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The paper analyses to what extent ownership structure, capital structure, and dividend policy as corporate governance mechanisms drive the firm value. From a data panel of publicly quoted Chilean firms for the years 2002–2010, we find that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. The positive slope is supported by the supervision hypothesis; whilst the negative relation between ownership concentration and firm value is supported by the expropriation hypothesis. We also find that there is a positive impact of both leverage and the dividend pay-out on the firm value. In this case, these two mechanisms reduce the free cash flows which otherwise might be used opportunistically by managers in their own interests (free rider problem). Contrary to the previous empirical literature in Chile, it is found that the mere fact that a firm is affiliated to a business group/conglomerate impacts positively its value. This positive effect is basically driven by the development of intragroup capital markets, and the governance imposed by the rules of the conglomerate.

RESUMENNuestro objetivo es analizar la decision de endeudamiento de las empresas espanolas, considerando los problemas de informacion asimetrica, los costes de agencia y la estructura de propiedad. Las hipotesis se establecen teniendo en cuenta el entorno institucional al que pertenecen las empresas. Para el analisis se utiliza un panel de datos incompleto de 111 empresas adquiridas durante los anos 1991–2001. Los resultados obtenidos indican que: i) La elevada concentracion accionarial de las empresas espanolas favorece el uso de la deuda para financiar sus oportunidades de crecimiento; ii) Las empresas con deficit de fondos recurren preferentemente, a los recursos externos mientras cuenten con una estructura de propiedad mayoritaria; iii) Las empresas cotizadas mantienen una velocidad de ajuste a su ratio de endeudamiento optima distinta a la de las empresas no cotizadas y a la de las empresas de otros paises.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of debt ownership as a mechanism of corporate governance in reducing the discretionary behavior of managers. We use earnings management and discretionary accruals as indicators of managerial accounting discretion. Our results show that corporate debt has a prominent impact on reducing earnings management. Banking debt can foster the discretionary behavior of managers whereas public debt plays no relevant role. At the same time we test the complementary effect of some other mechanisms of corporate governance such as capital structure and ownership concentration

Los clásicos problemas de separación de la propiedad y el control de las empresas, básicamente plasmados en las conductas oportunistas de quienes gestionan los recursos de los propietarios, han dado lugar al desarrollo de una serie de mecanismos de control de tales conductas oportunistas. Estos mecanismos se encuentran básicamente canalizados a través de la política de endeudamiento, la política de dividendo y a través del desarrollo de mecanismos internos de gobierno como la concentración de la propiedad de las empresas. La conducta oportunista de quienes gestionan los recursos empresariales puede llegar a concretarse en problemas de sobreinversión, la asunción de riesgos por debajo del punto óptimo de la empresa o el consumo de perquisites. En este sentido, el trabajo intenta ahondar en la utilización de los mecanismos internos de control como forma de limar las distintas manifestaciones de la discrecionalidad directiva. En términos específicos, tratamos de analizar cómo la estructura de propiedad, la estructura de capital y la política de dividendos inciden sobre los costes de agencia derivados de la separación entre la propiedad y el control, y de la discrecionalidad directiva en materia contable. Los resultados del análisis señalan que mientras la estructura de propiedad de las empresas permite converger los intereses de directivos y propietarios, la estructura de capital no necesariamente es un eficiente mecanismo de control de la conducta directiva. Con relación a la política de dividendos, se presenta como un mecanismo particularmente apto para el control del comportamiento discrecional directivo.

Our aim is to analyze the type of lender and the debt maturity of Chilean firms as a function of their ownership structure and their growth opportunities. We perform the empirical analysis using an unbalanced panel data of 169 firms from 1990 to 2001. Our results show that Chilean firms with growth opportunities, ownership concentration, and a need for external funds issue short‐term bank debt to finance their new investments. This financing source is an efficient mechanism in Chile to alleviate agency and asymmetric information problems. The Chilean institutional environment influences firms’ decisions on banking debt.

