All judges attempt to decide cases for reasons other than politics or their own personal opinions. But finding a consistent judicial methodology is fraught with peril. Against what it sees as the hyper-textualism of strict constructionism and the unfettered discretion of living constitutionalism, originalism posits itself as the only viable way to achieve an objectively neutral interpretation of the law. This is certainly the stance taken by the majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which claims that the Constitution is silent on abortion and that therefore no corresponding right to abortion exists. But there can be different forms of originalism. This article introduces principle originalism as an equally objective and superior theory of judicial interpretation to the meaning of originalism advanced by the Dobbs majority. Drawing from the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, principle originalism remains grounded in the Constitution as construed at the time of the Founding, but it interprets that semantic context at a higher level than meaning originalism and then uses legal precedent as a way to explain and justify the gradual evolution of the law. After exploring alternatives to meaning originalism advanced in two prominent cases interpreting Title VII, this article will delineate how principle originalism functions as a theory of jurisprudence. Applying this methodology to Obergefell v. Hodges and the dissent in Dobbs demonstrates principle originalism to be a better alternative to meaning originalism than strict constructionism or living constitutionalism. The public reaction to Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization1 overturning the constitutionally protected right to abortion in Roe v. Wade2 and upheld in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey3 was, understandably and unsurprisingly, swift and substantial, 4 with several major newspaper editorial boards condemning the decision and its impact on women. 5 Scholars and legal experts wrote numerous opinion articles noting the stripping away of a long-held right of significant importance to many women in the United States. 6 Some commentators decried the decision as "unvarnished radicalism" and an assault on the principles of stare decisis. 7 Others saw in the Dobbs decision a co-opting of the Supreme Court by the Christian right 8 or fear for what the decision portends for American democracy. 9 Still other commentators expressed concern for what rights an increasingly political Supreme Court might erode next. 10 While the Dobbs decision did not prohibit abortion, rather returned abortion law to the provenance of the states, for those in support of maintaining abortion rights, fears about the future are well-founded. 11 About half the states have banned abortion in anticipation of the Dobbs decision, either through existing laws or through implementing trigger laws, 12 and there remains significant legal and political debate over the future of abortion law in the United States. 13 It is undeniable that this decision will have a major impact on the lives of those capable of becoming pregnant. 14 Amid this turmoil, polls show widespread disagreement with the decision in Dobbs and public preference for maintaining the right to abortion. 15 Approval of the Supreme Court has correspondingly declined. 16 However justified these reactions may be, they fall into the trap set by the majority in Dobbs. At their essence, the majority opinion and concurrences (with the arguable exception of Roberts' concurrence) all assert that the legality of abortion cannot be derived from the Constitution but rather must be secured through the political process. 17 The majority and concurring opinions claim their decisions remove politics from the judicial decision- making process by removing the courts from the resolution of a highly contested political issue. 18 This creates a problem for those that would oppose Dobbs. To argue that Dobbs was incorrectly decided by the Court because it stripped women of a fundamental right, or to argue that the majority acted politically, is itself a political argument that fails to rebut the majority opinion for several reasons. For one, if the Supreme Court has become a realm of political decisions, the unavoidable conclusion is that one side -- namely conservative anti- abortion politicians and/or justices--has prevailed politically. 19 One could argue about unfair Supreme Court appointments, but short of arguing that the decisions of the Court therefore have no legal weight, the decisions of the Supreme Court are the legally binding law of the land. And, if politicized judicial opinions are the outcome of an appointment process for justices that has become overly political, 20 that politicization is an unfortunate result of the current era in which we find ourselves. 21 The remedy would be to appoint different justices through the political process, a prospect that likely would take many years to accomplish. Even then, one could not escape the rabbit hole of judicial decisions being a battle of political wills. 22 This issue points to a more fundamental concern over the line of critique outlined above: the Justices in Dobbs, and indeed in every other decision, are not overtly deciding cases on the basis of policy23 or politics. 24 Rather, the justices are trying -- at least with respect to how their opinions are framed and argued--to decide cases like Dobbs purely on the law itself. 25 In other words, consistent with originalist principles, 26 the Dobbs majority and concurrences seek to determine the outcome of the case within the legal framework and history of abortion, i.e., solely on criteria internal to the law. 27 The problem posed for critics of Dobbs is that they cannot assert a critique of the decision on the basis of criteria external to the law -- policy implications, moral objections, public sentiment, etc. -- and expect to engage with the "internal" reasoning of the justices in the majority. Using criteria to assess the Dobbs decision that draws on outcomes or moral considerations external to internal judicial reasoning of the opinions creates legally unrebuttable positions that only reinforce the majority's position that abortion and similar issues can only be resolved politically. What is needed, then, is a jurisprudential response to the majority in Dobbs. Namely, a response that relies upon a coherent form of judicial reasoning, one internal to the law. While it may be unrealistic to anticipate swaying the opinions of the majority in Dobbs, engaging in a meaningful debate with them on their terms remains crucial because a jurisprudential response prevents being summarily disregarded as an advocate with purely external or political motives. To borrow Justice Roberts's famous phrase, if the job of a justice is "to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat,"28 then a legal theorist must aspire to be a better umpire and not a home run hitter. Only by providing a more coherent and convincing theory of judicial interpretation can one assert a meaningful response to the majority in Dobbs. This article attempts to craft such a response by advancing the concept of "principle originalism."29 This article will start with competing claims of fidelity to originalism and to Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudential legacy in the majority and dissenting opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County. 30 An examination of the history and tenets of originalism will be presented next, not just as a way of resolving this dispute but also by way of introducing principle originalism as an alternative -- a third way -- of approaching an internal perspective on law. Principle originalism, which is primarily drawn from the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, relies upon deriving underlying legal principles from the evolution of legal doctrines through application in the common law. After articulating principle originalism as a theory of judicial interpretation, this Article will show it to have stronger jurisprudential foundations than more common conceptions of originalism by comparing the majority and concurring opinions in Dobbs to Justice Breyer's dissent along three dimensions: (1) allowing the law to evolve in a rational but constrained manner over time; 31 (2) respecting precedent and stare decisis for reasons beyond just stability of the law; 32 and (3) avoiding the fallacy that past legal understanding is more easily determined than the present. 33 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]