Search

In recent years, states have had to make drastic cuts to their budgets even as the economy flourished in the wake of the Great Recession. The task of balancing state budgets has always been a formidable one, but recent shifts in revenue sources and their ability to generate reliable funding have made this challenge increasingly common and difficult. Historically, states have viewed budget balancing as a fundamentally legislative obligation and prerogative, which is often delegated to the executive branch in the form of impoundment statutes because of the executive's superior budgeting capabilities. In several states, however, the legislature has either kept the power to balance the budget for itself or has delegated insufficient discretion to the executive, hampering the state's ability to meet its constitutional obligation to balance the budget. Consequently, this Note presents an alternative interpretation of the power to impound. It conceives of impoundment as a shared constitutional power exercisable by either the executive or legislature that can be constrained by statute. This interpretation permits the executive to better leverage its strengths in fiscal matters to resolve budget deficits quickly and efficiently, ensuring that the state meets its constitutional obligation to balance the budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various aspects of capital punishment (CP) and executive clemency procedures in America as of 2016, and it mentions criticism directed at American governors and decisions to grant or deny clemency requests from prisoners, as well as U.S. federal and state government constitutional CP sentencing requirements. Several American CP cases are examined, including Gregg v. Georgia, Woodson v. North Carolina, and McGautha v. California. Protections for innocent people are assessed.

Plea bargaining accounts for over ninety percent of criminal convictions and it dominates the American criminal justice system. Yet, once a defendant is convicted, bargaining almost completely disappears from the system. Even though years of litigation are on the horizon, there is nearly no bargaining in the appellate and habeas corpus process. There are two reasons for this. First, prosecutors and courts typically lack the power to alter a sentence that has already been imposed. Second, even if prosecutors had the authority to negotiate following a conviction, they would have little incentive to do so. Affirmance rates in ordinary criminal cases approach ninety-five percent in many jurisdictions. Because the government has little incentive to bargain, defendants slowly churn their way through the formal appellate and habeas process. The lack of post-trial bargaining makes perfect sense in ordinary criminal cases. It does not make as much sense in death-penalty cases, however. Death sentences are followed by decades of litigation. And, more importantly, challenges to death sentences are often successful. Capital cases are reversed at alarming rates, and re-trials typically follow the reversals. Faced with years of appellate litigation that it might not win, and the prospect of a re-trial and another slew of appeals, the State should have an incentive to bargain in its weakest cases. And the convicted individual-faced with a death sentence-likely has an even stronger incentive to bargain. This Article argues that governors should not simply think about clemency as a tool to prevent morally questionable executions. Rather, governors should regularly exercise their commutation power as a form of plea bargaining to clear weak cases out of the system. In exchange for inmates foregoing further appeals, governors could commute death sentences to terms of imprisonment. Clemency bargaining fits squarely within governors’ unreviewable commutation power and would save tens of millions of dollars by ending decades of unruly litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although executive authority is a critical element in separation of powers systems, an excessive amount is not conducive for responsible policymaking behavior. Unilateral executive powers allow elected executives to pursue policies consistent with their short-term electoral incentives. This proposition is tested by analyzing the relationship between the exercise of unilateral executive control over fiscal policymaking and fiscal-spending growth in the American states. The empirical evidence reveals that exercising some amount of unconstrained policymaking authority with a unitary elected executive promotes higher fiscal-spending growth. These effects systematically vary between Democratic and Republican governors. Specifically, fiscal-spending growth under Democratic governors reaches its apex when they possess either unilateral control over revenue forecasts or budget formulation, whereas, unilateral control over both policymaking tools yields the greatest fiscal-spending growth under Republican governors. This study underscores the benefits associated with constraining executive authority through shared policymaking authority arrangements in separation of powers systems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the necessity and importance of special sessions of the legislature. All state constitutions provide for special sessions of the legislature. Approximately 70 percent of the governors have exclusive control over special sessions. In the remaining states the governor shares this authority with the legislature itself. In either case the governor of most states may specify the items for legislative consideration. The ability to call special sessions is a significant legislative tool in the hands of the governor. Following are some of the arguments in support of this contention: one, in a special session the governor determines the scope of legislative activity; two, through controlling the subject matter the governor can give maximum focus of public attention to the areas of his choice; three, under the circumstances of a special session, the governor has control over the lives of the legislators; four, the governor has unlimited use of the special session. Thus the device becomes a useful threat. If the governor is not satisfied, he can inform the legislators that he will call them back again and again until his demands have been met. However, there are limitations to this special gubernatorial power. Thus, it can be concluded that the special session sword has two finely honed edges. It may be dramatically and successfully used to strengthen the governor's position, but it must be employed with prudence and intelligence. It can be a boomerang and is always a worthy test of the governor's political acumen.

The article reflects on federalism in the U.S. and the authority granted to state and federal government in the U.S., in light of the 1982 view of the National Governors Association (NGA) expressed by chairman Richard Snelling of Vermont. The author looks at Mississippi in particular in light of many fiscal policies, including taxation and income, and discusses how federal and state cooperation can insure economic growth and the realization of human capital in the state. Additional topics include the economic conditions of Mississippi in light of the 1982 recession, as well as the responsibilities of local and state authorities.