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Copyright of Studies in Politics & Society / Polityka & Społeczeństwo is the property of University of Rzeszow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the gender dimension of ideology and representation by analysing the political parties that ran in the 2019 Polish parliamentary elections, using a novel analytical framework based on gender claims and gender-related policy pledges. This article demonstrates that a left and liberal ideology largely determines feminist and pro-LGBTQ+ promissory representation. However, the gender ideologies of right-wing political parties vary in their traditional types and can include a populist element. This article contributes to comparative gender and politics scholarship by examining gender ideologies in the Central and Eastern European context, where on the one hand, populism and anti-gender campaigns have taken hold, and, on the other, feminist and progressive movements have challenged traditionalism and illiberalism. This article also differentiates a scholarly meaning of gender ideology from its populist meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprovoked Russian invasion on Ukraine on 24th February 2022 awakened in Poland a tremendous amount of solidarity with the Ukrainian people, including that of food solidarity. Food aid organised by the Polish government was preceded by initiatives of private citizens and NGOs to supply Ukrainian refugees - those gathered at the border and entering Poland - with ready-to-eat food, with more spontaneous food aid continuing after they arrived. It was only somewhat later that these grassroots efforts became coordinated by local governments and state bodies. Direct help was accompanied by two other, bottom-up initiatives, the first of which being attempts to boycott Russian food products, as well as companies and retail chains which continued doing business in Russia post-invasion, and the second being a symbolic renaming of some food products and dishes that indicated Russian origins or influences. This work aims to analyse food aid organised for Ukrainian refugees and people remaining in Ukraine as conducted by various entities in Poland. It stresses the significance of the activism of private citizens and small groups while also presenting the social and cultural implications of the symbolic de-russification of popular foods and dishes in Poland. While discussing Polish food solidarity with Ukrainians, it is important to consider that, one year after Putin's invasion, about 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees (of which over 87% are women and children) might be staying in Poland long-term (Sieradzka, 2023; Zharova, 2023). The initial impetus for solidarity is, however, wearing off; the new context also includes so-called "solidarity lanes" established by the European Union to transit agricultural products, which have unintentionally put Polish farmers in a difficult position. As food solidarity with Ukraine might be subsiding in Poland, its popularity throughout most of 2022 contributed to a better understanding of relief work in the work zones and augmented the integration of Ukrainian refugees within Polish society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political situation in Poland in October 1956, focusing on the divisions within the United Polish Workers' Party (VPAP) and the power struggle between different factions. It mentions "left" wing, led by Party Secretary Ochab, advocated for liberalization, while the "right" wing, known as the Natolin group, favored a tougher domestic policy and faced criticism for their close alliance with the Soviet Union.

The article discusses rumors of unrest in Poznań and the official statement released by the Polish radio confirming the disturbances. It mentios the statement attributes the unrest to imperialist agents and a reactionary underground movement aiming to incite uprisings against the government, and emphasizes the need for vigilance against anti-government uprisings and highlights the government's focus on addressing people's needs and promoting democratization.

Copyright of Studia Polonijne is the property of Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawla II and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyses a popular survey on national identity in Poland. However, the analysis of the survey is a pretext to remind one of the limitations of crude quantitative methods and to look at the Polish national identity itself. The article shows that the survey questions are far from unambiguous, and respondents might attribute different meanings to them. The survey does not "measure" national identity existing in the world, rather it serves to maintain the hegemonic concept of Polishness. It diminishes the significance of Catholicism and the perceived biological dimension of Polishness. It ignores public sentiment linking Whiteness and Polishness, contributing to maintaining the dominant image of Polishness as free of racism. Under the guise of objective research, the survey is one of the elements sustaining the image of a relatively open and inclusive Polishness. Referring to my own qualitative research and recent literature on the topic, I argue that Polish identity must be seen in terms of selective racism without racism—that is, it is an identity based on racial premises but which at the same time neglects its racial character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the context of the first parliamentary elections in independent Poland in January 1919, focusing on the National Democratic Party's (ND) election campaign addressed to Polish women and how anti-Jewish slogans were used to mobilize the participation of the female electorate. Before the First World War, ND, led by Roman Dmowski, was the most fervent opponent of women's enfranchisement (Gawin 2015); yet, after the introduction of suffrage, and one month before the elections, the party created the National Women's Organization (NOK), affiliated with ND, tasked with running an election campaign aimed at ethnically Polish women. The article demonstrates that ND instrumentalized female voters and their newly obtained right to win the elections and gain advantage over its largest rival, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna). It argues that members of NOK, who used antisemitic, ultra-nationalistic, and Catholic propaganda in the election campaign, became one of the major advocates of the party's ethno-nationalist vision of Poland; consequently, they significantly contributed to the worsening of Polish-Jewish relations in the interwar period. The article also looks at the critique of the extreme nationalism and antisemitism within ND and NOK by individual female activists and groups not affiliated with Dmowski's party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Germany, Poland and former Czechoslovakia, inevitably has led to strong diplomatic tensions, sedated by the initiatives first hired in 2010 by the Presidents of the Italian, Slovenian and Croatian Republics. It mentions about the possibility of going beyond the focus on sinkholes and exodus.

