the conditions which, arguably, any plausible account of personal persistence should satisfy. I sketch a semantics for the stage theory which yields a stage‐theoretical account of personal persistence that satisfies these conditions. I argue that standard purdurantist accounts do not. I conclude that standard purdurantist accounts fail because, while persons view themselves and their worlds from the time‐bound first‐person perspective of stages, purdurantist accounts privilege the atemporal view of persons as four‐dimensional aggregates of stages or 'worms'. Perdurantist accounts produce counterintuitive results in fission cases because there is a discrepancy between a person's time‐bound first‐person perspective and the purdurantist view from nowhen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dissemination and reception of Bernard Bolzano's ideas were not only mediated by his personal circumstances and context but also by the vicissitudes of his work. This paper traces the fate of his works from his death in 1848 to the publication of the first volume of his Gesamtausgabe in 1969, and it does so with the help of one of the last published volumes of this edition, namely the Bolzano‐Gesamtbibliographie 1804–1999. As the paper shows, this book is more than a mere list of publications and constitutes a highly valuable resource for anyone interested in Bolzano studies, the use of which is explained in detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using historical rather than philosophical means, this essay responds to a philosophical discussion of the problem of evil. Instead of constructing arguments in support of a general, theoretical position, the author examines a single, paradoxical image from the vision of a medieval anchoress and suggests that those concerned with the problem of evil, including philosophers, should take it seriously. In order to explain or contextualize why, despite the existence of evil, "all will be well... and all manner of thing will be well," Julian of Norwich narrates how, in her vision, God placed in her hand "something small, no bigger than a hazelnut," which is both contingent and eternal, all and nothing — opposites coexisting. This essay analyzes how Julian's image of the hazelnut as paradoxical is a simultaneity of opposites and argues that paradox, enacted and experienced in ritual, offers a way to assert and live with opposites such as good and evil, life and death, simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author presents a basic overview of a range of philosophical approaches to the notion of war from the early ancient Greek traditions relating to war, to the conservative tradition. The desktop research methodology employed combines a review of existing literature with a focus on analysis, synthesis, and ethical considerations. By utilizing a diverse range of sources and analytical techniques, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of a ‘just and ethical war’ and provides insights for further research. A range of philosophical ideas through the ages are briefly discussed followed by discussion on the Just War Theory. The role of abolitionists per se is not discussed since this work is then traversing St. Augustine’s philosophy and ethical stance apropos the waging of war which exemplifies the justice and peace aspect in restoring order out of chaos. He calls for an ethos of humanness to prevail when conducting war based on the intention to preserve harmonious co-existence between peoples. Augustine argues that waging any war should be avoided where this is possible, however, a just war allows for the acquisition of virtue which then hopefully leads to justice. The morality of waging war is severely compromised once narcissistic vested immoral interests are the primary motivators for belligerence and no genuine peaceful resolution to conflict has been seriously sought as is seemingly the case in the current Gaza war and its prevailing atrocities. Predictably various philosophers have investigated the subject of ‘just war’ and over time have determined the criteria of jus ad bellum (justice toward war), jus in bello (justice in war), and also jus post bellum (justice after war). It is clear that it is imperative to operate off a strong ethical basis when opting for a state of war to exist and to strongly consider preserving the safety and security of non-belligerents at all costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online dating is an inevitable phenomenon in this digital age. The close interaction of digital natives with the internet makes them seem to entrust all activities in their lives to the internet, including dating and finding a mate. This makes them more likely to use online dating applications. This thesis investigates the drivers of the use of online dating applications by the digital natives, their opinions about online dating application and how the use of such application is different or the same between Indonesians and Americans. Data collection techniques are using questionnaire and interview. The secondary data in this study were obtained from other sources such as research results presented on the official website. This research found that there are many factors that influence digital natives in using online dating applications. This study reveals an array of eastern philosophical ideas, such as the predominance of female gendered application users in Indonesia, which implies that the gender line has become more ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a dominant assumption the truth of instrumental thoughts—thoughts in which one action is identified as a means to another—are not affected by agents' normative conceptions of their ends. Agents could in principle grasp these thoughts, and thereby the correct means to their ends, without consulting any conception they may have as to the pursuit-worthiness of those ends. I argue this assumption (the 'Theoretical Conception') prevents us from explaining how agents can identify means to their ends. I sketch an alternative account according to which the contents of instrumental thoughts are directly determined by agent's reasons for acting. This is explained by the fact that an agent's reasons for action reveal what they take the good of their ends to be. Ultimately, I argue, agents must have a conception of their final ends as intrinsically good if they are to successfully specify means to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of "personhood" and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to veridicalism , your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes' demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don't know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between 'veridical' and 'hallucinatory' will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An experiment in what Elizabeth Bowen calls "creative criticism," this co-written fictional dialogue explores the figure of the heart in Bowen's work. Special attention is given to The Death of the Heart and to the short story "A Queer Heart," both first published in 1938. Drawing on correspondences with the fiction of Sheridan Le Fanu and E.M. Forster, the poetry of W.B. Yeats, and the philosophical thinking of Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Nancy, we dramatize an understanding of the value and importance of Bowen's work in embodying a new and singular modernist conception of the heart as other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Biblica & Patristica Thoruniensia is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bulletin of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Philology Series is the property of L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature is that resultant luck vitiates meaning; that if the relevant state-of-affairs is primarily the result of luck, chance, or happenstance, rather than the person's actions, then no meaning is conferred. Call this the anti-luck constraint. In this article it is argued that we should reject the anti-luck constraint. Two types of cases, often cited as examples in favour of the anti-luck constraint, are examined: the lucky idiot and the incompetent villain. Such lives, it is contended, can be meaningful even when the relevant states-of-affairs are primarily the product of resultant luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an editorial focuses on the diverse interplay between ethical theory and moral practice, highlighting the journal's commitment to exploring both abstract philosophical inquiries and their practical implications. Topics include the moral rights related to climate adaptation, the ethical considerations of retirementas free time rather than leisure, and the implications of prison violence as state-mediated punishment.