We analyze the ability of the capital structure and the ownership structure as mechanisms of control of the managers of the firms and to reduce their accounting discretionary power for a sample of Chilean firms. Using earnings management and abnormal accruals as indicators of discretionary behavior, our results show that both debt and ownership concentration reduce the managers’ discretionary behavior, so we corroborate the outstanding role both mechanisms play in a country with low protection of investors’ rights. At the same time, we find that earnings management is fostered by institutional investor ownership

The aim of the paper is to analyze the Chilean firms’ financial decisions on market value. The economic environment considers both the absence and existence of growth opportunities for a panel of 180 quoted Chilean companies during the period 1990 - 2001. Our results support the disciplinary view of debt in absence of profitable growth opportunities (overinvestment problem) and their investment inhibit effect in the contrary case (underinvestment and asset substitution problems). Furthermore, we find a positive and non-lineal relationship between ownership structure and the firm value for the case of low growth opportunities firms.

Our aim is to test if the leverage and the debt maturity of Chilean firms quoted in the stock market are related with their growth opportunities, their ownership structure and the environment in which they operate. We perform an empirical analysis over an unbalanced panel of 169 Chilean firms for the period 1990-2001. Chilean firms growth opportunities are financed with long term debt. However, when firms need external funds they finance their growth opportunities with short term debt. The high ownership concentration, characteristic of Chilean firms, along with the presence of growth opportunities favours debt financing. The largest firms and the more needed of external financing prefer longer maturities for their debt. Finally, our results indicate that the presence of internal capital markets within a group influences firms financing decisions, particularly in those firms within the group with financing deficit. Pecking order theory offers partial explanations of Chilean firms financing decisions.

We analyze the extent to which firm size determines the relationship between growth opportunities and bank debt in the Chilean corporate sector. Using generalized method of moments (GMM) system estimator techniques in an unbalanced panel data of quoted firms, we provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between growth opportunities and bank debt, which has a different behavior depending on the firm's size. Smaller firms seek private debt sooner than larger firms do when growth opportunities increase. This finding is supported by the institutional characteristics of the Chilean financial system, the higher confidence of small firms in bank debt, and the bank-based orientation of the Chilean financial markets.

En este trabajo se analizan algunas razones que pueden explicar el insuficiente nivel académico que se percibe en universidades de países en vías de desarrollo. El elemento de discusión es la relación profesor-alumno que es estudiada bajo el prisma de la teoría de agencia. Se concluye que en ausencia de eficientes mecanismos de control de la conducta tanto del profesor como del estudiante pueden proliferar vicios de responsabilidad que atentan contra la calidad del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje., This work analyses some reasons that might explain the insufficient academic level which is perceived in universities of developing countries. The discussion element is the teacher-student relationship which is studied under the perspective of the agency theory. It is concluded that in absence of efficient monitoring mechanisms of the teacher and student’s behavior might proliferate gaps of due diligence which attempts against the quality of the teaching-learning process.

EN ESTE TRABAJO SE ESTUDIA LA ESTRUCTURA DE CAPITAL DE LAS EMPRESAS QUE COTIZAN EN LA BOLSA DE VALORES DE CHILE, PARA LO CUAL SE EFECTÚA UN ANÁLISIS COMPARATIVO BASADO EN LA TEORÍA DE ASIMETRÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN. DE ACUERDO CON ESTA TEORÍA, LAS EMPRESAS DE MEJOR CALIDAD ENVÍAN SEÑALES AL MERCADO SOBRE SU CONDICIÓN CON EL PROPÓSITO DE ESTABLECER UN CRITERIO DE SEPARACIÓN Y DIFERENCIARSE DE LAS QUE TIENEN UNA CALIDAD INFERIOR (AKERLOF, 1970). SE HA CONSIDERADO A LAS EMPRESAS PERTENECIENTES AL ÍNDICE DE PRECIOS SELECTIVO DE ACCIONES (IPSA) EN EL MERCADO DE VALORES CHILENO COMO LAS QUE CUENTAN CON MENORES ASIMETRÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN Y SE HAN COMPARADO CON EL RESTO DE LAS EMPRESAS QUE COTIZAN EN LA BOLSA, PERO QUE NO PERTENECEN AL ÍNDICE, SUPONIENDO QUE SON LAS QUE POSEEN MAYORES ASIMETRÍAS DE INFORMACIÓN. ENTRE LOS PRINCIPALES HALLAZGOS SE ENCONTRÓ QUE PERTENECER AL ÍNDICE IMPLICA UNA REDUCCIÓN EN LA BRECHA INFORMATIVA CON EL MERCADO Y QUE LA MAYOR VISIBILIDAD DE LAS EMPRESAS INDEXADAS LES PERMITE ACCEDER MÁS FÁCILMENTE A LOS MERCADOS DE DEUDA.