The main aim of this article is to investigate the reception of Owen's ideas in the nineteenth-century Polish context. I argue that Owen's ideas did not attract as much attention as those of, amongst others, Charles Fourier, Félicité de Lamennais, or – in the second half of the century – Karl Marx. Despite being overshadowed by other Romantic socialists, Owen's reception in Poland can be described as having been marked by three phases. Though we can determine the general direction of this reception, we can only demarcate the rough time frames of it. The first phase may be traced from 1830 until around 1860. It was marked by Polish radicals' rejection of Owen's ideas. The phase, which may be dated from roughly 1848, saw the reception of and critical engagement with Owen's ideas by Polish conservatives. Ironically, conservatives represented the first political current in the Polish context, which made a real effort to analyse and engage with his ideas seriously. Finally, the third phase of reception was constituted by Marxist and modern socialists, who, in seeing themselves at the end of an historical teleology, read Owen, and other early socialists, as their ideological forefathers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces changes in Polish administrative approaches toward indigenous Upper Silesians in the 1960s and 1970s. By commissioning reports from voivodeship leaders in 1967, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognized that native Silesians held reservations toward Poland and, moreover, that postwar "Polonization" efforts may have backfired. These officials further understood the need to act quickly against "disintegration" trends. Although administrators in Katowice and Opole noted that relatively few Silesians engaged in clearly anti-Polish activities, these leaders still believed that West German influence threatened their authority in Silesia. Increasing West German involvement in the area, particularly through care packages and tourism, seemed to support this conclusion. In response to fears of West German infiltration and the rise in emigration applications, local authorities sought to bolster a distinctly Silesian identity. Opole officials in particular argued that strengthening a regional identity, rather than a Polish one, could combat the "tendency toward disintegration" in Silesia. This policy shift underscored an even greater change in attitude toward the borderland population: instead of treating native Silesians as an innate threat to Polish sovereignty, as had been the case immediately after the war, the administration now viewed them as essential for maintaining authority in western Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to discuss the political activity of Polish women and the way it developed after the granting of suffrage in 1918. During the period of the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939) this was an elitist affair, involving only a mall number of women, mainly from backgrounds in the inelligentsia. After 1945 the political activity of women in Communist Poland had different characteristics. The League of Women was not an independent organisation, its activity was controlled and dictated by the Communist authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical movements of the Polish far-right consist, as elsewhere, mainly of young men. The strict gender binarism, the exaltation of men's power, homosociality, brotherhood, physical strength and subordination of women are omnipresent among 'angry white men' everywhere, Poland included. However, these general characteristics have always its local variants, trajectories, and particularities. This article is an attempt to explain the phenomenon of Polish radical right movements in its local context: cultural, social, economic. The article focuses on 'The March of Independence' - a cyclical celebration for radical groups, which proliferates the discourses of far-right radical masculinity. In the first part, the author focuses on the social and economic background, worldview and 'masculinist' ideology of Polish' angry white men' (Kimmel 2013). The second part focuses on the historical and cultural coding of their 'aggrieved entitlement' (Kimmel 2013). The third part of the essay draws on Steve's Garlick (Garlick 2016: 163-193) concept of 'spectacular masculinity'. It analyzes how modern technology contributes to the construction of 'spectacular' masculinity among the participants of the march/members of radical groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Prime Minister's program speech, called the exposé, attracts particular attention. Its essence comes down to presenting the government's program. In a few key words, the Prime Minister often summarizes the framework proposals of his government in terms of economic policy, social policy, education, health care, the army as well as individual social and professional groups. The words spoken by the Prime Minister, asking for confidence in the government that has just been formed set the direction for the entire Council of Ministers for subsequent years. In this regard, there is a need to examine the economic policy of every Prime Minister in office since 1989 considering entrepreneurs. What offer did the heads of government make to entrepreneurs, what kind of support could this group count on, how were the institutions supporting the economy and political institutions evaluated? The aim of this article is to find answers to the presented problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the role of scholars when discussing activities of politicians during an election campaign? The article offers a study of articles and interviews conducted with academics in major opinion dailies Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna in the final