This article deals with the question of the rational plausibility of belief in the resurrection of the body. It points out that the idea of a continued existence of the soul after death at first sight seems reasonable, but since the body disintegrates into its physical components, it is difficult to accept the resurrection of the finite body. It outlines the concepts of the soul developed by Plato and Aristotle, and discusses contemporary approaches. Finally it shows that the anthropological basis for belief in the resurrection is that the perfection of the contributions and failings of each person do not come to light completely in their earthly existence but involves a dimension that goes beyond the finiteness of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski's account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain. Does this require that P would have obtained if E had not occurred? Pitcovski's theory faces problems no matter how one answers that question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is an honor to receive such careful and attentive criticism. In this response, I attempt to put the criticisms of the reasons latesters into the context of my argumentative aims in the book and to point toward how they might be answered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an overview of the main themes and theses of Reasons First for a book symposium, and intended to be read alongside the other contributions to that symposium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation constraint, according to which for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ for the reason that p. However, the argument goes, it is not possible to act (or not to act) for a reason for a reason. Therefore, he concludes, there are no second-order reasons. In this paper, I shall argue that Whiting's argument ought to be rejected. Thus, I will argue that we should not accept the motivation constraint on which it is based. It is true that for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ guided in the right way by the consideration that p favours you ϕing. However, I shall argue that it is possible for exclusionary reasons to guide us in the right way, even if it not possible for us to not to ϕ for a reason for a reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joseph Raz accepts the 'normative/explanatory nexus' which states, roughly, that 'necessarily normative reasons can explain the actions, beliefs, and the like of rational agents' (From Normativity to Responsibility, 34). I agree with this rough statement, but I disagree with Raz on the details of the nexus. I further argue that, once we see the correct version of the nexus and the reasons why it is true, we must accept an account of the nature of normative reasons that goes against another central commitment of Raz's. Specifically, we must reject Raz's view that ultimately, normative reasons for action are provided by the value of the relevant action. Instead, what it is to be a normative reason is to be a premise in good reasoning, of a certain sort. Actions supported by normative reasons may be valuable in some way, but it is not ultimately because of their value that we have normative reasons to perform them. I also briefly gesture at why the resulting type of 'good reasoning' view of normative reasons offers a more unified and explanatorily satisfying view of normative reasons for action, belief, and other responses than Raz's view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an original argument for a Humean thesis about promising that generalises to the domain of normative powers. The Humean 'natural unintelligibility' thesis – prominently endorsed by Rawls, Hart, and Anscombe, and roundly rejected or forgotten by contemporary writers (conventionalists and non – conventionalists alike) – holds that a rational, suitably informed agent cannot so much as make a promise (much less a morally-binding promise) without exploiting conventional norms that confer promissory significance on act types (e.g., signing on the dotted line) that would not otherwise have such significance. The argument (like Hume's) is action-theoretic in character; its central premise is the Contribution Condition on acting with an aim: roughly, that doing X in order to (bring about) Y requires that the agent believe that their having X-ed on the occasion might come to fully or partly account for Y's coming to pass. The argument generalises to the broader domain of exercises of normative powers, i.e., to acts that modify normative properties by 'fiat' or 'stipulation'. This stipulative act has been characterised in three different ways, each of which is given due consideration. Finally, two different ways of accommodating the 'natural unintelligibility' thesis are considered, as is the thesis's normative significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]