weeks of the 2015 presidential campaign in Poland. Pielke's categories of scientists – Honest Brokers of Policy Alternatives, Pure Scientists, Science Arbiters and Stealth Issue Advocates – are used as a point of departure to ask about the part played by scholars in media, to 'enlighten' and admonish readers they deem uninformed about what is good for them, or to serve a role closer to Burawoy's Public Sociologist, who engages in dialogue with others. I conclude that given the election results, which surprised and disappointed most of these scholars, adopting the latter stance may prove a better strategy in convincing voters about the usefulness of scholarly expertise in their political choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses political developments in Poland as of October 2020, particularly the moral pseudo-revolution of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Also cited are a brief history of the deep political division between the right-wing parties PiS and Civic Platform (PO) party particularly the effects of the collapse of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) party, as well as the issues during the presidential race between PiS' Andrzej Duda and PO's Rafal Trzaskowski like culture, gay rights, and social welfare.

Copyright of Political Science Review / Przegląd Politologiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Political Science Review / Przegląd Politologiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Political Science Review / Przegląd Politologiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the context of interwar Poland, we find that Jews tended to be more literate than non-Jews, but show that this finding is driven by a composition effect. In particular, most Jews lived in cities and most non-Jews lived in rural areas, and people in cities were more educated than people in villages regardless of their religion. The case of interwar Poland illustrates that the Jewish relative education advantage depends on the historical and institutional contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Internacional y Comparada de Relaciones Laborales y Derecho del Empleo is the property of ADAPT University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article highlights the Polish Government's actions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Topics include the mandatory use of a mobile application, called "Home Quarantine", which requires all smartphone users, who were ordered into quarantine due to Covid-19, to share their location data and send pictures of themselves to prove obeying the rules of the quarantine.

Copyright of Economic & Regional Studies/Studia Ekonomiczne i Regionalne is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Carl Tighe has written a great deal about the interface between politics and literature in Poland, much of it published in the Journal of European Studies. Here he outlines some of the personal experience behind his articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Public Law is the property of European Public Law Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The text is devoted to women's presence in the Polish higher education in 1918-2018. Its history is presented in chronological-thematic order, including information about the beginnings of women's studies at universities as well as their basic political, economic and cultural conditioning. Although during the discussed period, basis of political system in Poland changed three times, there was a constant development of the size of higher education, as well as an increase of women's participation among students and academic faculty. The beginnings were very modest. However, today women constitute already the majority of students of higher education and almost a half of academic employees. Women, during their fight for equality in access to studies and academic career, had to overcome many legal obstacles, also informal ones, resulting from vitality of the image of traditional social role of women. Even though, the formal equality was gradually earned, it is still more difficult for women than for men to undertake studies at some faculties, and to get higher degrees and academic positions as fast as men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the motifs of death and immortality in Polish film director and author Tadeusz Konwicki's 1971 film Jak daleko stąd, jak blisko [How Far, How Near, 1971], and the 1979 novel Mała apokalipsa [A Minor Apocalypse]. In these works, Konwicki grapples with the idea of mortality--he both fixates on and does away with death. At the same time humorous and eerie visits from the other side undo death's absolute power, even in those cases where it appears to have succeeded. While Konwicki's earlier works had already began his foray into the topic, How Far, How Near marks a special moment in his oeuvre, one in which death becomes an unavoidable matter and yet its own opposite, eternal life. Furthermore, the release of How Far, How Near coincides with a political shift in Poland--Edward Gierek being installed as Party secretary with a consequent change in the metaphorical might of immortality in Polish political rhetoric. Konwicki's "immortality" resides in the aesthetic realm during a period in which political rhetoric ceases to spare political leaders from death, How Far, How Near thus marks a new moment in Konwicki's works, and it occurs during a new moment in Polish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the special cluster titled Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective). March 1968 in Poland witnessed two different revolutions. The first one occurred at the universities. The students—the generation of twenty-year-olds—revolted against an oppressive, authoritarian state and demanded freedom of speech. But there was also a second, parallel revolution. It exploded with the anti-Jewish purge carried out by low- and mid-level party officials in their forties. These apparatchiks, born around 1930, denounced the student revolt as a "Zionist plot" and pushed for a nationalist version of the communist system. This article explores why those two generations clashed in 1968 and what was the outcome of that struggle, both in political and social terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the special cluster titled Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective). 1968 is universally considered as the year that Marxism and socialism achieved significant political legitimacy amongst the younger generation. This is only partly true for Czechoslovakia, where the younger generations—students in their early twenties, but also young intellectuals, artists, and political activists entering their professional careers—brought about the emancipation of non-Marxist political thinking in public discourse. In this article, I demonstrate the intellectual clash of the generations of 1968: the older generation that represented Dubček's famous "socialism with a human face" and that made the Prague Spring liberalization possible by introducing a set of reforms, and new political generations—of students and young intellectuals who rejected the idea of Reform Communism as insufficient for real democratic order. Examining each generation's understanding of key political concepts such as "opposition" or "political pluralism" reveals that the younger generations had vastly different expectations of "socialism with a human face." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an edited version of an interview conducted in 1991 and first published in New Politics 4, no. 2 (1993): 155–72. The editors of EEPS publish this version after the recent death of Karol Modzelewski, 1937–2019. In the 1991 interview, Modzelewski reflected on the difference between Solidarność 1980–1981 as a mass social movement and the very much changed Solidarność that in 1989 formed the first non-Communist government in the Soviet bloc. His comments have a premonitory relevance for Polish politics today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the special cluster titled Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective). Whereas much of the European right greeted the fiftieth anniversary of 1968 with a critique of its legacy, Poland's ruling Law and Justice party was largely silent, both because 1968 did not usher in a counterculture and because the protests were directed against the communist party. And yet the Law and Justice party detests the legacy of 1968, for three reasons: 1968 was shaped by the left, '68 activists and their values played a key role in the ensuing opposition, and because the right actually sympathizes with the communists of 1968, then dominated by nationalists. The right thus traditionally attacks the legacy of 1968 by attacking 1989 instead, when '68' ers played a central role and new left progressivism could finally emerge. That began changing early in 2018 when Poland's parliament passed its Holocaust-speech law banning calumny against the "Polish Nation." The resulting criticism brought 1968 back with a vengeance, with the right openly inhabiting the role of the national-communists, and beginning to attack Poland's 1968 directly. Shedding new light on the diverse meanings of 1968 and the relationship of the right to national communism, the piece ends by looking at developments through Bernhard and Kubik's theory of the politics of memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the special cluster titled Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective). This is the introduction to a special section "Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective)." The author analyzes the concept of "generation" and introduces the articles that compose this collection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the special cluster titled Generation '68 in Poland (with a Czechoslovak Comparative Perspective). The article presents the chronology of the events of 1968 in Poland and reviews their past and present interpretations. The perspective is that of a participant in the events and an engaged scholar. Eight versions of what happened are discussed, including those of conspiracy and provocation. The change in focus of the 1968 anniversary celebrations from exclusively Polish to predominantly Jewish is also analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poland and Hungary are two European countries where populist parties govern without coalition partners. Such undiluted power has meant they could target the formal institutions of accountability—courts, news media, and oversight agencies—and the informal norms of democracy, including tolerance and forbearance, by attacking the opposition, dividing societies, and reconfiguring national memories to justify their policies. The result is the authoritarian backsliding of these post-communist democratic pioneers. Yet the populist parties remain relatively popular, largely thanks to generous, if selective, social policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Przegląd Europejski is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this article is to analyze Polish migration policy after 2015. The author would like to show discrepancies between the political declarations and reality. Its purpose is also to show the position of the Law and Justice government regarding the EU's policy on solving the migration crisis and Poland's openness to admitting refugees/immigrants. The article proposes the thesis that the Polish government's migration policy from 2015--2019 was inconsistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]